DEVA

DOE/RW-0199

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Sections 8.3.5 through 8.3.5.20

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

DISCLAIMER

This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by the United States Government. Neither the United States nor the United States Department of Energy, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, mark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necssarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The view and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.

Printed in the United States of America

Available from:

U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information
Post Office Box 62
Oak Ridge, TN 37831

DOE/RW-0199

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Sections 8.3.5 through 8.3.5.20

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management


Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2012 with funding from
LYRASIS Members and Sloan Foundation

http://archive.org/details/sitecharacteriza00viipb

DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION

VOLUME I

Introduction

Part A: Description of the mined geologic disposal system introduction
- Chapter 1--Geology
- Chapter 2--Geoengineering

VOLUME II

- Chapter 3--Hydrology
- Chapter 4--Geochemistry
- Chapter 5--Climatology and meteorology

VOLUME III

- Chapter 6--Conceptual design of a repository
- Chapter 7--Waste package

VOLUME IV

Part B: Site characterization program (Chapter 8)
- 8.0 Introduction
- 8.1 Rationale
- 8.2 Issues
- 8.3 Planned tests, analyses, and studies
  - 8.3.1 Site program
  - 8.3.1.1 Site overview
  - 8.3.1.2 Geohydrology
  - 8.3.1.3 Geochemistry
  - 8.3.1.4 Rock characteristics

VOLUME V

  - 8.3.1.5 Climate
  - 8.3.1.6 Erosion
  - 8.3.1.7 Rock dissolution
  - 8.3.1.8 Postclosure tectonics
  - 8.3.1.9 Human interference
  - 8.3.1.10 Population density and distribution
  - 8.3.1.11 Land ownership and mineral rights
  - 8.3.1.12 Meteorology
  - 8.3.1.13 Offsite installations
  - 8.3.1.14 Surface characteristics
  - 8.3.1.15 Thermal and mechanical properties
  - 8.3.1.16 Preclosure hydrology
  - 8.3.1.17 Preclosure tectonics

VOLUME VI

  - 8.3.2 Repository program
  - 8.3.2.1 Repository overview

DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION (continued)

8.3.2.2 Configuration of underground facilities (postclosure)
8.3.2.3 Repository design criteria for radiological safety
8.3.2.4 Nonradiological health and safety
8.3.2.5 Preclosure design and technical feasibility

8.3.3 Seal program
8.3.3.1 Seal overview
8.3.3.2 Seal characteristics

8.3.4 Waste package
8.3.4.1 Waste package overview
8.3.4.2 Waste package characteristics (postclosure)
8.3.4.3 Waste package characteristics (preclosure)
8.3.4.4 Waste package production technologies

VOLUME VII

8.3.5 Performance assessment program
8.3.5.1 Strategy for preclosure performance assessment
8.3.5.2 Waste retrievability
8.3.5.3 Public radiological exposures--normal conditions
8.3.5.4 Worker radiological safety--normal conditions
8.3.5.5 Accidental radiological releases
8.3.5.6 Higher-level findings--preclosure radiological safety
8.3.5.7 Higher-level findings--ease and cost of construction
8.3.5.8 Strategy for postclosure performance assessment
8.3.5.9 Containment by waste package
8.3.5.10 Engineered barrier system release rates
8.3.5.11 Seal performance
8.3.5.12 Ground-water travel time
8.3.5.13 Total system performance
8.3.5.14 Individual protection
8.3.5.15 Ground-water protection
8.3.5.16 Performance confirmation
8.3.5.17 NRC siting criteria
8.3.5.18 Higher level findings--postclosure system and technical guidelines
8.3.5.19 Completed analytical techniques
8.3.5.20 Analytical techniques requiring development

VOLUME VIII

8.4 Planned site preparation activities
8.4.1 Introduction
8.4.2 Description and location of characterization operations
8.4.3 Potential impacts of site characterization activities on postclosure performance objectives

DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION (continued)

8.5 Milestones, decision points, and schedule
8.6 Quality assurance program
8.7 Decontamination and decommissioning

Glossary and acronyms

VOLUME IX

Index

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME VII

	Page
8.3.5 Performance assessment program	8.3.5- 1
8.3.5.1 Strategy for preclosure performance assessment	8.3.5.1- 1
8.3.5.1.1 Overview of the PRAM program	8.3.5.1- 2
8.3.5.1.2 Identifying information needs	8.3.5.1- 7
8.3.5.1.3 General analytical approach for assessing radiological risks from accidents	8.3.5.1- 7
8.3.5.1.4 General analytical approach for assessing radiological risks from routine operations	8.3.5.1- 13
8.3.5.2 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 2.4: Can the repository be designed, constructed, operated, closed, and decommissioned so that the option of waste retrieval will be preserved as required by 10 CFR 60.111?	8.3.5.2- 1
8.3.5.2.1 Information Need 2.4.1: Site and design data required to support retrieval	8.3.5.2- 23
8.3.5.2.1.1 Application of results	8.3.5.2- 24
8.3.5.2.2 Information Need 2.4.2: Determination that access to the waste emplacement boreholes can be provided throughout the retrievability period for normal and credible abnormal conditions	8.3.5.2- 30
8.3.5.2.2.1 Application of results	8.3.5.2- 35
8.3.5.2.3 Information Need 2.4.3: Determination that access to the waste packages can be provided throughout the retrievability period for normal and credible abnormal conditions	8.3.5.2- 36
8.3.5.2.3.1 Application of results	8.3.5.2- 39
8.3.5.2.4 Information Need 2.4.4: Determination that the waste can be removed from the emplacement boreholes for normal and credible abnormal conditions	8.3.5.2- 40
8.3.5.2.4.1 Application of results	8.3.5.2- 43
8.3.5.2.5 Information Need 2.4.5: Determination that the waste can be transported to the surface and delivered to the waste-handling surface facilities for normal and abnormal conditions	8.3.5.2- 43
8.3.5.2.5.1 Application of results	8.3.5.2- 46
8.3.5.2.6 Information Need 2.4.6: Determination that the retrieval requirements set forth in 10 CFR 60.111(b) are met using reasonably available technology	8.3.5.2- 46
8.3.5.2.6.1 Application of results	8.3.5.2- 49
8.3.5.2.7 Schedule for waste retrievability (Issue 2.4) (waste retrievability)	8.3.5.2- 50

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

8.3.5.3 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 2.1: During repository operation, closure, and decommissioning (a) will the expected average radiation dose received by members of the public within any highly populated area be less than a small fraction of the allowable limits and (b) will the expected radiation dose received by any member of the public in an unrestricted area be less than the allowable limits as required by 10 CFR 60.111, 40 CFR 191 Subpart A, and 10 CFR Part 20? 8.3.5.3- 1
8.3.5.3.1 Information Need 2.1.1: Site and design information needed to assess preclosure radiological safety 8.3.5.3- 20
8.3.5.3.1.1 Performance Assessment Activity 2.1.1.1: Refinement of site data parameters required for Issue 2.1 . . . . . 8.3.5.3- 23
8.3.5.3.1.2 Performance Assessment Activity 2.1.1.2: Development of performance assessment activities through the preclosure risk assessment methodology program 8.3.5.3- 24
8.3.5.3.1.3 Performance Assessment Activity 2.1.1.3: Advanced conceptual design assessment of the public radiological safety during the normal operations of the Yucca Mountain repository 8.3.5.3- 24
8.3.5.3.1.4 Application of results 8.3.5.3- 25
8.3.5.3.2 Schedule for public radiological exposures--normal conditions (Issue 2.1) 8.3.5.3- 25
8.3.5.4 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 2.2: Can the repository be designed, constructed, operated, closed, and decommissioned in a manner that ensures the radiological safety of workers under normal operations as required by 10 CFR 60.111, and 10 CFR Part 20? 8.3.5.4- 1
8.3.5.4.1 Information Need 2.2.1: Determination of radiation environment in surface and subsurface facilities due to natural and manmade radioactivity 8.3.5.4- 18
8.3.5.4.1.1 Activity 2.2.1.1: Refinement of site data parameters required for Issue 2.2 . . 8.3.5.4- 20
8.3.5.4.1.2 Activity 2.2.1.2: Advanced conceptual design assessment of the worker radiological safety during the normal operations of the Yucca Mountain repository . . 8.3.5.4- 20
8.3.5.4.1.3 Application of results 8.3.5.4- 21
8.3.5.4.2 Information Need 2.2.2: Determination that projected worker exposures and exposure conditions under normal conditions meet applicable requirements 8.3.5.4- 21

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

	Page
8.3.5.4.2.1 Activity 2.2.2.1: Refinement of site data parameters required for Issue 2.2 . .	8.3.5.4- 23
8.3.5.4.2.2 Activity 2.2.2.2: Development of performance assessment activities through the preclosure risk assessment methodology program	8.3.5.4- 24
8.3.5.4.2.3 Activity 2.2.2.3: Advanced conceptual design assessment of the worker radiological safety during the normal operations of the Yucca Mountain repository . .	8.3.5.4- 24
8.3.5.4.2.4 Application of results	8.3.5.4- 25
8.3.5.4.3 Schedule for worker radiological safety--normal conditions	8.3.5.4- 25
8.3.5.5 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 2.3: Can the repository be designed, constructed, operated, closed, and decommissioned in such a way that credible accidents do not result in projected radiological exposures of the general public at the nearest boundary of the unrestricted area, or workers in the restricted area, in excess of applicable limiting values? . .	8.3.5.5- 1
8.3.5.5.1 Information Need 2.3.1: Determination of credible accident sequences and their respective frequencies applicable to the repository	8.3.5.5- 19
8.3.5.5.1.1 Performance Assessment Activity 2.3.1.1: Refinement of site data parameters required for Issue 2.3	8.3.5.5- 22
8.3.5.5.1.2 Performance Assessment Activity 2.3.1.2: Determination of credible accident sequences and their respective frequencies applicable to the Yucca Mountain repository	8.3.5.5- 22
8.3.5.5.1.3 Performance Assessment Activity 2.3.1.3: Development of candidate design-basis accidents for the Yucca Mountain repository	8.3.5.5- 23
8.3.5.5.1.4 Application of results	8.3.5.5- 23
8.3.5.5.2 Information Need 2.3.2: Determination of the predicted releases of radioactive material and projected public and worker exposures under accident conditions and that these exposures meet applicable requirements	8.3.5.5- 24
8.3.5.5.2.1 Performance Assessment Activity 2.3.2.1: Refinement of site data parameters required for Issue 2.3	8.3.5.5- 26

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

8.3.5.5.2.2 Performance Assessment Activity 2.3.2.2: Consequence analyses of credible accidents at the Yucca Mountain repository . . 8.3.5.5- 27
8.3.5.5.2.3 Performance Assessment Activity 2.3.2.3: Sensitivity and importance analyses of credible accidents at the Yucca Mountain repository 8.3.5.5- 28
8.3.5.5.2.4 Performance Assessment Activity 2.3.2.4: Documentation of results of safety analyses and comparison to applicable "limiting" values 8.3.5.5- 28
8.3.5.5.2.5 Application of results. 8.3.5.5- 29
8.3.5.5.3 Schedule for accidental radiological releases (Issue 2.3) 8.3.5.5- 29
8.3.5.6 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 2.5: Can the higher-level findings required by 10 CFR Part 960 be made for the qualifying condition of the preclosure system guideline and the qualifying and disqualifying conditions of the technical guidelines for population density and distribution, site ownership and control, meteorology, and offsite installations and operations? 8.3.5.6- 1
8.3.5.7 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 4.1: Can the higher-level findings required by 10 CFR Part 960 be made for the qualifying condition of the preclosure system guideline and the disqualifying and qualifying conditions of the technical guidelines for surface characteristics, rock characteristics, hydrology, and tectonics? 8.3.5.7- 1
8.3.5.8 Strategy for postclosure performance assessment 8.3.5.8- 1
8.3.5.9 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.4: Will the waste package meet the performance objective for containment as required by 10 CFR 60.113? 8.3.5.9- 1
8.3.5.9.1 Information Need 1.4.1: Waste package design features that affect the performance of the container 8.3.5.9- 47
8.3.5.9.1.1 Activity 1.4.1.1: Integrate design and materials information (metal container) 8.3.5.9- 51
8.3.5.9.1.1.1 Subactivity 1.4.1.1.1: Mechanical properties 8.3.5.9- 51
8.3.5.9.1.1.2 Subactivity 1.4.1.1.2: Microstructural properties 8.3.5.9- 52
8.3.5.9.1.1.3 Subactivity 1.4.1.1.3: Physical properties 8.3.5.9- 54

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

	Page
8.3.5.9.1.1.4 Subactivity 1.4.1.1.4: State of stress in the container	8.3.5.9- 55
8.3.5.9.1.1.5 Subactivity 1.4.1.1.5: Characterization and inspection of weld integrity	8.3.5.9- 56
8.3.5.9.1.1.6 Subactivity 1.4.1.1.6: Characterization of the container surface	8.3.5.9- 58
8.3.5.9.1.2 Activity 1.4.1.2: Integrate design and materials information (alternate barriers investigation)	8.3.5.9- 59
8.3.5.9.1.2.1 Subactivity 1.4.1.2.1: Survey of alternative barrier designs, materials, and processes to determine feasibility of fabricating a satisfactory waste package	8.3.5.9- 60
8.3.5.9.1.2.2 Subactivity 1.4.1.2.2: Mechanical properties	8.3.5.9- 61
8.3.5.9.1.2.3 Subactivity 1.4.1.2.3: Microstructural properties	8.3.5.9- 62
8.3.5.9.1.2.4 Subactivity 1.4.1.2.4: Thermophysical properties	8.3.5.9- 63
8.3.5.9.1.2.5 Subactivity 1.4.1.2.5: Nondestructive characterization of alternate barrier investigations waste package container	8.3.5.9- 63
8.3.5.9.1.3 Application of results.	8.3.5.9- 65
8.3.5.9.2 Information Need 1.4.2: Material properties of the container	8.3.8.9- 66
8.3.5.9.2.1 Activity 1.4.2.1: Selection of the container material for the license application design	8.3.5.9- 68
8.3.5.9.2.1.1 Subactivity 1.4.2.1.1: Establishment of selection criteria and their weighting factors	8.3.5.9- 68
8.3.5.9.2.1.2 Subactivity 1.4.2.1.2: Material selection	8.3.5.9- 70
8.3.5.9.2.2 Activity 1.4.2.2: Degradation modes affecting candidate copper-based container materials	8.3.5.9- 70
8.3.5.9.2.2.1 Subactivity 1.4.2.2.1: Assessment of degradation modes in copper-based materials	8.3.5.9- 71
8.3.5.9.2.2.2 Subactivities 1.4.2.2.2 through 1.4.2.2.8: Laboratory test plan for copper-based materials	8.3.5.9- 72
8.3.5.9.2.3 Activity 1.4.2.3: Degradation modes affecting candidate austenitic container materials	8.3.5.9- 74

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

8.3.5.9.2.3.1 Subactivity 1.4.2.3.1: Assessment of degradation modes in austenitic materials 8.3.5.9- 75
8.3.5.9.2.3.2 Subactivities 1.4.2.3.2 through 1.4.2.3.9: Laboratory test plan for austenitic materials 8.3.5.9- 76
8.3.5.9.2.4 Activity 1.4.2.4: Degration modes affecting ceramic-metal, bimetallic/single metal, or coatings and filler systems . . . 8.3.5.9- 78
8.3.5.9.2.4.1 Subactivity 1.4.2.4.1: Assessment of degradation modes affecting ceramic-metal systems 8.3.5.9- 79
8.3.5.9.2.4.2 Subactivity 1.4.2.4.2: Laboratory test plan for ceramic-metal systems of the alternate barriers investigations . . . 8.3.5.9- 80
8.3.5.9.2.4.3 Subactivity 1.4.2.4.3: Assessment of degradation modes affecting bimetallic/single metal systems 8.3.5.9- 81
8.3.5.9.2.4.4 Subactivity 1.4.2.4.4: Laboratory test plan for bimetallic/single metal material system 8.3.5.9- 83
8.3.5.9.2.4.5 Subactivity 1.4.2.4.5: Assessment of degradation modes in coatings and filler systems 8.3.5.9- 84
8.3.5.9.2.4.6 Subactivity 1.4.2.4.6: Laboratory test plan for coatings and filler systems of the alternate barriers investigations 8.3.5.9- 85
8.3.5.9.2.5 Application of results 8.3.5.9- 86
8.3.5.9.3 Information Need 1.4.3: Scenarios and models needed to predict the rate of degradation of the container material 8.3.5.9- 86
8.3.5.9.3.1 Activity 1.4.3.1: Models for copper and copper alloy degradation 8.3.5.9- 88
8.3.5.9.3.1.1 Subactivity 1.4.3.1.1: Metallurgical aging and phase stability 8.3.5.9- 89
8.3.5.9.3.1.2 Subactivity 1.4.3.1.2: Low-temperature oxidation 8.3.5.9- 90
8.3.5.9.3.1.3 Subactivity 1.4.3.1.3: General aqueous corrosion 8.3.5.9- 91
8.3.5.9.3.1.4 Subactivity 1.4.3.1.4: Hydrogen entry and embrittlement 8.3.5.9- 93
8.3.5.9.3.1.5 Subactivity 1.4.3.1.5: Pitting, crevice, and other localized attack 8.3.5.9- 94
8.3.5.9.3.1.6 Subactivity 1.4.3.1.6: Stress corrosion cracking 8.3.5.9- 95

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

	Page
8.3.5.9.3.1.7 Subactivity 1.4.3.1.7: Other potential degradation modes	8.3.5.9- 97
8.3.5.9.3.2 Activity 1.4.3.2: Models for austenitic material degradation	8.3.5.9- 97
8.3.5.9.3.2.1 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.1: Metallurgical aging and phase transformations	8.3.5.9- 98
8.3.5.9.3.2.2 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.2: Low-temperature oxidation	8.3.5.9- 99
8.3.5.9.3.2.3 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.3: General aqueous corrosion	8.3.5.9-100
8.3.5.9.3.2.4 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.4: Intergranular attack and intergranular stress corrosion cracking	8.3.5.9-101
8.3.5.9.3.2.5 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.5: Hydrogen entry and embrittlement	8.3.5.9-103
8.3.5.9.3.2.6 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.6: Pitting, crevice, and other localized attack	8.3.5.9-104
8.3.5.9.3.2.7 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.7: Transgranular stress corrosion cracking	8.3.5.9-105
8.3.5.9.3.2.8 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.8: Other potential degradation modes	8.3.5.9-106
8.3.5.9.3.3 Activity 1.4.3.3: Models for degradation of ceramic-metal, bimetallic/single metal, and coatings and filler alternative systems	8.3.5.9-106
8.3.5.9.3.3.1 Subactivity 1.4.3.3.1: Models for degradation of ceramic-metal systems	8.3.5.9-107
8.3.5.9.3.3.2 Subactivity 1.4.3.3.2: Models for degradation of bimetallic/single metal systems	8.3.5.9-107
8.3.5.9.3.3.3 Subactivity 1.4.3.3.3: Models for degradation of coatings and filler systems	8.3.5.9-108
8.3.5.9.3.4 Application of results	8.3.5.9-108
8.3.5.9.4 Information Need 1.4.4: Estimates of the rates and mechanisms of container degradation in the repository environment for anticipated and unanticipated processes and events, and calculation of the failure rate of the container as a function of time	8.3.5.9-109
8.3.5.9.4.1 Activity 1.4.4.1: Estimate of the rates and mechanisms of container degradation in the repository environment for anticipated and unanticipated processes and events, and calculation of container failure rate as a function of time	8.3.5.9-110

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

8.3.5.9.4.1.1 Subactivity 1.4.4.1.1: Deterministic calculation of rates of container degradation in the repository environment for anticipated and unanticipated processes and events, and calculation of container failure rate as a function of time 8.3.5.9-110
8.3.5.9.4.1.2 Subactivity 1.4.4.1.2: Probabilistic calculation of rates of container degradation and distribution of time to initiation of release of radionuclides from the waste packages 8.3.5.9-111
8.3.5.9.4.2 Application of results 8.3.5.9-112
8.3.5.9.5 Information Need 1.4.5: Determination of whether the set of waste packages meets the requirement for substantially complete containment for anticipated processes and events 8.3.5.9-112
8.3.5.9.5.1 Activity 1.4.5.1: Determination of whether the substantially complete containment requirement is satisfied . . . 8.3.5.9-113
8.3.5.9.5.2 Application of results 8.3.5.9-114
8.3.5.9.6 Schedule for containment by waste package (Issue 1.4) 8.3.5.9-114
8.3.5.10 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.5: Will the waste package and repository engineered barrier systems meet the performance objective for radionuclide release rates as required by 10 CFR 60.113? . . . 8.3.5.10- 1
8.3.5.10.1 Information Need 1.5.1: Waste package design features that affect the rate of radionuclide release 8.3.5.10- 39
8.3.5.10.1.1 Activity 1.5.1.1: Integrate waste form data and waste package design data 8.3.5.10- 41
8.3.5.10.1.1.1 Subactivity 1.5.1.1.1: Integrate spent fuel information 8.3.5.10- 41
8.3.5.10.1.1.2 Subactivity 1.5.1.1.2: Integrate glass waste form information 8.3.5.10- 42
8.3.5.10.1.1.3 Subactivity 1.5.1.1.3: Integrate waste package and repository design information 8.3.5.10- 42
8.3.5.10.1.2 Application of results 8.3.5.10- 42
8.3.5.10.2 Information Need 1.5.2: Material properties of the waste form 8.3.5.10- 42

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

8.3.5.10.2.1 Activity 1.5.2.1: Characterization of the spent fuel waste form 8.3.5.10- 44
8.3.5.10.2.1.1 Subactivity 1.5.2.1.1: Dissolution and leaching of spent fuel 8.3.5.10- 44
8.3.5.10.2.1.2 Subactivity 1.5.2.1.2: Oxidation of spent fuel 8.3.5.10- 46
8.3.5.10.2.1.3 Subactivity 1.5.2.1.3: Corrosion of Zircaloy 8.3.5.10- 46
8.3.5.10.2.1.4 Subactivity 1.5.2.1.4: Corrosion of and radionuclide release from other materials in the spent fuel waste form 8.3.5.10- 49
8.3.5.10.2.1.5 Subactivity 1.5.2.1.5: Evaluation of the inventory and release of carbon-14 from Zircaloy cladding . . . 8.3.5.10- 49
8.3.5.10.2.1.6 Subactivity 1.5.2.1.6: Other experiments on the spent fuel waste form 8.3.5.10- 50
8.3.5.10.2.2 Activity 1.5.2.2: Characterization of the glass waste form 8.3.5.10- 51
8.3.5.10.2.2.1 Subactivity 1.5.2.2.1: Leach testing of glass 8.3.5.10- 51
8.3.5.10.2.2.2 Subactivity 1.5.2.2.2: Materials interactions affecting glass leaching 8.3.5.10- 52
8.3.5.10.2.2.3 Subactivity 1.5.2.2.3: Cooperative testing with waste producers 8.3.5.10- 53
8.3.5.10.2.3 Application of results 8.3.5.10- 54
8.3.5.10.3 Information Need 1.5.3: Scenarios and models needed to predict the rate of radionuclide release from the waste package and engineered barrier system 8.3.5.10- 55
8.3.5.10.3.1 Activity 1.5.3.1: Integrate scenarios for release from waste package 8.3.5.10- 58
8.3.5.10.3.1.1 Subactivity 1.5.3.1.1: Develop scenario identifications 8.3.5.10- 58
8.3.5.10.3.1.2 Subactivity 1.5.3.1.2: Separate scenarios into anticipated and unanticipated categories 8.3.5.10- 59
8.3.5.10.3.1.3 Subactivity 1.5.3.1.3: Development of parameters describing the scenarios 8.3.5.10- 60
8.3.5.10.3.1.4 Subactivity 1.5.3.1.4: Determine adequacy of design envelope of waste package 8.3.5.10- 61
8.3.5.10.3.2 Activity 1.5.3.2: Develop geochemical speciation and reaction model 8.3.5.10- 62

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

8.3.5.10.3.2.1 Subactivity 1.5.3.2.1: Develop data base for geochemical modeling 8.3.5.10- 63
8.3.5.10.3.2.2 Subactivity 1.5.3.2.2: Develop geochemical modeling code 8.3.5.10- 64
8.3.5.10.3.3 Activity 1.5.3.3: Generate models for release from spent fuel 8.3.5.10- 66
8.3.5.10.3.3.1 Subactivity 1.5.3.3.1: Generate release for spent fuel models 8.3.5.10- 66
8.3.5.10.3.4 Activity 1.5.3.4: Generate models for release from glass waste forms 8.3.5.10- 68
8.3.5.10.3.4.1 Subactivity 1.5.3.4.1: Generate release models for glass waste forms 8.3.5.10- 68
8.3.5.10.3.5 Activity 1.5.3.5: Waste package performance assessment model development 8.3.5.10- 70
8.3.5.10.3.5.1 Subactivity 1.5.3.5.1: Development of system model 8.3.5.10- 70
8.3.5.10.3.5.2 Subactivity 1.5.3.5.2: Development of uncertainty methodology 8.3.5.10- 73
8.3.5.10.3.5.3 Subactivity 1.5.3.5.3: Water flow into and out of a breached container 8.3.5.10- 74
8.3.5.10.3.6 Application of results 8.3.5.10- 75
8.3.5.10.4 Information Need 1.5.4: Determination of the release rates of radionuclides from the waste package and engineered barrier system for anticipated and unanticipated events 8.3.5.10- 76
8.3.5.10.4.1 Activity 1.5.4.1: Deterministic calculation of releases from the waste package 8.3.5.10- 77
8.3.5.10.4.2 Activity 1.5.4.2: Probabilistic calculation of releases from the waste package 8.3.5.10- 78
8.3.5.10.4.3 Application of results 8.3.5.10- 79
8.3.5.10.5 Information Need 1.5.5: Determination of the amount of radionuclides leaving the near-field environment of the waste package 8.3.5.10- 79
8.3.5.10.5.1 Activity 1.5.5.1: Determine radionuclide transport parameters 8.3.5.10- 80
8.3.5.10.5.1.1 Subactivity 1.5.5.1.1: Radionuclide distribution in tuff wafers 8.3.5.10- 80
8.3.5.10.5.1.2 Subactivity 1.5.5.1.2: Radionuclide distribution in tuff cores 8.3.5.10- 81

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

8.3.5.10.5.2 Activity 1.5.5.2: Radionuclide transport modeling in the near-field waste package environment 8.3.5.10- 81
8.3.5.10.5.2.1 Subactivity 1.5.5.2.1: Validation of near-field transport model using laboratory and field experimental data 8.3.5.10- 81
8.3.5.10.5.2.2 Subactivity 1.5.5.2.2: Application of near-field transport model to waste package releases 8.3.5.10- 82
8.3.5.10.5.3 Application of results 8.3.5.10- 82
8.3.5.10.6 Schedule for containment by waste package 8.3.5.10- 82
8.3.5.11 Plans for assessing seal system performance . . . 8.3.5.11- 1
8.3.5.12 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.6: Will the site meet the performance objective for pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time as required by 10 CFR 60.113? 8.3.5.12- 1
8.3.5.12.1 Information Need 1.6.1: Site information and design concepts needed to identify the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel and to calculate the ground-water travel time along that path 8.3.5.12- 25
8.3.5.12.1.1 Application of results 8.3.5.12- 40
8.3.5.12.2 Information Need 1.6.2: Calculational models to predict ground-water travel times between the disturbed zone and the accessible environment 8.3.5.12- 40
8.3.5.12.2.1 Activity 1.6.2.1: Model development . . . 8.3.5.12- 44
8.3.5.12.2.1.1 Subactivity 1.6.2.1.1: Development of a theoretical framework for calculational models 8.3.5.12- 45
8.3.5.12.2.1.2 Subactivity 1.6.2.1.2: Development of calculational models 8.3.5.12- 45
8.3.5.12.2.2 Activity 1.6.2.2: Verification and validation 8.3.5.12- 45
8.3.5.12.2.2.1 Subactivity 1.6.2.2.1: Verification of codes 8.3.5.12- 46
8.3.5.12.2.2.2 Subactivity 1.6.2.2.2: Validation of models 8.3.5.12- 46
8.3.5.12.2.3 Application of results 8.3.5.12- 48
8.3.5.12.3 Information Need 1.6.3: Identification of the paths of likely radionuclide travel from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment and identification of the fastest path 8.3.5.12- 49
8.3.5.12.3.1 Activity 1.6.3.1: Analysis of unsaturated flow system 8.3.5.12- 51

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

8.3.5.12.3.1.1 Subactivity 1.6.3.1.1: Unsaturated zone flow analysis 8.3.5.12- 51
8.3.5.12.3.1.2 Subactivity 1.6.3.1.2: Saturated zone flow analysis 8.3.5.12- 51
8.3.5.12.3.2 Application of results 8.3.5.12- 52
8.3.5.12.4 Information Need 1.6.4: Determination of the pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time along the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment 8.3.5.12- 52
8.3.5.12.4.1 Activity 1.6.4.1: Calculation of pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time 8.3.5.12- 53
8.3.5.12.4.1.1 Subactivity 1.6.4.1.1: Performance allocation for Issue 1.6 . . . . . 8.3.5.12- 53
8.3.5.12.4.1.2 Subactivity 1.6.4.1.2: Sensitivity and uncertainty analyses of ground-water travel time 8.3.5.12- 54
8.3.5.12.4.1.3 Subactivity 1.6.4.1.3: Determination of the pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time 8.3.5.12- 54
8.3.5.12.4.2 Application of results 8.3.5.12- 54
8.3.5.12.5 Information Need 1.6.5: Boundary of the disturbed zone 8.3.5.12- 55
8.3.5.12.5.1 Activity 1.6.5.1: Ground-water travel time after repository construction and waste emplacement 8.3.5.12- 62
8.3.5.12.5.2 Activity 1.6.5.2: Definition of the disturbed zone 8.3.5.12- 63
8.3.5.12.5.3 Application of results 8.3.5.12- 63
8.3.5.12.6 Schedule for ground-water travel time 8.3.5.12- 63
8.3.5.13 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.1: Will the mined geologic disposal system meet the system performance objective for limiting radionuclide releases to the accessible environment as required by 10 CFR 60.112 and 40 CFR 191.13? 8.3.5.13- 1
8.3.5.13.1 Information Need 1.1.1: Site information needed to calculate releases to the accessible environment 8.3.5.13-124
8.3.5.13.1.1 Application of results 8.3.5.13-124

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

8.3.5.13.2 Information Need 1.1.2: A set of potentially significant release scenario classes that address all events and processes that may affect the geologic repository 8.3.5.13-124
8.3.5.13.2.1 Performance Assessment Activity 1.1.2.1: Preliminary identification of potentially significant release scenario classes 8.3.5.13-126
8.3.5.13.2.1.1 Subactivity 1.1.2.1.1: Preliminary identification of potentially significant sequences of events and processes at the Yucca Mountain repository site 8.3.5.13-126
8.3.5.13.2.1.2 Subactivity 1.1.2.1.2: Preliminary identification of potentially significant release scenario classes 8.3.5.13-127
8.3.5.13.2.2 Performance Assessment Activity 1.1.2.2: Final selection of significant release scenario classes to be used in licensing assessments 8.3.5.13-127
8.3.5.13.2.3 Application of results 8.3.5.13-128
8.3.5.13.3 Information Need 1.1.3: Calculational models for predicting releases to the accessible environment attending realizations of the potentially significant release-scenario classes 8.3.5.13-129
8.3.5.13.3.1 Performance Assessment Activity 1.1.3.1: Development of mathematical models of the scenario classes 8.3.5.13-133
8.3.5.13.3.1.1 Subactivity 1.1.3.1.1: Development of models for releases along the water pathways 8.3.5.13-133
8.3.5.13.3.1.2 Subactivity 1.1.3.1.2: Development of a model for gas-phase releases . . 8.3.5.13-134
8.3.5.13.3.1.3 Subactivity 1.1.3.1.3: Development of a model of releases through basaltic volcanism 8.3.5.13-134
8.3.5.13.3.1.4 Subactivity 1.1.3.1.4: Development of a model of releases through human intrusion 8.3.5.13-135
8.3.5.13.3.2 Application of results 8.3.5.13-135
8.3.5.13.4 Information Need 1.1.4: Determination of the radionuclide releases to the accessible environment associated with realizations of potentially significant release scenario classes 8.3.5.13-135

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

8.3.5.13.4.1 Performance Assessment Activity 1.1.4.1: The screening of potentially significant scenario classes against the criterion of relative consequences 8.3.5.13-137
8.3.5.13.4.1.1 Subactivity 1.1.4.1.1: The screening of the preliminary scenario classes 8.3.5.13-137
8.3.5.13.4.1.2 Subactivity 1.1.4.1.2: A final screening of scenario classes 8.3.5.13-137
8.3.5.13.4.2 Performance Assessment Activity 1.1.4.2: The provision of simplified, computationally efficient models of the final scenario classes representing the significant processes and events mentioned in proposed 10 CFR 60.112 and 60.115 . . . . . 8.3.5.13-138
8.3.5.13.4.2.1 Subactivity 1.1.4.2.1: Preliminary development of simplified, computationally efficient scenario-class models 8.3.5.13-138
8.3.5.13.4.2.2 Subactivity 1.1.4.2.2: Development of the final, computationally efficient models of the scenario classes that will be used to represent all significant processes and events in the simulation of the total system 8.3.5.13-139
8.3.5.13.4.3 Application of results 8.3.5.13-139
8.3.5.13.5 Information Need 1.1.5: Probabilistic estimates of the radionuclide releases to the accessible environment considering all significant release scenarios 8.3.5.13-139
8.3.5.13.5.1 Performance Assessment Activity 1.1.5.1: Calculation of an empirical complementary cumulative distribution function 8.3.5.13-140
8.3.5.13.5.1.1 Subactivity 1.1.5.1.1: Construction of the total-system simulator 8.3.5.13-140
8.3.5.13.5.1.2 Subactivity 1.1.5.1.2: Construction of the joint probability distribution to be used in the licensing-assessment calculations 8.3.5.13-141
8.3.5.13.5.1.3 Subactivity 1.1.5.1.3: Construction of an empirical complementary cumulative distribution function for the licensing action 8.3.5.13-141
8.3.5.13.5.2 Application of results 8.3.5.13-142
8.3.5.13.6 Schedule for total system performance 8.3.5.13-142

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

Page

8.3.5.14 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.2: Will the mined geologic disposal system meet the requirements for limiting individual doses in the accessible environment as required by 40 CFR 191.15? 8.3.5.14- 1
8.3.5.14.1 Information Need 1.2.1: Determination of doses to the public in the accessible environment through ground-water transport . . 8.3.5.14- 9
8.3.5.14.1.1 Activity 1.2.1.1: Calculation of doses through the ground-water pathway 8.3.5.14- 10
8.3.5.14.1.2 Application of results 8.3.5.14- 10
8.3.5.14.2 Information Need 1.2.2: Determination of doses to the public in the accessible environment through the gaseous pathway . . . 8.3.5.14- 10
8.3.5.14.2.1 Activity 1.2.2.1: Calculation of transport of gaseous carbon-14 dioxide through the overburden 8.3.5.14- 12
8.3.5.14.2.2 Activity 1.2.2.2: Calculation of land-surface dose and dose to the public in the accessible environment through the gaseous pathway of carbon-14 . . . . . 8.3.5.14- 12
8.3.5.14.2.3 Application of results 8.3.5.14- 13
8.3.5.14.3 Schedule for Issue 1.2 (individual protection) 8.3.5.14- 13
8.3.5.15 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.3: Will the mined geologic disposal system meet the requirements for the protection of special sources of ground water as required by 40 CFR 191.16? 8.3.5.15- 1
8.3.5.15.1 Information Need 1.3.1: Determination whether any Class I or special sources of ground water exist at Yucca Mountain, within the controlled area, or within 5 km of the controlled area boundary 8.3.5.15- 4
8.3.5.15.1.1 Analysis 1.3.1.1: Determine whether any aquifers near the site meet the Class I or special source criteria 8.3.5.15- 7
8.3.5.15.1.1.1 Activity 1.3.1.1.1: Synthesis and evaluation of hydrologic and environmental information needed to determine whether aquifers at the site meet the special source criteria 8.3.5.15- 7

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

		Page
8.3.5.15.1.1.2	Activity 1.3.1.1.2: Synthesis and evaluation of demographic and economic data needed to determine whether Class I or special sources of ground water exist	8.3.5.15- 8
8.3.5.15.1.2	Application of results	8.3.5.15- 9
8.3.5.15.2	Information Need 1.3.2: Determine for all special sources whether concentrations of waste products in the ground water during the first 1,000 yr after disposal could exceed the limits established in 40 CFR 191.16	8.3.5.15- 9
8.3.5.15.2.1	Analysis 1.3.2.1: Determine the concentrations of waste products in any special source of ground water during the first 1,000 yr after disposal	8.3.5.15- 9
8.3.5.15.2.2	Activity 1.3.2.1.1: Synthesis and evaluation of releases of waste products to special sources of ground water during the first 1,000 yr after disposal	8.3.5.15- 10
8.3.5.15.2.3	Application of results	8.3.5.15- 10
8.3.5.15.3	Schedule for Issue 1.3 (ground-water protection)	8.3.5.15- 10
8.3.5.16	Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.7: Will the performance-confirmation program meet the requirements of 10 CFR 60.137?	8.3.5.16- 1
8.3.5.17	Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.8: Can the demonstrations for favorable and potentially adverse conditions be made as required by 10 CFR 60.122?	8.3.5.17- 1
8.3.5.18	Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.9: (a) Can the higher-level findings required by 10 CFR Part 960 be made for the qualifying condition of the postclosure system guideline and the disqualifying and qualifying conditions of the technical guidelines for geohydrology, geochemistry, rock characteristics, climatic changes, erosion, dissolution, tectonics and human interference; and (b) can the comparative evaluations required by 10 CFR Part 960.3-1-5 be made?	8.3.5.18- 1
8.3.5.19	Substantially completed analytical techniques	8.3.5.19- 1
8.3.5.19.1	Postclosure performance-assessment analytical techniques	8.3.5.19- 1
8.3.5.19.2	Preclosure performance-assessment analytical techniques	8.3.5.19- 3

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

	Page
8.3.5.20 Analytical techniques requiring significant development	8.3.5.20- 1
8.3.5.20.1 Analytical techniques	8.3.5.20- 1
8.3.5.20.2 Plans for verification and validation	8.3.5.20- 2
8.3.5.20.3 Verification of analytical techniques	8.3.5.20- 3
8.3.5.20.4 Model validation	8.3.5.20- 6
8.3.5.20.5 Validation program	8.3.5.20- 11

LIST OF FIGURES

VOLUME VII

Figure	Title	Page
8.3.5.1-1	Overview of the PRAM program for the high-level waste repository	8.3.5.1- 3
8.3.5.1-2	The applications of risk categories to end uses	8.3.5.1- 5
8.3.5.1-3	Analytical steps for assessing radiological risks from accidents	8.3.5.1- 8
8.3.5.2-1a	Logic diagram for Issue 2.4 (waste retrievability)	8.3.5.2- 4
8.3.5.2-1b	Legend for Figure 8.3.5.2-1a	8.3.5.2- 5
8.3.5.2-2	Information exchanged between waste retrievability issue and preclosure design and technical feasibility issue	8.3.5.2- 6
8.3.5.2-3	Retrieval time frame for design purposes	8.3.5.2- 13
8.3.5.2-4	Schedule information for Issue 2.4 (waste retrievability)	8.3.5.2- 52
8.3.5.3-1	Relationship of Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures-normal conditions) to other issues and the site characterization program	8.3.5.3- 2
8.3.5.3-2a	Logic diagram for Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures-normal conditions)	8.3.5.3- 6
8.3.5.3-2b	Legend for Figure 8.3.5.3-2a	8.3.5.3- 7
8.3.5.3-3	Schedule information for Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures--normal conditions)	8.3.5.3- 26
8.3.5.4-1	Relationship of Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety-normal conditions) and site characterization programs	8.3.5.4- 2
8.3.5.4-2a	Logic diagram for Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety-normal conditions)	8.3.5.4- 6
8.3.5.4-2b	Legend for Figure 8.3.5.4-2a	8.3.5.4- 7

LIST OF FIGURES (continued)

Figure	Title	Page
8.3.5.4-3	Schedule information for activities in Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety--normal conditions	8.3.5.4- 26
8.3.5.5-1	Relationship of Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases) to other issues and the site characterization programs	8.3.5.5- 2
8.3.5.5-2a	Logic diagram for Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases)	8.3.5.5- 5
8.3.5.5-2b	Legend for Figure 8.3.5.5-2a	8.3.5.5- 6
8.3.5.5-3	Analytical steps for assessing radiological risks from accidents	8.3.5.5- 7
8.3.5.5-4	Schedule information for Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases)	8.3.5.5- 30
8.3.5.6-1	Issue resolution strategy for Issue 2.5 (higher level findings-preclosure radiological safety)	8.3.5.6- 5
8.3.5.7-1	Issue resolution strategy for Issue 4.1 (higher level findings--ease and cost of construction)	8.3.5.7- 5
8.3.5.8-1	Simplified information flow among postclosure performance issues and their interaction with design issues	8.3.5.8- 3
8.3.5.8-2	Steps in performance assessment for postclosure performance issues	8.3.5.8- 5
8.3.5.9-1	Spent fuel and high-level waste glass containers	8.3.5.9- 2
8.3.5.9-2	Design configurations for vertical and horizontal emplacement	8.3.5.9- 3
8.3.5.9-3	Model hierarchy for Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package)	8.3.5.9- 7
8.3.5.9-4	Reference approach for Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package)	8.3.5.9- 8
8.3.5.9-5	Schedule and milestones for Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package)	8.3.5.9-115

LIST OF FIGURES (continued)

Figure	Title	Page
8.3.5.10-1	Model hierarchy for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates)	8.3.5.10- 3
8.3.5.10-2	Reference approach to resolving Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system performance)	8.3.5.10- 12
8.3.5.10-3	Alternative approaches to resolving Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system performance), assuming case of maximum water flux per package (20 liters per year)	8.3.5.10- 13
8.3.5.10-4	Schedule information for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates)	8.3.5.10- 83
8.3.5.11-1	Flowchart illustrating the approach for answering the performance-related questions	8.3.5.11- 2
8.3.5.11-2	Logic to select preferred performance goals for seal program	8.3.5.11- 3
8.3.5.12-1	Preliminary definition of the boundary of the accessible environment (Rautman et al., 1987) and the location of section B-B', Figure 8.3.5.12-2	8.3.5.12- 2
8.3.5.12-2	Conceptual hydrogeologic section from Solitario Canyon to well J-13	8.3.5.12- 4
8.3.5.12-3	Schematic logic for resolution of Issue 1.6 (current alternative models of flow system acknowledge matrix and fracture dominated flow in saturated zone, seepage velocity, dispersion and diffusion)	8.3.5.12- 7
8.3.5.12-4	Isopach contour maps of hydrogeologic units used for performance allocation	8.3.5.12- 12
8.3.5.12-5	Travel-time plots	8.3.5.12- 14
8.3.5.12-6	Cross section at Yucca Mountain showing pinchouts of unsaturated hydrogeologic units	8.3.5.12- 15
8.3.5.12-7	Examples of ground-water travel-time distributions	8.3.5.12- 18

LIST OF FIGURES (continued)

Figure	Title	Page
8.3.5.12-8	Schematic flow of site information on system geometry, material properties, initial and boundary conditions, and model validation through data reduction modeling (Programs 8.3.1.2 and 8.3.1.4) to definition of performance assessment parameters (Table 8.3.5.12-2) for use in ground-water travel time calculations and model validation (Information Needs 1.6.2, 1.6.3, and 1.6.4)	8.3.5.12- 26
8.3.5.12-9	Schedule information for Issue 1.12 (ground-water travel time)	8.3.5.12- 64
8.3.5.13-1a	Graphic representation of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) containment requirements	8.3.5.13- 6
8.3.5.13-1b	Example of an empirical complementary cumulative distribution function	8.3.5.13- 6
8.3.5.13-2	An illustration of the expansion of a complementary cumulative distribution function in independent scenario classes. Two types of events are assumed	8.3.5.13- 14
8.3.5.13-3	An illustration of the expansion of a complementary cumulative distribution function in independent scenario classes. Two types of events and one undetected figure are assumed	8.3.5.13- 15
8.3.5.13-4	Representation of a time-dependent state variable	8.3.5.13- 22
8.3.5.13-5	General hydrogeologic cross section at Yucca Mountain	8.3.5.13- 57
8.3.5.13-6A	Idealized scenario classification and screening (logic diagram for Issue 1.1, total system performance)	8.3.5.13-117
8.3.5.13-6B	Subtree 1--Idealized preliminary performance allocation (logic diagram for Issue 1.1, total system performance)	8.3.5.13-118
8.3.5.13-6C	Idealized probabilistic calculations and evaluations (logic diagram for Issue 1.1, total system performance)	8.3.5.13-119

LIST OF FIGURES (continued)

Figure	Title	Page
8.3.5.13-6D	Subtree 2--Idealized scenario classification (logic diagram for Issue 1.1, total system performance)	8.3.5.13-120
8.3.5.13-6E	Subtree 3--Idealized sequence for constructing a mathematical model of a scenario class (logic diagram for Issue 1.1, total system performance)	8.3.5.13-121
8.3.5.13-6F	Subtree 4--Idealized scenario screening (logic diagram for Issue 1.1, total system performance)	8.3.5.13-122
8.3.5.13-6G	Subtree 5--Decision to include scenario in complementary cumulative distribution function calculation (logic diagram for Issue 1.1, total system performance)	8.3.5.13-123
8.3.5.13-7	Schedule information for activities in Issue 1.1 (total system performance)	8.3.5.13-143
8.3.5.14-1	Logic diagram for Issue 1.2 (individual protection)	8.3.5.14- 3
8.3.5.14-2	Schedule information for activities in Issue 1.2 (individual protection)	8.3.5.14- 14
8.3.5.15-1	Logic diagram for Issue 1.3 (ground-water protection)	8.3.5.15- 3
8.3.5.15-2	Schedule information for analyses in Issue 1.3 (ground-water protection)	8.3.5.15- 11
8.3.5.16-1	Correlation between the phases and objectives of the DOE performance confirmation program phases of the repository program, and the regulations driving the objectives	8.3.5.16- 3
8.3.5.17-1	Logic diagram for resolving Issue 1.8 for potentially adverse conditions (PACs)	8.3.5.17- 10
8.3.5.17-2	Logic diagram for resolving Issue 1.8 for favorable conditions (FCs)	8.3.5.17- 16
8.3.5.18-1	Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.9(a) (postclosure higher-level findings)	8.3.5.18- 5
8.3.5.18-2	Resolution strategy for Issue 1.9(b)	8.3.5.18- 23

LIST OF TABLES

VOLUME VII

Table	Title	Page
8.3.5.2-1	Directory of discussions related to retrieval	8.3.5.2- 8
8.3.5.2-2	Performance measures, goals, and needed confidence for processes or activities involved in providing access to the emplacement borehole for retrieval (retrieval function 1)	8.3.5.2- 11
8.3.5.2-3	Performance measures, goals, and needed confidence for processes or activities involved in providing access to the waste packages for retrieval (retrieval function 2)	8.3.5.2- 15
8.3.5.2-4	Performance measures, goals, and needed confidence for processes or activities involved in removing waste packages from emplacement boreholes (retrieval function 3)	8.3.5.2- 17
8.3.5.2-5	Performance measures, goals, and needed confidence for processes or activities involved in transporting and delivering the waste to the surface facilities (retrieval function 4)	8.3.5.2- 20
8.3.5.2-6	Retrieval-related input items (to be provided by Issue 4.4)	8.3.5.2- 25
8.3.5.2-7	Retrieval-related design or performance goals (design criteria)	8.3.5.2- 27
8.3.5.2-8	Potential abnormal conditions for retrieval	8.3.5.2- 29
8.3.5.2-9	Input items to be provided by Issue 4.4 for Information Need 2.4.2 (access to emplacement boreholes)	8.3.5.2- 32
8.3.5.2-10	Input items to be provided by Issue 4.4 for Information Need 2.4.3 (access to waste packages)	8.3.5.2- 37

LIST OF TABLES (continued)

Table	Title	Page
8.3.5.2-11	Input items to be provided by Issue 4.4 for Information Need 2.4.4 (removal of waste from boreholes)	8.3.5.2- 41
8.3.5.2-12	Input items to be provided by Issue 4.4 for Information Need 2.4.5 (delivery of waste to surface facilities)	8.3.5.2- 45
8.3.5.2-13	Input items to be provided by Issue 4.4 for Information Need 2.4.6 (compliance with retrieval requirements)	8.3.5.2- 48
8.3.5.2-14	Major events and planned completion dates for information needs in Issue 2.4 (waste retrievability)	8.3.5.2- 51
8.3.5.3-1	Functions, performance measures, and performance goals for Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures--normal conditions)	8.3.5.3- 10
8.3.5.3-2	Parameters required for Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures--normal conditions)	8.3.5.3- 11
8.3.5.3-3	Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures--normal conditions)	8.3.5.3- 27
8.3.5.4-1	Functions, performance measures, and performance goals for Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety--normal conditions)	8.3.5.4- 10
8.3.5.4-2	Parameters required for Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety--normal conditions)	8.3.5.4- 12
8.3.5.4-3	Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety - normal conditions)	8.3.5.4- 27
8.3.5.5-1	Functions, performance measures, and performance goals for Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases)	8.3.5.5- 9
8.3.5.5-2	Parameters required for Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases)	8.3.5.5- 12
8.3.5.5-3	Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases)	8.3.5.5- 31

LIST OF TABLES (continued)

Table	Title	Page
8.3.5.6-1	Findings for qualifying and disqualifying conditions	8.3.5.6- 2
8.3.5.6-2	Preliminary findings for the qualifying and disqualifying condition concerned with preclosure radiological safety	8.3.5.6- 3
8.3.5.6-3	Preclosure performance issues that address the concerns of the preclosure radiological safety qualifying and disqualifying conditions covered by Issue 2.5	8.3.5.6-
8.3.5.6-4	Information used in the resolution of Issue 2.1 (adapted from Table 8.3.5.3-2)	8.3.5.6- 1
8.3.5.7-1	Findings for qualifying and disqualifying conditions	8.3.5.7- 2
8.3.5.7-2	Preliminary findings for the qualifying and disqualifying conditions concerned with ease and cost of construction	8.3.5.7- 4
8.3.5.7-3	Preclosure design issues that address the concerns of the qualifying and disqualifying conditions of the preclosure guidelines on ease and cost of siting, constructing, operating, and closing the repository	8.3.5.7- 7
8.3.5.7-4	Surface characteristics information considered in making the higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the surface characteristics guideline, and issues for which the information will be obtained	8.3.5.7- 10
8.3.5.7-5	Rock characteristics information considered in making the higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the rock characteristics guideline, and issues for which the information will be obtained	8.3.5.7- 12
8.3.5.7-6	Hydrologic information considered in making the higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the hydrology guideline, and issues for which the information will be obtained	8.3.5.7- 14

LIST OF TABLES (continued)

Table	Title	Page
8.3.5.7-7	Tectonics information considered in making the higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the tectonics guideline, and issues for which the information will be obtained	8.3.5.7- 15
8.3.5.9-1	Performance measures and goals for Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package)	8.3.5.9- 9
8.3.5.9-2	Water quality performance parameters and goals for Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package)	8.3.5.9- 13
8.3.5.9-3	Waste form performance parameters and goals for Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package)	8.3.5.9- 20
8.3.5.9-4	Performance parameters and goals for containers subdivided by alloy family and degradation mode	8.3.5.9- 37
8.3.5.9-5	Container degradation model inputs	8.3.5.9- 41
8.3.5.9-6	Major events and planned completion dates for information needs in Issue 1.4 (waste package performance)	8.3.5.9-116
8.3.5.10-1	Input to predictive models for Issue 1.5, engineered barrier system release rates	8.3.5.10- 4
8.3.5.10-2	Performance measures and goals for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates)	8.3.5.10- 17
8.3.5.10-3a	Performance parameters and goals for water composition for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates)	8.3.5.10- 19
8.3.5.10-3b	Performance parameters and goals for spent fuel and glass waste forms for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates)	8.3.5.10- 20
8.3.5.10-3c	Performance parameters and goals for components of spent fuel waste form for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates)	8.3.5.10- 28
8.3.5.10-4	Performance allocation for radionuclide migration in near-field host rock	8.3.5.10- 31

LIST OF TABLES (continued)

Table	Title	Page
8.3.5.10-5	Performance measures, parameters, and parameter goals for calculating radionuclide source term for near-field host rock	8.3.5.10- 32
8.3.5.10-6	Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates)	8.3.5.10- 86
8.3.5.12-1	Summary of performance allocation for Issue 1.6	8.3.5.12- 9
8.3.5.12-2	Performance parameters needed for resolving Issue 1.6	8.3.5.12- 21
8.3.5.12-3	Supporting performance parameters used by Issue 1.6	8.3.5.12- 28
8.3.5.12-4	Summary of performance allocation for defining the boundary of the disturbed zone	8.3.5.12- 59
8.3.5.12-5	Parameter needs for defining the disturbed zone	8.3.5.12- 61
8.3.5.12-6	Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 1.6 (ground-water travel time)	8.3.5.12- 65
8.3.5.13-1	Potentially significant scenarios	8.3.5.13- 27
8.3.5.13-2	Disruptive scenario classes for the site characterization program	8.3.5.13- 49
8.3.5.13-3	Categories of scenarios delineated according to potential impacts on barriers of the geologic repository (scenario classes)	8.3.5.13- 55
8.3.5.13-4	Typical distribution coefficients and approximate retardation factors for welded and nonwelded Yucca Mountain hydrogeologic units	8.3.5.13- 61
8.3.5.13-5	Estimates of ground-water travel time, predominately matrix flow	8.3.5.13- 63
8.3.5.13-6	Reference inventory used in system-level models	8.3.5.13- 68

LIST OF TABLES (continued)

Table	Title	Page
8.3.5.13-7	Maximum radioactivity (in curies) released in a single exploratory drilling at the Yucca Mountain site	8.3.5.13- 85
8.3.5.13-8	Preliminary performance allocation for Issue 1.1	8.3.5.13- 90
8.3.5.13-9	performance parameters for scenario class E (the nominal case)	8.3.5.13- 93
8.3.5.13-10	Performance parameters for scenario class A-1 (extrusive magmatic events)	8.3.5.13- 96
8.3.5.13-11	Performance parameters for scenario class A-2 (exploratory drilling)	8.3.5.13- 97
8.3.5.13-12	Performance parameters for scenario class C-1 (local or extensive increases in percolation flux through unsaturated zone)	8.3.5.13- 98
8.3.5.13-13	Performance parameters for scenario class C-2 (foreshortening of the unsaturated zone)	8.3.5.13-100
8.3.5.13-14	Performance parameters for scenario class C-3 (changes in rock, hydrologic, and geochemical properties in the unsaturated zone)	8.3.5.13-102
8.3.5.13-15	Performance parameters for scenario class D-1 (appearance of surficial discharge points within the C-area; foreshortening of the unsaturated zone)	8.3.5.13-104
8.3.5.13-16	Performance parameters for scenario class D-2 (increased head gradients or changed rock, hydrologic, or geochemical properties in the saturated zone)	8.3.5.13-106
8.3.5.13-17	Supporting parameters needed to evaluate the nominal case and as baseline data for the disturbed cases	8.3.5.13-108
8.3.5.13-18	Licensing strategy for resolving Issue 1.11 (total system performance)	8.3.5.13-114

LIST OF TABLES (continued)

Table	Title	Page
8.3.5.13-19	Major events and completion dates for activities in Issue 1.1 (total system performance)	8.3.5.13-144
8.3.5.14-1	Performance allocation for Issue 1.2 (individual protection)	8.3.5.14- 7
8.3.5.14-2	Performance parameters for Issue 1.2 (individual protection)	8.3.5.14- 8
8.3.5.14-3	Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 1.2 (individual protection)	8.3.5.14- 15
8.3.5.15-1	Performance allocation for Issue 1.3 (ground-water protection)	8.3.5.15- 5
8.3.5.15-2	Major events and completion dates for analyses in Issue 1.3 (ground-water protection)	8.3.5.15- 12
8.3.5.16-1	Monitoring activities initiated during site characterization and planned to be continued as performance confirmation	8.3.5.16- 7
8.3.5.16-2	Testing activities initiated during site characterization planned to be continued as performance confirmation	8.3.5.16- 8
8.3.5.17-1	Favorable conditions, Performance Issue 1.8 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission siting criteria)	8.3.5.17- 2
8.3.5.17-2	Potentially adverse conditions, Performance Issue 1.8 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission siting criteria)	8.3.5.17- 4
8.3.5.17-3	Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 2	8.3.5.17- 22
8.3.5.17-4	Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 3	8.3.5.17- 28
8.3.5.17-5	Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 4	8.3.5.17- 31
8.3.5.17-6	Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 5	8.3.5.17- 36

LIST OF TABLES (continued)

Table	Title	Page
8.3.5.17-7	Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 6	8.3.5.17- 49
8.3.5.17-8	Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 7	8.3.5.17- 53
8.3.5.17-9	Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 8	8.3.5.17- 56
8.3.5.17-10	Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 9	8.3.5.17- 59
8.3.5.17-11	Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 11	8.3.5.17- 63
8.3.5.17-12	Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 15	8.3.5.17- 71
8.3.5.17-13	Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 17	8.3.5.17- 79
8.3.5.17-14	Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 22	8.3.5.17- 82
8.3.5.17-15	Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 23	8.3.5.17- 87
8.3.5.17-16	Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 24	8.3.5.17- 90
8.3.5.18-1	Findings for qualifying and disqualifying conditions	8.3.5.18- 2
8.3.5.18-2	Preliminary findings on postclosure system and technical guidelines	8.3.5.18- 4
8.3.5.18-3	Geohydrologic characteristics considered in making a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the geohydrology technical guideline, and issues for which the information will be obtained	8.3.5.18- 10
8.3.5.18-4	Geochemical characteristics considered in making a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the geochemistry technical guideline, and issues for which the information will be obtained	8.3.5.18- 12

LIST OF TABLES (continued)

Table	Title	Page
8.3.5.18-5	Rock characteristics considered in making a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the rock characteristics technical guideline, and issues for which the information will be obtained	8.3.5.18- 13
8.3.5.18-6	Effects of future climatic conditions considered in making a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the climatic change technical guideline and in the resolution of Issue 1.1	8.3.5.18- 15
8.3.5.18-7	Effects of future tectonic activity considered in making a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the tectonics technical guideline and in the resolution of Issue 1.1	8.3.5.18- 18
8.3.5.18-8	Effects of human activities considered in making a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the human interference technical guideline and in the resolution of Issue 1.1	8.3.5.18- 20
8.3.5.18-9	Scenarios and parameters associated with the 10,000-yr disturbed-performance scenario class that need to be added to the 100,000-yr nominal-performance scenario class	8.3.5.18- 26
8.3.5.19-1	Computer codes for use in performance assessment	8.3.5.19- 2
8.3.5.19-2	Brief description of codes from Table 8.3.5.19-1	8.3.5.19- 4
8.3.5.19-3	Examples of computer codes for use in preclosure safety assessment	8.3.5.19- 9
8.3.5.19-4	Brief description of codes from Table 8.3.5.19-3	8.3.5.19- 10
8.3.5.20-1	Participants and codes used in COVE 1 benchmarking exercise	8.3.5.20- 4
8.3.5.20-2	Participants and codes used in COVE 2 benchmarking exercise	8.3.5.20- 5

LIST OF TABLES (continued)

Table	Title	Page
8.3.5.20-3	Participants and codes used in COVE 3 benchmarking exercise	8.3.5.20- 5

DOE/RW-0199

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)



Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5, Performance Assessment Program

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5 PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT PROGRAM

This section describes the Yucca Mountain Project (formerly the Nevada Nuclear Waste Storage Investigations (NNWSI) Project) performance assessment program for both the preclosure and postclosure time periods. Section 8.3.5.1 provides an overview of the strategy for preclosure performance assessment. The site data needs and the design activities necessary to demonstrate compliance with the performance objective for maintaining an option of waste retrieval are presented in Section 8.3.5.2 (Issue 2.4). Site and design information necessary to perform radiological safety assessments are described in Sections 8.3.5.3 through 8.3.5.5. Section 8.3.5.3 (Issue 2.1) addresses public exposure under normal conditions, and Section 8.3.5.4 (Issue 2.2) addresses worker exposure under normal conditions. Section 8.3.5.5 (Issue 2.3) describes the approach to assessments of radiological safety under accidental conditions.

Sections 8.3.5.6 and 8.3.5.7 (Issues 2.5 and 4.1) differ from the previous sections, in that they address the site data requirements for supporting higher level findings on the DOE general siting guidelines (10 CFR Part 960). These findings are required at the time of selection of the first repository site.

Section 8.3.5.8 describes the overall strategy for postclosure performance assessment. The approach to demonstrating compliance and the site data needed for the waste package containment performance objective are described in Section 8.3.5.9 (Issue 1.4). Site data needs and planned activities for assessing compliance with the release rate limits for the engineered barrier system are presented in Section 8.3.5.10 (Issue 1.5). Section 8.3.5.11 describes the general plans for assessing seal system performance. Site data needs required to establish that the pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time is at least 1,000 years are described in Section 8.3.5.12 (Issue 1.6). Activities to generate the necessary calculational models and to identify the likely flow paths are also described in Section 8.3.5.12. Section 8.3.5.13 (Issue 1.1) describes the plans for complying with the requirements for assessing total repository system performance. The site data needed, as well as the activities planned to develop appropriate calculational models and identify potentially significant release scenarios are described. Sections 8.3.5.14 and 8.3.5.15 describe the site data needs and the plans for activities to demonstrate compliance with the requirements for limiting radiation doses to man (Issue 1.2) and for protection of special sources of ground water (Issue 1.3).

The approach to be taken in addressing the NRC requirements for performance confirmation is described in Section 8.3.5.16 (Issue 1.7). Section 8.3.5.17 (Issue 1.8) describes the strategy for addressing the favorable and potentially adverse conditions in the NRC siting criteria. The close interaction between assessment of total system performance in Section 8.3.5.13 (Issue 1.1) and this section is highlighted in the discussion. Section 8.3.5.18 (Issue 1.9), like Sections 8.3.5.6 and 8.3.5.7, describes the approach developed to comply with the requirements for higher level findings on the DOE general siting guidelines. Section 8.3.5.18 specifically addresses higher level findings for the postclosure technical guidelines. Finally, Sections 8.3.5.19 and 8.3.5.20 describe the analytical techniques already developed and those still requiring development.

The schedule information provided in this section includes the sequencing, interrelationships, and durations of the performance assessment activities and should be regarded as a snapshot in time. Section 8.5 presents the major milestones, decision points, and summary schedule information for the repository program.

DOE/RW-0199

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)



Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.1, Strategy for Preclosure Performance Assessment

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.1 Strategy for preclosure performance assessment

During the repository preclosure period, performance assessment is synonymous with safety assessment. Safety assessment involves assessment of the risks and hazards to which the repository workers and the general public may be exposed as a result of the activities that will be carried out at the repository before its permanent closure.

Preclosure safety assessment is a major component of the overall licensing strategy, providing a mechanism for resolving Key Issue 2. The uses of preclosure safety assessment include (1) providing guidance to design by determining the need for preventive and mitigative measures for reducing the effects of potential accidents, as well as providing guidance to improve or modify repository operating procedures; (2) demonstrating compliance with regulatory requirements (10 CFR Part 60, 40 CFR Part 191, and 10 CFR Part 20) and with DOE orders; (3) identifying the structures, systems, and components important to safety for supporting the identification of the Q-List items; (4) supporting demonstration of compliance with DOE siting guidelines and NRC siting criteria by providing preclosure safety assessment result; and (5) providing information to the general public on preclosure repository safety.

The general categories of risks that will be considered within the scope of preclosure safety assessment include (1) radiation effects on repository personnel and the public from accidents and routine operations, (2) nonradiological effects on repository personnel and the public from accidents and routine operations, and (3) economic costs of accidents. For the resolution of Key Issue 2, however, only radiological safety will be considered. Nonradiological safety assessment and economic costs accidents will be considered for the resolution of Key Issue 4. The economic analyses will address costs of actual risks but not perceived risks.

The preclosure safety assessment will address risks during the following preclosure activities:

1. Construction of surface facilities and subsurface excavations.

2. Operations, including (a) receipt, handling, and preparation of spent fuel and other wastes in surface facilities for emplacement; (b) emplacement of wastes in the underground facility; and (c) monitoring and maintenance of activities before the repository is permanently closed.

3. Retrieval operations, if required.

4. Decommissioning, including the removal of the surface facilities and the permanent sealing of underground facilities.

The DOE plans to include many types of safety analyses within the overall structure of the analytical techniques of safety assessment. For the analyses performed for the Yucca Mountain Project, the DOE is developing a preclosure risk assessment methodology (PRAM) that will establish procedures on assessment methods, computer codes, assumptions, and data bases. Section 8.3.5.1.1 overviews the PRAM program, Section 8.3.5.1.2

identifies how information required to conduct a preclosure safety assessment will be obtained, Section 8.3.5.1.3 covers the uses of PRAM for both radiological and nonradiological accidents, and Section 8.3.5.1.4 covers the applicability of PRAM to routine operations.

8.3.5.1.1 Overview of the PRAM program

The PRAM program is illustrated in Figure 8.3.5.1-1. The program addresses four elements of safety assessment, including (1) major considerations for performing a preclosure safety assessment, (2) analytical approaches for assessing safety, (3) safety assessment results, and (4) end uses of preclosure safety assessment. A preclosure risk assessment methodology program (PRAM) will implement this process and further develop the safety assessment process as the repository program progresses.

Passage of the National Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 (NWPAA, 1987) has reduced the need for PRAM to provide for uniformity among analyses for various sites. Although the exact evolution of the PRAM program is not completely defined at this time, important uses for the program remain, including (1) providing tradeoff analyses for considering various risk categories, (2) providing a fully integrated program to assist the design, and (3) providing for consistency of analyses related to other elements of the waste disposal system, i.e., the monitored retrievable storage and transportation.

For the repository, the major considerations that will be addressed by the PRAM program include (1) repository design phases, (2) preclosure operation phases, (3) a spectrum of risk categories, (4) end uses of the safety assessment results by the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, and (5) data needed for assessing repository safety.

The PRAM program will address two design phases of the repository: the advanced conceptual design (ACD) and the license application design (LAD). This will include further development of the Q-List Methodology, which has been established for assessing the conceptual design (CD). The preclosure activities that will be addressed include construction, operation, potential retrieval, and decommissioning. The spectrum of risk categories that may be considered includes the following:

1. RAP--radiological risk from accidents to the public.
2. RAW--radiological risk from accidents to the essential workers.
3. RRP--radiological risk from routine operations to the public.
4. RRW--radiological risk from routine operations to the workers.
5. NAP--nonradiological risk from accidents to the public.
6. NAW--nonradiological risk from accidents to the workers.
7. NRP--nonradiological risk from routine operations to the public.
8. NRW--nonradiological risk from routine operations to the workers.
9. COSTR--economic risk from radiological accidents.
10. COSTN--economic risk from nonradiological accidents.

For resolving issues related to regulatory requirements for siting and licensing, the appropriate risk categories to be addressed in the SCP include



Figure 8.3.5.1-1. Overview of the PRAM program for the high-level waste repository.

RAP, RAW, RRP, and RRW. Nevertheless, the PRAM program will address all risk categories necessary to meet the needs of all end users. The applications of the risk categories to the various Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management end uses is illustrated in Figure 8.3.5.1-2.

The results used to support these applications will include (1) dominant accident sequences from each phase of repository operation; (2) accident sequence likelihood information; (3) information on dominant routine releases; (4) occupational exposures; (5) items important to safety; (6) consequence results, including health effects and economic costs; (7) estimates of the uncertainties in the safety assessment results; and (8) bottom-line risk estimates. The PRAM program will further define the results for supporting each end use.

The PRAM program will develop detailed analytical approaches for addressing each risk category. In developing the analytical approaches, the major considerations will be addressed collectively to reflect their interdependence.

A general description of the radiological and nonradiological risks that can result from accidents and routine operations during repository construction, operation, retrieval, and decommissioning is briefly provided in the following paragraphs.

Construction--accidents

Because significant quantities of radioactive materials will not be present at locations where construction is taking place (e.g., the excavation and waste emplacement areas of the underground facilities will be separated), no significant radiological effects are expected from construction-related accidents. Accidents during construction of the surface facilities should be typical of any large construction project. These accidents will primarily affect the workers. Some public effects are possible from construction accidents, but these would be principally associated with the transportation of construction materials to the site. Accidents during construction of the mined portion of the repository should be typical of any large underground construction project and will primarily affect workers and have little or no public effects.

Construction--routine activities

There may be radiological risks to both the public and the worker during routine construction of the mined portion of the repository. These mining operations will result in releases into the atmosphere of some natural radioactive materials that are present in the host rock. Some data exists on the amount of radioactive material present in the air in underground mines. These data have been used to make preliminary estimates of the airborne radionuclides and other particulates that would be present in the mine air and, therefore, available for the miners to breathe and for release from the mine to the atmosphere. The repository mining operation will also require that large amounts of the host rock material be stored on the surface during the construction and operational phases of the repository. This practice could also result in release of radioactive constituents of the host rock to the biosphere. In addition, small quantities of radioactive material will be


END USE
DESIGN AND OPERATIONS ASSESSMENT
REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
IDENTIFICATION OF Q-LIST ITEMS
SITE EVALUATIONS
PUBLIC INFORMATION
RADIOLOGICAL RISK FROM ACCIDENTS TO THE PUBLIC
RADIOLOGICAL RISK FROM ACCIDENTS TO THE ESSENTIAL WORKERS
RADIOLOGICAL RISK FROM ROUTINE OPERATIONS TO THE PUBLIC
RADIOLOGICAL RISK FROM ROUTINE OPERATIONS TO THE WORKERS
NONRADIOLOGICAL RISK FROM ACCIDENTS TO THE WORKERS
NONRADIOLOGICAL RISK FROM ROUTINE OPERATION TO THE WORKERS
NONRADIOLOGICAL RISK FROM ACCIDENTS TO THE PUBLIC
NONRADIOLOGICAL RISK FROM ROUTINE OPERATIONS TO THE PUBLIC
ECONOMIC RISK FROM RADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS
ECONOMIC RISK FROM NONRADIOLOGICAL ACCIDENTS
USED FOR RESOLVING PRECLOSURE RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT ISSUES
X RISK APPLIES TO END USE

Figure 8.3.5.1-2. The applications of risk categories to end uses.

used during construction for nondestructive testing, etc. These sources are not expected to impact the public and are expected only to have a minor impact on repository workers.

Operation--accidents

The potential accidents during waste repository operations can have both radiological and nonradiological impacts that may affect both workers and the public. Radiological risks to the public from accidents during repository operation are those traditionally addressed in risk assessment studies. Small "industrial" type accidents could expose workers to both radiological and nonradiological hazards. Some accidents could cause significant damage to the facility and exposure of workers, but probably not result in significant offsite releases. Very unlikely accidents might cause significant offsite releases, but preliminary analyses indicate that such events are either very rare or not credible.

Operation--routine

Workers will receive routine radiation exposures from handling radioactive wastes. Small amounts of radioactive material may be released as routine effluents from the facility at levels well within regulatory limits. There may also be small releases of fugitive dust from mined material stored at the surface.

Retrieval--accidents

Risks during retrieval will be characterized using methods similar to those applied to estimate risks from the operation phase of the repository.

Retrieval--routine operations

Risks during retrieval will be characterized using methods similar to those applied to estimate risk during operations, although retrieval is expected to be more complicated than emplacement.

Decommissioning--accidents

Radiological risks from accidents during decommissioning are expected to be small due to the relatively limited quantities of residual radioactive material expected to be present in the surface facilities. Nonradiological accident risks during decommissioning should be similar to nonradiological risks from accidents during construction.

Decommissioning--routine operations

Workers will be exposed routinely to low levels of radiation during the decommissioning operations and could be exposed to dust and other potential nonradiological hazards. These risks are expected to be small. No significant routine offsite effluents are expected.

8.3.5.1.2 Identifying information needs

A great deal of information is required to conduct an assessment of the risk categories identified in Sections 8.3.5.1 and 8.3.5.1.1. This information includes physical property values, design descriptions and objectives, and analytical tools. The resolution strategies for performance Issues 2.1 through 2.3 provide a comprehensive and systematic process for determining the required information. As shown in Sections 8.3.5.3 through 8.3.5.5, most of this information is associated with the design of engineered systems and does not require site characterization, environmental monitoring, or socioeconomic monitoring activities. Instead, the goals and expected ranges for this design-related information will be developed as an integral part of the normal design and safety assessment processes. For the information to be obtained from site characterization or from the collection of environmental and socioeconomic data, the parameter attributes that will be measured and the methods of satisfying the information needs are contained in study plans appropriate for the discipline or subject area of interest.

The general analytical strategies and approaches for assessing preclosure radiological safety are described in Sections 8.3.5.1.3 and 8.3.5.1.4. The analytical approaches fall within two broad categories: (1) the assessment of radiological risks from accidents and (2) the assessment of radiological risks from routine operations. These two general safety assessment analytical approaches may also be applicable to the other risk categories.

8.3.5.1.3 General analytical approach for assessing radiological risks from accidents

The general analytical approach for the assessment of radiological risks from accidents to the public and workers is illustrated in Figure 8.3.5.1-3. As pointed out in Section 8.3.5.1.1, preclosure safety assessment can be performed at any design phase (e.g., conceptual, advanced conceptual, or license application design phases), although its specificity is clearly a function of the level of detail of the available design and operations information. The analytical steps are briefly described below; their results are applicable to risk categories RAP (radiological risks from accidents to the public) and RAW (radiological risks from accidents to the workers). The inclusion of the appropriate analytical steps and the depth of analysis of each step at each design assessment phase will depend on the design and operations information, the available analytical data, and the intended end use.

Step 1: Repository familiarization and identification of initiating events

The objectives of step 1 are (1) to identify and describe the physical configurations and processes of the repository systems and support systems to be modeled, and the dependencies among them, and (2) to identify the accident initiating events to be considered in the risk assessment. The system description information includes surface and underground facility layout, engineering diagrams, and operating procedures. Engineering diagrams include process flow, functional, component-status (during standby, operation and


SYSTEM ANALYSIS
CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
REPOSITORY FAMILIARIZATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF INITIATING EVENTS 1
EVENT TREE DEVELOPMENT 2
DATA BASE DEVELOPMENT 6
REPOSITORY SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 3
HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 4
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE ANALYSIS 5
ACCIDENT SEQUENCE ANALYSIS 7
IN-PLANT CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 8
ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSPORT AND OFFSITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 9
UNCERTAINTY, SENSITIVITY, AND IMPORTANCE ANALYSES 10
DOCUMENTATION AND USE OF RESULTS 11

Figure 8.3.5.1-3. Analytical steps for assessing radiological risks from accidents. (The numbers in the diagram are keyed to text discussion.)

maintenance) and instrumentation. The information gained from this step will be used to model the systems and support systems in step 3 (repository systems analysis).

After the physical configuration and processes of the repository systems and support systems are described, the potential accident initiating events that could challenge the equipment and operations of the repository are identified. The identification of the initiating events will be based on previous studies and a detailed examination of the repository design and activities to be performed during construction, operation, retrieval, and decommissioning. The types of initiating events will include external natural phenomena (e.g., earthquakes), external man-caused phenomena (e.g., airplane crash), equipment failure (e.g., crane drops), and human error (e.g., transporter accident). The PRAM program will identify a list of initiating events that are generally applicable to a repository and estimate their probability of occurrence. The PRAM program will also establish guidelines on the identification of site-specific initiating events and the threshold probabilities for establishing the credible initiating events.

Step 2: Event tree development

The objective of step 2 is to identify the potential accident sequences that could occur following the initiating events. Accident sequences are commonly identified using an event tree modeling approach. Given each credible initiating event identified in Step 1, an event tree model will be constructed to identify a set of accident sequences based on the response of the surface and subsurface systems, repository processes, and reactions of the operator to the initiating event. The potential accidents are screened, usually through an iterative process based on their estimated frequency of occurrence (computed in step 7) and consequences (computed in steps 8 and 9). From the iteration process, a set of dominant accident sequences can be determined. The dominant accident sequences can be used to develop design basis accidents (DBAs) that complement the set of DBAs that may be required by regulatory authorities. DBAs are the postulated accidents and resulting conditions for which the confinement structures, systems, and components must meet their functional goals. For the advanced conceptual and license application design phases, the PRAM program will establish the methods and assumptions for event tree modeling and a common naming scheme for the repository systems and support systems.

Step 3: Repository systems analysis

The objective of step 3 is to develop the reliability models for the repository systems and support systems to be analyzed. As shown in Figure 8.3.5.1-3, the information needed for this step is obtained from step 1 (repository familiarization and identification of initiating events); step 4 (human reliability analysis); step 5 (common cause failure analysis); and step 6 (data base development). These system logic models are necessary for the quantification of the accident sequences to be performed in step 7 (accident sequence analysis). The PRAM program will establish the appropriate reliability modeling techniques for a repository. The appropriate level of analysis will depend on the design phase and input from steps 1, 4, 5, and 6. Potential techniques include fault-tree analysis, failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA), GO methodology, and reliability block diagram.

[Note: GO methodology computes probability that a system exists in each of a few states.] Most likely, a combination of reliability techniques (e.g., fault-tree analysis with FMEA) will be recommended by the PRAM program.

Step 4: Human reliability analysis

The objectives of step 4 are (1) to identify the human errors to be included in the preclosure safety assessment, (2) to provide the probability estimates for these errors, and (3) to assist in the inclusion of human recovery actions to mitigate the consequences of accidents. Human reliability analysis (HRA) has direct input to step 3 and will provide insights on how to improve design and to use certain types of procedures and operator training. The PRAM program will establish the appropriate HRA methods, computer codes, and assumptions for each design phase. HRA data will be developed under step 6 (data base development). The level of HRA effort will depend on the level of design information.

Step 5: Common cause failure analysis

The objective of step 5 is to identify the failures of multiple equipment items occurring from a single cause that is common to all equipment items, for example, a loss of electric power can cause failures of several repository systems. The results of this step will be used in step 3. The level of detail of common cause failure analysis (CCFA) will depend on the level of design information. Areas of CCFA that need to be addressed include common cause accident initiating events (e.g., floods, fire, and loss of electric power), intersystem dependencies (to be treated at the event tree level), and intercomponent dependencies (to be treated at the lower logic modeling level, e.g., fault tree). The PRAM program will establish the appropriate methods, computer codes, and assumptions to be used for a repository. CCFA data will be developed as part of step 6.

Step 6: Data base development

The objective of step 6 is to develop the data bases for the analytical steps of the preclosure safety assessment. As shown in Figure 8.3.5.1-3, data are needed for steps 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9. The PRAM program will develop the data bases that are generally applicable to a repository. As part of the development of data, the PRAM program will establish estimates of (1) initiating event frequencies; (2) component failure, repair, test, and maintenance parameters; (3) human reliability; (4) common cause failures; and (5) data used in consequence analysis. The PRAM program will also establish the methods and assumptions for modifying the generic data for a repository and for treating data uncertainty. Much of the activity in this step will occur as part of steps 1 through 5 and 7 through 9. The data base will be used in the documentation and control of the data used in the analysis.

Step 7: Accident sequence analysis

The objective of step 7 is to quantify the frequency of occurrence of the accident sequences identified from event tree development (step 2) by linking the system logic models (step 3) and using the data developed in step 6 for quantification. Each accident sequence is transformed into a

mathematical expression, represented in Boolean algebra, which is composed of minimal cut sets. Using the Boolean equation, an estimate of the frequency of occurrence of the accident sequence can be computed, uncertainty and sensitivity analyses can be performed (step 10), and an importance analysis (also in step 10) can be performed to identify structures, systems, and components important to safety for supporting the formulation of the Q-List items. As mentioned in step 3, the analysis of the results from steps 3, 4, and 9 will use an iterative process to identify the dominant accident sequences that complement the set of DBAs developed in response to regulatory requirements. The PRAM program will establish the methods, computer codes, and assumptions on (1) Boolean equation reductions, (2) the probability threshold for minimal cutsets, (3) the treatment of human recovery, and (4) the frequency threshold for identifying dominant accident sequences. In addition, PRAM will establish the screening process for identifying and incorporating accident sequences, including low probability/high consequence sequences into more general release categories to facilitate subsequent consequence analyses.

Step 8: In-plant consequence analysis

The objective of step 8 is to determine the accident consequences within the repository site boundary, including the surface and underground facilities. These consequences include exposure of essential workers and economic costs from radiological accidents.

In-plant consequence analysis will be performed for the selected design basis accidents and the full set of dominant accident sequences, or both. A consequence model representing the course of events from accident initiator to personnel exposure will be developed for the surface and underground facilities. Computer codes and analytical models will be used to describe the accident radionuclide release mechanisms, the resulting source term, radionuclide transport from the surface and underground facilities to the surface release points, exposure of essential workers, and economic losses due to accidents. The PRAM program will develop the methods, computer codes, and assumptions to ensure that consistency is maintained throughout the program.

Step 9: Environmental transport and offsite consequence analysis

The objective of step 9 is to estimate accident consequences outside the repository site boundary. These consequences include health effects on the general public and economic costs resulting from the radiological accidents.

Refinement of the release categories will be established based on results from steps 7 and 8 to minimize the offsite consequence analysis effort. The PRAM program will provide guidance for establishing the methods, computer codes, and assumptions for air and water dispersion, pathways to man, dosimetry, health effects, and economic models to ensure program consistency. The data will be developed in step 6.

Step 10: Uncertainty, sensitivity, and importance analyses

Each of the three analyses of step 10 has its own objective. The objective of an uncertainty analysis is to estimate the uncertainty in the

results due to uncertainty in the parameters and models. Such uncertainties as those in the accident sequence likelihood estimates (step 7), in the releases to the environment (step 8), and in the risk to the public health and safety (step 9) can be computed. The objective of a sensitivity analysis, which is often a useful adjunct to uncertainty analysis, is to determine how much the output of an analysis changes with respect to variation in the input. The objective of the importance analysis is to identify and rank the important accident sequences, system failures, component failures, and human errors with regard to the accident sequence likelihood estimates. The importance analysis will identify the structures, systems, and components important to safety and will be used to help formulate the Q-List items for the advanced conceptual and license application phases of design. The PRAM program will develop overall methods for combining the uncertainties and sensitivities from the various analytical steps and establish the methods for importance analysis to support the preparation of the Q-List items.

Step 11: Documentation and use of results

The objective of step 11 is to document the safety assessment methodology and results. The PRAM program will develop an annotated outline for the documentation of the safety assessment results by a repository project. A preclosure safety assessment will be prepared to support the advanced conceptual design compliance with siting requirements. The safety assessment results will be based on the advanced conceptual design information. A more detailed preclosure safety assessment will be prepared to support the preparation of the safety analysis report and the environmental impact statement. It will be based on the license application design information.

Safety assessment results from the analytical approaches described in this section and Section 8.3.5.1.4 can be used to improve the preclosure repository safety. An important principle of safety is that it is better to prevent or reduce the frequency of occurrence of an accident than to mitigate its consequences. When appropriate, preventive safety measures will be incorporated into the repository design as it matures. Selection of preventive measures will be based on the results from the accident sequence analysis (step 7), with additional safety insights from uncertainty, sensitivity, and importance analyses (step 10).

Safety assessment results can also be used to improve preclosure repository safety by identifying mitigative measures. Given accidents of various probabilities and consequences, which together constitute the incremental risk or significance of the event, it is possible to identify design and procedural measures that can reduce the risk. Those measures taken to lessen the consequences of potential accidents are termed mitigating features. Recommendations of mitigative measures will be based on results from accident sequence analysis (step 7) and consequence analyses (steps 8 and 9), with additional insights from uncertainty, sensitivity, and importance analyses (step 10).

8.3.5.1.4 General analytical approach for assessing radiological risks from routine operations

Public radiological safety

The general approach to resolving Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures--normal conditions) is discussed in Section 8.3.5.3 and depicted in Figure 8.3.5.3-2 of that section. The general approach for assessing public radiological safety is shown in the box labeled "public radiological safety assessment package" in Figure 8.3.5.3-2. The following provides a step-by-step discussion of the analytical approach.

Step 1: Design evaluation

The design package and site data are obtained from the reference information base (RIB), and the repository design features related to the radiological safety of the public during normal operations are evaluated. The following discusses the types of information that are investigated during this design evaluation. The high level waste (HLW) throughput (schedule and amount of waste received per year) is an important controlling factor in the design of the repository process and storage facilities (e.g., hot-cell structure and lag storage). Direct radiation that can be emitted from the central process area and the amount of routine radioactive effluents will be directly related to the amount of HLW on hand and being processed. These sources of potential doses to the public also depend on how processes are conducted for such activities as waste receipt, lag storage, waste handling and consolidation, transport of waste containers and possible heat treating of spent fuel assemblies. Public exposure to radiation sources from such activities will also be controlled by administrative procedures (e.g., limits on frequency of tasks and time in storage). Attributes of the repository design that will play a major role in controlling direct radiation and release of radioactive effluents to the unrestricted area include such features as

1. Barrier and shield thicknesses, composition, and distance from the source and the maximally exposed individual.

2. Containment and ventilation system characteristics (e.g., repository and hot-cell layout, differential pressures between areas, openings, air locks, and filters).

3. Containment characteristics of the waste form (i.e., fuel elements, waste package, etc.)

4. Radioactive material release point characteristics (e.g., stack height, diameter, exit velocity, temperature, and distance from unrestricted area).

In addition, as part of the regulatory performance verification requirements, specific systems and operational controls will be needed to verify that the repository design and operation will maintain the annual radiation dose to the public to less than the regulatory limits. Types of systems that must be provided include (1) gaseous, particulate, and liquid effluent monitoring and control equipment, (2) effluent sampling and measuring equipment,

(3) environmental surveillance equipment, and (4) emergency response features. Design of these systems will be incorporated in the normal repository design process. The information needed for this design evaluation will be the product of the design process and will generally not depend directly on the site characterization activities. However, data on background radiological constituents and dust characteristics may affect the design of monitoring equipment. Data on dust characteristics are discussed in Section 8.3.2.4 (nonradiological health and safety) and only mentioned here because worker health concerns require more extensive data on dust.

Step 2: Identification of radiation source characteristics

Potential sources of radiation that can contribute to the dose to the maximally exposed individual in the unrestricted area can be categorized as (1) resulting from repository operations, (2) resulting from operation of offsite facilities, and (3) resulting from miscellaneous operations. Examples of radiation sources resulting from repository operations are receipt of HLW shipping casks, releases during spent fuel consolidation, transport of HLW containers, and naturally occurring radionuclides. An example of radiation resulting from the operation of nearby offsite facilities is the routine release of radioactive material from a nearby nuclear fuel cycle facility, if any.

The specific information needed about the potential source terms includes radionuclides involved, quantity and concentration, decay radiation and energies, and physical and chemical forms. General information needed about the source terms for dose evaluation include

1. Planned repository operational details (e.g., scheduled HLW throughput and inventories, generated low-level waste (LLW) and transport rates, and normal effluent release rates).

2. Repository design features (e.g., radionuclide barriers, normal effluent release locations, layout distances, containment, leakage, and filtration details).

3. Environmental details (e.g., pathways for transport or dispersion of radioactive materials through the soil, air, and water to vegetation, animals, and the public, and location of relevant offsite facilities and their radionuclide release rates).

4. Natural radionuclide sources (e.g., radon emanation rate).

Depending on the characteristics of the source terms, the information needs will be satisfied by either the site characterization program, the repository design process, or the environmental and socioeconomic sampling and monitoring programs. Development of the analytical tools needed to evaluate potential adverse public impacts of the source terms will be coordinated with the preclosure risk assessment methodology (PRAM) program requirements and recommendations.

Step 3: Radionuclide transport evaluation

The next element in the public radiological safety assessment package is radionuclide transport evaluation following release to the environment of radioactive material from normal repository activities. Radioactive releases to the environment from offsite facilities must also be considered since these releases can contribute to the dose to the public in the repository unrestricted area.

The pathways for the initial concentration of radionuclides released from the repository central process area and offsite facilities to the public in the unrestricted area need to be described. The possible pathways to the public can be directly through the air, water, and soil, or indirectly through vegetation and animals.

The dispersion of airborne radioactive materials can result in (1) radionuclide concentrations in the air that can cause an external dose by direct radiation or an internal dose through inhalation or (2)ground deposition of radioactive material. Similarly, dispersion of waterborne radioactive effluents can result in an external dose by direct radiation, an internal dose through drinking of the water, or the deposition of radioactive material. Radionuclides deposited on the ground, plants, or riverbanks can cause a direct radiation dose but, more importantly, they can enter the food chain through uptake and bioaccumulation in plants and animals. Examples would be eating cattle that grazed on local grass or eating grain irrigated with local water.

Analytical tools in the form of dispersion and pathway models will be required to perform the radionuclide transport evaluation. Meteorological data (e.g., wind speed and direction and atmospheric stability) will be needed as input to the dispersion model. This need for site data will be satisfied by the site characterization program. Specific data (e.g., type of crops raised and bioaccumulation of radionuclides in plants and animals) will be required for the food chain pathway models. This data need will be addressed by the socioeconomic and environmental monitoring program.

Step 4: Public radiation exposure calculation

The last step in the analysis is the evaluation of radiological exposure that quantifies the maximum dose to the public postulated from the normal operation of the repository and offsite facilities.

The maximum dose to an individual at the nearest unrestricted location is normally considered the greatest potential adverse impact and is used as the basis for calculations. The furthest distance the unrestricted area can be from the repository is 5 km. The Bureau of Land Management limits occupancy at this location. Occupancy at a site about 15 km away from the repository will be assumed to be 24 hours per day, 365 days per year. Individuals are conservatively assumed to do such things as drink local water, eat local animals and fish, eat foodstuffs grown using local water, and spend recreational time in local water bodies. Analytical models will be used to quantify the public dose. The following types of analytical tools will be needed:

1. Building ventilation, filtration, and leakage models.
2. Radiation shielding models.
3. Atmospheric dispersion models.
4. Radiological impact models for transportation of LLW.
5. Food chain pathways models.
6. Radiological consequence assessment models.

The information needed to calculate doses using these analytical tools will be provided as discussed in the previous steps. This information will be the product of the site characterization program, the socioeconomic and environmental monitoring program, and the normal repository design process. Following is a list of some technical guidance documents that will be evaluated for applicability to the development of the previously mentioned analytical tools. A list of analytical tools that are available for use is contained in Section 8.3.5.19 (completed analytical techniques). Further discussions of analytical tools still needed are contained in Section 8.3.5.20 (techniques requiring development).

1. Regulatory Guide 1.21--Measuring, Evaluating, and Reporting Radio activity in Solid Waste and Release of Radioactivity in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents From Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Revision 1, June 1974) (AEC, 1974).

2. Regulatory Guide 1.23--Onsite Meteorological Programs (NRC, 1980).

3. Regulatory Guide 1.109--Calculation of Annual Doses to Man From Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purposes of Evaluating Compliance With 10 CFR 50, Appendix I (Revision 1, October 1977) (NRC, 1977a).

4. Regulatory Guide 1.111--Methods for Estimating Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion of Gaseous Effluents in Routine Releases From Light-Water-Cooled Reactors (Revision 1, July 1977) (NRC, 1977c).

5. Regulatory Guide 1.112--Calculation of Releases of Radioactive Materials in Gaseous and Liquid Effluents From Light-Water-Cooled Power Reactors (Revision O-R, May 1977) (NRC, 1976b).

6. Regulatory Guide 1.113--Estimating Aquatic Dispersion of Effluents From Accidental and Routine Reactor Releases for the Purpose of Implementing Appendix I (Revision 1, April 1977) (NRC, 1977b).

7. Safety Series No. 58--Concepts and Examples of Safety Analyses for Radioactive Waste Repositories in Continental Geological Formations (IAEA, 1983a).

8. Safety Series No. 60--Criteria for Underground Disposal of Solid Radioactive Waste (IAEA, 1983b).

9. Safety Series No. 68--Performance Assessment for Underground Radioactive Waste Disposal Systems (IAEA, 1985).

10. DOE/EP-0023--A Guide for Environmental Radiological Surveillance at U.S. Department of Energy Installations (July 1981) (Corley and Denham, 1981).

11. DOE/EP-0096--A Guide for Effluent Radiological Measurements at DOE Installations (April 1982) (Corley and Corbit, 1983).

Worker radiological safety

The general approach to resolving Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety--normal conditions) is discussed in Section 8.3.5.4 and depicted in Figure 8.3.5.4-2. The general approach for assessing worker radiological safety is shown in the box labeled "worker radiological safety assessment package" and is discussed here.

The following discussion provides a step-by-step explanation of the general approach to predict worker radiation doses during the normal operation of the repository.

Step 1: Design evaluation

The design package and site data are obtained from the reference information base (RIB), and the repository design features related to the radiological safety of the worker during normal operations are evaluated. The following text discusses the types of information that are investigated during this design evaluation. The high-level waste (HLW) throughout (schedule and amount of waste received per year) is an important controlling factor in the design of the repository process and storage facilities (e.g., hot-cell structure and lag storage) and, hence, in the radiation doses predicted for workers. Direct radiation that can be emitted from the central process area and the amount of routine radioactive effluents will be directly related to the amount of HLW on hand and being processed. These sources of potential dose to the workers also depend on how processes are conducted for such activities as waste receipt, lag storage, waste handling and consolidation, and transport of waste containers. Worker radiation doses from such activities will be controlled principally by design features and administrative procedures (e.g., limits on frequency of tasks and time in storage), which will be a secondary control on worker exposure. Attributes of the repository design that will play a major role in controlling direct radiation or release of radioactive effluents to the restricted area include such features as

1. Operations plan parameters such as number of workers present and time to complete tasks.

2. Remote-handling equipment used for tasks in high radiation or high frequency tasks.

3. Maintenance requirements of remote-handling and hot-cell equipment.

4. Barrier and shield thicknesses, composition, and distance to workers from the source.

5. Containment and ventilation system characteristics (e.g., repository and hot-cell layout, differential pressures between areas, openings, air locks, and filters).

6. Radioactive material release point characteristics (e.g., stack height, diameter, exit velocity, temperature, and location within the restricted area).

In addition, as part of the regulatory performance verification requirements, specific systems and operational controls will be needed to verify that the repository design and operation does maintain annual radiation doses to the workers to less than the regulatory limits. Examples of the systems that must be provided include gaseous and liquid effluent sampling and measuring equipment, area radiation and airborne monitoring equipment, and personnel and area dosimetry equipment. Design of these systems will be incorporated in the normal repository design process. The information needed for this design evaluation will be the product of the design process and will not depend directly on the site characterization activities.

Step 2: Identification of radiation source characteristics

Potential sources of radiation that can contribute to worker exposure in the restricted area can be categorized as (1) resulting from repository operations or (2) miscellaneous operations. Examples of radiation sources resulting from repository operations are receipt of HLW shipping casks, releases during spent fuel consolidation, transport of HLW containers, direct radiation from storage of disposal containers, direct radiation from emplacement activities, and naturally occurring radionuclides. Other miscellaneous operations that are potential radiation sources include treatment and transportation of site-generated low-level waste (LLW) and gamma and neutron radiation-producing equipment used in construction and nondestructive testing.

The specific information needed about the potential source terms includes the radionuclides involved and the quantity and concentration, decay radiation and energies, and physical and chemical forms of these radionuclides. General information needed about the source terms for dose evaluation include

1. Planned repository operational details (e.g., scheduled HLW throughput and inventories, LLW generation and transport rates, and normal effluent release rates).

2. Repository design features (e.g., radionuclide barriers, normal effluent release locations, layout distances, containment, leakage, and filtration details).

3. Environmental details (e.g., pathways for transport or dispersion of radioactive materials through the air).

4. Natural radionuclide sources (e.g., concentrations in tuff and ground water at the repository location).

Depending on the characteristics of the source terms, the information needs will be satisfied by the site characterization program (e.g., naturally occurring radionuclides), the repository design process (e.g., HLW and site-generated waste), or the environmental and socioeconomic monitoring programs (e.g., offsite installations and background radiation). Development of the analytical tools needed to evaluate potential adverse impacts of the source terms on worker safety will be coordinated with the PRAM program requirements and recommendations.

Step 3: Radionuclide transport evaluation

The third element in the worker radiological safety assessment package is radionuclide transport evaluation following release from containment systems or repository facilities of radioactive material as a result of normal repository activities. The dispersion of airborne radioactive materials can result in radionuclide concentrations in the air that can cause an external dose by direct radiation or an internal dose through inhalation, or result in ground deposition of radioactive material. The dominant pathway for occupational exposure to airborne radionuclides is expected to be from radionuclides entrained in repository airstreams. Analysis of this pathway will require data on the radionuclide source terms, air volumetric flow rates, air patterns, and location of workers and length of occupancy. Analytical tools will be required for determining direct radiation dose rates in all areas of the repository, as well as for determining ventilation leakage and filtration of airborne radionuclides in the repository airstreams.

Analytical tools in the form of dispersion and pathway models also will be required to perform the radionuclide transport evaluation for restricted areas outside the facility. Meteorological data (e.g., wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability) in the vicinity of the repository buildings, as well as repository design information, will be needed as input to the dispersion model. This information need will be satisfied by Characterization Program 8.3.1.12 (meteorology).

Step 4: Worker radiation exposure calculation

The last step in the analysis is the radiological exposure evaluation that quantifies the dose to the individual worker from routine operations of the repository and offsite installations. The quantification of radiation doses will be performed by the use of accepted analytical models and knowledge of the various design features as input into the models. Some design features needed include

1. The processes and activities necessary for the functioning of the repository.

2. The layout and physical design features (i.e., location of processes and activities, wall thickness and material, personnel occupied areas, source location and storage, transport, and personnel corridors).

3. The repository throughput of radioactive materials.

4. The source terms (i.e., radionuclides involved, low-level waste generated, material quantities, material form (solid, liquid, particulate, or gaseous), container parameters, and industrial sources).

5. Duration and frequency of tasks.

6. The number of workers involved.

Accepted analytical methods for the calculation of personnel doses will be selected or developed as part of the preclosure safety assessment activities consistent with the methodology described in this section. Computer models will be used to evaluate the potential of direct and indirect radiation doses to workers where appropriate. Design-limiting assumptions will be specified for the code input parameters (e.g., radionuclide sources). The following types of analytical tools will be needed:

1. Repository operations models.
2. Building ventilation, filtration, and leakage models.
3. Radiation shielding models.
4. Atmospheric dispersion models.
5. LLW treatment and transportation radiological impact models.
6. Radiological consequences assessment models.

The information needed to calculate doses using these analytical tools will be provided as discussed in the previous steps. This information will be the product of the site characterization program, the socioeconomic and environmental monitoring program, and the normal repository design process. The following list indicates some technical guidance documents that might be applicable to the development of the analytical tools. A list of analytical tools available for use is contained in Section 8.3.5.19 (completed analytical techniques). Further discussions of analytical tools still needed are contained in Section 8.3.5.20 (techniques requiring development).

1. Regulatory Guide 1.169--Concrete Radiation Shields for Nuclear Power Plants (December 1973) (NRC, 1973)

2. Regulatory Guide 8.19--Occupational Radiation Dose Assessment in Light-Water-Reactor Power Plants-Design Stage Man-Rem Estimates (Rev. 1, July 1979) (NRC, 1979a).

3. Safety Series No. 58--Concepts and Examples of Safety Analyses for Radioactive Waste Repositories in Continental Geological Formations, (IAEA, 1983a).

4. Safety Series No. 60--Criteria for Underground Disposal of Solid Radioactive Waste (IAEA, 1983b).

5. Safety Series No. 68--Performance Assessment for Underground Radioactive Waste Disposal Systems (IAEA, 1985).

6. DOE/EV/1830-T5--A Guide to Reducing Radiation Exposures to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) (Kathren et al., 1980).

7. DOE Order 6430.1--General Design Criteria Manual, as applicable (December 1983) (DOE, 1983a).

DOE/RW-0199

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.2, Waste Retrievability

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.2 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 2.4: Can the repository be designed, constructed, operated, closed, and decommissioned so that the option of waste retrieval will be preserved as required by 10 CFR 60.111?

This issue is concerned with the ability to retrieve emplaced waste as required by 10 CFR 60.111(b). As a result of this requirement, the repository must be designed, constructed, operated, and maintained to ensure that the emplaced waste can be retrieved. This leads to impacts on the design of the repository and upon the duration of many of the planned operations. As will be discussed in more detail later, numerous design decisions are based to a large degree on retrieval-related considerations; for example, the selection of the waste emplacement mode, the selection of materials for rock-support systems, and the maintenance requirements for the ramps, shafts, and drifts. Furthermore, the operations directly related to waste retrieval must be recognized as more complex than the emplacement operations, primarily because of the more difficult environment related to retrieval (e.g., increased heat).

There are three points that should be identified relative to the discussion of retrieval presented here. First of all, this issue (Issue 2.4, waste retrievability) is a performance issue. The importance of this issue and the numerous design constraints created to ensure retrievability lead to strong ties to the principal design issue (Issue 4.4, preclosure design and technical feasibility, Section 8.3.2.5). Issue 4.4 is responsible for the reference repository design, supporting analyses, and demonstrations required by this and other design or performance issues. This relationship between design and performance issues is shown in Figure 8.3.2.1-1 (Section 8.3.2.1). Because the performance goals for retrieval are integrated in Issue 4.4 with other related goals, the site data needed to implement and evaluate the goals are identified in the discussions under Issue 4.4. Secondly, the act of retrieval is considered complete in these discussions when the waste is brought to the surface. Temporary waste storage at the surface and offsite transport after retrieval are not addressed in the SCP because it is unlikely that these activities would require any site data that are not already being requested. Finally, the decision to retrieve will be made as a result of the performance confirmation program or by the DOE for recovery of resources. The discussions of retrieval are therefore limited to activities intended to maintain the retrieval option and to retrieve the waste.

In the discussion that follows in this section, the regulatory basis for addressing waste retrieval is presented, the approach to resolving this issue is described, and the interrelationships among the information needs related to retrievability are discussed. The schedule information for Issue 2.4 (waste retrievability) is given in Section 8.3.5.2.7.

Regulatory basis for the issue

The regulations concerning the retrieval of high-level radioactive waste from geologic repositories are contained in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA, 1983) and the NRC regulation 10 CFR Part 60. The DOE requirement for reasonably available technology is contained in 10 CFR Part 960.

The principal NWPA reference to retrieval is contained in Section 122 (NWPA, 1983):

> Notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle, any repository constructed on a site approved under this subtitle shall be designed and constructed to permit the retrieval of any spent nuclear fuel placed in such repository, during an appropriate period of operation of the facility, for any reason pertaining to the public health and safety, or the environment, or for the purpose of permitting the recovery of the economically valuable contents of such spent fuel. The Secretary shall specify the appropriate period of retrievability with respect to any repository at the time of design of such repository, and such aspect of such repository shall be subject to approval or disapproval by the Commission as part of the construction authorization process under subsections (b) through (d) of Section 114.

The principal NRC reference to retrievability is in Section 60.111(b) of 10 CFR Part 60.

> Retrievability of Waste. (1) The geologic repository operations area shall be designed to preserve the option of waste retrieval throughout the period during which wastes are being emplaced and, thereafter, until the completion of a performance confirmation program and Commission review of the information obtained from such a program. To satisfy this objective, the geologic repository operations area shall be designed so that any or all of the emplaced waste could be retrieved on a reasonable schedule starting at any time up to 50 yr after waste emplacement operations are initiated, unless a different time period is approved or specified by the Commission. This different time period may be established on a case-by-case basis consistent with the emplacement schedule and planned performance confirmation program. (2) This requirement shall not preclude decisions by the Commission to allow backfilling part or all, or permanent closure of, the geologic repository operations area prior to the end of the period of design for retrievability. (3) For purposes of this paragraph, a reasonable schedule for retrieval is one that would permit retrieval in about the same time as that devoted to construction of the geologic repository operations area and the emplacement of wastes.

In addition, minor references to retrieval and retrievability are included in 10 CFR Part 60, Sections 21(c)(12), 46(a)(1), 102(d), 133(c), 133(e), and 135(b)(3). These sections address the content requirements for the license application, design changes that affect retrievability, stages in the licensing process, design criteria for the surface and underground facilities, design criteria for underground openings, and design criteria for waste packages.

The DOE requirement for reasonably available technology is contained in 10 CFR 960.5-1(a)(3):

> Ease and cost of siting, construction, operation, and closure. Repository siting, construction, operation, and closure shall be

demonstrated to be technically feasible on the basis of reasonably available technology, and the associated costs shall be demonstrated to be reasonable relative to other available and comparable options.

A retrieval requirement is presented in 40 CFR 191.14(f). However, in the introductory text to Part 191.14, the EPA authors clearly indicate that this particular section does "not apply to facilities regulated by the [Nuclear Regulatory] Commission. (See 10 CFR Part 60)."

In compliance with the regulations, the Yucca Mountain repository is being designed with the option to initiate retrieval of emplaced waste at any time up to 50 yr after waste emplacement operations are initiated and to use reasonably available technology for the retrieval operations.

Approach to resolving the issue

The basic approach to resolving Issue 2.4 (waste retrievability) is depicted in the logic diagram provided as Figures 8.3.5.2-1a and 1b. The essence of the logic for resolving retrievability concerns is to

1. Evaluate regulatory requirements and existing site data, designs and analyses to determine what functions and processes must be performed to not preclude retrieval.

2. Establish performance measures and goals (design criteria) for the processes that contribute to performing those functions.

3. Identify normal and credible abnormal conditions for retrieval-related operations and identify input items needed from Issue 4.4 (preclosure design and technical feasibility).

4. Identify and request site parameters necessary to meet the goals of related issues for common system elements or develop the reference preclosure repository design, operations plans, supporting analyses and demonstrations requested to support resolution of all related issues.

5. Conduct a compliance analysis to critically evaluate whether the appropriate retrieval conditions have been considered, whether the input items provided by Issue 4.4 are complete and sufficient, and whether the performance goals are met.

Steps 1 and 2 above represent the performance allocation process being used in the SCP to communicate the development of preliminary performance measures and associated goals and needed confidence for resolving the design and performance issues. The remainder of this section on the approach to resolving this issue documents the current preliminary results of the performance allocation process for retrieval. The future work associated with steps 3 to 5 is described in the retrieval information needs discussions (Sections 8.3.5.2.1 through 8.3.5.2.6 for this issue) or in the discussions of future work for Issue 4.4 (preclosure design and technical feasibility). These steps indicate an important relationship between the retrieval issue and Issue 4.4. Figure 8.3.5.2-2 shows what the waste retrievability issue


IDENTIFY REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR RETRIEVABILITY
EVALUATE EXISTING DESIGN, ANALYSES, & SITE DATA
IDENTIFY FUNCTIONS
PROVIDE ACCESS TO EMPLACEMENT BOREHOLES
PROVIDE ACCESS TO WASTE PACKAGES
REMOVE WASTE PACKAGE FROM EMPLACEMENT BOREHOLE
TRANSPORT & DELIVER THE WASTE TO THE SURFACE FACILITY
IDENTIFY SYSTEM ELEMENTS
IDENTIFY PROCESSES
IDENTIFY PERFORMANCE MEASURES
SET PERFORMANCE GOALS (DESIGN CRITERIA) & INDICATIONS OF CONFIDENCE
IDENTIFY RETRIEVAL CONDITIONS (NORMAL AND CREDIBLE ABNORMAL)
IDENTIFY INPUT ITEMS NEEDED FROM DESIGN PACKAGE
N
ARE INPUT ITEM REQUESTS APPROPRIATE ?
Y
TRANSMIT PERFORMANCE GOALS (DESIGN CRITERIA) RETRIEVAL CONDITIONS, & REQUESTS FOR INPUT ITEMS TO ISSUE 4.4
IDENTIFY PARAMETERS, SET GOALS & INDICATIONS OF CONFIDENCE (ISSUE 4.4)
CREATE OR UPDATE REPOSITORY DESIGN BY ISSUE 4.4
RESPOND TO INPUT ITEM REQUESTS, OBTAIN DESIGN PACKAGE FROM ISSUE 4.4
• REFERENCE DESIGN
• OPERATIONS PLAN
• SUPPORTING ANALYSES
• DEMONSTRATIONS
Y
CAN PERFORMANCE GOALS OR DESIGN BE CHANGED ?
N
NOT FEASIBLE TO PROCEED
COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS
HAVE APPROPRIATE RETRIEVAL CONDITIONS BEEN CONSIDERED ?
Y
N
ARE INPUT ITEMS COMPLETE AND SUFFICIENT ?
Y
N
ARE PERFORMANCE GOALS MET ?
N
Y
N
IS DESIGN SUFFICIENT FOR LA ?
Y
PREPARE INPUT FOR LICENSE APPLICATION

Figure 8.3.5.2-1a. Logic diagram for Issue 2.4 (waste retrievability). See Figure 8.3.5.2-1b for legend. Section 8.3.2.1 describes the relationships and interfaces between design and performance issues.

LEGEND

ACTIVITY PERFORMED TO RESOLVE ISSUE



TEST TO DETERMINE SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITY

ACTIVITY PERFORMED BY INDICATED ISSUE

ACTIVITY WITH MULTIPLE SIMILAR ACTIVITIES OR TESTS



DECISION ABOUT ISSUE RESOLUTION

Y - YES N - NO LA - LICENSE APPLICATION

Figure 8.3.5.2-1b. Legend for Figure 8.3.5.2-1a


RETRIEVABILITY PROVIDES TO PRECLOSURE DESIGN & TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY
• PERFORMANCE GOALS (DESIGN CRITERIA)
• RETRIEVAL CONDITIONS (NORMAL & ABNORMAL)
• LIST OF NEEDED INPUT ITEMS
ISSUE 2.4 WASTE RETRIEVABILITY (SECTION 8.3.5.2)
• ALLOCATE PERFORMANCE
• IDENTIFY RETRIEVAL CONDITIONS
• IDENTIFY INPUT ITEMS
• CONDUCT COMPLIANCE ANALYSIS
ISSUE 4.4 PRECLOSURE DESIGN & TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY (SECTION 8.3.2.5)
• IDENTIFY PARAMETERS & GOALS FOR SITE DATA
• CREATE/UPDATE DESIGN, ANALYSIS, ETC.
PRECLOSURE DESIGN & TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY PROVIDES TO RETRIEVABILITY:
• REFERENCE DESIGN (REPOSITORY & EQUIPMENT)
• OPERATIONS PLAN
• SUPPORTING ANALYSES (VENTILATION, GEOMECHANICAL, ETC.)
• DEMONSTRATIONS OF EQUIPMENT & METHODS

Figure 8.3.5.2-2. Information exchanged between Waste Retrievability Issue and Preclosure Design and Technical Feasibility Issue.

provides to the repository design issue, as well as what the design issue provides for use in the retrieval compliance analysis. The results or products produced by the repository design issue include reports that document the reference designs for the repository and equipment as well as reports that document operations plans, analyses, and equipment demonstrations. Not all of these products (for example, muck haulage analyses) are needed to evaluate retrieval-related concerns. The products developed in Issue 4.4 that are requested by the retrievability issue are called "input items" in the discussions on retrieval to distinguish them from products (retrieval conditions, compliance analyses, etc.) developed by the retrieval issue. Section 8.3.2.1 explains this relationship between input items and products in more detail.

One concept considered throughout the retrieval discussions is that of identifying both normal conditions and credible abnormal conditions that might be expected to exist during retrieval-related operations. Normal conditions are the state or conditions (temperature, air quality, opening stability, etc.) expected to be present most of the time. The term, normal conditions, is generally used to indicate conditions expected about 90 percent of the time. Standard equipment and procedures would be expected to be used for retrieval operations when normal conditions exist. Credible abnormal conditions are the state or conditions expected to have a reasonable potential for occurring infrequently during the life of a repository. This term is generally used to identify those conditions that need to be considered in developing contingency plans for related retrieval operations. Such operations may require special equipment or procedures and may require substantial time to complete.

The starting point for the performance allocation process for retrievability is consideration of the regulatory requirements (discussed earlier in this section) and an evaluation of the existing design, analyses, and site data. Retrieval-related concerns are woven throughout numerous sections of the current design discussions in Chapter 6 of the SCP and, likewise, in the Site Characterization Plan-Conceptual Design Report (SCP-CDR) (SNL, 1987). Rather than presenting the details of those discussions here, a directory of these discussions related to retrieval is provided in Table 8.3.5.2-1. From the directory, it is evident that the subject of retrievability has received consideration in numerous areas, particularly in the design requirements, the ventilation system evaluation, operations planning, analyses of both thermomechanical effects and liner stresses, and equipment design. Additionally, a specific evaluation (Appendix L of the SCP-CDR; SNL, 1987) was made to determine the relative importance of various items to maintaining the option to retrieve the waste in a timely manner; it is this evaluation that forms the basis for the preliminary list of potential abnormal conditions that might exist during retrieval.

Using the regulatory requirements and the current design and analyses, the functions that must be performed for retrieval have been identified. These four functions are

1. Provide access to the emplacement boreholes.
2. Provide access to the waste packages.
3. Remove waste package from the emplacement borehole.
4. Transport and deliver the waste packages to the surface facilities.

Table 8.3.5.2-1. Directory of discussions related to retrieval

Topic	SCP section	SCP-CDR[a] section
Waste retrieval schedule	6.1.1.6.4	3.0
Retrievability-related design criteria	6.1.1.7	2.4.4.3
Waste retrieval and shipping operations	6.2.3.2	3.2.2. and Appendix J
Retrieval requirements and planning-basis time periods	6.2.9.1.	2.4.4.1
Retrieval conditions	6.2.9.2	6.3.1 and Appendix J
Equipment development	6.2.9.3	Appendix J
Issue 2.4 waste retrievability (current status)	6.4.8	8.3.5
Issue 2.4 waste retrievability (issue resolution strategy and future work)	8.3.5.	NA[b]
Retrieval philosophy	NA	2.4.4.2 and 3.2.1
Drift ventilation conditions for maintenance and retrieval	NA	3.4.2.2
Waste removal operations for performance confirmation	NA	4.5.4
Retrieval demonstrations	NA	6.3.2
Full repository retrieval	NA	6.3.3
Expected temperature for borehole walls and drifts after spent fuel emplacement	NA	Appendix A
Air-cooling requirements--vertical	NA	3.4.2.3
Air-cooling requirements--horizontal	NA	3.4.3.3
Preliminary liner stress analysis	NA	Appendix B
Ventilation and cooling analyses	NA	Appendix C
Equipment for retrieval	NA	Appendix D

Table 8.3.5.2-1. Directory of discussions related to retrieval (continued)

Topic	SCP section	SCP-CDR[a] section
An assessment of the feasibility of disposing of nuclear waste in the horizontal configuration	NA	Appendix E
Waste retrieval	NA	Appendix J
Items important to retrievability at the Yucca Mountain Repository	NA	Appendix L-2
Thermomechanical analyses	NA	Appendix N

[a]SCP-CDR = Site Characterization Plan-Conceptual Design Report (SNL, 1987).
[b]NA = not applicable. Topic discussed only in SCP-CDR or in SCP.

These four functions provide the organizing framework upon which the retrieval discussions, information needs, and plans for future evaluations are based. Specific information that was used in identifying the functions are the requirements documents (DOE, 1986b; Appendix P of SNL, 1987), operations reports (Dennis et al., 1984a,b; Stinebaugh and Frostenson, 1986; Stinebaugh et al., 1986), the Project report on a strategy for retrieval-related compliance demonstrations (Flores, 1986), and the applicable portions of 10 CFR Part 60 and 10 CFR Part 960.

For each of the four functions, the system elements and processes that relate to performing the functions were identified. The system elements involved in the performance of the general functions were identified by (1) reviewing the requirements contained in the system requirements (SR) and the subsystems design requirements (SDR) (SNL, 1987, Appendix P) and (2) analyzing the defined systems definitions with respect to the general function to be performed. A figure containing the system elements defined for the Yucca Mountain Project is presented in Section 8.2.1. The processes were identified using the previously mentioned operations reports and the Project report on retrieval-related compliance demonstration (Flores, 1986).

Next, the performance measures for each of the processes were established. These measures were developed using reference design information and engineering judgment. Performance goals and levels of confidence were defined for each of the performance measures. In instances where the goal is quantifiable, specific values are presented. For performance measures that do not require site data, specific goals are not presented in the SCP. These goals will be presented in the repository design plan. In

many instances the goals are based on specific details and assumptions in the current design. The goals may change as the design and design assumptions are refined. The paragraphs and tables that follow will document the performance allocation process for each of the four functions.

Function 1: Provide access to the emplacement boreholes

To provide a safe and reliable access from the surface facilities to the emplacement boreholes, the underground openings must be usable and the environment within them must be acceptable under normal and credible abnormal conditions. The processes, performance measures, and performance goals (design criteria) involved in providing this ability are presented in Table 8.3.5.2-2. The output of this performance allocation process, shown in the table, are performance goals (design criteria).

With respect to access and drift usability, the performance goal is usability for a time period of at least 84 yr. As shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-3, this time period is generated by adding the design-basis period of retrievability (50 yr) and the actual retrieval period of 34 yr (Flores, 1986). For purposes of design, the actual retrieval period is assumed to be the time for construction of the repository (6 yr) and the emplacement of waste (28 yr), a total of 34 yr. This time period is a significant and potentially severe restriction that will impact the design, construction, and operation of the repository. For example, the materials selected for the rock support system, the necessity for a continual, long-term monitoring and maintenance program for the underground openings, the timing for backfilling operations, and the selection of an acceptable emplacement mode (vertical, short horizontal, or long horizontal boreholes) are all significantly impacted by the 84-yr duration of potential activities (Figure 8.3.5.2-3).

Subsection (2) of 10 CFR 60.111(b) allows for the use of backfill before the end of the retrievability period. Since the access and drifts will be designed to be usable throughout the retrievability period, the option to backfill will be maintained through decommissioning. The Yucca Mountain Project design basis does not include the use of backfill during the period of retrievability; hence no performance goals relative to retrieval are established for backfilling operations. Descriptions of the postclosure-related goals for backfill are provided in discussions related to sealing (Section 8.3.3.2) and to the postclosure design of the repository (Section 8.3.2.2).

To ensure that the environment in the nonoperational areas (areas that were closed off after waste was emplaced) would not be so severe as to cause reentry to be impractical, the following goals were established for the nonoperational areas:

1. For vertical emplacement, the access drift wall temperatures will not exceed 50°C for 50 yr after waste emplacement is initiated.

2. For horizontal emplacement, the emplacement drift wall temperatures will not exceed 50°C for 50 yr after waste emplacement is initiated.

These goals are referred to as the 50/50 goals. The 50°C limit was selected such that it would not be impractical to modify the environment

Table 8.3.5.2-2. Performance measures, goals, and needed confidence for processes or activities involved in providing access to the emplacement borehole for retrieval (retrieval function 1) (page 1 of 2)

Process or activity	Performance measures	Tentative goals[a]	Needed confidence
Design and construct the accesses and drifts to be usable throughout the retrievability period for normal and credible abnormal conditions	Time during which the drifts and accesses will remain usable	Time ≥84 yr	High
Develop rock support concepts that ensure maintainability	Amount of spall	Spall averages less than 3 tons per 1,000 ft of drift per year	High
	Opening displacement	Opening displacement <6 in.	High
	Frequency of maintenance	Frequency of needed maintenance in underground openings >5 yr average	Low
Develop backfill removal concepts (if needed)	Time and level of effort for backfill removal	None--the current design basis allows for backfilling during repository closure (i.e, after the period of retrievability)	NA[b]
Monitor drifts and accesses to determine maintenance needs	Localized rock and rock support displacement	Monitor displacements >1 in.	High

Table 8.3.5.2-2. Performance measures, goals, and needed confidence for processes or activities involved in providing access to the emplacement borehole for retrieval (retrieval function 1) (page 2 of 2)

Process or activity	Performance measures	Tentative goals[a]	Needed confidence
Design for a specific temperature and air quality environment within the accesses and drifts	Drift temperature	Temperature less than 50°C (for 50 yr - emplacement drift (H)[c] or access drift (V)[c])	Low
	Air quality	Air quality standards met (work areas)	High
Verify environment for maintenance and retrieval operations	Air quality	Air quality measurements adequate for retrieval operations to meet standards	High
Modify environment (as necessary)	Time required to modify the environment for retrieval	Air quality standards met within 8 weeks (unprotected)	Medium

[a]These goals are integrated with goals from other issues in the discussion of Issue 4.4, preclosure design and technical feasibility (Section 8.3.2.5, Tables 8.3.2.5-1 through 12). Site characterization related design or performance parameters, their goals, and their confidences are also established in the Issue 4.4 discussions.

[b]NA = not applicable for SCP.

[c]H = horizontal emplacement; V = vertical emplacement.



Figure 8.3.5.2-3. Retrieval time frame for design purposes

within the drifts for unprotected workers during the 50-yr period of retrievability. In addition, protected workers could reenter for inspection purposes with minimal need for environment modification.

For the working areas, the ventilation system must be capable of maintaining the environment within specified limits on a continuous basis throughout the period of retrievability and the actual retrieval period. For nonoperational areas (areas that were closed off after waste was emplaced), the goal is for the system to be capable of providing a safe environment within a reasonable period of time selected to be eight weeks after initiation of "cooldown" activities.

Function 2: Provide access to the waste packages

To provide a safe and reliable access from the emplacement drifts to the waste packages, the waste emplacement envelope (borehole, liner, shield plug, and shielding collar) must be designed to allow for removal of emplaced waste under normal and credible abnormal conditions. The processes, performance measures, and performance goals (design criteria) involved in providing this ability are presented in Table 8.3.5.2-3.

The primary concern with respect to waste package access is to ensure that the waste package does not become lodged inside the emplacement borehole. As a result, the tentative goals for liner displacement and radius of curvature were established and tentative goals for borehole rockfall and displacement were identified. For vertical emplacement, the performance goal for maximum deflection of the liner or borehole is 2 in. (5 cm) assuming a partially lined hole. For horizontal emplacement, the goal is for a maximum liner deflection of 3 in. (7.6 cm). The larger allowable deflection for horizontal emplacement is a result of the larger diameter (hence, more clearance) of the emplacement boreholes. To ensure that the waste package does not bind against the liner for horizontal emplacement, the radius of curvature for the borehole and liner should be 110 ft (33.5 m) or greater. For both emplacement methods, the liner lifetime will be 84 yr or greater. The rationale for the 84-yr period is provided under Function 1.

The ability to perform this function will be one of the significant concerns in selecting the preferable emplacement mode. Particularly important will be a thorough and critical evaluation of the potential for excessive liner deflection in horizontal boreholes as a result of rockfall, seismic effects or excessive temperatures. If such abnormal conditions were found to be credible, relatively complicated retrieval operations would be required.

Function 3: Remove waste package from the emplacement borehole

To ensure that the waste package can be removed from the emplacement boreholes, the transporter and the waste package are being designed to allow for removal of the emplaced waste package under normal and credible abnormal conditions. In the horizontal case, a dolly also is included in the current design concepts. The processes, performance measures, and performance goals involved in providing this ability are presented in Table 8.3.5.2-4.

Table 8.3.5.2-3. Performance measures, goals, and needed confidence for processes or activities involved in providing access to the waste packages for retrieval (retrieval function 2) (page 1 of 2)

Process or activity	Performance measures	Tentative goals[a]	Needed confidence
Design waste emplacement envelope to allow access to the waste package throughout the retrievability period for normal and credible abnormal conditions	Borehole usability		
	Rockfall	Average rockfall <250 lb per foot of borehole	Medium
	Displacement of borehole wall	Rock displacement <2 in.	Medium
	Borehole liner lifetime	Liner lifetime ≥84 yr	High
	Borehole liner displacement	Liner displacement <2 in. (V)[b]	High
		Liner displacement <3 in. (H)[b]	High
	Borehole liner curvature radius	Liner curvature radius >110 ft (H)	Medium
Assess the condition of the emplacement envelope and waste package prior to removal (as required)	Borehole liner displacement	Detect displacement >0.5 in.	Medium

Table 8.3.5.2-3. Performance measures, goals, and needed confidence for processes or activities involved in providing access to the waste packages for retrieval (retrieval function 2) (page 2 of 2)

Process or activity	Performance measures	Tentative goals[a]	Needed confidence
Perform corrective actions (as required)	Time required to perform corrective actions	Average time <1 month per drift (normal conditions)	Medium
		Timely manner considering site-specific credible abnormal conditions. For planning purposes, time <1 yr is assumed for each event.	Medium

[a]These goals are integrated with goals from other issues in the discussion of Issue 4.4, preclosure design and technical feasibility (Section 8.3.2.5, Tables 8.3.2.5-1 through 12). Site characterization related design or performance parameters, their goals, and their confidences are also established in the Issue 4.4 discussions.
[b]V = vertical emplacement; H = horizontal emplacement.

Table 8.3.5.2-4. Performance measures, goals, and needed confidence for processes or activities involved in removing waste packages from emplacement boreholes (retrieval function 3) (page 1 of 2)

Process or activity	Performance measures	Tentative goals[a]	Needed confidence
Design the waste package and transporter with the option to remove the waste for normal and credible abnormal conditions	Radiation protection	Worker dose less than allowable dose (see Issue 2.7 for specific goals and needed parameters)	High
	Time required to perform waste removal	Average time for removal less than twice the time for emplacement	Medium
	Removal latch and pull strength	These performance measures do not require site data and will be addressed in the repository design plan	NA[b]
	Structural strength of the waste package or dolly	These performance measures do not require site data and will be addressed in the repository design plan	NA
Verify conditions of equipment and waste package	Waste package structural failure detection	These performance measures do not require site data and will be addressed in the repository design plan	NA
	Removal equipment performance	These performance measures do not require site data and will be addressed in the repository design plan	NA

Table 8.3.5.2-4. Performance measures, goals, and needed confidence for processes or activities involved in removing waste packages from emplacement boreholes (retrieval function 3) (page 2 of 2)

Process or activity	Performance measures	Tentative goals[a]	Needed confidence
Verify operator training	Operator competency certification	These performance measures do not require site data and will be addressed in the repository design plan	NA

[a]These goals are integrated with goals from other issues in the discussion of Issue 4.4, preclosure design and technical feasibility (Section 8.3.2.5, Tables 8.3.2.5-1 through 12). Site characterization related design or performance parameters, their goals, and their confidences are also established in the Issue 4.4 discussions.

[b]NA = not applicable for SCP.

Of primary concern is the ability of the host rock and shielding collar to provide an acceptable level of shielding during waste removal. Consequently, the performance goal is to provide shielding such that radiation dose levels to the workers do not exceed the design limits that are established in Issue 2.7 (repository radiological design criteria (preclosure), Section 8.3.2.3). Shielding analyses and requirements for site data are addressed in Issue 4.4 (preclosure design and technical feasibility, Section 8.3.2.5). The second performance goal addresses the time allowed for removal of a waste package from an emplacement borehole. For purposes of initial design evaluations, the time allowed for the removal of a waste package (under normal conditions) has been selected to be less than twice the amount of time that was allowed for the emplacement of a waste package. The rest of the performance measures for function 3 do not involve site data not already being requested. As a result, the corresponding performance goals will be addressed in the repository design plan to be published prior to the advanced conceptual design.

The ability to perform this function for credible abnormal events could be among the most difficult repository operations. The operations are complicated by the high-temperature, radioactive environment, the need to handle containers some of which may have been emplaced for more than 50 yr, and the uncertainties regarding the condition of the boreholes and waste containers. Hence, to think of these operations as the reverse of emplacement would be an understatement of the potential operational difficulties. Selected operations to perform this function will probably require proof-of-principle demonstrations in accordance with DOE policy (DOE, 1986c). In-depth plans will be developed for these equipment demonstrations, however designs and further identification and evaluation of related credible abnormal conditions will be developed before demonstration tests can be planned in detail. Nevertheless, Section 8.3.5.2.4 describes the current list of equipment components that might need to be demonstrated.

Function 4: Transport and deliver the waste packages to the surface facilities

The transporter must be developed to allow for transport of the waste packages to the surface and unloading at the surface. The surface waste handling building must be designed and constructed to allow for unloading of waste. Transport and unloading must be performed under normal and credible abnormal conditions. As discussed in the introduction to this section, the surface storage of retrieved waste and offsite transport are not included in the retrieval discussions. The processes, performance measures, and performance goals for function 4 are presented in Table 8.3.5.2-5. The requirements for access and drift usability and for an acceptable environment are included under function 1, access to the boreholes (Table 8.3.5.2-2).

Hence, for function 4, it is assumed that the accesses and drifts are usable and that an acceptable environment exists, even if substantial maintenance had to be performed.

Numerous analyses of the performance and design of the transporter will be needed to evaluate its ability to safely and reliably transport the waste. Evaluations of accident conditions, reliability, and efficiency will be made.

Table 8.3.5.2-5. Performance measures, goals, and needed confidence for processes or activities involved in transporting and delivering the waste to the surface facilities (retrieval function 4)[a] (page 1 of 2)

Process or activity	Performance measures	Tentative goals[b]	Needed confidence
Design the transporter with the ability to transport the waste to the surface for normal and credible abnormal conditions	Transporter design characteristics (braking ability, maximum speed, cornering ability, radiation protection)	Transporter must be able to operate with anticipated rockfall in accesses and drifts	High
	Time required to transport the waste to the surface	These performance measures do not require site data and will be discussed in the repository design plan	NA[c]
Design the surface waste-handling building and the transporter with the ability to unload waste at the surface facilities for normal and credible abnormal conditions	Time required to unload waste	These performance measures do not require site data and will be discussed in the repository design plan	NA
	Radiation protection	These performance measures do not require site data and will be discussed in the repository design plan	NA
	Transporter unloading capability	These performance measures do not require site data and will be discussed in the repository design plan	NA
Assess the ability to transport the waste to the surface facilities	Transporter drive system performance	These performance measures do not require site data and will be discussed in the repository design plan	NA

Table 8.3.5.2-5. Performance measures, goals, and needed confidence for processes or activities involved in transporting and delivering the waste to the surface facilities (retrieval function 4)[a] (page 2 of 2)

Process or activity	Performance measures	Tentative goals[b]	Needed confidence
Assess the ability to transport the waste to the surface facility (continued)	Operator competency certification	These performance measures do not require site data and will be discussed in the repository design plan	NA
Assess the ability to unload the waste at the waste-handling building	Transporter unloading system	These performance measures do not require site data and will be discussed in the repository design plan	NA
	Surface facility unloading system performance	These performance measures do not require site data and will be discussed in the repository design plan	NA
	Operator competency certification waste to the surface	These performance measures do not require site data and will be discussed in the repository design plan	NA

[a]Requirements for access and drift usability for transporter operation are included under function 1 (Table 8.3.5.2-1).

[b]These goals are integrated with goals from other issues in the discussion of Issue 4.4, preclosure design and technical feasibility (Section 8.3.2.5, Tables 8.3.2.5-1 through 12). Site characterization related design or performance parameters, their goals, and their confidences are also established in the Issue 4.4 discussions.

[c]NA = not applicable for SCP.

Interrelationships of information needs

The content of Tables 8.3.5.2-2 through 8.3.5.2-5 and the accompanying text cover performance allocation steps in the issue resolution strategy presented in Figure 8.3.5.2-1. The balance of the steps in the issue resolution strategy will be discussed in terms of the following information needs.

Information need	Subject
2.4.1	Site and design data required to support retrieval (Section 8.3.5.2.1)
2.4.2	Determination that access to the waste emplacement boreholes can be provided throughout the period of retrievability and the actual retrieval period for normal and credible abnormal conditions (Section 8.3.5.2.2)
2.4.3	Determination that access to the waste packages can be provided throughout the period of retrievability and the actual retrieval period for normal and credible abnormal conditions (Section 8.3.5.2.3)
2.4.4	Determination that the waste can be removed from the emplacement boreholes for normal and credible abnormal conditions (Section 8.3.5.2.4)
2.4.5	Determination that the waste can be transported to the surface and delivered to the waste-handling surface facilities for normal and credible abnormal conditions (Section 8.3.5.2.5)
2.4.6	Determination that the retrieval requirements set forth in 10 CFR 60.111(b) are met using reasonably available technology (Section 8.3.5.2.6)

There is a direct relationship between the logic shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-1 for the resolution of the waste retrievability issue and its information needs because the information needs were derived from the work that must be performed to ensure that the requirements for retrievability are met. The information needs can be categorized as follows:

1. The first information need is a summary of the information that will be communicated to Issue 4.4. This communication is shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-1 in the box labeled "transmit performance goals (design criteria), retrieval conditions, and requests for input items to Issue 4.4."

2. The next four information needs correspond directly to the four retrieval functions and address what needs to be done to ensure that the option to retrieve is maintained. These information needs are responsible for the development of performance goals (design criteria), retrieval conditions, and requests for input items as shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-1.

3. The last information need ties the other information needs together and addresses the global requirements for retrieval to be completed on a "reasonable schedule" and for the use of "reasonably available technology." This work involves performing the compliance analysis indicated in Figure 8.3.5.2-1.

As shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-1, the logic for resolution of this issue involves an iterative process. As the repository and equipment designs are refined, work will be performed under this issue in the following areas:

1. The performance goals (design criteria), retrieval conditions, and input item requirements will be refined.

2. The strategy and planning documents will be refined.

3. Compliance analyses will be performed to verify that the design meets all of the requirements for retrievability.

8.3.5.2.1 Information Need 2.4.1: Site and design data required to support retrieval

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Issue 2.4 requires that compliance with the retrievability requirements be demonstrated using reasonably available technology. Information Need 2.4.1 requires that site and design data (input items) needed by this issue be identified. This identification is necessary to ensure the proper data are acquired during site characterization and to ensure all required design products developed by Issue 4.4 are provided to this issue. In addition, the design criteria (performance goals) and retrieval conditions established under this issue are communicated to Issue 4.4, preclosure design and technical feasibility, to ensure sufficient consideration for retrieval in the design process.

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

Chapter 6 presents the current design, and the status of this issue is summarized in Section 6.4.8. Retrieval-related performance goals (design criteria) that were considered in the development of the current design are presented in Section 6.1.1.7. The status on the development of retrieval conditions is presented in Section 6.4.8.2.2.

Parameters

Because the retrieval-related design, support analyses and equipment tests and demonstrations are performed under Issue 4.4, site data needed to support these analyses and tests are specified by Issue 4.4. Requirements for products from Issue 4.4 are presented in the form of requests for input items. The current list of input items requested by this issue is shown in Table 8.3.5.2-6. More detailed information relative to the content of the input items is provided in later sections that discuss Information Needs 2.4.2 through 2.4.6 (Sections 8.3.5.2.2 through 8.3.5.2.6, respectively). The performance goals (design criteria) and retrieval conditions are presented in Tables 8.3.5.2-7 and 8.3.5.2-8, respectively. Generation of the actual performance goals was discussed in step 2 of the performance allocation process presented in the approach to resolving the issue section for this issue. Any refinement or updating of these performance goals will be addressed in design requirements documents in support of each phase of the repository design and will be reported in SCP progress reports.

As part of the resolution of this waste retrievability issue, Information Need 2.4.1 identifies the input items (products of Issue 4.4, preclosure design and feasibility) that are needed to evaluate whether performance goals of this issue are met and, in turn, to ensure compliance with the retrievability requirements. In addition, Information Need 2.4.1 facilitates the communication between this issue and Issue 4.4 (see Figure 8.3.5.2-2) by transmitting the performance goals (design criteria) and retrieval conditions, generated by Issue 2.4, to Issue 4.4, and by requesting the input items from Issue 4.4. (Information Need 2.4.1 also receives the design products from Issue 4.4 and distributes them, as input items, to Information Needs 2.4.2 through 2.4.6 for use in performing the compliance analysis.)

8.3.5.2.1.1 Application of results

As shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-2, results or products of this information need are performance goals, retrieval conditions, and calls for input items that are transmitted to Issue 4.4.

Table 8.3.5.2-6. Retrieval-related input items (to be provided by Issue 4.4)

Information need	Input item
2.4.2	Drift and access design and supporting evidence
	Rock support system design and supporting analyses
	Monitoring system (rock movement) and support analyses
	Drift and access maintenance program concepts and supporting evidence
	Ventilation system design and supporting analyses (for retrieval operations)
	Basis for ensuring air quality in operational areas and evaluating air quality in nonoperational areas
2.4.3	Waste emplacement envelope design and supporting analyses
	Waste emplacement envelope assessment
	Corrective actions (waste emplacement envelope)
2.4.4	Waste package removal system design and supporting analyses
	Concepts for borehole preparation for waste removal and supporting evidence
	Demonstrations of borehole preparation for waste removal and supporting evidence
2.4.5	Transporter design concepts and supporting analyses
	Unloading equipment design (surface facility) and supporting analyses
	Demonstrations for waste transport
	Demonstrations for waste unloading at the surface

Table 8.3.5.2-6. Retrieval-related input items (to be provided by Issue 4.4) (continued)

Information need	Input item
2.4.6	Reference operations plans
	Basis for establishing the use of reasonably available technology for retrieval-related equipment
	Reference design and supporting analyses

Table 8.3.5.2-7. Retrieval-related design or performance goals (design criteria)

Information need	Design or performance goal
2.4.2	The access and drifts will remain usable for at least 84 yr
	The average amount of spall in the drifts will be less than 3 tons per 1,000 ft of drift per year
	The rock displacement in the drifts will be less than 6 in.
	The monitoring system will detect rock displacements within the drifts that exceed 1 in.
	The frequency of maintenance within the underground openings will be greater than 5 yr
	For the vertical emplacement concept, the temperature within the access drifts will not exceed 50°C for 50 yr after waste emplacement
	For the horizontal emplacement concept, the temperature within the emplacement drifts will not exceed 50°C for 50 yr after waste emplacement
	For operational areas, all applicable air quality standards will be met
	The time required to modify the environment within closed drifts for unprotected workers will not exceed 8 wk
2.4.3	Rockfall within the emplacement boreholes will average less than 250 lb per foot of borehole
	Displacement of the borehole wall will be less than 2 in.
	The liner lifetime will be at least 84 yr
	The maximum liner deflection is 2 in. (5 cm) for the vertical emplacement concept and 3 in. (7.6 cm) for the horizontal concept
	For the horizontal emplacement concept, the minimum radius of curvature for the liner is 110 ft (33.5 m)

Table 8.3.5.2-7. Retrieval-related design or performance goals (design criteria) (continued)

Information need	Design or performance goal
2.4.4	The time required per container for waste removal will not exceed twice the amount of time required for emplacement of a waste container
	Worker dose rate during removal operations will not exceed the allowable rate established in Issue 2.7, repository radiological design criteria (preclosure)
	The ability to perform borehole preparation tasks will be demonstrated
	The ability to remove the waste containers under normal and credible abnormal conditions will be demonstrated
2.4.5	None related to site characterization
2.4.6	The design basis for the actual retrieval period is 34 yr
	The ability to perform the retrieval operations using reasonably available technology is required

Table 8.3.5.2-8. Potential abnormal conditions for retrieval

Information need	Potential abnormal condition
2.4.2	Rockfall within the ramp due to a seismic event, faulting, variability in rock strength, a maintenance error, or corrosion-induced rockbolt failure
	Rockfall within a drift due to faulting, variability in rock strength, a maintenance error, corrosion-induced rockbolt failure, or human error resulting in excessive thermal loading
	Rockfall within a shaft due to faulting or variability in rock strength
	A ventilation system malfunction due to a seismic event, an equipment fabrication error, or a maintenance error
	Loss of offsite power due to a seismic event
2.4.3	Rockfall in the emplacement borehole (vertical only) due to a seismic event, faulting, variability in rock strength, or excessive thermal loading resulting from human error
	Axial movement of the waste container (horizontal only) due to a seismic event
	Waste container tilt (vertical only) due to a seismic event
	Shield plug jam due to a seismic event, or a fabrication error
	Excessive liner deflection (horizontal only) due to faulting, a fabrication error, or excessive corrosion resulting from radiolysis
	A collar malfunction due to a fabrication or maintenance error
	An auxiliary equipment malfunction due to a fabrication or maintenance error
2.4.4	A cask-collar bind due to a seismic event
	A dolly failure during removal (horizontal only) due to a fabrication error or excessive corrosion resulting from radiolysis

Table 8.3.5.2-8. Potential abnormal conditions for retrieval (continued)

Information need	Potential abnormal condition
	A waste container pintle failure (vertical only) due to excessive corrosion resulting from radiolysis
	A malfunction of the transporter removal equipment due to a maintenance error
	Unspecified failures due to operator error including errors during alignment and waste removal
2.4.5	A transporter malfunction during transport or unloading due to a maintenance error
	A transporter collision with the ramp, a drift, auxiliary equipment, or another transporter due to human error
	Unspecified malfunctions due to operator error, including errors during alignment and waste unloading operations

8.3.5.2.2 Information Need 2.4.2: Determination that access to the waste emplacement boreholes can be provided throughout the retrievability period for normal and credible abnormal conditions

This section describes the work that will be performed under Information Need 2.4.2 to ensure safe and reliable access to the emplacement boreholes throughout the period of retrievability and the actual retrieval period. Ensuring safe and reliable access to the emplacement boreholes consists of providing usable openings and providing an acceptable working environment for waste retrieval under both normal and credible abnormal conditions. Access to the emplacement boreholes is function 1 of the four functions discussed for this issue in the introductory material to this section.

The work performed under Information Need 2.4.2 focuses on (1) developing performance goals (design criteria) for retrieval-related aspects of the overall repository design to be developed under Issue 4.4; (2) defining the spectrum of retrieval conditions to be considered in the overall design; (3) identifying requirements for products from Issue 4.4 to be used as input items for subsequent compliance analyses; and (4) performing compliance analyses to ensure that the performance goals for function 1, access to the emplacement boreholes, are met.

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

For Information Need 2.4.2, links to the technical data chapters fall into three categories: rock mechanics, ventilation systems, and retrieval conditions. The current drift designs are presented in Sections 6.2.6.1 through 6.2.6.3. Ground support systems for the drifts are discussed in Section 6.2.6.3.6. Ventilation system designs are presented in Section 6.2.6.5, and retrieval conditions are discussed in Section 6.4.8.2.2. Geomechanical and ventilation system analyses are presented in Section 6.4.10.2.6.

There are numerous links to sections in the Site Characterization Plan-Conceptual Design Report (SCP-CDR) (SNL, 1987): Geomechanical discussions are contained in Appendix N of the SCP-CDR. Ventilation discussions are contained in Sections 3.4.2.2 (maintenance and retrieval), 3.4.2.3 (air cooling--vertical emplacement, and 3.4.3.3 air cooling--horizontal emplacement) and in Appendix C (ventilation and cooling analyses). Retrieval conditions are addressed in Section 6.3.1 and Appendices A (temperature), J (normal and abnormal), and L (items important to retrievability).

Parameters

As noted earlier, site data needs are specified by Issue 4.4. However, this information need requires numerous input items (i.e., products from Issue 4.4) for use in analyses to ensure that the performance goals defined for this function are met. These input items and the required content are presented in Table 8.3.5.2-9.

The normal retrieval conditions are being developed in terms of opening stability (rockfall and distortion), rock temperature, and air quality (temperature, humidity, and contaminant levels). Work completed during conceptual design on quantification of these conditions is contained in Sections 6.4.8.2.2 and 6.4.10.6.2. The current set of abnormal conditions was developed during the study of items important to retrieval (SNL, 1987, Appendix L). The list of potential abnormal conditions for Information Need 2.4.2 is presented in Table 8.3.5.2-7 in Section 8.3.5.2.1. As a result of the study of items important to retrieval, a ventilation system malfunction as a result of a seismic event or a maintenance error was considered to be the only abnormal condition that could result in a significant delay in completing retrieval operations. A significant delay was considered to be a delay of six months or more.

Logic

Information Need 2.4.2 uses the results of the performance allocation process for function 1 (Table 8.3.5.2-2) as a starting point and continues the issue resolution process as shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-1. Performance goals are taken from step five in Table 8.3.5.2-2 and used as design criteria. Requirements for input items are developed to ensure that sufficient detail

Table 8.3.5.2-9. Input items to be provided by Issue 4.4 for Information Need 2.4.2 (access to emplacement boreholes) (page 1 of 2)

Item number	Subject	Description
1	Drift and access design and supporting technical evidence	This item includes design concepts for the accesses and drifts and results from design analyses, tests, and demonstrations performed under Issue 4.4 that verify drift and access usability under both normal and credible abnormal conditions. The results from near-field thermomechanical modeling, exploratory shaft facility (ESF) validation testing, and demonstrations of the construction techniques performed at G-Tunnel and the ESF are required.
2	Rock support system design and supporting analyses	This item includes the design concepts for the rock support system and results from design analyses and tests performed under Issue 4.4. Specific data on estimated sizes and amounts of rockfall under normal and credible abnormal conditions are required.
3	Monitoring system design (rock movement) and supporting analyses	This item includes the basis for identifying monitoring locations and the design of the monitoring system
4	Drift and access maintenance program concepts and supporting evidence	To ensure maintainability of the drifts and accesses, maintenance program details including expected schedules, equipment requirements, and analyses used to establish the maintenance program are required.
5	Ventilation system design and supporting analyses	This item includes ventilation design concepts and supporting analyses to ensure that air quality standards are met for temperature, humidity, particulate contamination, and concentration of contaminant gases, including radon-222, under both normal and credible abnormal conditions. This requires

Table 8.3.5.2-9. Input items to be provided by Issue 4.4 for Information Need 2.4.2 (access to waste emplacement boreholes) (page 2 of 2)

Item number	Subject	Description
5	Ventilation system design and supporting analyses (continued)	results from thermal, moisture, dust suppression, and air flow analyses, determination of inlet air characteristics and underground production rates of contaminant gases (personnel, equipment, and host media).
6	Basis for ensuring air quality in operational areas	This item includes the identification of the applicable regulations for air quality and the technical basis for verifying that all applicable air quality standards have been met under both normal and credible abnormal conditions. The design for the monitoring system to verify air quality is required.
7	Environment modification concepts and supporting analyses for closed drifts	Environment modification for operational areas is addressed under item 6. For this item, the concepts and supporting analyses for modification of the environment within closed drifts, for reentry purposes under both normal and credible abnormal conditions, is required. This includes environment modification concepts, including equipment modification requirements, requirements for additional equipment (if needed), results from thermal analyses, and the basis for thermal calculations.

and supporting evidence are available for the compliance analyses to verify that the performance goals are met. Retrieval conditions are developed using existing design information to ensure that a complete set of retrieval scenarios are considered in the design process. The performance goals (design criteria), requests for input items, and retrieval conditions are then sent to Issue 4.4, via Information Need 2.4.1, for use in developing designs, specifying supporting analyses, and for defining tests and demonstrations that are required. Specific work to be performed by Issue 4.4 for this information need includes

1. Developing drift designs using the thermomechanical analyses, G-Tunnel comparisons, and ESF tests.

2. Developing rock support systems based on analytic models, experience gained at G-Tunnel, and ESF tests.

3. Developing scenarios to evaluate the performance of the rock support systems under both normal and credible abnormal conditions and performing any tests or demonstrations needed.

4. Developing a maintenance program for drifts and accesses based on G-Tunnel experience, ESF tests, and experience during construction, operation, and caretaker phases. This includes developing contingency plans for installation of additional support system materials, if needed.

5. Developing monitoring systems to detect rock movement.

6. Developing a ventilation system design based on analytical models, G-Tunnel experience, and ESF tests. This development considers continuous ventilation requirements for operational areas and cooldown requirements for closed emplacement drifts.

7. Developing scenarios to evaluate the performance of the ventilation system under both normal and credible abnormal conditions and performing any tests or demonstrations that are needed.

8. Developing monitoring systems to verify air quality in operational areas and to evaluate the conditions within closed drifts before reentry.

The stability of mined openings is of particular concern. Evaluations of the thermal and mechanical effects on the stability of shafts, ramps, drifts, and boreholes have been the focus of about 15 reports or studies synopsized in SCP-CDR Section 8.3.7 (SNL, 1987). Rather than repeating the synopses here, the reader is referred to the SCP-CDR for details. These analyses have used a variety of numerical and empirical approaches: finite-element methods, boundary-element methods, and tunnel-indexing methods. Similarly, different constitutive models were employed: elastic, ubiquitous-joint, compliant-joint, and elastic-plastic models. Other items that have been varied in some of the analyses include opening sizes and shapes, depths, thermal and mechanical properties, fracture properties, and

in situ conditions. The common conclusions drawn from the approaches used to date are

1. Drifts, shafts, and ramps, as currently designed, are predicted to remain stable during preclosure.

2. Waste emplacement boreholes are predicted to remain stable during preclosure, although some potential exists for negligible amounts of rock to fall on the liner planned for use in horizontal emplacement holes.

3. Excavation-induced responses of openings in the Topopah Spring tuff should be expected to be similar to those in the Grouse Canyon tuff in G-Tunnel.

Further studies are planned during the advanced conceptual design phase to evaluate retrieval under potential abnormal conditions like those listed in Table 8.3.5.2-8 in the technical basis section for Information Need 2.4.1 (Section 8.3.5.2.1).

The results of this work in the form of input item responses are obtained from Issue 4.4. A compliance analysis to evaluate whether the design actually provides for the ability to access the emplacement boreholes as required is then performed under Information Need 2.4.2. As shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-1, this compliance analysis evaluates the completeness and sufficiency of the responses to the input items and the retrieval conditions and determines whether the performance goals have been met. For function 1, this involves evaluating the drift designs, rock support system and monitoring system (rock movement) designs, the maintenance program, and all the supporting evidence (results from analyses, G-Tunnel comparisons, ESF tests, and scenario development) to verify that usable openings will be available for 84 yr. In addition, the compliance analysis involves evaluating the ventilation system design, air quality monitoring system design, and all of the supporting evidence (results from ventilation system analyses, G-Tunnel tests, ESF tests, and scenario development) to verify that an acceptable environment can be established within the drifts. Negative responses to the three tests for the compliance analysis can be followed in Figure 8.3.5.2-1. They involve modification of input items, performance goals, or the design. If modification is not possible, a noncompliance exists for the design. If the results of all three tests are positive, then, relative to function 1 (access to the boreholes), compliance exists for the design. The results of the compliance analysis for function 1 are sent to Information Need 2.4.6 to be combined with the results from the other information needs for publication as a topical report.

8.3.5.2.2.1 Application of results

The performance goals, input items, and retrieval conditions developed under this information need are sent to Information Need 2.4.1 for communication with Issue 4.4. The results of the compliance analysis will be sent to Information Need 2.4.6 to be combined with the results from Information

Needs 2.4.3, 2.4.4, and 2.4.5 for the development of the compliance analysis for this issue.

8.3.5.2.3 Information Need 2.4.3: Determination that access to the waste packages can be provided throughout the retrievability period for normal and credible abnormal conditions

This discussion describes the work that will be performed under this information need to ensure safe and reliable access to the emplaced waste package (function 2). As indicated in Table 8.3.5.2-3 the design of the emplacement envelope (borehole, liner, shield plug, and collar) is of primary concern relative to providing access to the waste packages for both normal and credible abnormal conditions.

The work performed here, similar to the previous information need, focuses on (1) developing performance goals (design criteria) for equipment and operations related to the maintenance of access to the emplaced waste, (2) defining retrieval conditions for the emplacement envelope, (3) identifying requirements for products from Issue 4.4 to be used as input items for subsequent compliance analysis, and (4) performing a compliance analysis to ensure that the performance goals for function 2, access to the waste packages, are met.

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

The emplacement envelope layouts are discussed in Sections 6.2.6.2 and 6.2.6.3 for the vertical and horizontal configurations, respectively. Operations are discussed in Section 6.2.3.2. Geomechanical analyses for the emplacement borehole are presented in Section 6.4.10.2.6, and retrieval conditions are discussed in Section 6.4.8.2.2.

There are numerous links to sections in the SCP-CDR (SNL, 1987): Geomechanical discussions are contained in Appendix N. Equipment discussions are contained in Section 3.2.2.2 (operations) and Appendices B (liner stress analysis), D (equipment descriptions), and J (retrieval operations). Retrieval conditions are addressed in Section 6.3.1 and Appendices A (borehole temperatures), J (normal and abnormal), and L (items important to retrievability).

Parameters

This information need requires three input items from Issue 4.4 for use in analyses to ensure that the performance goals defined for function 2, access to the emplaced waste, are met. These required input items are presented in Table 8.3.5.2-10.

The normal retrieval conditions are being developed in terms of borehole stability (rockfall and distortion), borehole rock temperature, radiation levels, and condition of the liner. Work completed to quantify these conditions is described in Sections 6.4.8.2.2. The current set of abnormal

Table 8.3.5.2-10. Input items to be provided by Issue 4.4 for Information Need 2.4.3 (access to waste packages)

Item number	Subject	Description
1	Waste emplacement envelope design and supporting analyses	The design concepts and supporting analyses used for the waste emplacement envelope are required. This includes providing estimates of rockfall within the borehole (type and amount), borehole distortion, liner deflection, liner stress, liner corrosion rate, and liner lifetime under normal and credible abnormal conditions.
2	Waste emplacement envelope assessment	This item includes the normal and credible abnormal conditions for the waste emplacement envelope, requirements for assessment of the conditions of the waste emplacement envelope (at the time of retrieval), assessment of equipment design and supporting analyses, and the requirements for and results from any tests or demonstrations.
3	Corrective actions	This item includes the identification of corrective actions that may be required under normal and credible abnormal conditions, the design and supporting analyses for equipment to perform the corrective actions, and the results of any tests or demonstrations.

conditions was developed during the study of items important to retrieval (Appendix L of SNL, 1987). The list of potential abnormal conditions for Information Need 2.4.3 is presented in Table 8.3.5.2-7 in Section 8.3.5.2.1. As a result of the study of items important to retrieval, three conditions were identified that could result in a significant delay in completing retrieval operations:

1. In the vertical configuration, rockfall into the borehole could occur as a result of a seismic event.

2. In the vertical configuration, a waste container misalignment or "tilt" in the borehole could result from a seismic event.

3. Shield plugs could jam as the result of a seismic event.

Logic

Information Need 2.4.3 uses the results of the performance allocation process for function 2 (see Table 8.3.5.2-3) as a starting point and continues the issue resolution process as shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-1. Performance goals are taken from Table 8.3.5.2-3 and used as design criteria. Input item requirements are developed to ensure that sufficient detail and supporting evidence are available for the compliance analysis. Retrieval conditions are developed using existing design information to ensure that a complete set of retrieval scenarios is considered in the design process. Specific work to be performed by Issue 4.4 for this information need includes

1. Developing borehole designs using thermomechanical analyses, G-Tunnel comparisons, and exploratory shaft facility (ESF) tests.

2. Designing the liner based on analytic models, experience in the mining industry, and corrosion test results.

3. Designing the shield plug based on analytic models and experience in the nuclear industry.

4. Designing the shielding closure based on analytic models and experience in the nuclear industry.

5. Developing scenarios to estimate the performance of the emplacement envelope under both normal and credible abnormal conditions and performing any tests or demonstrations needed. It is anticipated that proof-of-principle demonstrations may be required for some of the equipment related to retrieval under abnormal conditions. The reader is referred to Section 3.2.2 and Appendix J in the SCP-CDR (SNL, 1987).

6. Developing the equipment required to verify the condition of the waste emplacement envelope before waste removal.

7. Developing the equipment and operations to perform corrective actions that may be required to restore acceptable access to the waste packages.

The conditions within the emplacement boreholes can be characterized in terms of the following parameters: rock temperature, condition of the opening, radiation levels, and condition of the borehole liner.

1. The predicted temperature histories for the emplacement boreholes for the vertical and horizontal emplacement concepts are discussed in the SCP-CDR, Appendix J (SNL, 1987). As shown in that section, the temperature remains above 100°C throughout the retrievability period; therefore, a dry environment in the emplacement borehole is anticipated.

2. For the vertical emplacement concept, the borehole is expected to be stable with negligible amounts of rockfall into the emplacement borehole under normal conditions. For the horizontal concept, minor rockfall against the liner is anticipated. In addition, as noted previously, a dry environment, as a result of high temperatures, is expected.

3. At the time of emplacement, the waste container surface radiation levels for spent fuel (pressurized water reactor) are estimated at 1×10^5 rem/h for gamma and 1×10^2 mrem/h for neutron radiation (O'Brien, 1985). These surface radiation levels are used as the worst-case levels for shielding design.

4. Under normal conditions, the liner will be intact and provide acceptable access to the emplaced waste containers throughout the design-basis 84-yr retrievability period.

Further studies are planned during the advanced conceptual design phase to evaluate retrieval under credible abnormal conditions like those listed in Table 8.3.5.2-8 in Section 8.3.5.2.1.

Issue 4.4 returns the results of this work in the form of input item responses. Information Need 2.4.3 performs a compliance analysis to evaluate whether the design actually provides for the ability to access the emplacement boreholes as required. As shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-1, this compliance analysis evaluates the completeness and sufficiency of the responses to the input items and the retrieval conditions and determines whether the performance goals have been met. For function 2, this involves evaluating the emplacement envelope design (borehole, liner, shield plug, and shielding collar), the concepts for the assessment of the condition of the waste emplacement envelope, the equipment design and operations for performing corrective action, and supporting evidence (analyses, G-Tunnel comparisons and tests, experience in the mining and nuclear industries, ESF tests, corrosion tests, demonstrations, and scenarios). The results of the compliance analysis for function 2 are sent to Information Need 2.4.6 to be combined with the results from the other information needs.

8.3.5.2.3.1 Application of results

The performance goals, input item requests, and retrieval conditions developed under this information need are sent to Issue 4.4. The results of

the compliance analysis for function 2 will be sent to Information Need 2.4.6 to be combined with the results of other retrieval-related information needs as part of the development of the compliance analysis for Issue 2.4.

8.3.5.2.4 Information Need 2.4.4: Determination that the waste can be removed from the emplacement boreholes for normal and credible abnormal conditions

The discussion under this information need describes the work that will be performed to ensure that the ability to remove the emplaced waste from the emplacement boreholes is maintained (function 3). Design of the waste package and the transporter waste removal equipment is of primary concern relative to providing the ability to remove the emplaced waste for both normal and credible abnormal conditions.

The work performed under Information Need 2.4.4 focuses on the four steps: (1) developing performance goals, (2) defining retrieval conditions for the waste removal operations, (3) identifying input items and their needed content, and (4) performing a compliance analysis to ensure that the performance goals are met.

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

Links to the conceptual designs of the repository and waste package (Chapters 6 and 7, respectively) include three categories: removal equipment design and supporting analyses, waste package design and supporting analyses, and retrieval conditions. Equipment design is discussed in Sections 6.2.6.2 (vertical emplacement mode), 6.2.6.3 (horizontal emplacement mode), and 6.2.9.3 (equipment development). Operations are discussed in Section 6.2.3.2. The current waste package designs and supporting analyses are presented in Sections 7.3 and 7.4. Retrieval conditions are discussed in Section 6.4.8.2.2.

Sections in the SCP-CDR (SNL, 1987) contain discussions related to waste removal from the boreholes. Equipment discussions are contained in Section 3.2.2.2 (operations) and Appendices B (liner stress analysis), D (equipment descriptions), and J (retrieval operations). Waste package discussions are contained in Section 2.1 (basis). Retrieval conditions are addressed in Section 6.3.1 and Appendices A (temperature), J (normal and abnormal), and L (items important to retrievability).

Parameters

This information need requires three input items from Issue 4.4 to ensure that the performance goals defined for function 3 (waste removal) are met. These required input items are presented in Table 8.3.5.2-11.

Normal retrieval conditions are being identified for the waste removal equipment and waste packages. Work completed to quantify the conditions is

Table 8.3.5.2-11. Input items to be provided by Issue 4.4 for Information Need 2.4.4 (removal of waste from boreholes)

Item number	Subject	Description
1	Waste package removal design and supporting analyses	This item includes the design concepts and supporting analyses for the waste package removal equipment, the waste package, the dolly (if used), and the shielding collar.
2	Concepts for borehole preparation for retrieval and supporting evidence	This item includes the design concepts and the supporting analyses related to preparation of the emplacement borehole for waste retrieval under normal and credible abnormal conditions.
3	Demonstrations of borehole preparation and waste removal	The requirements for and results of any demonstrations for borehole preparation and waste removal under normal and credible abnormal conditions are required.

described in Section 6.4.8.2.2. The current set of credible abnormal conditions was developed during the study of items important to retrieval (Appendix L of SNL, 1987). The list of potential abnormal conditions for Information Need 2.4.4 is presented in Table 8.3.5.2-8 in Section 8.3.5.2.1. As a result of the items important to retrieval study, no conditions were identified that could result in a significant delay in completing retrieval operations.

Logic

Information Need 2.4.4 uses the results of the performance allocation process for function 3 (Table 8.3.5.2-4) as a starting point and continues the issue resolution process as shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-1. Performance goals are taken from Table 8.3.5.2-4 and used as design criteria. Input item requirements are developed to ensure that sufficient detail and supporting evidence are available for the compliance analysis. Retrieval conditions are developed using existing design information to ensure that a complete set of retrieval scenarios are considered in the design process. Specific work to be performed by Issue 4.4 for this information need includes

1. Designing the transporter waste removal equipment based on analytic models, scale models, component testing, and full scale tests (if required).

2. Specifying the design of the waste package interface with retrieval equipment based on analytic models, experience in the nuclear industry, and extensive testing.

3. Developing scenarios to estimate the performance of the waste removal equipment and the waste package under both normal and abnormal conditions and performing any tests or demonstrations needed. It is anticipated that proof-of-principle and prototype demonstrations may be required for some of the removal equipment. (The reader is referred to Section 3.2.2 and Appendix J of the SCP-CDR (SNL, 1987) for details of the scenarios and equipment considered to date.)

4. Developing the equipment required to verify the condition of the waste package before waste removal.

5. Developing the equipment and operations to perform corrective actions that may be required to remove the waste package under credible abnormal conditions.

The DOE is evaluating the need for demonstration of selected equipment. The need for testing certain equipment was evaluated as part of the conceptual design and will be further evaluated as part of subsequent design stages.

Results of this work will be returned from Issue 4.4 in the form of input item responses. Information Need 2.4.4 performs a compliance analysis to evaluate whether the design actually provides for the ability to remove the emplaced waste as required. As shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-1, this compliance analysis evaluates the completeness and sufficiency of the responses to

the input items and the retrieval conditions and determines whether the performance goals have been met. For function 3, this involves evaluating the transporter waste removal equipment design, the waste package design, the dolly design (horizontal only), the concepts for verifying the condition of the waste package and dolly (horizontal only), the equipment design and operations for performing corrective actions, and all supporting evidence (results from tests and analyses, experience in industry, scenarios, and demonstrations). The results of this compliance analysis for function 3 are sent to Information Need 2.4.6 to be combined with the results of the other information needs.

8.3.5.2.4.1 Application of results

The performance goals, input item requests, and retrieval conditions developed under this information need are sent to Issue 4.4. The results of the compliance analysis for function 3 will be sent to Information Need 2.4.6 to be combined with the results of Information Needs 2.4.2, 2.4.3, and 2.4.5 for the development of the compliance analysis for Issue 2.4.

8.3.5.2.5 Information Need 2.4.5: Determination that the waste can be transported to the surface and delivered to the waste-handling surface facilities for normal and abnormal conditions

This section describes the work that will be performed under this information need to ensure that the ability to transport the retrieved waste and unload it at the surface waste-handling building is maintained (function 4). The design of the transporter and the surface unloading equipment is of primary concern relative to providing the ability to transport and unload the retrieved waste for both normal and credible abnormal conditions.

The work performed under this information need focuses on the familiar four steps: (1) developing performance goals (design criteria) for the equipment and operations associated with waste transport and unloading, (2) defining retrieval conditions for the waste transport and unloading operations, (3) identifying requirements for input items, and (4) performing a compliance analysis to ensure that the performance goals for function 4 are met.

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

For Information Need 2.4.5, the links fall into these categories: transporter design and supporting analyses, unloading equipment (surface facility waste-handling building) design and supporting analyses, and retrieval conditions. The transporter is discussed in Sections 6.2.6.2 (vertical emplacement mode), 6.2.6.3 (horizontal emplacement mode), and 6.2.9.3 (equipment development). Operations including those for retrieval are discussed in Section 6.2.3.2. Operations for the waste-handling building

are presented in Section 6.2.4. Retrieval conditions are discussed in Section 6.4.8.2.2.

There are links to similar sections in the SCP-CDR (SNL, 1987): Equipment discussions are contained in Section 3.2.2.2 (operations) and Appendices D (equipment descriptions) and J (retrieval operations). The surface facility waste handling is discussed in Sections 3.1 (operations) and 4.2 (design). Retrieval conditions are addressed in Section 6.3.1 and Appendices J (normal and abnormal conditions) and L (items important to retrievability).

Parameters

This information need requires four input items from Issue 4.4 to ensure that the performance goals defined for function 3 (waste removal) are met. These required input items are presented in Table 8.3.5.2-12.

Normal retrieval conditions are being identified for the transporter and the unloading equipment. Work completed during conceptual design on quantification of these conditions is contained in Section 6.4.8.2.2. The current set of credible abnormal conditions was developed during the study of items important to retrieval (Appendix L of SNL, 1987). The list of potential abnormal conditions for Information Need 2.4.5 is presented in Table 8.3.5.2-8 in Section 8.3.5.2.1. As a result of the items important to retrieval study, one condition was identified that could result in a significant delay in completing retrieval operations. This abnormal condition involved a transporter collision with the ramp wall as the result of an operator error.

Logic

As noted previously, Information Need 2.4.5 was derived from function 4, transport and unload the waste at the surface. Information Need 2.4.5 uses the results of the performance allocation process for function 4 (Table 8.3.5.2-5) as a starting point and continues the issue resolution process as shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-1. Performance goals are taken from Table 8.3.5.2-5 and used as design criteria. Input item requirements are developed to ensure that sufficient detail and supporting evidence are available for the compliance analysis. Retrieval conditions are developed using existing design information to ensure that a complete set of retrieval scenarios are consid-ered in the design process. Specific work to be performed by Issue 4.4 for this information need includes

1. Designing the transporter based on analytic models, existing equipment, scale models, component testing, and full-scale tests (if required).

2. Designing the surface unloading equipment based on analytic models, experience in the nuclear industry, component testing, and scale models (if required).

3. Developing scenarios to estimate the performance of the transporter and unloading equipment under both normal and credible abnormal conditions and performing any tests or demonstrations that are

Table 8.3.5.2-12. Input items to be provided by Issue 4.4 for Information Need 2.4.5 (delivery of waste to surface facilities)

Item number	Subject	Description
1	Transporter design concepts and supporting analyses	This item includes the design and analyses for the transporter under normal and credible abnormal conditions, including the propulsion system, braking system, steering, and radiation shielding.
2	Unloading equipment design and supporting analyses	This item includes the design and supporting analyses for the unloading equipment within the transporter cask and the surface facility equipment for unloading the waste from the transporter under normal and credible abnormal conditions.
3	Demonstrations for waste transport	This item includes the requirements for and the results of demonstrations, if required, of the ability to transport waste.
4	Demonstrations for waste unloading	This item includes the requirements for and the results of of demonstrations, if required, of the ability to unload waste at the surface waste-handling building.

needed. It is anticipated that proof-of-principle and prototype demonstrations may be required for the transporter and unloading equipment. The reader is referred to Section 3.2.2 and Appendix J of the SCP-CDR (SNL, 1987) for additional information.

Issue 4.4 returns the results of this work in the form of input item responses. Information Need 2.4.5 performs a compliance analysis to evaluate whether the design actually provides for the ability to transport and unload the waste as required. As shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-1, this compliance analysis evaluates the completeness and sufficiency of the responses to the input items and the retrieval conditions and determines whether the performance goals have been met. For function 4, this involves evaluating the transporter design, the design of the unloading equipment at the surface, and all supporting evidence (results from tests, analyses, and demonstrations, experience in the nuclear and mining industries, and results from scenario development). The results of this compliance analysis are sent to Information Need 2.4.6 to be combined with the results from the other information needs.

8.3.5.2.5.1 Application of results

The performance goals, input item requests, and retrieval conditions developed under this information need are sent to Issue 4.4. The results of the compliance analysis for function 4 will be sent to Information Need 2.4.6 to be combined with the results of the compliance analyses performed under the other retrieval-related information needs.

8.3.5.2.6 Information Need 2.4.6: Determination that the retrieval requirements set forth in 10 CFR 60.111(b) are met using reasonably available technology

The discussion under this information need describes the work that will be performed to ensure that the requirements for retrievability contained in 10 CFR 60.111(b) and that the requirement for the use of reasonably available technology imposed by 10 CFR 960.5-1(a)(3) will be met.

The work performed under Information Need 2.4.6 focuses on (1) developing performance goals (design criteria), (2) identifying requirements for input items, and (3) performing a compliance analysis to ensure that the performance goals for retrievability shown in Table 8.3.5.2-7 are met.

Technical basis for addressing the information need

As shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-1, there are four functions that must be performed in order to retrieve emplaced waste. Information Need 2.4.6 combines the results from the other information needs under this issue, and verifies the ability to retrieve any or all of the emplaced waste is maintained throughout the period of retrievability. In addition, Information Need 2.4.6 imposes two additional requirements: (1) that the repository design allows for retrieval to be performed on a reasonable schedule and

(2) that the repository design includes the use of technology that will be reasonable at the time of repository construction.

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

For Information Need 2.4.6, the links fall into the following two categories: retrieval schedule and use of reasonably available technology. The design basis retrieval schedule is discussed in Sections 6.1.1.6.4 and 6.2.9.1. The use of reasonably available technology is discussed in Section 6.4.10. In the SCP-CDR (SNL, 1987), time lines for retrieval and the time consequences of abnormal conditions are included in Appendix L-2 (items important to retrievability).

Parameters

This information need requires three input items from Issue 4.4 to ensure that the performance goals for Information Need 2.4.6 are met. These required input items are presented in Table 8.3.5.2-13.

The performance goals (design criteria) developed for this information need are located in Table 8.3.5.2-8 in Section 8.3.5.2.1. These goals were developed as a result of the requirements for retrieval to be completed on a reasonable schedule and for the use of reasonably available technology.

Logic

The work to be accomplished under Information Need 2.4.6 is aimed at verifying that all of the retrievability requirements set forth in 10 CFR 60.111(b) are met using reasonably available technology. To accomplish this, it must be established that the repository design

1. Includes the option to retrieve any or all of the emplaced waste throughout the period of retrievability.

2. Allows for the completion of retrieval of any or all of the emplaced waste on a reasonable schedule.

3. Incorporates the use of reasonably available technology.

Ensuring that the option to retrieve waste is preserved involves verifying that the four retrieval functions can be performed. Information Needs 2.4.2 through 2.4.5 correspond to retrieval functions 1 through 4, respectively. Each of these information needs will complete a compliance analysis relative to a retrieval function and will forward the results to Information Need 2.4.6.

To ensure that the requirements for a reasonable schedule and reasonably available technology are met, Information Need 2.4.6 (1) develops performance goals (design criteria) to ensure that the design considers these requirements, (2) develops input item requirements to ensure that sufficient detail and supporting evidence are available to verify compliance, a (3) performs a compliance analysis to verify that the design meets the performance goals.

Table 8.3.5.2-13. Input items to be provided by Issue 4.4 for Information Need 2.4.6 (compliance with retrieval requirements)

Item number	Subject	Description
1	Reference operations plan	A complete operations plan is required to ensure compliance with the 10 CFR 60.111 (b) "reasonable schedule" requirement for retrieval.
2	Use of reasonably available technology	This item includes all technical evidence which confirms the use of reasonably available technology for all retrieval-related equipment.
3	Reference design and supporting analyses	In support of the compliance analyses, reference design information and supporting analyses for the underground facilities, the surface facilities, and repository equipment are required.

The performance goals (design criteria) and requests for input items are sent to Issue 4.4 for use in developing the design, specifying supporting analyses, and defining tests and demonstrations that are required. Specific work to be performed by Issue 4.4 for this information need includes

1. Developing a reference design and performing required supporting analyses.

2. Developing a reference operations plan.

3. Performing the activities necessary to prove the design is based on reasonably available technology.

Issue 4.4 returns the results of this work in the form of input item responses. Information Need 2.4.6 performs a compliance analysis to evaluate whether the design actually provides for the ability to retrieve on a reasonable schedule and uses reasonably available technology. As shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-1, this compliance analysis evaluates the completeness and sufficiency of the retrieval conditions and the responses to the input items and determines whether the performance goals have been met. Specifically, Information Need 2.4.6 evaluates the complete design package relative to the ability to perform retrieval in a reasonable period of time and with the use of reasonably available technology. Negative responses to the three tests in the compliance analysis can be followed in Figure 8.3.5.2-1. They involve modification of input items, performance goals, or the design. If modification is not possible, a noncompliance exists for the design. If the results of all three tests are positive, then, relative to the reasonable schedule and reasonably available technology requirements, compliance exists for the design.

The results of the compliance analysis conducted under Information Need 2.4.6 are combined with the compliance analyses conducted under Information Needs 2.4.2 through 2.4.5 to create a compliance analysis for Issue 2.4, waste retrievability. The objective of this compliance analysis is to demonstrate that all of the performance goals relative to preserving the option of waste retrieval as set forth in 10 CFR Part 60.111(b) using reasonably available technology are met, and that Issue 2.4, waste retrievability, is resolved.

8.3.5.2.6.1 Application of results

The performance goals and input item requests developed under this information need are sent to Issue 4.4. The results of the compliance analysis are combined with the results of Information Needs 2.4.2, 2.4.3, 2.4.4, and 2.4.5 for the development of the compliance analysis for Issue 2.4, waste retrievability.

8.3.5.2.7 Schedule for waste retrievability (Issue 2.4) (waste retrievability)

Issue 2.4 (waste retrievability) includes six information needs. Schedule information for Information Needs 2.4.1 and 2.4.6, which address site and design data needed for retrieval and retrieval requirements, respectively, is summarized in Figure 8.3.5.2-4. This figure includes the information need number and a brief description, as well as major events associated with each information need. A major event, for purposes of these schedules, may represent the initiation or completion of any activity, completion or submittal of a report to the DOE, an important data feed, or a decision point. Solid lines on the schedule represent activity durations and dashed lines show interfaces among information needs as well as data transferred into or out of this performance assessment issue. The events shown on the schedule and their planned dates of completion are provided in Table 8.3.5.2-14.

The information need-level schedules, in combination with information provided in the logic diagrams for this issue (Figures 8.3.5.1a and 1b), are intended to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the relationships between major elements of the site, performance, and design programs. The information provided in Table 8.3.5.2-14 and Figure 8.3.5.2-4, however, should be viewed as a snapshot in time.

The overall program schedule presented here is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE, 1988a). The site characterization program will undergo a series of refinements following issuance of the statutory SCP. Refinements will consider factors both internal and external to the site characterization program, such as changes to the quality assurance program. Such refinements are to be considered in ongoing planning efforts, and changes that are implemented will be reflected in the semiannual progress reports. Summary schedule information for this and other preclosure performance assessment issues can be found in Sections 8.5.2.1 and 8.5.6.

Table 8.3.5.2-14. Major events and planned completion dates for information needs in Issue 2.4 (waste retrievability)

Information need number	Brief description of information need or activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
2.4.1	Site and design data to support retrieval	A	Complete compilation of site and design requirements to support retrieval	8/89
		B	Complete analysis of site and design data requests	11/89
		C	Complete compilation of retrieval conditions	8/90
		D	Complete report on site and design requirements to support retrieval	8/90
2.4.6	Determination that retrieval requirements can be met using reasonably available technology	A	Complete compilation of retrieval strategy data required for compliance analysis	6/89
		B	Complete retrieval compliance analysis required for advanced conceptual design	1/92
		C	Complete retrieval compliance analysis required for license application design	5/94

[a]The letters in this column key the major events shown in Figure 8.3.5.2-4.



Figure 8.3.5.2-4. Schedule information for Issue 2.4 (waste retrievability). See Table 8.3.5.2.4 for description of major events. This network is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE, 1988a) schedule. Revisions will be published in semiannual site characterization progress reports as new information becomes available.

DOE/RW-0199

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.3, Public Radiological Exposures — Normal Conditions

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.3 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 2.1: During repository operation, closure, and decommissioning (a) will the expected average radiation dose received by members of the public within any highly populated area be less than a small fraction of the allowable limits and (b) will the expected radiation dose received by any member of the public in an unrestricted area be less than the allowable limits as required by 10 CFR 60.111, 40 CFR 191 Subpart A, and 10 CFR Part 20?

This issue is concerned with the radiation exposure to the general public from the normal operation, closure, and decommissioning of the repository. The issue is divided into two parts: (a) the exposure to members of the public in a highly populated area (a highly populated area is defined in 10 CFR 960.2) and (b) the maximum exposure to any member of the public. The lower radiation dose limit stated in part (a) is intended to limit the total population dose (man-rem exposure). To address part (a) of this issue, the locations of the highly populated areas must be determined in relation to the repository site. To address part (b) of this issue, the dose to individuals in the vicinity of the site must be evaluated. The assessment of the potential doses will allow an evaluation of the impact of the operation, closure, and decommissioning of the repository on the surrounding population. The assessments will be conducted periodically (i.e., at each design phase) throughout the design of the repository to provide feedback to the design process. A monitoring program will provide verification of the results of the analyses. Note that the as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) criterion (10 CFR 20.1) will be applied in designing the repository to minimize the potential radiation dose to the public. The DOE is presently evaluating how the limits in 40 CFR Part 191 relate to the ALARA criterion. Any decisions will be incorporated into the issues resolution strategy for this issue.

The relationship of this issue with the other issues of the issues hierarchy is shown on an overall scale in Figure 8.3.2.1-1 (Section 8.3.2.1), which illustrates the relationship between design and performance issues and fixes the lines of communication between these issues. To emphasize the relationship of this issue to the other issues with which it has direct or very strong ties, only Issues 2.1 (this issue), 2.2 (Section 8.3.5.4), 2.3 (Section 8.3.5.5), 2.7 (Section 8.3.2.3), and 4.4 (Section 8.3.2.5) are illustrated in Figure 8.3.5.3-1. The figure defines the ties between these issues by indicating the major information items passed between them. The figure also illustrates the connection of all these issues with the site characterization program. The methods to perform preclosure safety analyses are also discussed in Section 8.3.5.1. The scope of an issue is indicated by its size with respect to the other issues in the figure. Note that Issue 4.4 is the largest in scope, and the other issues, including this issue, branch out from Issue 4.4, reducing the scope to more specific areas. In the discussion that follows in this section, the regulatory basis for addressing this issue is presented, the approach to resolving this issue is described, and the interrelationships among the information needs are discussed. The schedule information for Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures--normal conditions) is given in Section 8.3.5.3.1.


REPOSITORY REFERENCE DESIGN OPERATING PLAN, AND SUPPORTING ANALYSES; ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY DESIGN CRITERIA AND GOALS
ISSUE 2.7 REPOSITORY DESIGN CRITERIA FOR RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY 8.3.2.3
REPOSITORY REFERENCE DESIGN, OPERATING PLAN, AND SUPPORTING ANALYSES
ISSUE 4.4 PRECLOSURE DESIGN AND TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY 8.3.2.5
REQUESTS FOR SITE DATA
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PERFORMANCE CRITERIA AND GOALS
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY DESIGN CRITERIA
REQUESTS FOR SITE DATA
ISSUE 2.1 PUBLIC RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURES-NORMAL CONDITIONS 8.3.5.3
ISSUE 2.2 WORKER RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY-NORMAL CONDITIONS 8.3.5.4
ISSUE 2.3 ACCIDENTAL RADIOLOGICAL RELEASES 8.3.5.5
REQUESTS FOR SITE DATA
SITE CHARACTERIZATION PROGRAM

Figure 8.3.5.3-1. Relationship of Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures–normal conditons) to other issues and the site characterization program

Regulatory basis for the issue

As stated in this issue, the allowable exposure limits are those specified in 10 CFR 60.111, 40 CFR Part 191 Subpart A, and 10 CFR Part 20. In fact, 10 CFR 60.111 only requires conformance with 10 CFR Part 20 and "such generally applicable environmental standards for radioactivity as may have been established by the Environmental Protection Agency" (i.e., 40 CFR Part 191 Subpart A). 10 CFR 60.111 does not impose any additional requirements; therefore, the only regulatory requirements directly applicable to this issue are those in 10 CFR Part 20 and 40 CFR Part 191 Subpart A:

1. 10 CFR 20.105, Permissible levels of radiation in unrestricted areas.

2. 10 CFR 20.106, Radioactivity in effluents to unrestricted areas.

3. 40 CFR 191.03, Standards. This section contains limits on radiation doses to members of the public.

The objective of 10 CFR 20.105 and 20.106 is to limit the radiation dose that members of the public in unrestricted areas may receive to less than 0.5 rem per year to the whole body and other limits specified for particular organs. In addition, 10 CFR 20.1(c) requires that the exposures be maintained as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). The DOE is currently evaluating how the limits in 40 CFR Part 191 relate to the ALARA criterion.

40 CFR 191.03(a) requires that "management and storage of spent nuclear fuel or high-level or transuranic radioactive wastes at all facilities regulated by the Commission or by Agreement States shall be conducted in such a manner as to provide reasonable assurance that the combined annual dose equivalent to any member of the public in the general environment resulting from: (1) Discharges of radioactive material and direct radiation from such management and storage and (2) all operations covered by Part 190; shall not exceed 25 millirems to the whole body, 75 millirems to the thyroid, and 25 millirems to any other critical organ."

In addition, there are other sections of 10 CFR Part 60 that require compliance with 10 CFR 60.111 and 10 CFR Part 20; these sections, however, do not contain any additional exposure limits relevant to the issue. They include the following:

1. 10 CFR 60.131, General design criteria for the geologic repository operations area.

2. 10 CFR 60.132, Additional design criteria for surface facilities in the geologic repository operations area.

3. 10 CFR 60.133, Additional design criteria for the underground facility.

Section 8.3.2.3 contains a detailed discussion of the design criteria in 10 CFR 60.131 through 60.133. In addition, it is Office of Civilian

Radioactive Waste Management (OCRWM) policy that DOE Orders will be followed where they do not conflict with NRC requirements.

Approach to resolving this issue

Licensing strategy overview

Part (a) of this issue (will the expected average radiation dose received by members of the public within any highly populated area be less than a small fraction of the allowable limits) is not a requirement of the NRC or EPA, but is a qualifying condition on population density and distribution in 10 CFR 960.5-2-1(a)(1). As such, information and results used in resolution of part (a) of Issue 2.1 will also be applicable to the resolution of the corresponding part of Issue 2.5 (Section 8.3.5.6), which deals with the higher level findings of 10 CFR 960.5. This part can be analyzed on the basis of repository design and operational controls, identification of population density and distribution, location of members of the public in the unrestricted area, and calculation of radiation doses to individuals and population groups from the repository and other sources. The part of this issue that deals with population distribution and location of members of the public is the subject of the Population Density Program 8.3.1.10. The remainder of part (a) of Issue 2.1 deals with repository design and assessment of the projected radiation exposures and is within the scope of part (b) of this issue.

Part (b) of this issue (will the expected radiation dose received by any member of the public in an unrestricted area be less than the allowable limits as required by 10 CFR 60.111, 40 CFR 191 Subpart A, and 10 CFR Part 20) addresses radiation doses from the repository and from other potential sources (regulated under 40 CFR Part 190) to nearby individuals. To determine this expected radiation dose, the unrestricted area must be defined and doses to the nearby individuals determined from both repository operation and other uranium fuel cycle facilities. Calculation of this dose will be performed using acceptable analytical models that require radionuclide source terms, locations of release points, location of nearby individuals, exposure pathways, meteorologic, and hydrologic parameters. This will require an iterative analysis because the location of the nearby individuals may change since the contribution from the repository to the combined dose may change both in magnitude and location as the repository design matures (i.e., as predicted source terms and release points may change). Radiation doses from other facilities from all pathways to the unrestricted area will be determined to ensure that the combined doses and radionuclide concentrations are less than the allowable limits.

Doses in the unrestricted area may be derived from direct radiation from sources inside the repository boundary, direct radiation from repository radioactive airborne emissions, inhalation of these airborne radioactive material emissions, and ingestion of radioactive material from liquids and foodstuffs contaminated by radioactive material. Radiation doses to individuals in the unrestricted area are expected to be primarily due to gaseous radioactive material released during waste handling and packaging operations. Doses are expected to be reduced to levels well below the allowable limits by design features such as filtration and by natural dispersion in the atmosphere.

Additional potential sources of radiation dose to unrestricted areas include radon and radon daughters from the underground portions of the repository that may be entrained in subsurface ventilation air and discharged at surface release points and from radon and other naturally occurring radionuclides that may be released from muck stored on the surface. These releases are not within the scope of Subpart A of 40 CFR Part 191. Even though these releases also do not appear to be within the scope of 10 CFR Part 20, their contribution to offsite releases to unrestricted areas will be assessed. Therefore, analyses are required to quantify the emanation rate of this radionuclide from the mine and from the muck pile. Sources of radiation exposure from the transportation of high-level waste (HLW) to the repository are expected to be addressed under Issue 3.3, as part of the environmental program planned activities. (Transportation of HLW to the repository is excluded from the definition of site characterization by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.) Transportation of this HLW within the repository boundaries will be considered part of the repository program.

In addition to a primary focus on ensuring radiation doses to the public are at a very low level, both 10 CFR Part 20 and Part 60 require the verification of performance. This requirement for performance verification necessitates the design and installation of in-plant radiation measurement systems for effluent monitoring with alarm mechanisms to warn of significant increases in radioactivity. The radiation monitoring systems must monitor and record concentrations of radioactive material in the effluents and in the surrounding environment. Data from these systems are required to determine radiation exposures to the public and to verify they are within regulatory limits. These requirements are discussed in the Project Radiological Monitoring Plan, which is discussed in Section 8.3.1.13.

In summary, the repository will be designed to limit the expected radiation dose received by any member of the public in an unrestricted area to less than the allowable limits required by 40 CFR Part 191 Subpart A and 10 CFR Part 20. Computer models will be used to evaluate the potential of radiation exposure of any member of the public in the unrestricted area. The performance verification systems, which will be designed and constructed to comply with 10 CFR Part 20 and Part 60 requirements, will be used during operations to ensure that the as-built repository will meet regulatory dose requirements. The preclosure performance monitoring and confirmation program (see Section 8.3.5.16) will provide the mechanism for corrective action, either operational or design, which will ensure successful compliance.

The resolution of this issue will be accomplished by the analysis of the repository design and operational controls and activities and calculation of doses to members of the public in unrestricted areas to ensure that the doses meet allowable limits and are as low as reasonably achievable.

Application of the issue resolution strategy

The logic to be used in the resolution of this issue is illustrated in the logic diagram shown in Figure 8.3.5.3-2. This logic diagram depicts how the generic issue resolution strategy of Section 8.2.2 is to be applied to this issue. The first step of the process (identifying regulatory requirements) was discussed earlier in the section called Regulatory basis for


IDENTIFY PRECLOSURE REGULATORY AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS ON PUBLIC RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS
EVALUATE EXISTING DESIGN ANALYSES & SITE DATA
IDENTIFY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
SURFACE
REPOSITORY
OFFSITE INSTALLATIONS
PROVIDE REMOTENESS FROM HIGHLY POPULATED AREAS & MEMBERS OF THE PUBLIC
PROVIDE DISPERSION & TRANSPORT OF ROUTINE RADIOACTIVE RELEASES THROUGH WATER PATHWAYS, CROPS, & ANIMALS
PROVIDE TRANSPORT, DISPERSION, DIFFUSION OF ROUTINE AIRBORNE RADIOACTIVE EFFLUENTS TO THE UNRESTRICTED AREA
PROVIDE CONTAINMENT OF POTENTIAL SOURCES OF RADIATION TO THE UNRESTRICTED AREA
VERIFY THAT THERE ARE NO URANIUM FUEL CYCLE FACILITIES THAT NEED TO BE CONSIDERED IN ASSESSING THE PUBLIC DOSE
IDENTIFY PERFORMANCE MEASURES
SET PERFORMANCE GOALS & INDICATIONS OF CONFIDENCE
IDENTIFY PARAMETERS, SET GOALS & INDICATIONS OF CONFIDENCE
IDENTIFY SITE DATA NEEDED & TRANSMIT TO CHARACTERIZATION PROGRAM
DEVELOP DESIGN CRITERIA & CONSTRAINTS
IDENTIFY INPUT ITEMS NEEDED FROM DESIGN PACKAGE
CREATE OR UPDATE REPOSITORY DESIGN BY ISSUE 4.4
TRANSMIT DESIGN REQUIREMENTS & REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION TO ISSUE 2.7
PUBLIC RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT PACKAGE
OBTAIN DESIGN PACKAGE & SITE DATA FROM REFERENCE INFORMATION BASE
IDENTIFY SOURCE CHARACTERISTICS
RADIONUCLIDE TRANSPORT EVALUATION
PUBLIC RADIATION EXPOSURE CALCULATION
NOT FEASIBLE TO PROCEED
ARE REGULATORY LIMITS MET ?
N
RECOMMEND CHANGES TO PERFORMANCE GOALS OR DESIGN & OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
CAN THE PERFORMANCE GOALS OR DESIGN BE CHANGED ?
N
Y
Y
IS EXPOSURE REDUCED TO EXTENT REASONABLE ?
N
Y
IS ANOTHER DESIGN PHASE REQUIRED PRIOR TO LA ?
Y
N
PREPARE INPUT FOR LICENSE APPLICATION

Figure 8.3.5.3-2a. Logic diagram for Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures–normal conditions). See Figure 8.3.5.3-2b for legend. Section 8.3.2.1 describes the relationships and interfaces between design and performance issues.

LEGEND



ACTIVITY PERFORMED TO RESOLVE ISSUE



TEST TO DETERMINE SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITY



ACTIVITY PERFORMED BY INDICATED ISSUE

ACTIVITY WITH MULTIPLE SIMILAR ACTIVITIES OR TESTS



DECISION ABOUT ISSUE RESOLUTION

Y - YES N - NO LA - LICENSE APPLICATION

Figure 8.3.5.3-2b. Legend for Figure 8.3.5.3-2a.

addressing the issue. The following discussions will explain each of the remaining steps in the resolution of this issue as shown in the logic diagram.

Identification of functional requirements. To allocate performance in this issue to specific system elements of the mined geologic disposal system (MGDS) at Yucca Mountain, the functions of these system elements with respect to this issue must be identified. The preclosure portion of the Yucca Mountain MGDS is divided into three major system elements: the site, the repository, and the waste package. The waste package will not be considered in allocating performance for this issue but will be considered in Section 8.3.4. The waste package will be considered as part of the repository system element equipment. The major system elements are further subdivided into more specific system elements; however, for resolving this issue, only the site need be divided further. The site is divided into two systems elements: the surface and the subsurface. In addition to these three system elements from the MGDS requirements, a fourth system element, offsite installation, is required for the resolution of this issue. A description of each of these system elements and their function with respect to this issue follows.

Surface system element. The surface system element affects transport of radionuclides between the repository and the members of the public in the unrestricted area during the preclosure period. Transport mechanisms include atmospheric transport, surface water movement and dilution, bioaccumulation, and consumption of agricultural and indigenous food stuffs.

Atmospheric transport is most likely the dominant mode of transport of radionuclides from the repository to the public. The main processes involved are the physical transport, dispersion, and deposition of potential releases of radionuclides. The atmosphere will impact the potential radiation dose from both the natural and man-made source terms. The radioactivity deposited will then move through the food chain to crops, animals, and man. A lesser contributor to the dose rate in the unrestricted area is direct radiation from the repository. The distance between the repository and the unrestricted area is expected to greatly attenuate the direct radiation. Direct radiation that can contribute to the dose in the unrestricted area has to be controlled to maintain a safe environment for the workers. A possible exception to this is direct radiation exposure of the public due to transportation, which is to be addressed by Issue 3.3.

Concentration of radionuclides in the unrestricted area is also affected by dispersion and transport of routine radioactive releases through water pathways, followed by uptake by crops, animals, and man.

The surface system element also provides a remote location (with respect to highly populated areas and members of the public) for the repository operations. This serves to limit the number of people in the adjacent unrestricted area. Part (a) of this issue requires that the average dose to members in a highly populated area be less than a small fraction of the allowable limit. Since the repository is far from a highly populated area, the doses to the population are expected to be small. Verification of this attribute is directly determined by investigating the local demographics (Section 8.3.1.10, population density and distribution program).

Repository system element. The repository system element includes all surface and subsurface systems that can impact man-made sources of radiation in the unrestricted area. This includes all systems and operations that control radiation releases and exposures in the unrestricted area. The repository will be designed and analyzed to ensure that the radioactive effluents are below the regulatory limits. Potential effluents are in the form of gases, liquids, and solids, all of which must be evaluated for compliance with the applicable regulations. Analyses to determine compliance of the repository with the regulations will require information on the radioactive sources, systems design, and operations to be performed.

Offsite installations. The exposure standards in 40 CFR 191, Subpart A, apply to releases from the repository and from uranium fuel cycle facilities defined in 40 CFR 190. Therefore, a determination of which of the installations in the vicinity of the Yucca Mountain MGDS are nuclear fuel cycle facilities is required. The function that the offsite installations system element plays, with respect to this issue, is to verify that there are no uranium fuel cycle facilities in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain that would need to be considered when assessing total exposure to the population.

Allocation of performance to the system elements. The next four steps after the identification of functional requirements make up the bulk of the performance allocation process. In these steps, performance measures and performance goals are developed, and needed parameters are defined. The results of these steps may be seen in Tables 8.3.5.3-1 and 8.3.5.3-2.

Development of design criteria and constraints and identification of input items. The only constraints on the design of the repository forthcoming from this issue are those general performance goals shown in Tables 8.3.5.3-1 and 8.3.5.3-2. These performance goals are transmitted to Issue 2.7 (Section 8.3.2.3) where specific design criteria are developed and transmitted to Issue 4.4 (Section 8.3.2.5) for incorporation into the design of the repository. In general, specific design products or information required of either Issue 2.7 or Issue 4.4 and needed by the performance issues are also transmitted to Issue 2.7. However, at this time no specific design products or information items have been identified as being needed by this issue.

Public radiological safety assessment package. The specific analytical approach for resolution of this issue will be developed as part of the preclosure risk assessment methodology (PRAM) program described in Section 8.3.5.1 and other project activities. A general approach is shown in Figure 8.3.5.3-2 in the dashed box labeled "public radiological safety assessment package." The following provides a step-by-step discussion of the analytical approach.

Design Evaluation. The design package and site data are obtained from the reference information base (RIB), and the repository design features related to the radiological safety of the public during normal operations are evaluated. The following is a discussion of what types of information are investigated during this design evaluation. The high level waste (HLW) throughput (schedule and amount of waste received per year) is an important controlling factor in the design of the repository process and storage

Table 8.3.5.3-1. Functions, performance measures, and performance goals for Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures--normal conditions)

System element	Function	Process or activity	Performance measure	Tentative goal	Needed confidence
Surface	Provide remoteness from highly populated areas and members of the public	Locate repository in a low population area	Population density	A. Population densities less than or equal to those required by the qualifying conditions of 10 CFR Part 960	High
	Provide dispersion and transport of routine radioactive releases to the unrestricted area through water pathways, crops, and animals	Analyze dilution, transportation, bioaccumulation of radionuclides in rivers, streams, and food stuffs	Radionuclides concentrations in environmental media and individual doses	B. Dose limits of 40 CFR Part 191, Subpart A and 10 CFR Part 20 as applied to the contribution from radionuclides in food chain pathways	High
	Provide transport, dispersion, and diffusion of routine airborne radioactive effluents to the unrestricted area	Analyze atmospheric transport by wind and convection, including dispersion and diffusion	Radionuclides concentrations in environmental media and individual doses	C. Composite dose limits required by 40 CFR Part 191, Subpart A and 10 CFR Part 20	High
Repository	Provide containment of potential sources of radiation to the unrestricted area	Limit releases of routine gaseous, particulate, and liquid radioactive effluents	Radionuclides concentrations in environmental media and individual doses	D. Composite dose limits required by 40 CFR Part 191, Subpart A and 10 CFR Part 20 as applied to routine releases from the repository	High
Offsite installations	Verify that there are no nuclear (uranium) fuel cycle facilities that need to be considered in assessing the public dose	Locate and analyze nearby nuclear (uranium) fuel cycle facilities	Number of nuclear (uranium) fuel cycle facilities requiring consideration in assessing the public dose	E. No nuclear (uranium) fuel cycle facilities requiring consideration in assessing the public dose	High

Table 8.3.5.3-2. Parameters required for Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures--normal conditions) (page 1 of 4)

Related performance goal[a]	Performance or design parameter	Parameter descriptor	Tentative parameter goal	Needed confidence	Expected parameter value	Current confidence	SCP section providing parameter
A	Distances from highly populated areas	140 km radius	≥5 km	High	About 130 km	Medium	8.3.1.12, (b)
A	Population located in adjacent 1-mile by 1-mile area	Nye and Clark counties	<1,000 persons	High	No permanent population	Medium	(b)
A	Population density of the region	Nye and Clark counties	Low population density	High	Section 3.6.2 in environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b)	Medium	(b)
B	Bioaccumulation of radionuclides in terrestrial flora	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	1×10^{-28} to 1×10^{-14} Ci/kg (see footnote d)	Medium	(b)
B	Bioaccumulation of radionuclides in terrestrial fauna	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	1×10^{-25} to 1×10^{-15} Ci/kg (see footnote e)	Medium	(b)
B	Types of crops raised	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	(f)	Medium	(b)
B	Amounts of crops raised	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	1×10^{4} to 1×10^{7} kg/yr (see footnote g)	Medium	(b)
B	Types of crops consumed	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	(h)	Medium	(b)
B	Amounts of crops consumed	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	1×10^{4} to 1×10^{5} kg/yr	Medium	(b)
B	Types of animals raised	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	(i)	Medium	(b)

Table 8.3.5.3-2. Parameters required for Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures--normal conditions) (page 2 of 4)

Related performance goal[a]	Performance or design parameter	Parameter descriptor	Tentative parameter goal	Needed confidence	Expected parameter value	Current confidence	SCP section providing parameter
B	Number of animals raised	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	1×10^1 to 1×10^5 kg/yr	Medium	(b)
B	Types of animals consumed	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	(j)	Medium	(b)
B	Amounts of meat consumed	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	1×10^4 to 1×10^6 kg/yr	Medium	(b)
B	Animal consumption of forage	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	1×10^1 to 1×10^4 kg/yr	Medium	(b)
B	Forage storage time	80 km radius	Goal is values given in Reg. Guide 1.109 (NRC, 1977a)	Medium	Data not available	Data not available	(b)
B	Grazing yield and period	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	75 to 100% of the year	High	(b)
B	Radius of crop and animal area	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	50 km to bulk of cropland and farms (W to SW)	High	(b)
B	Volumetric flow of surface water to water bodies	80 km radius	Little or no surface runoff	Medium	Section 3.3.1 in environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b)	Medium	(b)
B	Population served by local drinking water	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	1×10^2 to 1×10^4	Medium	(b)
B	Volumetric flow of local drinking water	80 km radius	(c)	Low	Section 3.3.1 in environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b)	Medium	(b)

Table 8.3.5.3-2. Parameters required for Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures--normal conditions) (page 3 of 4)

Related performance goal[a]	Performance or design parameter	Parameter descriptor	Tentative parameter goal	Needed confidence	Expected parameter value	Current confidence	SCP section providing parameter
B	Recreational uses of water bodies	80 km radius	Very little recreational use of water	High	(k)	(k)	(b)
C,E	Wind speeds	80 km radius	(c)	High	Figures 5-3 to 5-7, and Tables 5-6 and 5-7	Medium	8.3.1.12
C,E	Wind direction	80 km radius	(c)	High	Figures 5-3 to 5-7, and Tables 5-6 and 5-7	Medium	8.3.1.12
C,E	Atmospheric stability	80 km radius	(c)	Medium (See footnote 1)	Table 5-11	Medium	8.3.1.12
C,E	Mixing layer depth	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	(m)	Medium	8.3.1.12
C,E	Average ambient temperature	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	Tables 5-2 and 5-3	Medium	8.3.1.12
C,E	Atmospheric moisture	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	Tables 5-2 and 5-5	Medium	8.3.1.12
C,E	Precipitation: type, amount, intensity, etc.	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	Tables 5-2 and 5-4	Medium	8.3.1.12
C,E	Barometric pressure	80 km radius	(c)	Medium	Table 5-2	Medium	8.3.1.12
C,E	Size and distance of topographic features from release points	80 km radius	Topographic features beneficial to dispersion	Medium	See U.S Geological Survey (USGS) topographic maps	High	Literature

Table 8.3.5.3-2. Parameters required for Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures--normal conditions) (page 4 of 4)

Related performance goal[a]	Performance or design parameter	Parameter descriptor	Tentative parameter goal	Needed confidence	Expected parameter value	Current confidence	SCP section providing parameter
D	Radon emanation rate from tuff	(TSw2 unit)[n]	(c)	High	0.48 pCi/m^2-s	Low	8.3.1.15
D	Reference repository design and supporting analyses	No additional site characterization data needed--see footnote o.					
E	Location of nearby uranium fuel cycle facilities	80 km radius	No nearby nuclear fuel cycle facilities	High	No nearby nuclear fuel cycle facilities	Medium	8.3.1.13
E	Doses from nearby uranium fuel cycle facilities	80 km radius	Doses less than 40 CFR 191 limits	High	Doses less than 40 CFR 191 limits	Medium	8.3.1.13

[a]The letters in this column key the performance parameters in this table to the tentative performance goals in Table 8.3.5.3-1.
[b]Collection of these data is part of the environmental program planned activities and is addressed in the Radiological Monitoring Plan discussed in Section 8.3.1.13.
[c]Tentative goal is to have further measurements of this parameter verify the range of expected values listed here.
[d]This range covers all flora for which data are now available; specific values are flora and radionuclide specific.
[e]This range covers all fauna for which data are now available; specific values are fauna and radionuclide specific.
[f]Wheat/grains, corn, apples, potatoes, alfalfa, alfalfa seed, hay, silage, peppers, melons, berries, pecans, leafy vegetables, and honey.
[g]Specific values depend on available crops, crop areas, and crop densities.
[h]Includes all crops listed footnote f except alfalfa, hay, and silage.
[i]Beef cattle, dairy cattle, goats, hogs, sheep, and poultry.
[j]All of those in footnote i plus quail, freshwater fish, ducks, geese, rabbit, deer.
[k]Very limited use of Crystal Reservoir; swimming pool data not yet available.
[l]Medium confidence requirements are intended to indicate that these parameters need to be site-specific.
[m]See Quiring (1968).
[n]TSw2 unit is the nonlithophysal Topopah Spring unit (repository horizon).
[o]For communicating the design information needed to evaluate worker radiological safety under normal conditions, the input items from Issue 4.4 (obtained through Issue 2.7) are collectively listed as a parameter.

facilities (e.g., hot cell structure and lag storage). Direct radiation that can be emitted from the central process area and the amount of routine radioactive effluents will be directly related to the amount of HLW on hand and being processed. These sources of potential doses to the public also depend on how processes are conducted for such activities as waste receipt, lag storage, waste handling and consolidation, transport of waste containers and the heat treatment of spent fuel, if done. Public radiation doses from such activities will also be controlled by administrative procedures (e.g., limits on frequency of tasks and time in storage). Attributes of the repository design that will play a major role in controlling direct radiation and release of radioactive effluents to the unrestricted area include such features as

1. Barrier and shield thicknesses, composition, and distance from the source, and the exposed individuals.

2. Containment and ventilation system characteristics (e.g., repository and hot cell layout, differential pressures between areas, openings, air locks, and filters).

3. Containment characteristics of the waste form (i.e., fuel elements, waste package, etc.)

4. Radioactive material release point characteristics (e.g., stack height, diameter, exit velocity, temperature, and distance from unrestricted area).

In addition, as part of the regulatory performance verification requirements, specific systems and operational controls will be needed to verify that the repository design and operation will maintain the annual radiation dose to the public to less than the regulatory limits. Types of systems that must be provided include (1) gaseous, particulate, and liquid effluent monitoring and control equipment; (2) effluent sampling and measuring equipment; (3) environmental surveillance equipment; and (4) emergency response features. Design of these systems will be incorporated in the normal repository design process. The information needed for this design evaluation will be the product of the design process and will generally not depend directly on the site characterization activities. However, data on background radiological conditions and dust characteristics may affect the design of monitoring equipment. Data on dust characteristics are discussed in Section 8.3.2.4 (nonradiological health and safety) and only mentioned here because worker health concerns require more extensive data on dust.

Identification of radiation source characteristics. Potential sources of radiation that can contribute to the dose to the exposed individuals in the unrestricted area can be categorized as resulting from (1) repository operations, (2) operation of offsite facilities, and (3) miscellaneous operations. Examples of radiation sources resulting from repository operations are receipt of HLW shipping casks, releases during spent fuel consolidation, transport of HLW containers, and naturally occurring radionuclides (e.g., releases from ventilation exhausts and the muck pile).

The specific information needed about the potential source terms includes radionuclides involved, quantity and concentration, decay radiation and energies, and physical and chemical forms. General information needed about the source terms for dose evaluation include

1. Planned repository operational details (e.g., scheduled HLW throughput and inventories, generated low-level waste (LLW) and transport rates, and normal effluent release rates).

2. Repository design features (e.g., radionuclide barriers, normal effluent release locations, layout distances, containment, leakage, and filtration details).

3. Environmental details (e.g., pathways for transport or dispersion of radioactive materials through the soil, air, and water to vegetation, animals, and the public, and location of other relevant offsite facilities and their radionuclide release rates).

4. Natural radionuclide sources (e.g., radon emanation rate).

Depending on the characteristics of the source terms, the information needs will be satisfied by either the site characterization program, the repository design process, or the environmental and socioeconomic sampling and monitoring programs. Development of the analytical tools needed to evaluate potential adverse public impacts of the source terms will be coordinated with the preclosure risk assessment methodology (PRAM) program requirements and recommendations.

Radionuclide transport evaluation. The next element in the public radiological safety assessment package is radionuclide transport evaluation following release to the environment of radioactive material from normal repository activities. Radioactive releases to the environment from relevant offsite facilities must also be considered since these releases this can contribute to the dose to the public in the repository unrestricted area.

The pathways for the initial concentration of radionuclides released from the repository central process area and offsite facilities to the public in the unrestricted area need to be described. The possible pathways to the public can be directly through the air, water, and soil, or indirectly through vegetation and animals.

The dispersion of airborne radioactive materials can (1) result in radionuclide concentrations in the air that can cause an external dose by direct radiation or an internal dose through inhalation, or (2) result in ground deposition of radioactive material. Similarly, dispersion of waterborne radioactive effluents can result in an external dose by direct radiation, result in an internal dose through drinking of the water, or result in the deposition of radioactive material. Radionuclides deposited on the ground, plants, or riverbanks can cause a direct radiation dose but, more importantly, they can enter the food chain through uptake and bioaccumulation in plants and animals. Examples would be eating cattle that grazed on local grass or eating grain irrigated with local water.

Analytical tools in the form of dispersion and pathway models will be required to perform the radionuclide transport evaluation. Meteorological data (e.g., wind speed and direction atmospheric stability) will be needed as input to the dispersion model. This need for site data will be satisfied by the site characterization program. Specific data (e.g., type of crops raised and bioaccumulation of radionuclides in plants and animals) will be required for the food chain pathway models. This data need will be addressed by the socioeconomic and environmental monitoring program.

Public radiation exposure calculation. The last step in the analysis is the evaluation of radiological exposure that quantifies the maximum dose to the public postulated from routine operation of the repository and offsite facilities.

The maximum dose to an individual at the nearest unrestricted location is normally considered the greatest potential adverse impact and is used as the basis for calculations. The furthest distance the unrestricted area can be from the repository is 5 km. The Bureau of Land Management limits occupancy at this location. Occupancy at a site about 15 km away from the repository will be assumed to be 24 hours per day, 365 days per year. Individuals are conservatively assumed to do such things as drink local water, eat local animals and fish, eat foodstuffs grown using local water, and spend recreational time in local water bodies. Analytical models will be used to quantify the public dose. The following types of analytical tools will be needed:

1. Building ventilation, filtration, and leakage models.
2. Radiation shielding models.
3. Atmospheric dispersion models.
4. Radiological impact models for transportation of LLW.
5. Food chain pathways models.
6. Radiological consequence assessment models.

The information needed to calculate doses using these analytical tools will be provided as discussed in the previous steps. This information will be the product of the site characterization program, the socioeconomic and environmental monitoring program, and the normal repository design process. Following is a list of some technical guidance documents that will be evaluated for applicability to the development of the above analytical tools. A list of analytical tools that are available for use is contained in Section 8.3.5.19 (completed analytical techniques). Further discussions of analytical tools are contained in Sections 8.3.5.20 (techniques requiring development).

1. Regulatory Guide 1.21--Measuring, Evaluating, and Reporting Radioactivity in Solid Waste and Release of Radioactivity in Liquid and Gaseous Effluents From Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Plants (Revision 1, June 1974) (AEC, 1974).

2. Regulatory Guide 1.23--Onsite Meteorological Programs (NRC, 1980).

3. Regulatory Guide 1.109--Calculation of Annual Doses to Man From Routine Releases of Reactor Effluents for the Purposes of Evaluating Compliance With 10 CFR 50, Appendix I (Revision 1, October 1977) (NRC, 1977a).

4. Regulatory Guide 1.111--Methods for Estimating Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion of Gaseous Effluents in Routine Releases From Light-Water-Cooled Reactors (Revision 1, July 1977) (NRC, 1977c).

5. Regulatory Guide 1.112--Calculation of Releases of Radioactive Materials in Gaseous and Liquid Effluents From Light-Water-Cooled Power Reactors (Revision O-R, May 1977) (NRC, 1976b).

6. Regulatory Guide 1.113--Estimating Aquatic Dispersion of Effluents From Accidental and Routine Reactor Releases for the Purpose of Implementing Appendix I (Revision 1, April 1977) (NRC, 1977b).

7. Safety Series No. 60--Criteria for Underground Disposal of Solid Radioactive Waste (IAEA, 1983b).

8. Safety Series No. 68--Performance Assessment for Underground Radioactive Waste Disposal Systems (IAEA, 1985).

9. DOE/EP-0023--A Guide for Environmental Radiological Surveillance at U.S. Department of Energy Installations (July 1981) (Corley and Denham, 1981).

10. DOE/EP-0096--A Guide for Effluent Radiological Measurements at DOE Installations (April 1982) (Corley and Corbit, 1983).

Performance evaluation for compliance with goals. The remainder of Figure 8.3.5.3-2 deals with the final evaluation of the results documented in the public radiological safety assessment package. The results are compared with the regulatory limits contained in the regulations listed earlier in the section called "Regulatory basis for addressing this issue." If all the limits are met, then the results are examined to see if the ALARA criterion has been met. If both the regulatory limits and the ALARA criterion have been met and if the design is in the final design phase, then the design is ready for license application and a favorable issue resolution has been achieved. If both the regulatory limits and the ALARA criterion have been met but the design is not in the final design phase, then this process is repeated for the next design phase.

If the results of the public radiological safety assessment package do not meet either the regulatory limits or the ALARA criterion, then design, procedural, or operational changes are recommended to correct the situation. If these changes cannot be made and the performance goals cannot be reasonably changed, then an unfavorable resolution of the issue has occurred. However, if the design, procedural, or operational changes can be made or the performance goals can be reasonably changed, then the recommended changes are implemented and the whole process is repeated.

Interrelationships of information needs

The questions asked by this issue address the radiological health and safety of the public. The basic question is will the expected doses to the public be within the regulatory limits contained in 10 CFR Part 20 and 40 CFR Part 191 Subpart A? The resolution of this issue can be obtained by answering three other questions. These questions are as follows:

1. What site and design information is required to predict the expected radiation doses to the public from the normal operation of the repository and nearby uranium fuel cycle facilities?

2. What are the projected releases of radioactive material from the normal operations of repository and nearby uranium fuel cycle facilities that could be transported to the unrestricted area and cause radiation doses to the public?

3. Are the combined radiation doses to the public resulting from the projected releases of radioactive material from the normal operations of the repository and nearby uranium fuel cycle facilities within applicable limits?

These questions have been designated as information needs. Questions 1, 2, and 3 are Information Needs 2.1.1, 2.1.2, and 2.1.3, respectively. All site data required to perform the dose calculations and assessments are collected under Information Need 2.1.1. Information Needs 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 use the data called for by Information Need 2.1.1 to perform the release determinations, radionuclide transport calculations, and public dose assessment, but do not collect any site data on their own. For this reason, only Information Need 2.1.1 is discussed in this report. The functions and performance measures (associated with the MGDS system elements) necessary for answering these two questions and resolving issue are listed in Table 8.3.5.3-1. The site data needed to answer these two questions are listed in Table 8.3.5.3-2. Information Needs 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 (together with Issue 2.1 in its entirety) will be discussed in the repository design plan (RDP). The RDP will be published approximately one year after publication of the SCP.

Information Need 2.1.1 (Section 8.3.5.3.1) describes the site and design information required to resolve this issue. The detailed site data needed is shown in Table 8.3.5.3-2, along with an indication of the confidence with which the information must be known. The design information required is not listed in any detail at this point. It is sufficient to say that the repository reference design and supporting analyses will be required.

Information Need 2.1.2 is a determination of the expected releases of radioactive materials from the repository during normal operations. Included in this information need are the releases of radioactive materials from nearby uranium fuel cycle facilities. Releases from the repository will be determined from the reference repository design and supporting analyses. A brief discussion of some of the processes is presented previously under design evaluation. Information on releases from nearby uranium fuel cycle facilities will be collected as part of site characterization and a determination of the expected releases from these facilities will be performed as part of this information need.

Information Need 2.1.3 is a determination of whether predicted doses to the public resulting from the expected releases of radioactive materials are within applicable limits or a small fraction of those limits. As described earlier in the section called public radiologic safety assessment package, the doses to the public are predicted using radionuclide transport and dispersion models to estimate the amounts of radionuclides that eventually reach the public. The final resolution of this issue will take place under this information need when the results of the dose calculations are evaluated and compared with the regulatory limits contained in 10 CFR Part 20 and 40 CFR Part 191 Subpart A.

8.3.5.3.1 Information Need 2.1.1: Site and design information needed to assess preclosure radiological safety

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

Chapter 3 discusses the present state of the knowledge on the site hydrology, including uses of surface water and ground water. Chapter 4 discusses the water chemistry of the site. Section 4.1.2.6 (background radioactivity (of repository ground water)), contains a discussion on what is known about the radionuclide content of repository ground water to date. Chapter 5 discusses the present state of the knowledge on the meteorology of the site and surrounding region. Further discussions on the subject of radiological protection of the public may be found in Sections 6.1.1.4.1 (radiological protection design requirements) and 6.4.4 (Issue 2.1: radiological exposure expected to public). Section 8.3.5.1 discusses the preclosure risk assessment methodology (PRAM) program, which includes radiological risk to the public during normal operations as part of its scope. Sections 2.5 (radiological protection) and 6.1 (radioactive releases during normal operations) of the site characterization plan-conceptual design report (SCP-CDR) (SNL, 1987) also contain discussions relevant to this issue. Section 6.1 of the SCP-CDR is especially informative because it contains some preliminary estimates of expected releases during normal operations of the repository.

Parameters

The parameters required by this information need are those site and design parameters relevant to the determination that the expected doses to the public are within applicable limits. Design information required for this purpose is listed in Table 8.3.5.3-2 simply as the reference repository design and supporting analyses. Reference repository design information and supporting analyses will be obtained from the reference information base (RIB) and will contain all design details necessary to perform the dose calculations to resolve this issue.

The site data required to resolve this issue are obtained through various site characterization programs. Following is a summary table of the required site data and the SCP section providing the information.

Data requirement	SCP section
POPULATION DENSITY DATA	
Distance of the repository from highly populated areas	(a)
Population located in adjacent 1-mile by 1-mile area	(a)
Population density of the region around the repository	(a)
AGRICULTURAL DATA	
Bioaccumulation of radionuclides in the terrestrial flora	(a)
Bioaccumulation of radionuclides in the terrestrial fauna	(a)
Types and amounts of crops raised	(a)
Types and amounts of crops consumed	(a)
Types and amounts of animals raised	(a)
Types and amounts of meat consumed	(a)
Animal consumption of forage	(a)
Forage storage time	(a)
Grazing yield and period	(a)
Radius of the crop and animal area	(a)
SURFACE-WATER DATA	
Volumetric flow of surface water to water bodies	(a)
Population served and the volumetric flow of drinking water from affected water bodies	(a)
Recreational uses of area water bodies	(a)
METEOROLOGICAL DATA	
Wind speeds in the region	8.3.1.12.1
Prevailing wind directions	8.3.1.12.2
Atmospheric stability of the area	8.3.1.12.2

Data requirement	SCP section
METEOROLOGICAL DATA (continued)	
Atmospheric mixing layer depth of the region	8.3.1.12.2
Average ambient temperature of the area	8.3.1.12.2
Atmospheric moisture of the area	8.3.1.12.2
Area precipitation, including type, amount, intensity, etc.	8.3.1.12.2
Size and distance of major topographic features from release points	Existing data should be adequate
REPOSITORY ROCK DATA	
Radon emanation rate from the tuff	8.3.1.15.1.6.2
OFFSITE INSTALLATION DATA	
Location of nearby uranium fuel cycle facilities	8.3.1.13.1.2
Liquid, particulate, and gaseous radionuclide releases from nearby uranium fuel cycle facilities	8.3.1.13.1.3
Meteorological data for nearby uranium fuel cycle facilities	8.3.1.12.1, 8.3.1.12.2

[a]Collection of these data is part of the environmental program planned activities and is addressed in the Radiological Monitoring Plan discussed in Section 8.3.1.13.

this Table summarizes information listed in Table 8.3.5.3-2, which was also discussed earlier.

As shown in Table 8.3.5.3-2, these parameters are needed with differing levels of confidence and for different locations on and around the site.

Logic

The assessment of the preclosure radiological safety of the public under normal repository conditions requires a thorough understanding of the repository design and operating procedures. This information is obtained from the repository reference design and supporting analyses. The radiation source terms can be developed from the design, the repository rock and water data, and the offsite installation data. After developing the source terms, calculations of radionuclide transport through the atmosphere and other environmental pathways are performed. These calculations require the agricultural and meteorological data. Finally, to assess the doses to the public, the population density data are needed. A more detailed discussion of the dose assessment process is presented earlier in the section called "public radiological safety assessment package."

The activities described here are related to all of this issue and not just to Information Need 2.1.1. Three distinct activities are planned under this information need during site characterization in support of performance analyses for public radiological safety. The first activity concerns the refinement of site parameters needs for this issue. The second activity deals with the development of methods to perform evaluations of public radiological safety and is connected with the PRAM program. The third activity is a performance assessment of public radiological safety for the advanced conceptual design (ACD).

8.3.5.3.1.1 Performance Assessment Activity 2.1.1.1: Refinement of site data parameters required for Issue 2.1

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to refine the list of site-data parameters presented earlier in this section in Table 8.3.5.3-2. This list may be incomplete or the level of confidence required may be inappropriate.

Parameters

The list of parameters presented in Table 8.3.5.3-2 is the starting point for this activity. As the activity progresses and matures, parameters may be added to or deleted from this list.

Description

There are three ways in which the parameter list will be refined. First, during the course of site-characterization reviews and activities by those organizations specified to collect data will discover problems with parameter lists. These problems will be resolved and parameter lists will be revised. Second, the PRAM program will be developing methods for radiological performance analyses (Performance Assessment Activity 2.1.1.2, Section 8.3.5.3.1.2). During the development of these methods, lists of required parameters for each type of analysis are expected to be created. A review of the parameter list resulting from PRAM methods development activities may result in refinement of the Issue 2.1 parameter list. Finally, a

performance assessment of the ACD and license application design (LAD) for public radiological safety may uncover deficiencies in the current parameter list. This is an ongoing activity whose end date is the completion of the license application.

8.3.5.3.1.2 Performance Assessment Activity 2.1.1.2: Development of performance assessment activities through the preclosure risk assessment methodology program

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to benefit from the PRAM program performance assessment methods development efforts. The Yucca Mountain Project will participate in the PRAM program and will adapt PRAM program to the Yucca Mountain program. A secondary objective of this activity is to use the information developed in this activity to assist in refining the site data parameters list for this issue (Performance Assessment Activity 2.1.1.1).

Parameters

There are presently no parameters for this activity; however, a list of parameters may result from the PRAM program development.

Description

A part of PRAM will be concerned with the assessment of public radiological safety during the normal operations of a repository. The Yucca Mountain Project will participate in this program and assist in the development of the overall methodology. Methods developed in the PRAM program will be adapted for use in the Yucca Mountain Project assessment of public radiological safety during the normal operations of the Yucca Mountain repository (Performance Assessment Activity 2.1.1.3). Since the PRAM program is expected to continue through license application design, this activity will be ongoing through license application. A more detailed discussion of the PRAM program is presented in Section 8.3.5.1.

8.3.5.3.1.3 Performance Assessment Activity 2.1.1.3: Advanced conceptual design assessment of the public radiological safety during the normal operations of the Yucca Mountain repository

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to perform a public radiological safety assessment of the Yucca Mountain repository advanced conceptual design. Secondary objectives of this activity are to provide information for the refinement of the site data parameter list for Issue 2.1 (Performance Assessment Activity 2.1.1.1) and to provide feedback to the PRAM program for future methods development activities (Performance Assessment Activity 2.1.1.2).

rameters

The parameters necessary for this activity are those listed in the site ta parameter list for Issue 2.1 presented in Table 8.3.5.3-2.

scription

This activity will assess the Yucca Mountain repository advanced concep- al design for public radiological safety during normal operations. A neral description of the process presented earlier in this section under ublic radiological safety assessment package."

3.5.3.1.4 Application of results

The information generated by this information need will be used directly Information Needs 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 to resolve this issue. Information eeds 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 (together with this issue in its entirety) will be dis- ssed in the repository design plan. Issues 2.2, 2.3, and 2.7 (Sec- ons 8.3.5.4, 8.3.5.5, and 8.3.2.3) may require some of the same site data s called for here; however, those issues will call for their own site data. he results of the safety assessments performed to resolve this issue will be sed in the preparation of the safety analysis report, which will be a part f the license application.

.3.5.3.2 Schedule for public radiological exposures--normal conditions (Issue 2.1)

Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures--normal conditions) includes he information need, which contains three performance assessment activities. he schedule information for these performance assessment activities is sum- arized in Figure 8.3.5.3-3. This figure includes the performance assessment ctivity number and a brief description, as well as major events associated th each activity. A major event, for purposes of these schedules, may epresent the initiation or completion of an activity, completion or sub- ttal of a report to the DOE, an important data feed, or a decision point. olid lines on the schedule represent activity durations and dashed lines ow interfaces among activities as well as data transferred into or out of is performance assessment issue. The events shown on the schedule and eir planned dates of completion are provided in Table 8.3.5.3-3.

The activity-level schedules, in combination with information provided the logic diagrams for this issue (Figures 8.3.5.3-1 and 8.3.5.3-2), are tended to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the relation- ips between major elements of the site, performance, and design programs. e information provided in Table 8.3.5.3-3 and Figure 8.3.5.3-3, however, ould be viewed as a snapshot in time.

The overall program schedule presented here is consistent with the Draft ssion Plan Amendment (DOE, 1988a). The site characterization program will dergo a series of refinements following issuance of the statutory SCP.



Figure 8.3.5.3-3. Schedule information for Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures–normal conditions) See Table 8.3.5.3-3 for descriptions of major events This network is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE 1988a) schedule Revisions will be published in semiannual site characterization progress reports as new information becomes available

Table 8.3.5.3-3. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures - normal conditions) (page 1 of 2)

Performance assessment activity number	Brief description of performance assessment activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
2.1.1.1	Refinement of site data needed for Issue 2.1	A	Compilation of site data needed	10/88
		B	Site data feed; Site data feeds will be continuous throughout site characterization for use in assessing public radiological safety	10/88
		C	Final site data feed	5/94
2.1.1.2	Development of performance assessment activities the preclosure risk assessment methodology (PRAM) program	A	Complete development of performance assessment activities for advanced conceptual design (ACD) preclosure radiological safety through the PRAM program; Initiate development of assessment activities for license application design (LAD) preclosure radiological safety	7/89
		B	Complete development of performance assessment activities for LAD preclosure radiological safety through the PRAM program	3/93
2.1.1.3	ACD assessment of public radiological safety during normal operations	A	Complete assessment of PRAM program for ACD assessment of public safety	2/91

Table 8.3.5.3-3. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures - normal conditions) (page 2 of 2)

Performance assessment activity number	Brief description of performance assessment activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
2.1.1.3	ACD assessment of public radiological safety during normal operations (continued)	B	Complete ACD assessment of public radiological safety using PRAM program method	1/92
		C	Start LAD assessment of public radiological safety using final PRAM program methods developed	11/93
		D	Complete LAD assessment of public radiological safety using final PRAM program methods developed	8/94

[a]The letters in this column key major events shown in Figure 8.3.5.3-3.

Refinements will consider factors both internal and external to the site characterization program, such as changes to the quality assurance program. Such refinements are to be considered in ongoing planning efforts, and changes that are implemented will be reflected in the semiannual progress reports. Summary schedule information for this and other preclosure performance assessment issues can be found in Sections 8.5.2.1 and 8.5.6.

DOE/RW-0199

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.4, Worker Radiological Safety — Normal Conditions

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.4 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 2.2: Can the repository be designed, constructed, operated, closed, and decommissioned in a manner that ensures the radiological safety of workers under normal operations as required by 10 CFR 60.111, and 10 CFR Part 20?

This performance issue addresses the radiological safety of workers during normal operations. To resolve this issue, the mined geologic disposal system (MGDS) at Yucca Mountain will be designed to limit the normal radiation doses to workers during construction, operation, closure, and decommissioning of the repository to less than the limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20. The design process will be an iterative process as the design proceeds through the various phases. Design criteria and assumptions will be needed for both repository system operation and worker radiation safety. Many of the same parameters will apply to both areas and require appropriate input from design development. Further, the regulatory requirement to maintain radiation doses as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) imposes additional iterations on the design to implement the differential cost-benefit analyses for the ALARA process. In these iterative design activities, DOE and other guidelines will be used in designing for repository worker radiation safety. Administrative procedures will be required to limit personnel exposure (e.g., personnel monitoring, limited access, and operational changes) for any operational activities for which design features are not able to preclude the possibility of dose rates to personnel above the guidelines.

The relationship of this issue with the other issues of the issues hierarchy is discussed in Section 8.3.2.1. That section discusses the relationship between design and performance issues and fixes the lines of communication between these issues. To be more specific about the relationship of this issue to the other issues with which it has direct or very strong ties, only Issues 2.1 (Section 8.3.5.3), 2.2 (this issue), 2.3 (Section 8.3.5.5), 2.7 (Section 8.3.2.3), and 4.4 (Section 8.3.2.5) are illustrated in Figure 8.3.5.4-1. The figure defines the ties between these issues by indicating the major information items passed between them. The figure also illustrates the connection of all these issues with the site characterization program. The scope of an issue is indicated by its size with respect to the other issues in the figure. Note that Issue 4.4 is the largest in scope, and the other issues, including this issue, branch out from Issue 4.4, reducing the scope to more specific areas.

In the discussion that follows in this section, the regulatory basis for addressing this issue is presented, the approach to resolving this issue is described, and the interrelationships among the information needs are discussed. The schedule information for Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety -- normal conditions) is given in Section 8.3.5.4.3.

Regulatory basis for the issue

While the issue refers to both 10 CFR 60.111(a) and 10 CFR Part 20, 10 CFR 60.111(a) simply refers to 10 CFR Part 20 and 40 CFR Part 191 Subpart A. Because 40 CFR Part 191 Subpart A is only applicable to members of the public, 10 CFR Part 20 (standards for protection against radiation) is the only regulation directly relevant to this issue. In addition, there are



Figure 8.3.5.4-1. Relationship of Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety–normal conditions) and site characterization programs.

other sections of 10 CFR Part 60 that either require conformance with 10 CFR Part 20 or for which compliance with 10 CFR Part 20 is relevant. These include the following:

1. 10 CFR 60.21(c)(7), which requires description of the program to maintain effluents and occupational exposures in accordance with 10 CFR Part 20.

2. 10 CFR 60.131, which requires the design to meet the radiation protection requirements of 10 CFR Part 20.

3. 10 CFR 60.132, which requires the design to provide effluent control and monitoring in accordance with 10 CFR 60.111(a), which in turn invokes 10 CFR Part 20.

4. 10 CFR 60.133, which requires the underground ventilation system to maintain radionuclide concentrations and releases in accordance with 10 CFR 60.111(a) (which invokes 10 CFR Part 20).

Detailed discussions of these sections of 10 CFR Part 60 can be found with the issue resolution strategies for Issue 2.7 (repository design criteria for radiological safety, Section 8.3.2.3) and Issue 2.6 (preclosure waste package characteristics, Section 8.3.4.3). Additional guidance that will be evaluated for relevance to this issue includes the following:

1. Regulatory Guide 8.10--Operating Philosophy for Maintaining Occupational Radiation Exposures as Low as is Reasonably Achievable (NRC, 1975).

2. Regulatory Guide 8.12--Criticality Accident Alarm System (NRC, 1981a).

3. Regulatory Guide 8.15--Acceptable Programs for Respiratory Protection (October 1976) (NRC, 1976a).

4. DOE Order 5480.11, Chapter 11--Radiation Protection Requirements (September 28, 1986) (DOE, 1985c).

5. DOE Order 6430.1--General Design Criteria Manual (December 1983) (DOE, 1983a).

6. 3 CFR--Radiation Protection Guidance to Federal Agencies for Occupational Exposure (Recommendations Approved by the President). (3 CFR, 1987).

7. ICRP 26 and 30--Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP, 1977; 1978).

8. NUREG/CR 3254--Licensee Programs for Maintaining Occupational Exposure to Radiation ALARA (Munson, 1983).

9. DOE/EV/1830-T5--A Guide to Reducing Radiation Exposure to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) (Kathren et al., 1980).

10 CFR Part 20 specifies the regulatory requirements for control of occupational radiation exposure. The concept and application of ALARA also applies to worker radiation exposure. In addition to the requirements that worker doses be maintained less than regulatory limits and conform to an ALARA philosophy, design guidelines are generally established at a fraction of the limits to ensure that necessary operations can be performed and occupational doses maintained below allowable limits. The establishment of design criteria for radiological safety is performed under Issue 2.7, which uses the performance criteria established in this issue to develop the design criteria.

10 CFR Part 20 and Part 60 also require a performance verification program during repository operations that ensures area radiation levels, airborne activity concentrations, contamination levels, and criticality controls are known and routinely verified. These operational requirements necessitate including systems to perform the verification of the design and operation of the facility. To ensure that the occupational radiation doses from the operation of the repository are less than the allowable levels, regulatory requirements must be known, both by designers to produce a design, and by evaluators to ensure that requirements are met.

The 10 CFR Part 20 and Part 60 requirements for verification of radiological performance necessitate special considerations for radiation measuring and monitoring systems. These requirements include "each licensee shall make or cause to be made such surveys as (1) may be necessary for the licensee to comply with the regulations in this part, and (2) are reasonable under the circumstances to evaluate the extent of radiation hazards that may be present," "means to monitor and control the dispersal of radioactive contamination," "a radiation alarm system to warn of significant increases in radiation levels, concentrations of radioactive material in air, and of increased radioactivity in effluents," and "the effluent monitoring systems shall be designed to measure the amount and concentration of radionuclides in any effluent with sufficient precision to determine whether releases conform to the design requirements for effluent control." Radiological measurement and monitoring systems that will be required for performance verification include air monitoring systems, criticality monitoring systems, gaseous effluent monitoring and sampling systems, liquid effluent monitoring and sampling systems, and personnel monitoring systems. The criteria for the testing, operation, and performance of these systems are found in documents issued by the various organizations and government agencies setting the standards.

In addition to complying with 10 CFR Part 20, the DOE has voluntarily agreed to comply with the radon monitoring and control provisions established by the Mine Safety and Health Administration in 30 CFR Part 57. To ensure adequate protection of repository workers, the contribution of radon and its daughter products to occupational exposure will be considered in assessing compliance with the applicable standards of 10 CFR Part 20.

Approach to resolving the issue

Licensing strategy overview

The repository will be designed to limit the expected radiation doses to workers during construction, operation, and closure as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) below allowable limits required by 10 CFR Part 20. To ensure that the occupational exposure limits are met, design guidelines in the form of performance goals will be specified in this issue and transmitted to Issue 2.7, where radiological safety design criteria will be developed based on these design guidelines. The design criteria will specify dose rates in normally occupied areas and annual individual dose limits from penetrating radiation. The design criteria will also specify airborne radioactivity concentration limits in normally occupied areas. For some operational activities, design features may not be able to preclude the possibility of dose rates to personnel above the guidelines. In these instances, administrative procedures will be required to limit personnel exposure.

The personnel exposure performance verification systems, which will be designed and constructed to comply with 10 CFR Part 20 and Part 60 requirements, will be used during operations to ensure that the as-built repository systems will meet regulatory dose limits. Performance verification monitoring will provide the mechanism for corrective actions, either operational or design, and will ensure successful compliance. The provisions of the performance verification process significantly enhance the probability of successfully resolving this issue.

Resolution of this issue will occur when assurance is established that the repository can be designed, constructed, operated, closed, and decommissioned in a manner that provides for the radiological safety of workers under normal operations. This will be done by detailed analysis of the design and quantification of expected worker doses.

This strategy is not based on prior numerical evaluations of worker exposure since the actual operations of the repository are only conceptual. However, since there is currently considerable design flexibility available in terms of remote operations, shielding, restricted access procedural controls, etc., and since more significant operations already exist within the nuclear industry, it is expected that the radiation limits of the regulations can be met.

Application of the issue resolution strategy

The logic to be used in the resolution of this issue is illustrated in the logic diagram shown in Figure 8.3.5.4-2a and 8.3.5.4-2b. This logic diagram depicts how the generic issue resolution strategy of Section 8.2.2 is to be applied to this issue. The first step of the process, identifying regulatory requirements, has already been discussed in the section entitled "regulatory basis for the issue." The following discussions will explain each of the remaining steps in the resolution of this issue as shown in the logic diagram.


IDENTIFY PRECLOSURE REGULATORY AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS ON WORKER RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS
EVALUATE EXISTING DESIGN, ANALYSES, & SITE DATA
IDENTIFY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
SURFACE
SUBSURFACE
REPOSITORY
PROVIDE TRANSPORT, DISPERSION, & DIFFUSION OF ROUTINE AIRBORNE RAD EFFLUENTS WITHIN SITE BOUNDARY
PROVIDE ASSURANCE THAT DOSES TO WORKERS UNDERGROUND ARE NOT EXCESSIVE
PROVIDE CONTAINMENT OF RADIATION & LIMIT TRADITIONAL DOSE TO REPOSITORY WORKERS
IDENTIFY PERFORMANCE MEASURES
SET PERFORMANCE GOALS & INDICATIONS OF CONFIDENCE
IDENTIFY PARAMETERS, SET GOALS & INDICATIONS OF CONFIDENCE
IDENTIFY SITE DATA NEEDED & TRANSMIT TO CHARACTERIZATION PROGRAM
DEVELOP DESIGN CRITERIA & CONSTRAINTS
IDENTIFY INPUT ITEMS NEEDED FROM DESIGN PACKAGE
CREATE OR UPDATE REPOSITORY DESIGN BY ISSUE 4.4
TRANSMIT DESIGN REQUIREMENTS & REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION 2.7
WORKER RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY ASSESSMENT PACKAGE
OBTAIN DESIGN PACKAGE & SITE DATA FROM REFERENCE INFORMATION BASE
IDENTIFY SOURCE CHARACTERISTICS
RADIATION TRANSPORT EVALUATION
WORKER RADIATION EXPOSURE CALCULATION
NOT FEASIBLE TO PROCEED
ARE REGULATORY LIMITS MET ?
N
RECOMMEND CHANGES TO PERFORMANCE GOALS OR DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
CAN THE PERFORMANCE GOALS OR DESIGN BE CHANGED ?
N
Y
Y
IS EXPOSURE REDUCED TO EXTENT REASONABLE ?
N
Y
IS ANOTHER DESIGN PHASE REQUIRED PRIOR TO LA ?
Y
N
PREPARE INPUT FOR LICENSE APPLICATION

Figure 8.3.5.4-2a. Logic diagram for Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety–normal conditions) See Figure 8.3.5.4-2b for legend Section 8.3.2.1 describes the relationships and interfaces between design and performance issues

LEGEND

ACTIVITY PERFORMED TO RESOLVE ISSUE



TEST TO DETERMINE SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITY

ACTIVITY PERFORMED BY INDICATED ISSUE

ACTIVITY WITH MULTIPLE SIMILAR ACTIVITIES OR TESTS

DECISION ABOUT ISSUE RESOLUTION

Y - YES N - NO LA - LICENSE APPLICATION

Figure 8.3.5.4-2b. Legend for Figure 8.3.5.4-2a

Identification of functional requirements. To allocate performance in this issue to specific system elements of the mined geologic disposal system (MGDS) at Yucca Mountain, the functions of these system elements with respect to this issue and to the radiological safety of the repository workers must be identified. The preclosure portion of the MGDS is divided into three major system elements: the site, the repository, and the waste package. The waste package will not be considered by itself in allocating performance for this issue but will be considered in Section 8.3.4. The waste package will be considered as part of the repository system element equipment. The major system elements are further subdivided into more specific system elements; however, for resolving this issue, only the site need be divided further. The site is divided into two systems elements: the surface and the subsurface. The following sections describe each of these system elements and their function with respect to this issue.

Surface system element. The surface system element includes all radionuclide transport mechanisms which affect the occupational exposure of repository workers. Because of the proximity of the repository workers to the source, only the atmospheric transport mechanisms are important. The main processes involved are the physical transport, dispersion, and deposition of potential releases of radionuclides within the site boundary.

Subsurface system element. The subsurface system element includes the natural systems of the site that have a potential to impact the radiological safety of the repository workers while in the underground facilities. The natural radioactivity in the host rock (i.e., uranium, thorium, and radon, and their daughter products) is a source that has the potential to increase the radiation level in the restricted areas. The release of radionuclides from the site system would result from mining, transporting, and storing of the mined tuff and of the mine dewatering processes (if any). These sources are not expected to be significant. Note that exposure to naturally occurring radionuclides is not specifically regulated under 10 CFR Part 20. However, prudence dictates that total worker exposure be monitored and controlled through the implementation of applicable Mine Safety and Health Administration regulations (30 CFR 57) and DOE orders.

Repository system element. The repository system element includes all surface and subsurface systems that can be sources of man-made radiation exposure in the restricted area. The principal source of exposure to radiation in the repository system element is expected to be from high-level waste (HLW) handling operations. For these operations, the dominant source of occupational exposure is expected to be penetrating radiation (gamma rays and neutrons) emitted by the radioactive constituents of HLW. Exposure to radiation fields can be reduced by shielding or by limiting occupancy in the affected areas. These factors, among others, such as remote operation, will be considered in analysis of the repository design when recommendations are made for alternative means of meeting the performance goals for this issue and reducing the occupational exposures to ALARA levels.

Secondary radioactive wastes that will be generated on the site and processed by the waste treatment systems are another source of occupational exposure in the repository system element. The dominant mode of exposure to these sources is expected to be external exposure to the resultant radiation fields. As with the waste handling operations, the waste treatment system

design will be periodically analyzed and, if necessary, modified to ensure that occupational exposure will be adequately controlled.

In addition to external exposure from the contained sources discussed above, there is a potential for internal exposure from radionuclides that may be released from containment and entrained in the ventilation air flow or brought to the surface by the mine dewatering system (if any). These exposures will be precluded during normal operations by measures such as radiation monitoring and sampling and ventilation control. In addition, protective clothing, and respiratory protection equipment will be available for use, if necessary.

The construction and operation of the repository may also require the use of radioactive sources not generated from HLW handling operations. These would include sealed sources used for the calibration of health physics and radiation monitoring equipment and the radiography sources used for nondestructive examination of welds and radioactive sources used in scientific investigations. Control of exposure to these sources will be accomplished primarily by following the proper operational procedures, instituting appropriate administrative controls on their use, and adequate training.

The last potential source of occupational radiation exposure is from the decommissioning of the facilities. The exposure during this phase of operation would be from contaminated and activated equipment, buildings, and natural materials. The worker dose will be controlled by designing the facilities for easy disassembly, control, and consolidation of contaminated materials, and limiting the generation of neutron activation products. Note that the retrieval of waste containers is considered an operation activity.

Allocation of performance to the system elements. The next four steps after the identification of functional requirements make up the bulk of the performance allocation process. In these steps performance measures, performance goals, and needed parameters are developed. The results of these steps may be seen in Tables 8.3.5.4-1 and 8.3.5.4-2. The rationale for the assignment of confidence levels and the calls for site data are presented in the information need discussions following this discussion.

Development of design criteria and constraints and identification of input items. The only constraints on the design of the repository forthcoming from this issue are those general performance goals shown in Tables 8.3.5.4-1 and 8.3.5.4-2. These performance goals are transmitted to Issue 2.7 (repository design criteria for radiological safety, Section 8.3.2.3) where specific design criteria are developed and transmitted to Issue 4.4 (preclosure design and technical feasibility, Section 8.3.2.5) for incorporation in the design of the repository. Specific design products or information required of either Issue 2.7 or Issue 4.4 are also transmitted to Issue 2.7. At this time, no specific design products or information items have been identified.

Worker radiological safety assessment package. The specific analytical approach for use in the resolution of this issue will be developed as part of the preclosure risk assessment methodology (PRAM) program described Section 8.3.5.1. Although some work has been performed to obtain preliminary

Table 8.3.5.4-1. Functions, performance measures, and performance goals for Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety--normal conditions) (page 1 of 2)

System element	Function	Process or activity	Performance measure	Tentative goal	Needed confidence
Surface	Provide transport, dispersion, and diffusion of routine airborne radioactive effluents within site boundaries	Analyze atmospheric transport and dispersion characteristics within the site boundaries	Transport characteristics of atmosphere within site boundaries	A. Adequate atmospheric transport characteristics to assist in meeting dose limits	High
		Analyze worker doses from outdoor airborne radionuclides within site boundaries	Doses resulting from airborne radionuclide concentrations around repository facilities	B. Total doses below limits of 10 CFR Part 20 and ALARA[a]	High
Subsurface	Provide assurance that doses to workers underground are not excessive	Analyze shielding of workers from direct radiation using properties of the host rock	Effective attenuation of direct radiation by host rock	C. Significant attenuation of direct radiation using host rock properties	High
		Analyze the natural radiation released in the underground facilities	Release rates and concentrations of naturally occurring radionuclides	D. Natural radiation levels low enough to pose no significant health hazard to the workers	High
		Analyze radiation levels from miscellaneous sources of radiation such as calibration and testing sources	Direct radiation and contamination levels from miscellaneous sources	E. Insignificant levels of direct radiation and contamination from miscellaneous sources	High
Repository	Provide containment of radiation and limit radiation doses to repository workers	Analyze direct radiation levels in all areas of the repository	Direct radiation levels in all areas of the repository	F. Levels low enough to keep doses to workers below limits of 10 CFR Part 20 and ALARA	High

Table 8.3.5.4-1. Functions, performance measures, and performance goals for Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety--normal conditions) (page 2 of 2)

System element	Function	Process or activity	Performance measure	Tentative goal	Needed confidence
Repository (continued)	Provide containment of radiation and limit radiation doses to repository workers (continued)	Analyze high-level waste containment and handling operations	Doses due to worker occupancy in direct radiation areas	G. Total doses below limits of 10 CFR Part 20 and ALARA	High
		Analyze site-generated waste containment, handling, and treatment operations	Doses due to worker occupancy in direct radiation areas	H. Total doses below limits of 10 CFR Part 20 and ALARA	High
		Analyze radiation levels from miscellaneous sources of radiation such as calibration and testing sources	Direct radiation and contamination levels from miscellaneous sources	I. Insignificant levels of direct radiation and contamination from miscellaneous sources	High
		Analyze shielding provided by structures, containments, equipment, and waste packages	Effective attenuation of direct radiation levels	J. Significant attenuation of direct radiation from all sources	High
		Analyze ventilation and filtration of repository airstreams	Contamination and airborne radionuclide concentrations in repository airstreams	K. Total doses below limits of 10 CFR Part 20 and ALARA	High

[a]ALARA - as low as reasonably achievable.

Table 8.3.5.4-2. Parameters required for Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety--normal conditions) (page 1 of 2)

Related performance goal[a]	Performance or design parameter	Parameter descriptor	Tentative parameter goal	Needed confidence	Expected parameter value(s)	Current confidence	SCP section providing parameters
A,B	Wind speeds	Site area	(b)	High	Figures 5-3 to 5-7, and Tables 5-6 and 5-7	Medium	8.3.1.12
A,B	Wind direction	Site area	(b)	High	Figures 5-3 to 5-7, and Tables 5-6 and 5-7	Medium	8.3.1.12
A,B	Atmospheric stability	Site area	(b)	Medium[c]	Table 5-11	Medium	8.3.1.12
A,B	Mixing layer depth	Site area	(b)	Medium	(d)	Medium	8.3.1.12
A,B	Average ambient temperature	Site area	(b)	Medium	Tables 5-2 and 5-3	Medium	8.3.1.12
A,B	Atmospheric moisture	Site area	(b)	Medium	Tables 5-2 and 5-5	Medium	8.3.1.12
A,B	Precipitation type, amount, intensity, etc.	Site area	(b)	Medium	Tables 5-2 and 5-4	Medium	8.3.1.12
A,B	Barometric pressure	Site area	(b)	Medium	Table 5-2	Medium	8.3.1.12
A,B	Dust particle size distributions	Site area	1 to 10 micron, normal	High	Data not available	Data not available	(e)
A,B	Size and distance of topographic features from release points	Site area	Topographic features beneficial to dispersion	Medium	See U.S Geological Survey topographic maps	High	Literature
B	Routine releases	(f)	(f)	(f)	(f)	(f)	(f)
B	Surface facilities layout	(f)	(f)	(f)	(f)	(f)	(f)

Table 8.3.5.4-2. Parameters required for Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety--normal conditions) (page 2 of 2)

Related performance goal[a]	Performance or design parameter	Parameter descriptor	Tentative parameter goal	Needed confidence	Expected parameter value(s)	Current confidence	SCP section providing parameters
C	Elemental composition of host rock	TSw2 unit[g]	Normal composition for tuffs	High	Normal composition for tuffs	Medium	8.3.1.3
C	Bulk density of host rock	TSw2 unit	(b)	High	2.26 to 2.33 g/cc	Medium	8.3.1.15
C	Water content of host rock	TSw2 unit	(b)	High	65% saturation	Medium	8.3.1.16
D	Radon emanation rate from tuff	TSw2 unit	(b)	High	0.48 pCi/m^2-s	Low	8.3.1.15[e]
E,F,G,H,I,J,K	Reference repository design, operating plan, and supporting analyses	No additional site characterization data needed--see footnote f					

[a]The letters in this column key the performance parameters in this table to the tentative goals in Table 8.3.5.4-1.
[b]Tentative goal is to have further measurements of this parameter verify the range of expected values listed here.
[c]Medium confidence requirements are intended to indicate that these parameters need to be site specific.
[d]See Quiring (1968).
[e]Collection of these data is part of the environmental program planned activities and is addressed in the Radiological Monitoring Plan discussed in Section 8.3.1.13.
[f]For purposes of communicating the design information needed to evaluate worker radiological safety under normal conditions, the input items from Issue 4.4 (obtained through Issue 2.7) are collectively listed as a parameter.
[g]TSw2 unit is the nonlithophysal Topopah Spring unit (repository horizon).

estimates of worker doses, the approach used may not be the same as the final technique developed in the PRAM program. Therefore, only a general approach, shown in Figure 8.3.5.4-2 in the dashed box labeled "worker radiological safety assessment package" is discussed below. The following discussion provides a step-by-step explanation of the general approach to predict worker radiation doses during the normal operation of the repository.

Design evaluation. The design package and site data are obtained from the reference information base (RIB), and the repository design features related to the radiological safety of the worker during normal operations are evaluated. The following text discusses what types of information are investigated during this design evaluation. The high-level waste (HLW) throughput (schedule and amount of waste received per year) is an important controlling factor in the design of the repository process and storage facilities (e.g., hot cell structure and lag storage) and, hence, in the radiation doses predicted for workers. Direct radiation that can be emitted from the central process area and the amount of routine radioactive effluents will be directly related to the amount of HLW on hand and being processed. These sources of potential dose to the workers also depend on how processes are conducted for such activities as waste receipt, lag storage, waste handling and consolidation, and transport of waste containers. Worker radiation doses from such activities will be controlled principally by design features and administrative procedures (e.g., limits on frequency of tasks and time in storage), which will be a secondary control on worker exposure. Attributes of the repository design that will play a major role in controlling direct radiation or release of radioactive effluents to the restricted area include such features as

1. Operations plan parameters such as number of workers present and time to complete tasks.

2. Remote-handling equipment used for tasks in high radiation or high frequency tasks.

3. Maintenance requirements of remote-handling and hot-cell equipment.

4. Barrier and shield thicknesses, composition, and distance to workers from the source.

5. Containment and ventilation system characteristics (e.g., repository and hot cell layout, differential pressures between areas, openings, air locks, and filters).

6. Radioactive material release point characteristics (e.g., stack height, diameter, exit velocity, temperature, and location within the restricted area).

In addition, as part of the regulatory performance verification requirements, specific systems and operational controls will be needed to verify that the repository design and operation does maintain annual radiation doses to the workers to less than the regulatory limits. Examples of the systems that must be provided include gaseous and liquid effluent monitoring and control equipment, effluent sampling and measuring equipment, area radiation and airborne monitoring equipment, and personnel and area dosimetry equipment.

Design of these systems will be incorporated in the normal repository design process. The information needed for this design evaluation will be the product of the design process and will not depend directly on the site characterization activities.

Identification of radiation source characteristics. Potential sources of radiation that can contribute to worker exposure in the restricted area can be categorized as (1) resulting from repository operations or (2) miscellaneous operations. Examples of radiation sources resulting from repository operations are receipt of HLW shipping casks, releases during spent fuel consolidation, transport of HLW containers, direct radiation from storage of disposal containers, direct radiation from emplacement activities, and naturally occurring radionuclides. Other miscellaneous operations that are potential radiation sources include treatment and transportation of site-generated low-level waste (LLW) and gamma and neutron radiation-producing equipment used in construction and nondestructive testing.

The specific information needed about the potential source terms includes the radionuclides involved and the quantity and concentration, decay radiation and energies, and physical and chemical forms of these radionuclides. General information needed about the source terms for dose evaluation include

1. Planned repository operational details (e.g., scheduled HLW throughput and inventories, LLW generation and transport rates, and normal effluent release rates).

2. Repository design features (e.g., radionuclide barriers, normal effluent release locations, layout distances, containment, leakage, and filtration details).

3. Environmental details (e.g., airborne transport and dispersion of radioactive materials within the restricted area).

4. Natural radionuclide sources (e.g., concentrations in tuff and ground water at the repository location).

Depending on the characteristics of the source terms, the information needs will be satisfied by the site characterization program (e.g., naturally occurring radionuclides), the repository design process (e.g., HLW and site-generated waste), or the environmental and socioeconomic monitoring programs (e.g., offsite installations and background radiation). Development of the analytical tools needed to evaluate potential adverse impacts of the source terms on worker safety will be coordinated with the PRAM program requirements and recommendations.

Radionuclide transport evaluation. The next element in the worker radiological safety assessment package is radionuclide transport evaluation following release from containment systems or repository facilities of radioactive material as a result of normal repository activities. The dispersion of airborne radioactive materials can result in radionuclide concentrations in the air that can cause an external dose by direct radiation or an internal dose through inhalation, or result in ground deposition of radioactive

material. The dominant pathway for occupational exposure to airborne radionuclides is expected to be from radionuclides entrained in repository airstreams. Analysis of this pathway will require data on the radionuclide source terms, air volumetric flow rates, air patterns, and location of workers and length of occupancy. Analytical tools will be required for determining direct radiation dose rates in all areas of the repository, as well as for determining ventilation leakage and filtration of airborne radionuclides in the repository airstreams.

Analytical tools in the form of dispersion and pathway models also will be required to perform the radionuclide transport evaluation for restricted areas outside the facility. Meteorological data (e.g., wind speed, wind direction, and atmospheric stability) in the vicinity of the repository buildings, as well as repository design information, will be needed as input to the dispersion model. This information need will be satisfied by Characterization Program 8.3.1.12 (meteorology).

Worker radiation exposure calculation. The last step in the analysis is the radiological exposure evaluation that quantifies the dose to the individual worker from routine operation of the repository and offsite installations. The quantification of radiation doses will be performed by the use of accepted analytical models and knowledge of the various design features as input into the models. Some design features needed include

1. The processes and activities necessary for the functioning of the repository.

2. The layout and physical design features (i.e., location of processes and activities, wall thickness and material, personnel occupied areas, source location and storage, transport, and personnel corridors).

3. Repository throughput of radioactive materials.

4. Source terms (i.e., radionuclides involved, low-level waste generated, material quantities, material form (solid, liquid, particulate, or gaseous), container parameters, and industrial sources).

5. Duration and frequency of tasks.

6. Number of workers involved.

Accepted analytical methods for the calculation of personnel exposures will be selected or developed as part of the preclosure safety assessment activities consistent with the methodology described in Section 8.3.5.1. Computer models will be used to evaluate the potential radiation doses to workers where appropriate. Design-limiting assumptions will be specified for the code input parameters (e.g., radionuclide sources). The following types of analytical tools will be needed:

1. Repository operations models.
2. Building ventilation, filtration, and leakage models.
3. Radiation shielding models.
4. Atmospheric dispersion models.

5. LLW treatment and transportation radiological impact models.
6. Radiological consequences assessment models.

The information needed to calculate doses using these analytical tools will be provided as discussed in the previous steps. This information will be the product of the site characterization program, the socioeconomic and environmental monitoring program, and the normal repository design process. The following list indicates some technical guidance documents that might be applicable to the development of the analytical tools. A list of analytical tools that are available for use is contained in Section 8.3.5.19 (completed analytical techniques). Further discussions of analytical tools still needed are contained in Section 8.3.5.20 (techniques requiring development).

1. Regulatory Guide 1.69--Concrete Radiation Shields for Nuclear Power Plants (December 1973) (NRC, 1973).

2. Regulatory Guide 8.19--Occupational Radiation Dose Assessment in Light-Water-Reactor Power Plants--Design Stage Man-rem Estimates (Rev. 1, July 1979) (NRC, 1979a).

3. Safety Series No. 60--Criteria for Underground Disposal of Solid Radioactive Waste (IAEA, 1983b).

4. Safety Series No. 68--Performance Assessment for Underground Radioactive Waste Disposal Systems (IAEA, 1985).

5. DOE/EV/1830-T5--A Guide to Reducing Radiation Exposures to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) (Kathren et al., 1980)

6. DOE Order 6430.1--General Design Criteria Manual, as applicable (December 1983) (DOE, 1983a).

Performance evaluation for compliance with goals. The remainder of Figure 8.3.5.4-2 deals with the final evaluation of the results documented in the worker radiological safety assessment package. The results are compared with the regulatory limits contained in the regulations listed in the section entitled "regulatory basis for this issue". If all the limits have been met, then the results are examined to see if the ALARA criterion has been met. If both the regulatory limits and the ALARA criterion have been met and if the design is in the final design phase, then the design is ready for license application and a favorable issue resolution has been achieved. If both the regulatory limits and the ALARA criterion have been met but the design is not in the final design phase, then this process is repeated for the next design phase.

If the results of the worker radiological safety assessment package do not meet either the regulatory limits or the ALARA criterion, then design, procedural, or operational changes are recommended to correct the situation. If these changes cannot be made and the performance goals cannot be reasonably changed, then an unfavorable resolution of the issue has occurred (i.e., not feasible to proceed). However, if the design, procedural, or operational changes can be made or the performance goals can be reasonably changed, then the recommended changes are implemented and the whole process is repeated.

Interrelationships of information needs

The question asked by this issue (2.2) addresses the radiological health and safety of the workers during the normal operations of the repository. The resolution of this issue can be obtained by answering two questions:

1. Given the repository design, what is the expected radiation environment on the surface and in the surface and subsurface facilities due to natural and man-made sources of radiation?

2. For the normal operations of the repository, what are the projected worker radiation doses for the normal operations of the repository and do these doses meet applicable requirements?

There is a one-to-one correspondence between these questions and the two steps in Figure 8.3.5.4-2 in the box labeled worker radiological safety assessment package. The two questions have been designated Information Needs 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, respectively. Information Need 2.2.1 describes the radiation environments that workers may be subjected to during the course of their work. This information need requires (1) site data to determine the radiation environments resulting from natural radioactivity and the background radiation of the site for baseline definition purposes and (2) design data to evaluate the effects of the design on the radiation environment.

Information Need 2.2.2 is a determination of the expected exposure conditions and worker radiation doses resulting from the normal operations of the repository. As described earlier in the section called worker radiological safety assessment package, the doses to the workers are predicted using radionuclide transport and dispersion models, radiation shielding models, the repository operating plan, and radiological dose assessment models. The final resolution of this issue will take place under this information need when the results of the dose calculations are evaluated and compared with the regulatory limits contained in 10 CFR Part 20.

The functions and performance measures (associated with the MGDS system elements) necessary for answering these two questions and resolving this issue are listed in Table 8.3.5.4-1. The site data needed to answer these two questions are listed in Table 8.3.5.4-2.

8.3.5.4.1 Information Need 2.2.1: Determination of radiation environment in surface and subsurface facilities due to natural and manmade radioactivity

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

Further discussions on the subject of radiological protection of the workers may be found in Sections 6.1.1.4.1 (radiological protection design requirements) and 6.4.5 (Issue 2.2: radiological safety of workers--normal conditions). Section 8.3.5.1 contains discussions on the preclosure risk assessment methodology (PRAM) program, which, as part of its scope, includes

radiological risk to the workers during normal operations. Sections 2.5 (radiological protection) and 6.1 (radioactive releases during normal operations) of the Site Characterization Plan-Conceptual Design Report (SCP-CDR) (SNL, 1987) also contain discussions relevant to this issue. Section 6.1 of the SCP-CDR is especially informative because it contains some preliminary estimates of expected releases during normal operations of the repository.

Parameters

The parameters required by this information need are those site and design parameters relevant to the determination of the radiation environment on the surface and in the surface and subsurface facilities. The relevant design information is noted in Table 8.3.5.4-2 and further information on these needs is not required at this time. The reference repository design and supporting analyses will be obtained from the reference information base (RIB) and will contain all design details necessary to perform the required evaluations.

There is only one piece of site data needed to satisfy this information need: the radon emanation rate of the mined tuff. Collection of these data is part of the environmental program planned activities and is addressed in the Yucca Mountain Project Radiological Monitoring Plan discussed in Section 8.3.1.13. All other data is design data and will be obtained from the reference information base.

Logic

The determination of the radiation environment on the surface and in the surface and subsurface facilities requires information about the site, the potential sources of radiation, and the repository design. Information about the repository design is obtained from the repository reference design, as is information about the potential man-made sources of radiation. Information about the site is obtained through the site characterization program. Using this information, airborne radionuclide concentrations are estimated for the surface and subsurface facilities and for the area on the surface surrounding the repository. Radiation levels from direct radiation sources are then calculated to establish dose rates from the different source terms. Once potential sources of radiation are accounted for, radiation areas are established and associated radiation levels for both direct and airborne radiation are determined. Table 8.3.5.4-2 lists the data (in addition to radon emanation rate from the tuff) required to perform this task. After these calculations are completed, this information need is satisfied, and the results can then be used in Information Need 2.2.2 to determine radiation doses to workers.

8.3.5.4.1.1 Activity 2.2.1.1: Refinement of site data parameters required for Issue 2.2

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to refine the list of site data parameters just presented in the technical basis section for Information Need 2.2.1. This list may be incomplete or the level of confidence (as shown in Table 8.3.5.4-2) required may be inappropriate.

Parameters

The list of parameters presented in the technical basis section for Information Need 2.2.1 is the starting point for this activity. As the activity progresses parameters may be added to or deleted from this list.

Description

The parameter list will be refined in three ways. First, during site characterization, reviews and activities by those organizations responsible for collecting data will discover problems with parameter lists. These problems will be resolved and parameter lists will be revised. Second, the PRAM program will be developing methods for radiological performance analyses (Performance Assessment Activity 2.2.2.2 in Section 8.3.5.4.2.2). During the development of these methods, it is expected that lists of required parameters for each type of analysis will be created. A review of these parameter lists may result in refinement of the Issue 2.2 parameter list. Finally, a performance assessment of the advanced conceptual design (ACD) and license application design (LAD) for worker radiological safety (Performance Activity 2.2.1.2) may uncover deficiencies in the current parameter list. This is an ongoing activity whose end date is the completion of the license application.

8.3.5.4.1.2 Activity 2.2.1.2: Advanced conceptual design assessment of the worker radiological safety during the normal operations of the Yucca Mountain repository

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to perform a worker radiological safety assessment of the ACD for a Yucca Mountain repository. Secondary objectives of this activity are to provide information for the refinement of the site data parameter list for Issue 2.2 (Performance Assessment Activity 2.2.1.1 in the previous sections) and to provide feedback to the PRAM program for future methods development activities (Performance Assessment Activity 2.2.2.2, Section 8.3.5.4.2.2).

Parameters

The parameters necessary for this activity are those listed in the site data parameter list for Issue 2.2 presented in the technical basis section for Information Need 2.2.1.

Description

This activity will assess the ACD for worker radiological safety during normal operations. A general description of the process is presented earlier in the section on worker radiological safety assessment package.

8.3.5.4.1.3 Application of results

The information generated by this information need will be used directly by Information Need 2.2.2 to resolve this issue. Issues 2.1 (Section 8.3.5.3), 2.3 (Section 8.3.5.5) and 2.7 (Section 8.3.2.3) may require some of the same site data as called for here; however, those issues will call for their own site data. The results of the safety assessments performed to resolve this issue will be used in the preparation of the safety analysis report that will be part of the license application.

8.3.5.4.2 Information Need 2.2.2: Determination that projected worker exposures and exposure conditions under normal conditions meet applicable requirements

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

Chapter 3 discusses the present state of the knowledge on the site hydrology, including uses of surface water and ground water. Chapter 5 discusses the present state of the knowledge on the meteorology of the site and surrounding region. Further discussions on the subject of radiological protection of the workers may be found in Sections 6.1.1.4.1 (radiological protection design requirements) and 6.4.5 (Issue 2.2: radiological safety expected to workers--normal conditions). Section 8.3.5.1 contains discussions on the preclosure risk assessment methodology (PRAM) program. The PRAM program includes radiological risk to workers during normal operations as part of its scope. Sections 2.5 (radiological protection) and 6.1 (radioactive releases during normal operations), of the Site Characterization Plan-Conceptual Design Report (SCP-CDR) (SNL, 1987) also contain discussions relevant to this issue. Section 6.1 of the SCP-CDR is especially informative because it contains some preliminary estimates of expected releases during normal operations of the repository.

Parameters

The parameters required by this information need are those site and design parameters relevant to the prediction of worker radiation doses during the normal operations of the repository. The calculation of worker doses due to airborne radionuclides within the facilities requires only design information; however, the determination of worker doses due to airborne radionuclides outside the facilities does require site data. Design information needed for this purpose is noted in Table 8.3.5.4-2, and further information on these needs is not required at this time. Reference repository design

information and supporting analyses will be obtained from the reference information base (RIB), which will contain all design the details necessary to perform the required evaluations.

The site data required to satisfy this information need are obtained through various characterization programs and also through the RIB. Following is a summary of the required site data and the SCP section providing the information:

Data requirement	SCP section
METEOROLOGICAL DATA	
Wind speeds in the region	8.3.1.12.2
Prevalent wind directions	8.3.1.12.2
Atmospheric stability of the area	8.3.1.12.2
Atmospheric mixing layer depth of the area	8.3.1.12.2
Average ambient temperature of the area	8.3.1.12.2
Atmospheric moisture of the area	8.3.1.12.2
Area precipitation, including type, amount, intensity, etc.	8.3.1.12.2
Barometric pressure	8.3.1.12.2
Dust particle size distributions	8.3.1.12.2
Size and distance of major topographic features from release points	8.3.1.14.1
REPOSITORY ROCK AND GROUND-WATER DATA	
Elemental composition of the host rock	8.3.1.3.2
Bulk density of the host rock	8.3.1.15.1
Water content and saturation of the host rock	8.3.1.12.3

These parameters are needed with differing levels of confidence and for different locations on and around the site as shown in Table 8.3.5.4-2.

Logic

Once the results of Information Need 2.2.1 are obtained, the prediction of worker doses during normal operations may begin. The calculation of worker exposures to airborne radionuclides on the surface outside the facilities depends on the concentrations of radionuclides released from the repository (obtained from the reference repository design and Information Need 2.2.1), the meteorological conditions surrounding the facilities, and to a lesser extent, sources in the environment. Worker doses from airborne radionuclides inside the repository facilities are determined from the radiation levels estimated by Information Need 2.2.1 and the repository operations plan. Worker doses resulting from direct radiation in the surface facilities can be predicted using the characteristics of the repository design, the information on radiation areas supplied by Information Need 2.2.1, and the repository operations plan. The prediction of doses resulting from direct radiation from emplaced waste in the underground facilities requires data on the density and composition of the repository rock. With this information, the shielding provided by the host rock can be determined and the worker doses from emplaced waste predicted. The repository design will provide shielding data needs for the transporter and other emplacement and retrieval equipment. Once all these contributions to worker doses are determined and combined, the results are used to predict compliance with applicable requirements and provide a resolution of Issue 2.2. In addition, ground-water data will be obtained for assessing its contribution to shielding of gamma and neutron radiation emitted by the waste package.

8.3.5.4.2.1 Activity 2.2.2.1: Refinement of site data parameters required for Issue 2.2

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to refine the list of site data parameters presented in the technical basis section for Information Need 2.2.2. This list may be incomplete or the level of confidence required (as shown in Table 8.3.5.4-2) may be inappropriate.

Parameters

The list of parameters presented in the technical basis section for Information Need 2.2.2 is the starting point for this activity. As the activity progresses parameters may be added to or deleted from this list.

Description

The parameter list will be refined in three ways. First, during site characterization, reviews and activities by those organizations responsible for collecting data will discover problems with parameter lists. These problems will be resolved and parameter lists will be revised. Second, the PRAM program will be developing methods for radiological performance analyses (Performance Assessment Activity 2.2.2.2). During the development of these methods, it is expected that lists of required parameters for each type of analysis will be created. A review of these parameter lists may result in

refinement of the Issue 2.2 parameter list. Finally, a performance assessment of the advanced conceptual design for worker radiological (Performance Assessment Activity 2.2.2.3) safety may uncover deficiencies in the current parameter list. This is an ongoing activity whose end date is the completion of the license application.

8.3.5.4.2.2 Activity 2.2.2.2: Development of performance assessment activities through the preclosure risk assessment methodology program

Objectives

Performance assessment methods development efforts in the preclosure risk assessment methodology. The objective of this activity is to benefit from the PRAM program. The Yucca Mountain Project will participate in the PRAM program through the PRAM Working Group and will adapt the PRAM program to the Yucca Mountain Program. A secondary objective of this activity is to use the information developed in this activity to assist in refining the site data parameters list for this issue (Performance Assessment Activity 2.2.2.1 described in the previous section).

Parameters

Initially there are no parameters for this activity; however, a list of parameters will develop as a result of the PRAM program and other project activities.

Description

The objective of the PRAM program is to develop a consistent preclosure safety assessment methodology. A part of this methodology will be concerned with the assessment of worker radiological safety during the normal operations of a repository. The Yucca Mountain Project will participate in this program and assist in the development of the overall methodology. Methods developed in the PRAM program will be adapted for use in the Yucca Mountain Project assessment of worker radiological safety during the normal operations of the Yucca Mountain repository (Performance Assessment Activity 2.2.2.3 in Section 8.3.5.4.2.3). Since the PRAM program is expected to continue through license application design this activity will be ongoing through license application. A more detailed discussion of the PRAM program is presented in Section 8.3.5.1.

8.3.5.4.2.3 Activity 2.2.2.3: Advanced conceptual design assessment of the worker radiological safety during the normal operations of the Yucca Mountain repository

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to perform a worker radiological safety assessment of the advanced conceptual design for the Yucca Mountain

repository. Secondary objectives of this activity are to provide information for the refinement of the site data parameter list for this issue (Performance Assessment Activity 2.2.2.1) and to provide feedback to the PRAM program for future methods development activities (Performance Assessment Activity 2.2.2.2).

Parameters

The parameters necessary for this activity are those listed in the site data parameter list for this issue presented in the technical basis section for Information Need 2.2.2.

Description

This activity will assess the Yucca Mountain repository advanced conceptual design for worker radiological safety during normal operations. A general description of the process is presented in the section on worker radiological safety assessment package.

8.3.5.4.2.4 Application of results

The information generated by this information need will be used directly to resolve this issue (2.2). Issues 2.1 (Section 8.3.5.3), 2.3 (Section 8.3.5.5), and 2.7 (Section 8.3.2.3) may require some of the same site data as called for here, however, those issues will call for their own site data. The results of the safety assessments performed to resolve this issue will be used in the preparation of the safety analysis report that will be part of the license application. These results will provide insight to needed design changes during subsequent design phases.

8.3.5.4.3 Schedule for worker radiological safety--normal conditions

Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety--normal conditions) includes two information needs, which contain five activities. The schedule information for these activities is summarized in Figure 8.3.5.4-3. This figure includes the activity number and a brief description, as well as major events associated with the activities. A major event, for purposes of these schedules, may represent the initiation or completion of an activity, completion or submittal of a report to the DOE, an important data feed, or a decision point. Solid lines on the schedule represent activity durations and dashed lines show interfaces among activities as well as data transferred into or out of this performance assessment issue. The events shown on the schedule and their planned dates of completion are provided in Table 8.3.5.4-3.

The activity-level schedules, in combination with information provided in the logic diagram for this issue (Figure 8.3.5.4-2), are intended to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the relationships between major elements of the site, performance, and design programs. The information provided in Table 8.3.5.4-3 and Figure 8.3.5.4-3, however, should be viewed as a snapshot in time.



Figure 8.3.5.4-3. Schedule information for activities in Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety–normal conditions) See Table 8.3.5.4-3 for descriptions of major events This network is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE 1988a) schedule Revisions will be published in semiannual site characterization progress reports as new information becomes available

Table 8.3.5.4-3. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety - normal conditions) (page 1 of 2)

Activity number	Brief description of activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
2.2.1.1	Refinement of site data needed for Issue 2.2	A	Compilation of site data needed	10/88
		B	Site data feed; site data feeds will be continuous through site characterization for use in assessing worker radiological safety	10/88
		C	Final site data feed	6/94
2.2.1.2 and 2.2.2.3	ACD assessment of worker radiological safety during normal operations	A	Continue preliminary assessment of worker radiological safety during normal operations	10/88
		B	Start advanced conceptual design (ACD) assessment of worker radiological safety during normal operations	12/90
		C	Complete ACD assessment of worker radiological safety during normal operations	7/92
		D	Start license application design (LAD) assessment of worker radiological safety during normal operations	11/93
		E	Complete LAD assessment of worker radiological safety during normal operations	8/94

Table 8.3.5.4-3. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 2.2 (worker radiological safety - normal conditions) (page 2 of 2)

Activity number	Brief description of activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
2.2.2.2	Development of performance assessment activities through the preclosure risk assessment methodology (PRAM) program	A	Start development of performance assessment activities for worker radiological safety during normal operations through the PRAM program	12/90
		B	Complete development of performance assessment activities for worker radiological safety during normal operations through the PRAM program	5/91
		C	PRAM procedure guide available for LAD assessment of worker radiological safety during normal operations	7/92
		D	Final PRAM procedures available to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)	9/93

[a]The letters in this column key major events shown in Figure 8.3.5.4-3.

The overall program schedule presented here is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE, 1988a). The site characterization program will undergo a series of refinements following issuance of the statutory SCP. Refinements will consider factors both internal and external to the site characterization program, such as changes to the quality assurance program. Such refinements are to be considered in ongoing planning efforts, and changes that are implemented will be reflected in the semiannual program reports. Summary schedule information for this and other preclosure performance assessment issues can be found in Sections 8.5.2.1 and 8.5.6.

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.5, Accidental Radiological Releases

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.5 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 2.3: Can the repository be designed, constructed, operated, closed, and decommissioned in such a way that credible accidents do not result in projected radiological exposures of the general public at the nearest boundary of the unrestricted area, or workers in the restricted area, in excess of applicable limiting values?

Resolution of this issue requires the assurance that during the preclosure period the repository will not pose any undue radiological risk to the health and safety of the public and repository workers as a result of possible accidents. This will be initially established by an analysis documenting the adequacy of structures, systems, and components provided for the prevention of accidents and mitigation of consequences. The structures, systems, and components to be analyzed are those that will be presented to the NRC in the safety analysis report (SAR) of the license application. Frequent interactions with the NRC on site-specific preclosure activities are planned. Regulatory closure of this issue will first occur when the NRC issues a favorable safety evaluation report (SER) on the license application.

The relationship of this issue with the other issues of the issues hierarchy is shown in Figure 8.3.2.1-1 (Section 8.3.2.1), which illustrates the relationship between design and performance issues and fixes the lines of communication between these issues. To be more specific about the relationship of this issue to the other issues with which it has direct or very strong ties, only Issues 2.1 (Section 8.3.5.3), 2.2 (Section 8.3.5.4), 2.3 (this issue), 2.7 (Section 8.3.2.3), and 4.4 (Section 8.3.2.5) are shown in Figure 8.3.5.5-1. The figure defines the ties between these issues by indicating the major information items passed between them. The figure also illustrates the connection of all these issues with the site characterization program. The scope of an issue is indicated by its size with respect to the other issues in the figure. Note that Issue 4.4 is the largest in scope, and the other issues, including this issue, branch out from Issue 4.4, reducing the scope to more specific areas. In the discussion that follows in this section, the regulatory basis for addressing accidental radiological releases is presented, the approach to resolving this issue is described, and the interrelationships among the information needs are discussed. The schedule information for Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases is given in Section 8.3.5.5.3.

Regulatory basis for the issue

Although the issue states that radiation exposures resulting from credible accidents must be maintained below applicable limits, there are currently no regulatory limits for radiation exposures to either members of the public or repository workers from accidents at a repository. 10 CFR Part 60 does not specify an accident dose guideline to the public. The DOE has initiated steps to petition the NRC to amend the rule so as to include an accident dose guideline in Part 60. When such guideline is promulgated, it will be addressed in the repository design. Regulatory criteria pertaining to worker exposure during accidents for other situations and facilities will be considered.


REPOSITORY REFERENCE DESIGN OPERATING PLAN, AND SUPPORTING ANALYSES; ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE WITH RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY DESIGN CRITERIA AND GOALS
ISSUE 2.7 REPOSITORY DESIGN CRITERIA FOR RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY 8.3.2.3
REPOSITORY REFERENCE DESIGN, OPERATING PLAN, AND SUPPORTING ANALYSES
ISSUE 4.4 PRECLOSURE DESIGN AND TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY 8.3.2.5
REQUESTS FOR SITE DATA
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY PERFORMANCE CRITERIA AND GOALS
RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY DESIGN CRITERIA
REQUESTS FOR SITE DATA
ISSUE 2.1 PUBLIC RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURES-NORMAL CONDITIONS 8.3.5.3
ISSUE 2.2 WORKER RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY-NORMAL CONDITIONS 8.3.5.4
ISSUE 2.3 ACCIDENTAL RADIOLOGICAL RELEASES 8.3.5.5
REQUESTS FOR SITE DATA
SITE CHARACTERIZATION PROGRAM

Figure 8.3.5.5-1. Relationship of Issue 2 3 (accidental radiological releases) to other issues and the site characterization programs

Approach to resolving the issue

Licensing strategy overview

As stated earlier, the resolution of this issue requires the assurance that during the preclosure period the repository will not pose any undue radiological risk to the health and safety of the public and essential repository workers as a result of possible accidents. The preclosure period encompasses all activities associated with repository operation; simultaneous mining, construction, and emplacement; retrieval; decommissioning; and closure. The possibility of accidents will be considered for all underground and surface facilities, systems, or operations within the repository site boundary. The features initially assumed for issue resolution are (1) the reference repository design and operations described in the site characterization plan-conceptual design report (SCP-CDR) (SNL, 1987) and (2) site characteristics known to date from reconnaissance investigations. These encompass the appropriate elements from the hierarchy for the mined geologic disposal system (MGDS) at Yucca Mountain. The accident initiators that will be considered are natural phenomena, equipment failure or malfunction, and man-made events, including human error. Besides the initiating event that starts the accident sequences, other events or failures (called intermediate events) that are direct or consequential results will be considered in developing the accident sequence.

Using the methods consistent with those developed by the NRC, the DOE, and the preclosure risk assessment methodology (PRAM) program (see Section 8.3.5.1), the full range of the accident sequences will be identified, developed, and screened to establish the set of design-basis accidents for which radiological consequence assessments will be made. The definition of credible accidents is still being discussed within the DOE. Probabilistic analyses are expected to be performed to support, or perhaps to establish, the design-basis accident selections and to estimate the radiological risk to the public resulting from the repository. As part of the safety analyses, evaluations will also be made of the systems designed to prevent the accidents, to detect the accidents, and to mitigate the radiological consequences of the accidents. The protection of public health and safety will be demonstrated by comparing the doses calculated in the radiological consequence assessments with the criteria established within the repository program or with regulatory limits, if and when the regulatory limits are established.

These analyses will be reviewed at each design phase to determine the need for improvements or updating due to new information. The iteration of design and safety analysis, taking into consideration a proper balance between risk and cost, is expected to result in a well-designed MGDS. Finally, this issue will be resolved when (1) the set of credible design basis accidents has been established and analyzed using a deterministic approach, (2) supporting probabilistic risk analyses have been completed, and (3) both have been described in a format appropriate for the safety analysis report.

Application of the issue resolution strategy

The logic to be used in resolving this issue is illustrated in the logic diagrams shown in Figures 8.3.5.5-2 and -3. These logic diagrams depict how the generic issue resolution strategy of Section 8.2.2 is to be applied to this issue. The first step of the process, identifying regulatory requirements, was discussed earlier in the section entitled "regulatory basis for the issue." The following discussions will explain each of the remaining steps in the resolution of this issue as shown in the logic diagram.

Identification of functional requirements. To allocate performance in this issue to specific system elements of the MGDS, the functions of these system elements with respect to this issue must be identified. The preclosure portion of the MGDS is divided into three major system elements: the site, the repository, and the waste package. The waste package will not be considered by itself in allocating performance for this issue but will be considered in Section 8.3.4. The waste package will be considered as part of the repository system element equipment. The major system elements are further subdivided into more specific system elements; however, for resolving this issue, this level of detail is sufficient. In addition to these two system elements from the MGDS requirements, a third system element (offsite installations) is required for the resolution of this issue. The following sections describe each of these system elements and their role with respect to this issue.

Site system element. Disturbances in the site system element can induce accidents in the repository. The site events that could initiate accidents would primarily be natural disruptive phenomena such as earthquakes, rockfall, or potential methane or water intrusion. Structures, systems, and components important to safety (as defined in 10 CFR 60.2) must be protected against these phenomena.

Atmospheric transport of airborne radionuclides is expected to be the dominant pathway by which members of the public can be impacted by an accidental release of radioactive material. This is an important pathway for accident analysis because exposure can occur shortly after the release, before implementation of protective actions and, thus, must be dealt with through design. The relevant processes include atmospheric transport and dispersion, plume depletion, and deposition on the ground and in bodies of water. Atmospheric transport of airborne radionuclides is also important with respect to radiation exposure of the repository workers; however, direct exposure to penetrating radiation may be a more important source of radiation exposure for some workers in the vicinity of an accident. Exposure of essential workers is controlled by design features and is therefore in the domain of the repository system element.

The surface environment also includes longer-term pathways through which public exposure could occur after an accident. These pathways include surface-water bodies into which radioactive liquids could be accidentally released or into which radionuclides initially deposited on land could be washed down by precipitation. Long-term pathways also include inhalation of resuspended material deposited on the ground and ingestion of food products contaminated by uptake into plants, milk, and meat animals. Since these


IDENTIFY PRECLOSURE REGULATORY AND OTHER REQUIREMENTS ON PUBLIC AND ESSENTIAL WORKER RADIOLOGICAL SAFETY UNDER ACCIDENT CONDITIONS
EVALUATE EXISTING DESIGN, ANALYSES, & SITE DATA
IDENTIFY FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
SITE
REPOSITORY
OFFSITE INSTALLATIONS
PROVIDE LOCATION THAT ASSISTS IN LIMITING POTENTIAL RADIATION EXPOSURE TO THE PUBLIC AND ESSENTIAL WORKERS FROM ACCIDENTS
PROVIDE PREVENTION, CONTAINMENT, & MITIGATION OF ACCIDENT CONSEQUENCES & LIMIT RADIATION EXPOSURES TO ESSENTIAL WORKERS & PUBLIC
PROVIDE ASSURANCE THAT REPOSITORY AND ESSENTIAL WORKERS ARE SAFE FROM EFFECTS OF OFFSITE ACCIDENTS
IDENTIFY PERFORMANCE MEASURES
SET PERFORMANCE GOALS & INDICATIONS OF CONFIDENCE
IDENTIFY PARAMETERS, SET GOALS & INDICATIONS OF CONFIDENCE
IDENTIFY SITE DATA NEEDED & TRANSMIT TO CHARACTERIZATION PROGRAM
DEVELOP DESIGN CRITERIA & CONSTRAINTS
IDENTIFY INPUT ITEMS NEEDED FROM DESIGN PACKAGE
CREATE OR UPDATE REPOSITORY DESIGN BY ISSUE 4.4
TRANSMIT DESIGN REQUIREMENTS & REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION TO ISSUE 2.7
OBTAIN DESIGN PACKAGE & SITE DATA FROM REFERENCE INFORMATION BASE
ASSESS RADIOLOGICAL RISKS FROM ACCIDENTS (SEE FIGURE 8.3.5.5-3)
NOT FEASIBLE TO PROCEED
N
ARE REGULATORY LIMITS MET ?
N
RECOMMEND CHANGES TO PERFORMANCE GOALS OR DESIGN AND OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES
CAN THE PERFORMANCE GOALS OR DESIGN BE CHANGED ?
Y
Y
IS ANOTHER DESIGN PHASE REQUIRED PRIOR TO LA?
Y
N
PREPARE INPUT FOR LICENSE APPLICATION

Figure 8.3.5.5-2a. Logic diagram for Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases). See Figure 8.3.5.5-2b for legend. Section 8.3.2.1 describes the relationships and interfaces between design and performance issues.

LEGEND

ACTIVITY PERFORMED TO RESOLVE ISSUE



TEST TO DETERMINE SUBSEQUENT ACTIVITY

ACTIVITY PERFORMED BY INDICATED ISSUE

ACTIVITY WITH MULTIPLE SIMILAR ACTIVITIES OR TESTS



DECISION ABOUT ISSUE RESOLUTION

Y - YES N - NO LA - LICENSE APPLICATION

Figure 8.3.5.5-2b. Legend for Figure 8.3.5.5-2a.


SYSTEM ANALYSIS
CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS
EVENT TREE DEVELOPMENT 2
REPOSITORY FAMILIARIZATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF INITIATING EVENTS 1
DATA BASE DEVELOPMENT 6
ACCIDENT SEQUENCE ANALYSIS 7
IN-PLANT CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 8
ENVIRONMENTAL TRANSPORT AND OFFSITE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 9
REPOSITORY SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 3
UNCERTAINTY, SENSITIVITY, AND IMPORTANCE ANALYSES 10
DOCUMENTATION AND USE OF RESULTS 11
HUMAN RELIABILITY ANALYSIS 4
COMMON CAUSE FAILURE ANALYSIS 5

Figure 8.3.5.5-3. Analytical steps for assessing radiological risks from accidents. (The numbers in the diagram are keyed to text discussion.)

pathways are amenable to protective actions such as interdiction and decontamination of contaminated land and food products, they are not expected to be significant.

In view of the previous discussion, the site system element provides a location that assists in limiting potential radiation exposure to the public and repository workers from accidents. The site system element attributes that affect accidental radiation exposures include: (1) the remoteness of the site, (2) site-related accident initiators, (3) quick-acting radionuclide transport pathways, and (4) long-term radionuclide transport pathways. These four attributes define the analysis activities required to evaluate the effectiveness of the site system element in limiting accidental exposures.

Repository system element. The repository is important to the resolution of this issue because it contains the radioactive material available for release during an accident and, thus, will provide the source term for accident analysis. The radioactive material includes the high-level waste handled in the facilities and any secondary wastes generated on the site. In addition to providing the source term for accident analysis, the site facilities system is important because it contains the systems whose failure can initiate or continue an accident, as well as the systems that can prevent or mitigate an accident.

The repository will be designed to prevent, contain, and mitigate accident consequences and to limit radiation exposures to essential repository workers and the public. To evaluate the repository system element performance with respect to these objectives (for this issue), four main analysis activities are required. These are (1) analysis of the probabilities and consequences of design-related initiating events; (2) analysis of the vulnerability of the repository to the effects of natural, site-related, and design-related initiating events; (3) analysis of the effectiveness of preventive systems and design features; and (4) analysis of the effectiveness of mitigative systems and design features. All these analyses are interrelated and will be performed in parallel.

Offsite installations. Offsite installations are relevant to resolution of this issue because accidents at those facilities could be the initiating events for accidents at the repository. The operations performed in the local area include defense operations, transportation, surface disposal and storage of radioactive waste, and possibly nuclear fuel cycle operations. Potential hazards to the repository from these operations will be assessed and may contribute to the design basis for structures, systems, and components important to safety and to initiating events for accident analysis. Because of the large distances involved and past history, it is expected that the safety of the repository and essential workers from offsite accidents can be fulfilled by systems designed to handle onsite accidents.

Allocation of performance to the system elements. The next four steps in Figure 8.3.5.5-2 after the identification of functional requirements make up the bulk of the performance allocation process. In these steps performance measures, performance goals, and needed parameters are developed. For each system element, the functions it will serve in the resolution of this issue are listed in Table 8.3.5.5-1. The processes and activities that take place in serving each of these functions are also listed. Since this is a

Table 8.3.5.5-1. Functions, performance measures, and performance goals for Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases) (page 1 of 2)

System element	Function	Process or activity	Performance measure	Tentative goal	Needed confidence
Site	Provide location that assists in limiting potential radiation exposure to the public and essential workers from accidents	Analyze remoteness of repository location	Population density of region	A. Resolution of Issue 2.5 (higher level findings--preclosure radiological safety)	High
		Analyze probabilities and consequences of accidents caused by natural or site-related phenomena[a]	Consequences of credible site-related accidents	B. Radiation doses well below applicable limiting values	High
		Analyze short-term public and essential worker radiation exposure mitigation features of the site	Quick-acting dispersion and transport characteristics of the site	C. Adequate short-term transport characteristics to assist in limiting doses	High
		Analyze long-term public and essential worker radiation exposure mitigation features of the site	Long-term dispersion, diffusion, and bioaccummulation characteristics of the site	D. Adequate long-term transport characteristics to assist in limiting doses	High
Repository	Provide prevention, containment, and mitigation of accident consequences and limit radiation exposures to essential workers and public	Analyze probabilities and consequences of design-related accidents	Consequences of credible design-related initiating events	E. Radiation doses well below applicable limiting values	High
		Analyze design for vulnerability to effects of natural, site-related, and design-related accidents	Sensitivity of repository design to possible accidents	F. Repository designed to provide desirable responses to possible accidents	High

Table 8.3.5.5-1. Functions, performance measures, and performance goals for Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases) (page 2 of 2)

System element	Function	Process or activity	Performance measure	Tentative goal	Needed confidence
Repository (continued)		Analyze design for effectiveness of preventive features	Effectiveness of preventive design features	G. Near total prevention of accidents and consequences	High
		Analyze design for effectiveness of mitigative features	Effectiveness of mitigative design features	H. Mitigation of accident consequences to well below applicable limiting values	High
Offsite installations	Provide assurance that repository and essential workers are safe from effects of offsite accidents	Analyze vulnerability of repository and essential workers to effects of offsite accidents	Consequences of credible offsite accidents that could affect the repository and the essential workers	I. Radiation doses well below applicable limiting values	High

[a]Short-term radiation exposures will be evaluated to assess compliance with applicable accident dose limits. Long-term radiation exposures will be used to assess risk from credible accidents.

performance issue, the purpose of which is to analyze the performance of the repository systems with respect to radiological health and safety under accident conditions, these processes and activities are analyses rather than physical processes. The quantity used to measure the performance under each analysis, called a performance measure, is listed for each process, together with a goal for that performance measure. These goals are selected so that if they are met, then the regulatory requirements are satisfied with some margin of safety. The present goals are tentative, permitting future adjustment in the allocation between subsystems, if necessary. Finally, the confidence needed in meeting these goals is an indication of the relative importance of each performance measure in contributing to meeting the ultimate regulatory requirement. The results of the performance allocation steps may be seen in Tables 8.3.5.5-1 and 8.3.5.5-2.

Development of design criteria and constraints and identification of input items. The only constraints on the design of the repository forthcoming from this issue are those general performance goals shown in Tables 8.3.5.5-1 and 8.3.5.5-2. These performance goals are transmitted to Issue 2.7 (Section 8.3.2.3) where specific design criteria are developed and transmitted to Issue 4.4 (Section 8.3.2.5) for incorporation in the design of the repository (see Figure 8.3.5.5-1). Specific design products or information required for either Issue 2.7 or Issue 4.4 are also transmitted to Issue 2.7. At this time, no specific design products or information items have been identified.

Analytical approach for radiological safety assessment of accidents. The general analytical approach for the assessment of radiological risks from accidents to the public and essential workers is illustrated in Figure 8.3.5.5-3. The following is a brief discussion of the steps shown in Figure 8.3.5.5-3. This methodology is discussed in more detail in Section 8.3.5.1.

Step 1--Repository familiarization and identification of initiating events. The objectives of step 1 are to (1) identify and describe the physical configurations and processes of the repository systems and support systems to be modeled, and (2) identify the accident initiating events to be considered in the risk assessment. The accident initiators of most concern are those that occur during waste handling on the surface and during waste emplacement and retrieval, if required, in the underground facilities.

Step 2--Event tree development. The objective of step 2 is to identify the potential accident sequences that could occur following the initiating events. Accident sequences are commonly identified using the event tree technique. Accident sequences are developed for initiating events affecting all operations including, to the extent, practical, retrieval operations.

Step 3--Repository systems analysis. The objective of step 3 is to develop the reliability models for the repository systems and support systems to be analyzed. This step obtains information from steps 1, 4, 5, and 6 as shown in Figure 8.3.5.5-3.

Step 4--Human reliability analysis. The objectives of step 4 are to (1) identify the human errors that should be included in the preclosure

Table 8.3.5.5-2. Parameters required for Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases) (page 1 of 5)

Related performance goal[a]	Performance or design parameter	Parameter descriptor	Tentative parameter goal	Needed confidence	Expected parameter value	Current confidence	SCP section providing parameter
A	Population density of region	Nye and Clark counties	Low population density	High	Section 3.6.2 in Environmental Assessment (DOE, 1986[b])	Medium	8.3.1.10
B	Frequency and magnitudes of						
	Tornadoes	At facility	(b)	High	Section 5.1.1.6 (see footnote c)	Medium	8.3.1.12
	Cloud-to-ground lightning strikes	At facility	(b)	Medium	About 18/yr, magnitude unknown	Medium	8.3.1.12
	Sandstorms and windstorms	At facility	(b)	High	Table 5-8, and Section 5.1.1.6	Medium	8.3.1.12
	Snow fall and ice storms	At facility	Rare, low magnitude	High	Rare, low magnitude	Medium	8.3.1.12
	Repository surface flooding	At facility	PMF[d]	High	PMF[d]	Medium	8.3.1.16
	Surface and subsurface seismic events	In region	(b)	High	(e)	(e)	8.3.1.17
	Fault movement within the repository	Surface and subsurface	(b)	High	Section 1.5.2	Medium	8.3.1.17
	Drift roof fall and collapse or failure	Underground	(f)	Medium	Data not available	Data not available	8.3.2.4
	Landslides	At facility	(f)	Medium	Data not available	Data not available	8.3.1.14

Table 8.3.5.5-2. Parameters required for Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases) (page 2 of 5)

Related performance goal[a]	Performance or design parameter	Parameter descriptor	Tentative parameter goal	Needed confidence	Expected parameter value	Current confidence	SCP section providing parameter
	Volcanic ash fall	At facility	(f)	Medium	Data not available	Data not available	8.3.1.17
	Nearby brush fires	Near facilities	(f)	Low	Data not available	Data not available	8.3.1.13
	Aircraft crashes	At facility	(f)	High	1×10^{-5} to 1×10^{-7} per year	Medium	8.3.1.13
	Criticality events	In surface and subsurface	Criticality events precluded	High	Not credible	High[g]	8.3.5.5
	Other potential accidents	Natural or site-related	(h)	High	(h)	(h)	PRAM program[i]
C,I	Wind speeds	80 km radius	(b)	High	Figures 5-3 to 5-7, and Tables 5-6 and 5-7	Medium	8.3.1.12
C,I	Wind direction	80 km radius	(b)	High	Figures 5-3 to 5-7, and Tables 5-6 and 5-7	Medium	8.3.1.12
C,I	Atmospheric stability	80 km radius	(b)	Medium[j]	Table 5-11	Medium	8.3.1.12
C,I	Mixing layer depth	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	(k)	Medium	8.3.1.12
C,I	Average ambient temperature	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	Tables 5-2 and 5-3	Medium	8.3.1.12
C,I	Atmospheric moisture	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	Tables 5-2 and 5-5	Medium	8.3.1.12
C,I	Precipitation type, amount, intensity, etc.	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	Tables 5-2 and 5-4	Medium	8.3.1.12

Table 8.3.5.5-2. Parameters required for Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases) (page 3 of 5)

Related performance goal[a]	Performance or design parameter	Parameter descriptor	Tentative parameter goal	Needed confidence	Expected parameter value	Current confidence	SCP section providing parameter
C,I	Barometric pressure	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	Table 5-2	Medium	8.3.1.12
C,I	Size and distance of topographic features from release points	80 km radius	Topographic features beneficial to dispersion	Medium	See U.S. Geological Survey topographic maps	High	Literature
D	Bioaccumulation of radionuclides in terrestrial flora	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	1×10^{-28} to 1×10^{-14} Ci/kg (see footnote m)	Medium	(1)
D	Bioaccumulation of radionuclides in terrestrial fauna	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	1×10^{-25} to 1×10^{-15} Ci/kg (see footnote n)	Medium	(1)
D	Types of crops raised	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	(o)	Medium	(1)
D	Amounts of crops raised	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	1×10^{4} to 1×10^{7} kg/yr (see footnote p)	Medium	(1)
D	Types of crops consumed	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	(q)	Medium	(1)
D	Amounts of crops consumed	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	1×10^{4} to 1×10^{5} kg/yr	Medium	(1)
D	Types of animals raised	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	(r)	Medium	(1)
D	Number of animals raised	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	1×10^{1} to 1×10^{5} kg/yr	Medium	(1)
D	Types of animals consumed	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	(s)	Medium	(1)
D	Amounts of meat consumed	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	1×10^{4} to 1×10^{6} kg/yr	Medium	(1)
D	Animal consumption of forage	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	1×10^{1} to 1×10^{4} kg/yr	Medium	(1)

Table 8.3.5.5-2. Parameters required for Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases) (page 4 of 5)

Related performance goal[a]	Performance or design parameter	Parameter descriptor	Tentative parameter goal	Needed confidence	Expected parameter value	Current confidence	SCP section providing parameter
D	Forage storage time	80 km radius	Values given in Regulatory Guide 1.109 (NRC, 1977a)	Medium	Data not available	Data not available	(1)
D	Grazing yield and period	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	75 to 100% of the year	High	(1)
D	Radius of crop and animal area	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	50 km to bulk of cropland and farms (W to SW)	High	(1)
D	Volumetric flow of surface water to water bodies	80 km radius	Little or no surface runoff	Medium	Environmental Assessment Section 3.3.1	Medium	(1)
D	Population served by local drinking water	80 km radius	(b)	Medium	1×10^2 to 1×10^4	Medium	(1)
D	Volumetric flow of local drinking water	80 km radius	(b)	Low	Section 3.3.1 in Environmental Assessment (DOE, 1986b)	Medium	(1)
D	Recreational uses of water bodies	80 km radius	Very little recreational use of water	Low	(t)	(t)	(1)
E,F,G,H,I, J,K	Reference repository design, operating plan, and supporting analysis	No additional site characterization data needed--see footnote u.					

[a]The letters in this column key the performance parameters on this table to the tentative performance goals in Table 8.3.5.5-1.

[b]Tentative goal is to have further measurements of this parameter verify the range of expected values listed here.

[c]Probability at Yucca Mountain is approximately 7.5×10^{-4} in any given year; magnitude is F-0 on Fujita tornado scale (very weak).

Table 8.3.5.5-2. Parameters required for Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases) (page 5 of 5)

Footnotes (continued)

[d]PMF = probable maximum flood; the PMF is still under investigation.
[e]Information on seismic events may be found in "Ground Motion Evaluation at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, with Application to Repository Conceptual Design and Siting," (URS/Blume, 1986).
[f]Parameter goal to be evaluated in terms of frequency and consequence.
[g]Design will preclude criticality accidents per 10 CFR 60.131(b)(7).
[h]Other accident-specific goals to be evaluated as appropriate under preclosure risk assessment methodology.
[i]PRAM = preclosure risk assessment methodology.
[j]Medium confidence requirements are intended to indicate that these parameters need to be site-specific.
[k]See Quiring (1968).
[l]Collection of these data are part of the environmental program planned activities and is addressed in the Radiological Monitoring Plan discussed in Section 8.3.1.13.
[m]This range covers all flora for which data are now available; specific values are flora and radionuclide specific.
[n]This range covers all fauna for which data are now available; specific values are fauna and radionuclide specific.
[o]Wheat/grains, corns, apples, potatoes, alfalfa, alfalfa seed, hay, silage, peppers, melons, berries, pecans, leafy vegetables, and honey.
[p]Specific values depend on available crops, crop areas, and crop densities.
[q]Includes all crops listed in footnote o except alfalfa, hay, and silage.
[r]Beef cattle, dairy cattle, goats, hogs, sheep, and poultry.
[s]Includes all animals listed in footnote r plus quail, freshwater fish, ducks, geese, rabbit, and deer.
[t]Very limited use of Crystal Reservoir; swimming pool data not yet available.
[u]For purposes of communicating the design information needed to evaluate worker radiological safety under normal conditions, the input items from Issue 4.4 (obtained through Issue 2.7) are collectively listed as parameter.

risk assessment, (2) provide the probability estimates for these errors, and (3) develop human recovery actions to mitigate accident consequences.

Step 5--Common cause failure analysis. The objective of step 5 is to identify the failures of multiple equipment items occurring from a single cause that is common to all the equipment items; for example, the loss of electric power may cause the failure of several repository systems.

Step 6--Data base development. The objective of step 6 is to develop the data bases for the analytical steps of the preclosure risk assessment. The data base will provide data for use in steps 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8.

Step 7--Accident sequence analysis. The objective of step 7 is to quantify the frequency of occurrence of the accident sequences developed in step 3 by linking system logic models from step 3 and using data from step 6.

Step 8--In-plant consequence analysis. The objective of step 8 is to determine accident sequence consequences within the repository site boundary, including the surface and underground facilities.

Step 9--Environmental transport and offsite consequence analysis. The objective of step 9 is to determine accident sequence consequences outside the repository boundary. The consequences include radiation doses to the public.

Step 10--Uncertainty, sensitivity, and importance analyses. There are three objectives in step 10. The first objective is to estimate the uncertainty in the results due to the parameters, modeling, and completeness at the various analytical steps of the risk assessment. The second objective is to determine how much the results of the analyses change with respect to variation of the input data. This is needed to perform the uncertainty analyses. The final objective is to identify and rank the important accident sequences, system failures, component failures, and human errors with regard to the accident sequence frequency of occurrence estimates. This importance analysis will be used in the identification of systems, structures, and components important to safety.

Step 11--Documentation and use of results. The objective of step 11 is to document the risk assessment methodology and results to support the various repository program activities and the resolution of this issue.

Performance evaluation for compliance with goals. The remainder of Figure 8.3.5.5-2 deals with the final evaluation of the results documented in the accident risk assessment package. The results are compared with the performance goals and any regulatory limits that may be developed. If the goals or limits have been met and if the design is in the final design phase, then the design is ready for license application and a favorable issue resolution has been achieved. If the goals or limits have been met but the design is not in the final design phase, then this process is repeated for the next design phase.

If the results of the accident risk assessment package do not meet the goals or limits, then design, procedural, or operational changes are

recommended to correct the situation. If these changes cannot be made and the performance goals cannot be reasonably changed, then an unfavorable resolution of the issue has occurred. However, if the design, procedural, or operational changes can be made or the performance goals can be reasonably changed, then the recommended changes are implemented and the whole process is repeated.

Interrelationships of information needs

The question asked by this issue addresses the potential threat to health and safety of essential repository workers and the public from radiological accidents at the repository. The resolution of this issue can be obtained by answering two questions:

1. What are the credible accident sequences and their respective frequencies that can occur at the repository that can adversely affect the health and safety of the workers and the public?

2. What are the predicted releases of radioactive material and the projected public and essential worker exposures resulting from credible accidents at the repository, and are these exposures within applicable limiting values?

These questions are addressed by Information Needs 2.3.1 and 2.3.2. Information Need 2.3.1 determines and describes the possible accidents that could occur at the repository. Once the list of accidents is developed, the list is screened to determine those that are both applicable to the repository and credible. This information need requires both site and design data to determine all credible natural, site-related, and design-related accidents. This process is described previously in the section on accident risk assessment package. The final product of Information Need 2.3.1 is a list of credible accidents along with their frequencies of occurrence and resulting scenarios. This information need corresponds to the system analysis steps in assessing accident risks discussed previously.

This set of accident sequences is used under Information Need 2.3.2 to predict essential worker and public exposures resulting from accidents. First, the projected releases of radioactive material resulting from the credible accidents are determined, which requires detailed information about the repository design as well as information about the characteristics of the accidents. This step will require very little site data. The major factors affecting releases of radioactive material during accidents are the source terms present and the response of the repository structures and systems. It is here that information about which systems, structures, and components are important to safety will be developed and refined. When the releases of radioactive material have been determined, the process of resolving Issue 2.3 continues with the determination of essential worker and public radiation exposures. Information Need 2.3.2 determines the radiation exposures for the repository workers and the public due to accidents and compares the results to applicable limiting values. This step will require a great deal of site data to perform the necessary radionuclide transport calculations. Along

with the exposure values, there will be a frequency of occurrence associated with each accident. The combination of the frequency of occurrence and the consequence defines the risk for a given accident. The sum of all the accident risks defines the repository risk. Accident risk quantification (sensitivity analyses and documentation) is the responsibility of this information need. The final results of the accident risk assessment package will be documented as part of this information need. At this point, this issue is finally resolved.

The functions and performance measures (associated with the MGDS system elements) necessary for answering these two questions and resolving this issue are listed in Table 8.3.5.5-1. The site data needed to answer these questions are listed in Table 8.3.5.5-2.

8.3.5.5.1 Information Need 2.3.1: Determination of credible accident sequences and their respective frequencies applicable to the repository

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

Chapter 3 discusses the present state of the knowledge on the site hydrology, including uses of surface water and ground water. Chapter 5 contains discussions about the present state of the knowledge on the meteorology of the site and surrounding region. Further discussions on the subject of radiological protection of the public may be found in Sections 6.1.1.4.1 (radiological protection design requirements), Section 6.1.4 (items important to safety) and 6.4.6 (Issue 2.3: accidental radiological releases). Section 8.3.5.1 discusses the preclosure risk assessment methodology (PRAM) program. The PRAM program includes radiological risk to the public and workers under accident conditions as part of its scope. Sections 2.5 (radiological protection) and 6.2 (releases under abnormal conditions) of the site characterization plan-conceptual design report (SCP-CDR) (SNL, 1987) also contain discussions relevant to this issue. Also, Sections 4.6.1 and 7.4.1 of the SCP-CDR contain brief discussions of items important to safety. Finally, two appendices of the SCP-CDR have information especially relevant to this information need. These are Appendix F (preclosure radiological safety analysis), which is a preliminary analysis of accidents at the Yucca Mountain repository prepared to support the development of the preliminary Yucca Mountain Project Q-list, and Appendix L (items important to safety and retrievability), which discusses the method used and results of the preliminary Q-list. The methodology described in Appendix F of the SCP-CDR will be considered by the PRAM program.

Parameters

The parameters required by this information need are those parameters relevant to the determination of credible accident sequences and their respective frequencies for the Yucca Mountain repository. There is a great deal of design information required for this purpose; this information is

listed in Table 8.3.5.5-2. Reference repository design information and supporting analyses will be obtained from the reference information base (RIB).

The site data required to determine credible site-related accidents are obtained through various characterization programs. A summary of the required site data and the associated investigation or information need follows.

Data requirement (frequency and characteristics)	SCP section
EVENTS ON THE SITE	
Tornadoes	8.3.1.12.4
Cloud-to-ground lightning strikes	8.3.1.12.4
Sandstorms	8.3.1.12.4
Snowfall	8.3.1.12.4
Ice storms	8.3.1.12.4
Repository surface flooding	8.3.1.16.1, 8.3.1.16.3
Repository flooding from ground-water inflow	8.3.1.16.1, 8.3.1.16.3
Surface and subsurface seismic events	8.3.1.17.3
Fault movement within the repository	8.3.1.17.2
Drift roof fall, collapse, or failure	8.3.2.4.1
Surface landslides	8.3.1.14.1
Volcanic ash fall	8.3.1.17.1
Nearby forest or brush fires	8.3.1.13.1, 8.3.1.13.2
Aircraft and helicopter crashes in the area of the surface facilities	8.3.1.13.1, 8.3.1.13.2
Other potential accidents	Preclosure risk assessment methodology (PRAM) program, 8.3.1.13.1, 8.3.1.13.2

Data requirement (frequency and characteristics)	SCP section
OFFSITE INSTALLATION ACCIDENTS IN THE REGION	
Explosive shockwave	8.3.1.13.1, 8.3.1.13.2
Toxic and chemical gases	8.3.1.13.1, 8.3.1.13.2
Missiles	8.3.1.13.1, 8.3.1.13.2
Flammable vapor clouds	8.3.1.13.1, 8.3.1.13.2
Incendiary fragments	8.3.1.13.1, 8.3.1.13.2

Logic

The determination of credible accidents for the Yucca Mountain repository requires a great deal of site and design information. Site data are required to determine site-related accidents. These data include severe weather phenomena, seismic phenomena, tectonic phenomena, offsite installation activities, and military activities. Using the site data, the frequencies and characteristics of these various phenomena and activities can be assessed, and a decision can be made as to what accidents are credible. The definition of credible has not yet been firmly established; however, it is expected that a credible accident will be defined in terms of frequency of occurrence. In some instances, where an accident may have extremely severe consequences, an accident with a very low frequency of occurrence may be included in those to be analyzed. Therefore, it is possible that, for conservatism, the severity of an accident could be a factor in deciding whether to classify an accident as credible or not credible. Design-related accidents will also be investigated, and site data are needed to determine the consequences of these accidents; however, accident consequences are developed as part of Information Need 2.3.2. The function of this information need corresponds to the system analysis steps shown in Figure 8.3.5.5-3. Once a list of credible accident sequences and their respective frequencies applicable to the Yucca Mountain repository is developed, the process of analyzing the effects of these accidents on the repository is continued in Information Need 2.3.2, where radioactive material releases resulting from these accidents are estimated.

8.3.5.5.1.1 Performance Assessment Activity 2.3.1.1: Refinement of site data parameters required for Issue 2.3

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to refine the list of site data parameters presented in the technical basis for this information need. This list may be incomplete or the level of confidence (Table 8.3.5.5-2) may be inappropriate.

Parameters

The list of parameters presented earlier is the starting point for this activity. This list may be added to or shortened as work in this area progresses.

Description

As the accident risk assessment activities progress, more information may be required to better define accidents or their characteristics. In addition, feedback from the site characterization program will be an important source of information about parameter confidence requirements and may result in identification of more parameters that are needed.

8.3.5.5.1.2 Performance Assessment Activity 2.3.1.2: Determination of credible accident sequences and their respective frequencies applicable to the Yucca Mountain repository

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to develop a comprehensive list of accidents that are both credible and applicable to the Yucca Mountain repository.

Parameters

The site data parameters required for this task are those listed earlier for the information need. A great deal of design data will also be required to perform this activity.

Description

This activity consists of performing the system analysis steps shown in Figure 8.3.5.5-3 and discussed in detail in Section 8.3.5.1. Note that uncertainty, sensitivity, and importance analyses and documentation are included in these steps.

8.3.5.5.1.3 Performance Assessment Activity 2.3.1.3: Development of candidate design-basis accidents for the Yucca Mountain repository

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to develop a set of candidate design-basis accidents to be analyzed as part of the total safety analysis.

Parameters

The parameters to be used in this analysis are those listed earlier for the information need and the repository reference design.

Description

A set of design-basis accidents will be developed to be analyzed as part of the total safety analysis of the repository. The procedure to be used in developing this set of accidents has not yet been established; however, the PRAM program will address this need. The development of the list of credible accidents and the development of design-basis accidents are complementary and will be performed in parallel. Design-basis accidents do not necessarily have to be credible; indeed, they are generally less likely than what are usually considered credible events. Design-basis accidents are proposed to show that the repository response to these accidents is acceptable, and, therefore, the repository can be expected to withstand any expected or credible accidents.

8.3.5.5.1.4 Application of results

The information generated by this information need will be used directly in Information Needs 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 to complete the accident risk assessment of the repository. Design-basis accident information will be used in Issue 4.4 (Section 8.3.2.5) to support the design of the repository in the form of radiation safety design criteria. Issues 2.1 (Section 8.3.5.3), 2.2 (Section 8.3.5.4), and 2.7 (Section 8.3.2.3) may require some of the same site data as called for here; however, those issues will call for their own site data. During the iteration of design and assessment, information developed here will be used to improve design features and correct any problems discovered early in the design process.

8.3.5.5.2 Information Need 2.3.2: Determination of the predicted releases of radioactive material and projected public and worker exposures under accident conditions and that these exposures meet applicable requirements

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

The data chapters and technical support documents for this information need are the same as those listed for Information Need 2.3.1 (see Section 8.3.5.5.1).

Parameters

The parameters required by this information need are those parameters relevant to the determination of the radioactive material releases and the projected essential worker and public exposures resulting from the credible accidents developed in Information Need 2.3.1. The information required is mainly site data for public exposures and a mixture of site data and design data for worker exposures. The design information needed is listed in Table 8.3.5.5-2. Reference repository design information and supporting analyses will be obtained from the reference information base (RIB), which and will contain all design details necessary to perform the dose calculations to resolve this issue.

The site data required to determine radioactive material releases resulting from the credible accidents are obtained through various characterization issues. This information need uses mostly meteorological and agricultural data, which are given in the following summary.

The population density data required are given in Section 8.3.5.6. (Data will also be gathered under Characterization Program 8.3.1.10.)

The following table presents the data required, as well as the SCP section providing the information.

Data requirement	SCP section
METEOROLOGICAL DATA	
Wind speeds	8.3.1.12.1, 8.3.1.12.2
Wind direction	8.3.1.12.1, 8.3.1.12.2
Atmospheric stability	8.3.1.12.1, 8.3.1.12.2
Mixing layer depth	8.3.1.12.1, 8.3.1.12.2

Data requirement	SCP section
METEOROLOGICAL DATA (continued)	
Average ambient temperature	8.3.1.12.1, 8.3.1.12.2
Atmospheric moisture	8.3.1.12.1, 8.3.1.12.2
Precipitation type, amount, intensity, etc.	8.3.1.12.1, 8.3.1.12.2
Size and distance of topographic features from releases points	8.3.1.14.1
Meteorological data for offsite installations	8.3.1.12.1, 8.3.1.12.2
AGRICULTURAL DATA	
Bioaccumulation of radionuclides in terrestrial flora	8.3.1.13(a)
Bioaccumulation of radionuclides in terrestrial fauna	8.3.1.13(a)
Types and amounts of crops raised	8.3.1.13(a)
Types and amounts of crops consumed	8.3.1.13(a)
Types and amounts of animals raised	8.3.1.13(a)
Types and amounts of meat consumed	8.3.1.13(a)
Animal consumption of forage	8.3.1.13(a)
Forage storage time	8.3.1.13(a)
Grazing yield and period	8.3.1.13(a)
Radius of crop/animal area	8.3.1.13(a)
Volumetric flow of surface water to water bodies	8.3.1.13(a)

Data requirement	SCP section
AGRICULTURAL DATA (continued)	
Population served and volumetric flow of drinking water	8.3.1.13(a)
Recreational uses of water bodies	8.3.1.13(a)

[a]Collection of these data is part of the environmental program planned activities and is addressed in the Radiological Monitoring Plan discussed in Section 8.3.1.13.

Logic

This information need corresponds to the consequence analysis steps of Figure 8.3.5.5-3 and is discussed in detail in Section 8.3.5.1. The determination of releases of radioactive material requires detailed information about the repository design and the characteristics of accidents, but little site data. The determination of radionuclide transport and radiation exposure requires a great deal of site data. To calculate doses to essential workers, both design and site information is needed. For workers, the short-term pathways, which are dominated by atmospheric transport, are important. For the public, both short-term and long-term pathways must be evaluated. Meteorological data are needed to evaluate the short-term atmospheric transport pathways, and agricultural data are needed to evaluate the long-term transport pathways. To perform the uncertainty, sensitivity, and importance analyses, a great deal of design information and very little site data are needed. The final resolution of Issue 2.3 will take place after the safety assessment has been documented and a comparison with applicable limiting values is completed.

Four performance assessment activities are planned and are discussed in the following sections.

8.3.5.5.2.1 Performance Assessment Activity 2.3.2.1: Refinement of site data parameters required for Issue 2.3

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to refine the list of site data parameters presented earlier for this information need. This list may be incomplete or the level of confidence (Table 8.3.5.5-2) may be inappropriate.

Parameters

The list of parameters presented earlier for this information need is the starting point for this activity. This list may be amended as work in this area progresses.

Description

As the accident risk assessment activities progress, more information may be required to better define accidents or their characteristics. In addition, feedback from the site characterization program will be an important source of information about parameter confidence requirements and may identify more parameters that are needed.

8.3.5.5.2.2 Performance Assessment Activity 2.3.2.2: Consequence analyses of credible accidents at the Yucca Mountain repository

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to determine the consequences of credible accidents in terms of radiation doses to the essential repository workers and the public.

Parameters

The site data parameters required to perform this activity are listed earlier for the information need. This activity will require little design data.

Description

This activity consists of performing the consequence analysis steps shown in Figure 8.3.5.5-3 and discussed in detail in Section 8.3.5.1. A determination of consequences involves calculations of radiation transport within the repository facilities and in the environment, radionuclide removal by repository systems and environmental systems, and doses to workers and the public. Radiation doses resulting from both short-term transport mechanisms (e.g., atmospheric transport) and long-term transport mechanisms (e.g., through crops and animals) will be estimated. Consequences will also be calculated in terms of economic losses to the repository and to others. An example of the types of analyses that are to be performed can be found in Appendix F of the SCP-CDR (SNL, 1987).

8.3.5.5.2.3 Performance Assessment Activity 2.3.2.3: Sensitivity and importance analyses of credible accidents at the Yucca Mountain repository

Objectives

The objectives of this activity are (1) to quantify uncertainties and sensitivities in the accident risk assessment and (2) to establish importance rankings for systems, structures, and components of the repository with respect to radiological safety.

Parameters

The parameters required to perform this activity consist mainly of failure rate data for repository systems, structures, and components. Some site data will be required to quantify uncertainties of initiating event frequencies of occurrence and uncertainties in meteorological data.

Description

Quantifying uncertainties in the accident risk assessment analyses will require an extensive data base from which to draw statistical data. The development of these data bases is within the scope of the PRAM program as discussed in Section 8.3.5.1. Sensitivity analyses will be performed to establish important parameters. This work will help to refine the site data parameter lists for safety assessment early in the design process. By the time the design is ready for license application, most of the sensitivity and uncertainty work will have been completed. Importance analyses will be performed using computer codes to analyze the event trees developed in Performance Assessment Activity 2.3.2.2. These analyses will establish the importance of repository systems, structures, and components with respect to radiological safety and will be used to refine the Yucca Mountain Project Q-list.

8.3.5.5.2.4 Performance Assessment Activity 2.3.2.4: Documentation of results of safety analyses and comparison to applicable "limiting" values

Objectives

The objectives of this activity are (1) to produce documentation of the results of the accident risk assessment in the necessary format and (2) to make comparisons of these results to applicable limiting values. This activity will complete the resolution of this issue at the end of the license application design.

Parameters

The only parameters required for this activity are the analyses and results of the preceding performance assessment activities.

ription

This activity consists of presenting the results of the accident risk ssment in a manner consistent with the needs of the NRC, the DOE, and the sitory program in general. The PRAM program will recommend an annotated ine for the documentation of these analyses. Included in the documen- on is a comparison of the results with any regulatory limits that may be blished in the future. Currently, no regulatory limits exist for reposi- accident consequences. In the absence of regulatory limits, the PRAM ram will recommend appropriate limiting values for both design-basis dents and the credible accidents evaluated in the accident risk assess- . The completion of this activity will mark the final resolution of this e and will supply written documentation of that resolution.

5.5.2.5 Application of results

The information generated by this information need will be used directly esolve Issue 2.3. Issues 2.1 (Section 8.3.5.3), 2.2 (Section 8.3.5.4), 2.7 (Section 8.3.2.3) may require some of the same site data as called here; however, those issues will call for their own site data. During iteration of design and assessment, information developed here will be to improve design features and correct any problems discovered early in design process. Most importantly, the results of the accident risk ssment analyses will be used in the preparation of the safety analysis rt and will be included as part of the license application when the final gn is complete.

5.5.3 Schedule for accidental radiological releases (Issue 2.3)

Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases) includes two information ls, which contain seven performance assessment activities. The schedule rmation for these performance assessment activities is summarized in re 8.3.5.5-4. This figure includes the performance assessment activity er and a brief description, as well as major events associated with each vity. A major event, for purposes of these schedules, may represent the iation or completion of an activity, completion or submittal of a report he DOE, an important data feed, or a decision point. Solid lines on the dule represent activity durations and dashed lines show interfaces among vities as well as data transferred into or out of this performance ssment issue. The events shown on the schedule and their planned dates ompletion are provided in Table 8.3.5.5-3.

The activity-level schedules, in combination with information provided he logic diagrams for this issue (Figures 8.3.5.5-1 and -2), are intended rovide the reader with a basic understanding of the relationships between r elements of the site, performance, and design programs. The infor- on provided in Table 8.3.5.5-3 and Figure 8.3.5.5-4, however, should be ed as a snapshot in time.



Figure 8.3.5.5-4. Schedule information for Issue 2 3 (accidental radiological releases) See Table 8 3 5 5-3 for description of major events This network is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE 1988a) schedule Revisions will be published in semiannual site characterization progress reports as new information becomes available

Table 8.3.5.5-3. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases) (page 1 of 4)

Performance assessment activity number	Brief description of performance assessment activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
2.3.1.1 and 2.3.2.1	Refinement of site data needed for Issue 2.3	A	Compilation of site data needed	10/88
		B	Site data feed; Site data feeds will be continuous throughout site characterization for use in projecting accidental releases	10/88
		C	Final site data feed	5/94
2.3.1.2	Determination of credible accident sequence and their respective frequencies	A	Continue assessment of accidental sequence methodology	10/88
		B	Initiate development of list of credible accident sequences	4/90
		C	Complete development of list of credible accident sequences	11/90
		D	Complete assessment of the development methodologies for credible accident sequences	7/92
		E	Complete report on credible accident sequences and their respective frequencies	5/94

Table 8.3.5.5-3. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases) (page 2 of 4)

Performance assessment activity number	Brief description of performance assessment activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
2.3.1.3	Development of candidate design-basis accidents	A	Continue development of the methodology for assessing credible design-basis accidents	10/88
		B	Initiate development of list of credible design-basis accidents	12/90
		C	Complete development of list of credible design-basis accidents	3/91
		D	Complete assessment of the development methodologies for design-basis accidents	7/92
		E	Complete report on design-basis accidents	8/94
2.3.2.2	Consequence analysis of credible accidents	A	Continue development of the methodology for consequence analysis of credible accidents	10/88
		B	Start credible accident consequence analysis	11/90
		C	Complete credible accident consequence analysis for advanced conceptual design (ACD)	6/91

Table 8.3.5.5-3. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases) (page 3 of 4)

Performance assessment activity number	Brief description of performance assessment activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
2.3.2.2	Consequence analysis of cridible accidents (continued)	D	Begin preparation of report on the results of the sensitivity and importance analysis of credible accidents	6/93
		E	Final report available to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) on the consequence analysis of credible accidents for ACD	7/94
2.3.2.3	Sensitivity and importance analysis of credible accidents	A	Continue assessment of the methodology for credible accident sensitivity analysis	10/88
		B	Start credible accident sensitivity analysis for ACD	5/90
		C	Complete credible accident sensitivity analysis	6/91
		D	Complete sensitivity study; begin updating credible accident sensitivity analysis	10/91
		E	Initiate documentation of updated credible accident sensitivity analysis	5/93
		F	Results of sensitivity analysis input to preparation of report on consequence analysis (2.3.2.2)	1/94

Table 8.3.5.5-3. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 2.3 (accidental radiological releases) (page 4 of 4)

Performance assessment activity number	Brief description of performance assessment activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
2.3.2.4	Documentation of results of safety analyses	A	Start documentation of safety analyses	4/90
		B	Complete documentation of the results of safety analyses for ACD	1/92
		C	Start documentation of safety analyses for license application design (LAD)	2/94
		D	Complete documentation of safety analyses for LAD	9/94

[a]The letters in this column key major events shown in Figure 8.3.5.5-3.

The overall program schedule presented here is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE, 1988a). The site characterization program will undergo a series of refinements following issuance of the statutory SCP. Refinements will consider factors both internal and external to the site characterization program, such as changes to the quality assurance program. Such refinements are to be considered in ongoing planning efforts, and changes that are implemented will be reflected in the semiannual progress reports. Summary schedule information for this and other preclosure performance assessment issues can be found in Sections 8.5.2.1 and 8.5.6.

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)



Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.6, Higher Level Findings — Preclosure Radiological Safety

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.6 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 2.5: Can the higher-level findings required by 10 CFR Part 960 be made for the qualifying condition of the preclosure system guideline and the qualifying and disqualifying conditions of the technical guidelines for population density and distribution, site ownership and control, meteorology, and offsite installations and operations?

Regulatory basis for the issue

The DOE has established a set of siting guidelines to be used as a basis for evaluating the suitability of potential repository sites during the site selection process.* These siting guidelines, which are set forth in 10 CFR Part 960, are separated into two categories: those that address postclosure conditions (10 CFR 960.4) and those that address preclosure conditions (10 CFR 960.5). The manner in which the siting guidelines must be addressed during the siting process is described in the DOE Implementation Guidelines (10 CFR 960.3).

The DOE's preclosure guidelines that relate to preclosure radiological safety under normal and anticipated operating conditions are the subject of this issue (2.5). These guidelines consist of a system guideline and four technical guidelines. The system guideline is concerned with the expected performance of the repository system as a whole during the period before permanent closure, while each technical guideline is concerned with the effect of some specific aspect of the site on the preclosure performance. Each preclosure technical guideline has one qualifying condition that must be met for a site to be acceptable. In addition, two of the technical guidelines have one or more disqualifying conditions; a site is unacceptable if any one of the disqualifying conditions is found to be present. The technical guidelines also identify favorable conditions and potentially adverse conditions that describe characteristics of the setting that, if present, could contribute to or detract from the postclosure performance of a site.

The Implementation Guidelines require that the qualifying and disqualifying conditions of the system and technical guidelines be evaluated and that specific findings be made for each condition at principal decision points in the siting process. These findings are stated in 10 CFR Part 960, Appendix III, and are shown in Table 8.3.5.6-1.

There are four levels of findings. Disqualifying and qualifying conditions both require a lower-level and a higher-level finding. Lower-level findings must be made to determine if a site may be nominated as suitable for characterization or recommended as a candidate site for characterization. Higher-level findings, however, must be made to determine if a site may be recommended for the development of a repository. Disqualifying conditions

---

*The passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 (NWPAA, 1987) may impact the manner in which this process is implemented.

Table 8.3.5.6-1. Findings for qualifying and disqualifying conditions

Disqualifying condition--lower-level findings		
Level 1	(a)	The evidence does not support a finding that the site is disqualified.
	(b)	The evidence supports a finding that the site is disqualified.
Disqualifying condition--higher-level findings		
Level 2	(a)	The evidence supports a finding that the site is not disqualified on the basis of that evidence and is not likely to be disqualified.
	(b)	The evidence supports a finding that the site is disqualified or is likely to be disqualified.
Qualifying condition--lower-level findings		
Level 3	(a)	The evidence does not support a finding that the site is not likely to meet the qualifying condition.
	(b)	The evidence supports a finding that the site is not likely to meet the qualifying condition, and therefore the site is disqualified.
Qualifying condition--higher-level findings		
Level 4	(a)	The evidence supports a finding that the site meets the qualifying condition and is likely to continue to meet the qualifying condition.
	(b)	The evidence supports a finding that the site cannot meet the qualifying condition or is unlikely to be able to meet the qualifying condition, and therefore the site is disqualified.

require Level 1 and Level 2 findings, and qualifying conditions require Level 3 and Level 4 findings. Each level has both a positive finding and a negative finding associated with it.

Table 8.3.5.6-2 shows the findings previously made for the qualifying and disqualifying conditions concerned with preclosure radiological safety. These findings and the evidence supporting them are given in the Yucca Mountain environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b). The available evidence was

Table 8.3.5.6-2. Preliminary findings for the qualifying and disqualifying condition concerned with preclosure radiological safety[a]

Preclosure radiological safety guidelines qualifying and disqualifying conditions (10 CFR Part 960)		Preliminary finding[b]
960.5-1(a)(1)	System qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
960.5-2-1	Population density and distribution	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
(d)(1)	Disqualifying condition 1	Level 2(a)
(d)(2)	Disqualifying condition 2	Level 2(a)
(d)(3)	Disqualifying condition 3	Level 1(a)
960.5-2-2	Site ownership and control	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
960.5-2-3	Meteorology	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
960.5-2-4	Offsite installations and operations	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
(d)	Disqualifying condition	Level 1(a)

[a]Preliminary findings from DOE (1986b).
[b]See Table 8.3.5.6-1 for an explanation of the finding levels.

sufficient to support a positive higher-level finding for the first two disqualifying conditions of the population density and distribution technical guideline, and a positive lower-level finding for the remaining qualifying and disqualifying conditions. To determine if the Yucca Mountain site is suitable for the development of a repository, higher-level findings must be made for all the qualifying and disqualifying conditions.

The DOE siting guidelines do not require any findings similar to lower-level or higher-level findings to be made for the favorable or potentially adverse conditions of the technical guidelines. As stated in the Supplementary Information (DOE, 1984b) for 10 CFR Part 960 (Overview of the Guidelines), these conditions were intended to be used to predict the suitability of a site and provide a preliminary indication of system performance before the start of detailed site characterization studies. These conditions were considered and used in the identification of potentially acceptable sites and in the nomination and recommendation of sites as suitable for characterization. By the completion of site characterization, however, sufficient data will be available to directly evaluate site performance against the qualifying conditions of the system and technical guidelines. Therefore, the favorable and potentially adverse conditions will not

be considered in specific terms as they were for the environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b).

Approach to resolving the issue

To resolve Issue 2.5, sufficient evidence must be available to support either a positive or negative higher-level finding for each qualifying and disqualifying condition associated with preclosure radiological safety. Each of the qualifying conditions makes reference either directly or through the system guideline to regulatory requirements of the NRC (specifically, 10 CFR Part 60). To support a higher-level finding for the qualifying conditions, evidence must show whether the preclosure radiological releases under normal and projected operating conditions will be within the limits set by the NRC and the EPA, given the conditions that exist at the site. The system guideline looks at the site conditions as a whole, and the technical guideline looks at specific conditions. The disqualifying conditions are also related to NRC regulations, but not always as explicitly as the qualifying conditions.

Figure 8.3.5.6-1 shows the strategy for resolving Issue 2.5. The first step is to eliminate from further consideration the qualifying and disqualifying conditions for which higher-level findings have already been made. This is the case for the first two disqualifying conditions of the population density and distribution technical guideline. Next, for each remaining condition, it is determined whether the evidence presently available is sufficient to support a higher-level finding. This evidence consists of the information presented in the Yucca Mountain environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b) and in Chapters 1 through 7 of the SCP. If the evidence is sufficient, the finding and the evidence are documented.

For the qualifying and disqualifying conditions for which there is not adequate evidence available, the planned site characterization studies are reviewed to determine if the conditions will be investigated. This is accomplished by evaluating the resolution strategies of other preclosure radiological safety performance issues (Issues 2.1 and 2.2, Sections 8.3.5.3 and 8.3.5.4) that assess the ability of the site to comply with the NRC's preclosure radiological safety regulatory requirements under normal and anticipated operating conditions. As discussed previously, the qualifying and disqualifying conditions are linked to NRC regulatory requirements, and evidence to support a higher-level finding must show that the condition does not prevent compliance with the referenced requirements. Therefore, if the concerns of the qualifying and disqualifying conditions are being considered in the resolution strategies of the issues that assess compliance with the regulations, it can be expected that the evidence to support higher-level findings will be made available through the information and analyses that support resolution of these issues. A correlation of the qualifying and disqualifying conditions and the issues that will supply the information is shown in Table 8.3.5.6-3.

After ensuring that the qualifying and disqualifying conditions will be investigated, the information necessary to assess compliance will be obtained during site characterization. Upon completion of the assessments, the results will be evaluated to determine if sufficient evidence is available to support higher-level findings. If the evidence is sufficient, the findings


PERFORMANCE ISSUE 2.5 RESOLUTION STRATEGY
ADDRESS QUALIFYING OR DISQUALIFYING CONDITION
HAS A HIGHER-LEVEL FINDING BEEN MADE ?
Y
DOCUMENT PREVIOUS FINDING AND SUPPORTING EVIDENCE
N
CAN AVAILABLE EVIDENCE SUPPORT A HIGHER-LEVEL FINDING ?
Y
N
ENSURE THAT THE CONCERNS OF THE CONDITION ARE ADDRESSED BY OTHER ISSUES
REVISE STRATEGIES OF OTHER ISSUES
SITE CHARACTERIZATION
COLLECT ADDITIONAL SITE DATA
ATTEMPT RESOLUTION OF OTHER ISSUES
N
HAVE THE IDENTIFIED INFORMATION NEEDS OF THE OTHER ISSUES BEEN SATISFIED ?
Y
N
CAN A HIGHER-LEVEL FINDING BE SUPPORTED ?
Y
DOCUMENT FINDING AND EVIDENCE
IS THE HIGHER-LEVEL FINDING POSITIVE ?
N
SITE IS REJECTED
Y
HAVE HIGHER-LEVEL FINDINGS BEEN MADE FOR ALL CONDITIONS ?
Y
SITE IS ACCEPTABLE
N

Figure 8.3.5.6-1. Issue resolution strategy for Issue 2.5 (higher-level findings-preciosure radiological safety)

Table 8.3.5.6-3. Preclosure performance issues that address the concerns of the preclosure radiological safety qualifying and disqualifying conditions covered by Issue 2.5

Guideline	Issue 2.1 (Public radiological exposures--normal conditions)	Issue 2.2 (Worker radiological safety--normal conditions)
Preclosure system guideline		
Preclosure radiological safety qualifying condition	x	x
Population density and distribution		
Qualifying condition	x	
Disqualifying condition 1[a]		x
Disqualifying condition 2[a]	x	
Disqualifying condition 3[b]		
Site ownership and control		
Qualifying condition[b]		
Meteorology		
Qualifying condition	x	
Offsite installations and operations		
Qualifying condition	x	
Disqualifying condition	x	

[a]Higher-level findings have been made in the environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b); see Table 8.3.5.6-2.

[b]Not addressed by the issues and is outside the scope of site characterization and this document.

and the evidence will be documented. If the evidence shows that a negative higher-level finding must be made for any one of the conditions, i.e., that a disqualifying condition is present or that a qualifying condition is not present, then the site will be disqualified. This evaluation will continue until positive higher-level findings can be supported for all the conditions or until a negative higher-level finding must be made.

If, in evaluating the results of the assessments, insufficient information is found to support either a positive or a negative higher-level finding for a qualifying or disqualifying condition, additional information may be necessary to satisfy existing information needs. Otherwise, the resolution strategies of the appropriate performance issues will be again reviewed to determine if, in fact, the condition was adequately considered. This process continues until there is sufficient evidence to support either a positive or negative higher-level finding for every qualifying and disqualifying condition. As discussed previously, findings are not required for the favorable conditions or the potentially adverse conditions at this stage in the siting process. However, the DOE's analysis indicates that the concerns of these conditions are adequately addressed through the analyses of other issues.

The following discusses the qualifying condition of the preclosure system guideline and the qualifying and disqualifying conditions of the preclosure technical guidelines that are concerned with preclosure radiological safety. The ties of each condition to the NRC regulations are explained, and the preclosure performance issue resolution strategies that will be relied upon are identified. The information relevant to each guideline, which will be collected during site characterization and used in the resolution of the other issues, is also given.

System guideline qualifying condition

The qualifying condition pertaining to preclosure radiological safety is stated in 10 CFR 960.5-1(a)(1) as follows:

> Any projected radiological exposures of the general public and any projected releases of radioactive materials to restricted and unrestricted areas during repository operation and closure shall meet the applicable safety requirements set forth in 10 CFR Part 20, 10 CFR Part 60, and 40 CFR 191, Subpart A....

This qualifying condition is concerned with the amounts of radioactive material that may be released to the environment before and during permanent closure. The DOE distinguishes between the restricted and unrestricted environment. The restricted area is defined in 10 CFR 960.2 as "any area access to which is controlled by the DOE for purposes of protecting individuals from exposure to radiation and radioactive materials before repository closure...." The unrestricted area is everything outside the restricted area.

10 CFR 60.111 is the NRC performance objective that addresses the performance of the geologic repository operations area through permanent closure. Part (a) of this objective states that radiation exposures and radiation levels through permanent closure must be maintained within the limits specified in 10 CFR Part 20 and any that may be established by the EPA. Therefore, to make a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the system guideline for preclosure radiological safety, the ability of the site to comply with 10 CFR 60.111(a) must be determined.

The requirements of 10 CFR 60.111(a), 10 CFR Part 20, and 40 CFR 191, Subpart A, are addressed by two preclosure performance issues. Issue 2.1,

which is discussed in Section 8.3.5.3, is concerned with projected releases to unrestricted areas and is stated as follows:

> During repository operation and closure, (a) will the expected average radiation dose to members of the public within any highly populated area be less than a small fraction of the allowable limits, and (b) will the expected radiation dose received by any member of the public in an unrestricted area be less than the allowable limits as required by 10 CFR 60.111, 40 CFR 191, Subpart A, and 10 CFR Part 20?

Issue 2.2, which is discussed in 8.3.5.4, is concerned with projected releases to restricted areas and is stated as follows:

> Can the repository be designed, constructed and operated in a manner that ensures the radiological safety of workers under normal operations as required by 10 CFR 60.111 and 10 CFR Part 20?

It is the judgment of the DOE that these two issues adequately cover the concerns of the system guideline for preclosure radiological safety. The information and analyses required to support resolution of these issues will thus provide sufficient evidence to support a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the system guideline. The details of the issue resolution strategies for these two issues and the information that will be collected during site characterization to resolve the issues are given in Sections 8.3.5.3 and 8.3.5.4. No information beyond that described in the two sections is expected to be required.

Population density and distribution technical guideline

The population density and distribution technical guideline has one qualifying condition and three disqualifying conditions.

Qualifying condition. The qualifying condition for the population density and distribution technical guideline is stated in 10 CFR 960.5-2-1(a) as follows:

> The site shall be located such that, during repository operation and closure, (1) the expected average radiation dose to members of the public within any highly populated area will not be likely to exceed a small fraction of the limits allowable under the requirements specified in 960.5-1(a)(1), and (2) the expected radiation dose to any member of the public in an unrestricted area will not be likely to exceed the limit allowable under the requirements specified in 960.5-1(a)(1).

This qualifying condition is concerned with radioactive releases to unrestricted areas and subsequent doses to members of the general public and is virtually identical to Issue 2.1 (public radiological exposures--normal conditions), which asks the following:

> During repository operation and closure, (a) will the expected average radiation dose to members of the public within any highly populated area be less than a small fraction of the allowable

limits, and (b) will the expected radiation dose received by any member of the public in an unrestricted area be less than the allowable limits as required by 10 CFR 60.111, 40 CFR 191, Subpart A, and 10 CFR Part 20?

The resolution of Issue 2.1 will thus provide sufficient evidence to support a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition. The issue resolution strategy for Issue 2.1 and the information that will support resolution of Issue 2.1 are described in detail in Section 8.3.5.3, and this information is summarized in Table 8.3.5.6-4. No information beyond that described in Section 8.3.5.6 is expected to be required to support a higher-level finding.

Disqualifying condition 1. The first of the three disqualifying conditions of the population density and distribution technical guideline (10 CFR 960.5-2-1(d)(1)) states that a site will be disqualified if

(1) Any surface facility of a repository would be located in a highly populated area.

The proximity of the site to highly populated areas greatly affects the extent of exposures of the general public during the preclosure period. It is desirable to locate a repository away from highly populated areas to limit doses to members of the public. A positive higher-level finding has been made for this condition. The finding and the supporting evidence are given in the Yucca Mountain environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b).

Disqualifying condition 2. The second of the three disqualifying conditions of the population density and distribution technical guideline (10 CFR 960.5-2-1(d)(2)) states that a site will be disqualified if

(2) Any surface facility of a repository would be located adjacent to an area 1 mile by 1 mile having a population of not less than 1,000 individuals as enumerated by the most recent U.S. census.

As with the first disqualifying condition, a positive higher-level finding has been made for this condition. The finding and the supporting evidence are given in the Yucca Mountain environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b).

Disqualifying condition 3. The third of the three disqualifying conditions of the population density and distribution technical guideline (10 CFR 960.5-2-1(d)(3)) states that a site shall be disqualified if

(3) The DOE could not develop an emergency preparedness program which meets the requirements specified in DOE Order 5500.3 (Reactor and Non-Reactor Facility Emergency Planning, Preparedness, and Response Program for Department of Energy Operations) and related guides or, when issued by the NRC, in 10 CFR Part 60, Subpart I, Emergency Planning Criteria.

The development of an emergency preparedness program is outside the scope of site characterization and the SCP. The development of such a plan will be discussed in Section 8.3.5.3.

Table 8.3.5.6-4. Information used in the resolution of Issue 2.1 (adapted from Table 8.3.5.3-2)

Population density and distribution
Distance from highly populated areas
Population located in adjacent 1-mile by 1-mile area
Population density of the region
Radionuclide concentration in environmental media and individual doses
Bioaccumulation of radionuclides in terrestial flora
Bioaccumulation of radionuclides in terrestial fauna
Types and amounts of crops raised and consumed
Types and amounts of animals raised and consumed
Annual consumption of forage
Forage storage time
Grazing yield and period
Radius of crop and animal area
Volumetric flow of surface water to water bodies
Population served by local drinking water
Volumetric flow of local drinking water
Recreational uses of water bodies
Meteorological information
Windspeeds
Wind direction
Atmospheric stability
Mixing layer depth
Average ambient temperature
Atmospheric moisture
Precipitation: type, amount, intensity, etc.
Barometric pressure
Size and distance of topographic features from release points
Reference repository design and supporting analyses
Offsite installations and operations
Location of nearby uranium fuel cycle facilities
Radionuclides normally released from nearby uranium cycle facilities

Site ownership and control technical guideline

The site ownership and control technical guideline has one qualifying condition and no disqualifying conditions. The qualifying condition (10 CFR 960.5-2-2(a)) requires that

> The site shall be located on land for which the DOE can obtain, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 60.121, ownership, surface and subsurface rights, and control of access that are required in order that surface and subsurface activities during repository operation and closure will not be likely to lead to radionuclide releases to an unrestricted area greater than those allowable under the requirements specified in 960.5-1(a)(1).

This qualifying condition is concerned with the ability of the DOE to control the use of the land within which a geologic repository system is located. Inability to control such use would affect the boundary of the unrestricted area, and therefore could affect releases to the unrestricted area. Lack of such control could also lead to a disruption of repository activities.

The ability of the DOE to obtain ownership, surface and subsurface rights, and control of access in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 60.121 is an institutional question that is outside the scope of the SCP. Instead, this subject will be addressed in future environmental program planning activities (see Section 8.3.1.11).

Meteorology technical guideline

The meteorology technical guideline has one qualifying condition and no disqualifying conditions. The qualifying condition (10 CFR 960.5-2-3(a)) requires that

> The site shall be located such that expected meteorological conditions during repository operation will not be likely to lead to radionuclide releases to an unrestricted area greater than those allowable under the requirements specified in 960.5-1(a)(1).

This qualifying condition is concerned with the effect of meteorological conditions only on releases to unrestricted areas. The releases expected at a site, given the meteorological conditions, must be within the limits set for releases to unrestricted areas.

The determination of whether releases to unrestricted areas are within allowable limits is addressed by Issue 2.1 (Section 8.3.5.3). The allowable limits are those referenced by 10 CFR 60.111 (10 CFR Part 20 and 40 CFR 191, Subpart A). To provide the information necessary to make a higher-level finding for this qualifying condition, the evaluation of releases to unrestricted areas must take into account the meteorological conditions expected at the site during the preclosure period. Table 8.3.5.6-4 lists the data identified through the resolution strategy for Issue 2.1, including meteorological data, that will be obtained during site characterization. Through the resolution of Issue 2.1, therefore, information is expected to be available to determine if expected meteorological conditions at the site will

result in radiological releases to unrestricted areas greater than the allowable limits. This information will be sufficient to support a higher-level finding for this qualifying condition.

Offsite installations and operations

The offsite installations and operations technical guideline has one qualifying condition and one disqualifying condition.

Qualifying condition. The qualifying condition is stated in 10 CFR 960.5-2-4(a) as follows:

> The site shall be located such that present projected effects from nearby industrial, transportation, and military installations and operations, including atomic energy defense activities, (1) will not significantly affect repository siting, construction, operation, closure, or decommissioning or can be accommodated by engineering measures and (2), when considered together with emissions from repository operation and closure, will not be likely to lead to radionuclide releases to an unrestricted area greater than those allowable under the requirements specified in 960.5-1(a)(1).

Offsite installations and operations can affect required preclosure activities and the preclosure performance of a repository system in two ways: (1) the routine or anticipated activities associated with such operations or installations could interfere with or disrupt repository development, and (2) the offsite installations or operations could be releasing radioactive material to unrestricted areas that, when combined with the expected releases from repository operations, could result in total releases to unrestricted areas that are greater than the allowable limits. The first part of the qualifying condition is concerned with the potential for offsite installations and operations to significantly disrupt repository development and operations. The effects of offsite installations and operations on repository operations are being evaluated to establish the normal and anticipated conditions under which the repository will operate. For example, the effects of ground motion due to weapons testing at the Nevada Test Site will be investigated and the necessary measures taken to accommodate such motion. This investigation of normal and anticipated operating conditions is discussed in the resolution strategies of Issues 2.1 and 2.2 (public and worker radiological safety--normal conditions). The second part of the qualifying condition is concerned with total combined releases to unrestricted areas from offsite installations and operations. The combined total radionuclide releases to unrestricted areas under normal and anticipated operational conditions will be evaluated in resolving Issue 2.1. The NRC requires that, in calculating combined total releases, only releases from nuclear-fuel-cycle facilities need to be considered. However, through monitoring to establish background radiation levels at the site, releases from all other types of offsite installations and operations, such as the Nevada Test Site, will be determined. The evaluations and information obtained to resolve Issue 2.1 are therefore expected to be sufficient to support a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the offsite installations and operations technical guideline.

Disqualifying condition. The offsite installations and operations technical guideline disqualifying condition is stated in 10 CFR 960.5-2-4(d) as follows:

> A site shall be disqualified if atomic energy defense activities in proximity to the site are expected to conflict irreconcilably with repository siting, construction, operation, closure, and decommissioning.

This condition is the inverse of the first part of the qualifying condition. As discussed previously, the existence of offsite installations and operations, including those activities related to atomic energy defense, could conflict with or disrupt the activities required for repository development and operation, or they could result in total combined releases such that the applicable limits would be exceeded. Issue 2.1 will investigate the effects of offsite installations and operations on preclosure radiological safety (see the previous discussion of the qualifying condition). These investigations will provide the information necessary to support a higher-level finding for this disqualifying condition.

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.7, Higher Level Findings — Ease and Cost of Construction

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.7 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 4.1: Can the higher-level findings required by 10 CFR Part 960 be made for the qualifying condition of the preclosure system guideline and the disqualifying and qualifying conditions of the technical guidelines for surface characteristics, rock characteristics, hydrology, and tectonics?

Regulatory basis for the issue

The DOE has established a set of siting guidelines to be used as a basis for evaluating the suitability of potential repository sites during the site selection process.* These siting guidelines, which are set forth in 10 CFR Part 960, are separated into two categories: those that address postclosure conditions (10 CFR 960.4) and those that address preclosure conditions (10 CFR 960.5). The manner in which the siting guidelines must be addressed during the siting process is described in the DOE Implementation Guidelines (10 CFR 960.3).

DOE's preclosure system guideline and technical guidelines related to ease and cost of construction are the subject of this issue (4.1). These guidelines consist of a system guideline and four technical guidelines. The system guideline is concerned with the technical feasibility and relative cost of siting, constructing, operating, and closing a repository at a given site. Specific concerns are whether special engineering measures beyond the bounds of reasonably available technology may be necessary for repository construction, operation, and closure, and whether the cost of repository construction, operation, and closure may be unreasonable in comparison with the other repository siting options if a large number of special measures were necessary for these phases. The Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 (NWPAA, 1987) identified the Yucca Mountain site as the only site to be characterized. As a consequence, the requirement for comparative evaluation of costs is no longer appropriate.

Each technical guideline is concerned with the effect of some specific aspect of site conditions on the concerns expressed in the system guideline. Each technical guideline has a qualifying condition that must be met for the site to be acceptable. In addition, three of the technical guidelines have a disqualifying condition. A site is unacceptable if any one of the disqualifying conditions is found to be present. The technical guidelines also identify favorable conditions and potentially adverse conditions that describe characteristics of the setting that, if present, could benefit or adversely affect the ease or cost of constructing, operating, or closing a repository.

The Implementation Guidelines require that the qualifying and disqualifying conditions of the system and technical guidelines be evaluated and that specific findings be made for each condition at principal decision points in the siting process. These findings are stated in 10 CFR Part 960, Appendix III, and are shown in Table 8.3.5.7-1.

---

*The passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 (NWPAA, 1987) may impact the manner in which this process is implemented.

Table 8.3.5.7-1. Findings for qualifying and disqualifying conditions

Disqualifying condition--lower-level findings		
Level 1	(a)	The evidence does not support a finding that the site is disqualified.
	(b)	The evidence supports a finding that the site is disqualified.
Disqualifying condition--higher-level findings		
Level 2	(a)	The evidence supports a finding that the site is not disqualified on the basis of that evidence and is not likely to be disqualified.
	(b)	The evidence supports a finding that the site is disqualified or is likely to be disqualified.
Qualifying condition--lower-level findings		
Level 3	(a)	The evidence does not support a finding that the site is not likely to meet the qualifying condition.
	(b)	The evidence supports a finding that the site is not likely to meet the qualifying condition, and therefore the site is disqualified.
Qualifying condition--higher-level findings		
Level 4	(a)	The evidence supports a finding that the site meets the qualifying condition and is likely to continue to meet the qualifying condition.
	(b)	The evidence supports a finding that the site cannot meet the qualifying condition or is unlikely to be able to meet the qualifying condition, and therefore the site is disqualified.

There are four levels of findings--disqualifying and qualifying conditions both require a lower-level and higher-level finding. Lower-level findings must be made to determine if a site may be nominated as suitable for characterization or recommended as a candidate site for characterization. Higher-level findings, however, are the findings that must be made to determine if a site may be recommended for the development of a repository. Disqualifying conditions require Level 1 and Level 2 findings, and qualifying conditions require Level 3 and Level 4 findings. Each level has both a positive finding and a negative finding associated with it.

Table 8.3.5.7-2 shows the findings previously made for the guideline qualifying and disqualifying conditions concerned with preclosure ease and cost of construction. These findings and the evidence supporting them are given in the Yucca Mountain Project environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b). The available evidence was sufficient to support positive lower-level findings for the qualifying and disqualifying conditions of the technical guidelines and the specified preclosure system guideline. To determine if the Yucca Mountain site is suitable for the development of a repository, therefore, higher-level findings must be made for the qualifying and disqualifying conditions of the system and technical guideline.

The DOE siting guidelines do not require any findings similar to lower-level or higher-level findings to be made for the favorable or potentially adverse conditions of the technical guidelines. As stated in the Supplementary Information (DOE, 1984b) for 10 CFR Part 960, Overview of the Guidelines, these conditions were intended to be used to predict the suitability of a site and provide a preliminary indication of system performance before the start of detailed site characterization studies. These conditions were considered and used in the identification of potentially acceptable sites, and in the nomination and recommendation of sites as suitable for characterization. By the completion of site characterization, however, sufficient data will be available to directly evaluate site performance and repository designs against the qualifying conditions of the system and technical guidelines. Therefore, the favorable and potentially adverse conditions will not be considered in specific terms as they were for the environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b).

Approach to resolving the issue

Key Issue 4 is basically concerned with design concepts, whereas Key Issue 1 and Key Issue 2 are concerned with postclosure and preclosure aspects of repository performance. Key Issue 1 is concerned with performance of the repository as compared with the postclosure release standard and other requirements as implemented in 10 CFR Part 60. Key Issue 2 is concerned with the preclosure performance of the repository as compared with the allowable release limits as specified in 10 CFR 60.111, 40 CFR 191 Part A, and 10 CFR Part 20. Key Issue 4, on the other hand, is concerned with the feasibility and availability of the technology needed to construct, operate, and close the repository, and with the reasonableness of the cost associated with the repository in comparison with the other sites under consideration. Since the passage of the NWPAA, the Yucca Mountain site is the only site under consideration and the requirement for the comparative evaluation of costs is no longer applicable (NWPAA, 1987). As noted, these are design topics. The reader should specifically note that the higher-level findings required for Issue 1.9 (higher-level findings--postclosure) and Issue 2.5 (higher-level findings--preclosure radiological safety) are concerned with repository performance by comparison with numerical standards. The strategies for resolving these two issues reference other related performance issues in outlining the information needed to make these findings. Conversely, the higher-level findings required for Issue 4.1 (this issue) are concerned with design questions of feasibility and safety for which there are no numerical standards, and the resolution strategy described below references related design issues to indicate the source of the information needed to make these findings.

Table 8.3.5.7-2. Preliminary findings for the qualifying and disqualifying conditions concerned with ease and cost of construction.[a]

Preclosure guideline (10 CFR Part 960)		Preliminary finding[b]
960.5-1(a)(3)	System qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
960.5-2-8	Surface characteristics	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
960.5-2-9	Rock characteristics	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
(d)	Disqualifying condition	Level 3(a)
960.5-2-10	Hydrology	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
(d)	Disqualifying condition	Level 3(a)
960.5-2-11	Tectonics	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
(d)	Disqualifying condition	Level 3(a)

[a]Preliminary findings from DOE (1986b).
[b]See Table 8.3.5.7-1 for an explanation of the finding levels.

To resolve Issue 4.1 sufficient evidence must be available to support either a positive or negative higher-level finding for each qualifying and disqualifying condition associated with the preclosure guideline on ease and cost of construction, operation and closure. Each of the qualifying conditions references the requirement for technical feasibility based on reasonably available technology. In making higher-level findings for the qualifying and disqualifying conditions, specific aspects of the geologic setting must be considered in the evaluation of this requirement.

Figure 8.3.5.7-1 shows the strategy for resolving Issue 4.1. The first step is to eliminate, if possible, from further consideration the qualifying and disqualifying conditions for which higher-level findings have already been made. In the group of technical guidelines subsumed by Issue 4.1, there are none that meet this condition. Next, for each condition, it is determined whether the evidence presently available is sufficient to support a higher-level finding. This evidence consists of the information presented in the Yucca Mountain Project environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b) and in Chapters 1 through 7 of the SCP. If the evidence is sufficient, the finding and the evidence are documented.



Figure 8.3.5.7-1. Issue resolution strategy for Issue 4 1 (higher-level findings — ease and cost of construction)

For the qualifying and disqualifying conditions for which there is not adequate evidence available, the planned site characterization studies are reviewed to determine if the conditions will be investigated. This is accomplished by evaluating the resolution strategies for Issues 4.2 through 4.4, the preclosure design issues that are relevant to the evaluation of Performance Issue 4.1. These issue resolution strategies address design concerns in terms of the proposed technologies for construction, operation, and closure being reasonably available. Resolution of Issue 4.5, (total system costs), which was intended to provide the strategy for comparative evaluation of costs as called for by the performance issue, is no longer appropriate or necessary since the passage of the NWPAA (NWPAA, 1987). Therefore, if the concerns of the qualifying and disqualifying conditions are being considered in the resolution strategies of these issues, then the evidence to support higher-level findings will be made available through the information, analyses, and assessments that support resolution of these design issues. A correlation of the qualifying and disqualifying conditions and the issues that will supply the information is shown in Table 8.3.5.7-3.

After ensuring that the qualifying and disqualifying conditions will be investigated, the information necessary to assess compliance will be obtained during site characterization. Upon completion of the assessments, the results will be evaluated to determine if sufficient evidence is available to support higher-level findings. If the evidence is sufficient, the findings and the evidence will be documented. If the evidence shows that a negative higher-level finding must be made for any one of the conditions, i.e., that a disqualifying condition is present or that a qualifying condition is not present, then the site will be disqualified. This evaluation will continue until positive higher-level findings can be supported for all the conditions or until a negative higher-level finding must be made.

If, in evaluating the results of the assessments, insufficient information is found to support either a positive or a negative higher-level finding for a qualifying or disqualifying condition, additional data or analyses may be necessary to satisfy existing information needs. The resolution strategies of the appropriate design issues will be reviewed to determine if, in fact, the condition was adequately considered and the related information needs were satisfied. If not, the strategies for the design issues will be revised and new information needs will be identified as necessary, additional data will be collected, and compliance will be reassessed. This process continues until there is sufficient evidence to support either a positive or a negative higher-level finding for every qualifying and disqualifying condition. As discussed previously, findings are not required for the favorable conditions or the potentially adverse conditions at this stage in the siting process. However, the DOE's analyses indicate that the concerns of these conditions are adequately addressed through the data and analyses of other issues.

System Guideline Qualifying Condition

The preclosure system guideline qualifying condition on ease and cost of siting, construction, operation, and closure is stated in 10 CFR 960.5-1(a)(3) as follows:

Table 8.3.5.7-3. Preclosure design issues that address the concerns of the qualifying and disqualifying conditions of the preclosure guidelines on ease and cost of siting, constructing, operating, and closing a repository

Guideline	Issue 4.2[a] (nonradiological health and safety)	Issue 4.3[a] (waste package production technologies)	Issue 4.4 (preclosure design and technical feasibility)	Issue 4.5[a,b] (total system costs)
System guideline				
Qualifying condition	D[c]	D	D	NA[d]
Surface characteristics				
Qualifying condition	I[e]	I	D	NA
Rock characteristics				
Qualifying condition	I	I	D	NA
Disqualifying condition	I	I	D	NA
Hydrology				
Qualifying condition	I	I	D	NA
Disqualifying condition	I	I	D	NA
Tectonics				
Qualifying condition	I	I	D	NA
Disqualifying condition	I	I	D	NA

[a]Issues 4.2, 4.3, and 4.5 do not directly require site information. Rather, they place design constraints upon Issue 4.4 or evaluate products prepared under Issue 4.4.

[b]Resolution of Issue 4.5 is not required as the Yucca Mountain site is the only site under consideration for development as a repository as designated by the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 (NWPAA, 1987).

[c]Information considered in resolving the issue directly (D) contributed to the higher-level finding for the specified guideline condition.

[d]NA = not applicable.

[e]Information considered in resolving the issue indirectly (I) contributed to the higher-level finding for the specified condition.

> Repository siting, construction, operation, and closure shall be demonstrated to be technically feasible on the basis of reasonably available technology, and the associated costs shall be demonstrated to be reasonable relative to other available and comparable siting options.

This qualifying condition is concerned with the feasibility of a potential repository site from the perspectives of the relative reasonableness of the cost of siting, constructing, operating, and closing the facility compared with the other siting options. Since the passage of the NWPAA, this portion of the qualifying condition no longer needs to be addressed in making a finding on the system guideline (NWPAA, 1987). The condition is also concerned with the availability of the technology required to implement the design developed to meet the regulatory requirements expressed under Key Issues 1 and 2, as well as the other concerns addressed under Key Issue 4. To make the higher-level finding for this qualifying condition, the evidence must be available to (1) establish the properties of the host rock and the character of the site and to develop constitutive models, (2) develop and demonstrate site-specific equipment for packaging and handling the waste and to perform specific mining and drilling tasks, (3) identify site-specific seal requirements and develop site-specific materials, designs, and emplacement techniques for the seals, and (4) integrate the resulting information into an overall design that will meet the functional requirements and performance criteria established for the repository. The design task is an evolutionary and iterative process that includes (1) the formulation, testing, and refinement of concepts, (2) the combination of concepts into the design, (3) analyses of the design for technical validity, (4) comparisons of the design with criteria and requirements, and (5) the evaluation of costs to implement the design. This sequence is repeated and refined until the design meets the requirements established for performance, efficiency, and cost effectiveness.

The information that will be used to support the higher-level finding for this qualifying condition derives primarily from the design and cost evaluation of the facility as addressed under Issues 4.4 and 4.5. Therefore, the site characteristic information used in the development of the design is included. An effort has been made to centralize repository design activities for the Yucca Mountain site under Issue 4.4 (preclosure design and technical feasibility). Thus, although postclosure facility design and design requirements for preclosure radiological safety are not explicitly addressed under Key Issue 4, the design prepared under Key Issue 4 incorporates these concerns in addition to those expressed in Issue 4.1 (see Section 8.3.2.1).

Surface characteristics

There is one qualifying condition for this technical guideline for which higher-level findings must be made.

Qualifying condition. The qualifying condition for the technical guideline on surface characteristics (10 CFR 960.5-2-8(a)) is as follows:

> The site shall be located such that, considering the surface characteristics and conditions of the site and surrounding area including surface water systems and the terrain, the requirements specified in

10 CFR 960.5-1(a)(3) can be met during repository siting, construction, operation, and closure.

The qualifying condition is concerned with the potential for surface conditions of the site and surrounding area that could impact the ability of the site to meet the cost and technical feasibility requirements specified in the system guideline. Assurance that the preclosure system can be constructed and operated under the surface conditions present or credibly expected to be encountered must be provided. A determination of the surface characteristics and conditions, as well as credible events, is required for the evaluation needed to determine compliance with the system guideline and to make the higher-level finding required for this qualifying condition.

The impact of surface characteristics on repository preclosure performance will be evaluated in support of the resolution of Issue 4.4 (Section 8.3.2.5). These evaluations will also serve as the basis for making a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the guideline on surface characteristics under Issue 4.1. No additional information outside the information needs identified as being needed for resolution of Issue 4.4 is required.

The link between the information required for making a higher-level finding on the qualifying condition for the technical guideline on surface characteristics and the information needs identified to support resolution of preclosure design Issue 4.4 is identified in Table 8.3.5.7-4.

Rock characteristics

There are three qualifying and one disqualifying conditions for this technical guideline for which higher-level findings must be made.

Qualifying conditions. The qualifying conditions for the technical guideline on rock characteristics (10 CFR 960.5-2-9(a)) are as follows:

The site shall be located such that:

(1) the thickness and lateral extent and the characteristics and composition of the host rock will be suitable for accommodation of the underground facility;

(2) repository construction, operation, and closure will not cause undue hazard to personnel; and

(3) the requirements specified in 10 CFR 960.5-1(a)(3) can be met.

The qualifying conditions for preclosure rock characteristics require that the host rock must be capable of safely accommodating the construction, operation, and closure of the underground facility using reasonably available technology. A determination of the characteristics and properties for the geologic setting in which construction activities are proposed is required to determine compliance with the system guideline and to make a higher-level finding for this qualifying condition.

Table 8.3.5.7-4. Surface characteristics information considered in making the higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the surface characteristics guideline, and issues for which the information will be obtained

Issue	Information
4.2	No surface characteristics information required
4.3	No surface characteristics information needed
4.4	Surface topography at facility locations Surface topography at candidate mined material storage area Surface topography at underground access locations Surface topography of surface facility sites Surface topography on access routes Surface topography at facility locations Allowable foundation bearing load pressure for soil considering shear failure and settlement (total and differential) Allowable foundation bearing load pressure for rock considering shear failure and settlement (total and differential) Active and passive soil pressures for flexible and rigid structural walls Active and passive rock pressure for flexible and rigid structural walls Factor of safety for an identified mechanism of potential slope failure in soil for static and dynamic loading conditions Factor of safety for an identified mechanism of potential slope failure in rock for static and dynamic loading conditions Magnitude and rate of time dependent settlement in soils below earthfills Magnitude and rate of swell in subgrade soils below roads Magnitude of soil collapse below surface facilities (foundations, earthfills, and roads) due to saturation and/or loading Soil liquefaction potential for saturated low density soils under dynamic loading conditions

The characteristics and properties of the host rock must be determined in support of evaluations made for resolution of design Issue 4.4. Evaluations of these characteristics and properties will serve as the basis for making the higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the technical guideline on rock characteristics under Issue 4.1. Other than the information needs identified for the design issue just cited, no additional information is required.

The link between the information required for making a higher-level finding on the qualifying condition for the technical guideline on rock characteristics and the information needs identified to support resolution of preclosure design issues is identified in Table 8.3.5.7-5.

Disqualifying condition. The disqualifying condition for the technical guideline on rock characteristics (10 CFR 960.5-2-9(d)) is in Table 8.3.5.7-5. The site shall be disqualified if the rock characteristics are such that the activities associated with repository construction, operation, or closure are predicted to cause significant risk to the health and safety of personnel, taking into account mitigating measures that use reasonably available technology.

The information identified in Table 8.3.5.7-5 will also support the evaluation necessary to reach the required higher-level finding for this disqualifying condition.

Hydrology

There are three qualifying and one disqualifying conditions for this technical guideline for which higher-level findings must be made.

Qualifying conditions. The qualifying conditions for the technical guideline on hydrology (10 CFR 960.5-2-10(a)) are as follows:

> The site shall be located such that the geohydrologic setting of the site will
>
> (1) be compatible with the activities required for repository construction, operation, and closure;
>
> (2) not compromise the intended functions of the shaft liners and seals; and
>
> (3) permit the requirements specified in 10 CFR 960.5-1(a)(3) to be met.

These qualifying conditions require that the present and expected characteristics of the geohydrologic setting be compatible with the safe construction, operation, and closure of the repository using reasonably available technology as required by the system guideline. A determination of the hydrologic characteristics and properties within the geologic setting is required for the evaluations needed to determine compliance with the system guideline and to make a higher-level finding for these qualifying conditions.

Evaluations of the geohydrologic setting and of the resulting impact on repository preclosure performance will be performed in support of the resolution of Issue 4.4. These evaluations will serve as the basis for making a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the geohydrology guideline under Issue 4.1. Other than the information needs identified for the design issue just cited, no additional information is required.

Table 8.3.5.7-5. Rock characteristics information considered in making the higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the rock characteristics guideline, and issues for which the information will be obtained

Issue	Information
4.2	No site rock characteristics information is requested directly by this issue
4.3	No site rock characteristics information is requested directly by this issue
4.4	Description and frequency of abnormal conditions in rock mass Initial formation temperature Thermal conductivity of rock Heat capacity of rock Rock properties in primary area Poisson's ratio (intact rock) In situ stress (rock mass) Coefficient of thermal expansion (rock mass) Thermal conductivity (rock mass) Young's modulus (intact rock) Deformation modulus (rock mass) Heat capacity Unconfined compressive strength (intact rock) Cohesion of rock and angle of internal friction--intact rock (compressive strength as a function of confining pressure) Joint normal and shear stiffness properties (fractures) Joint wall compressive strength (fracture surfaces) Joint roughness coefficient (fracture surfaces) Cohesion and coefficient of friction (fractures) Joint frequency and spacing Joint orientation Number of joint sets Joint roughness and condition of joints Rock quality designation Joint alteration Construction method Presence of swelling or squeezing ground Water inflow Expected seismic loading Stratigraphic features Depth, thickness, and lateral extent of host rock Stratigraphy and structural features

The link between the information required for making a higher-level finding on the qualifying condition for the technical guideline on hydrology and the information needs identified to support resolution of preclosure design issues is identified in Table 8.3.5.7-6.

Disqualifying condition. The disqualifying condition for the technical guideline on hydrology (10 CFR 960.5-2-10(d)) is as follows:

> A site shall be disqualified if, based on expected ground water conditions, it is likely that engineering measures that are beyond reasonably available technology will be required for exploratory shaft construction or for repository construction, operation, or closure.

The information identified in Table 8.3.5.7-6 will also support the evaluation necessary to reach the required higher-level finding for this disqualifying condition.

Tectonics

There is one qualifying and one disqualifying condition for this technical guideline for which a higher-level finding must be made.

Qualifying condition. The qualifying condition for the technical guideline on tectonics (10 CFR 960.5-2-11(a)) is as follows:

> The site shall be located in a geologic setting in which any projected effects of expected tectonic phenomena or igneous activity on repository construction, operation, or closure will be such that the requirements specified in 10 CFR 960.5-1(a)(3) can be met.

The characteristics and probability of occurrence of tectonic and igneous processes and events must be determined to identify the potentially disruptive scenarios that may affect the ability of the site to meet the preclosure requirements on ease and cost of construction, operation, and closure as specified in the system guideline and to make a higher-level finding for this qualifying condition. An evaluation of these same processes, events, and scenarios is also required to support the resolution of Issue 4.4. The information identified as being needed to resolve this design issue will serve as the basis for the required higher-level finding for the qualifying condition for tectonics under Issue 4.1. No new information needs are required for the higher-level finding for this qualifying condition.

The link between the information required for making a higher-level finding on the technical guideline for tectonics and the information needs identified to support the resolution of other preclosure issues is identified in Table 8.3.5.7-7.

Disqualifying condition. The disqualifying condition for the technical guideline on tectonics (10 CFR 960.5-2-11(d)) is as follows:

Table 8.3.5.7-6. Hydrologic information considered in making the higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the hydrology guideline, and issues for which the information will be obtained

Issue	Information
4.2	No site hydrologic characteristics are requested directly by this issue
4.3	No site hydrologic characteristics are requested directly by this issue
4.4	Surface Surface hydrology for 5-, 25-, 50-, 100-, 500-year flood and the probable maximum flood (PMF) Area of inundation Surface water systems, stream flow rate, quantities and durations, channel morphology Subsurface Aquifer locations Aquifer characteristics Sustained yield of pumped water source for operational water

A site shall be disqualified if, based on the expected nature and rates of fault movement or other ground motion, it is likely that engineering measures that are beyond reasonably available technology will be required for exploratory shaft construction or for repository construction, operation, or closure.

The information identified in Table 8.3.5.7-7 will also support the required higher-level finding for this disqualifying condition of the technical guideline on tectonics.

Table 8.3.5.7-7. Tectonics information considered in making the higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the tectonics guideline, and issues for which the information will be obtained

Issue	Information
4.2	No site tectonic information is requested directly by this issue
4.3	No site tectonic information is requested directly by this issue
4.4	Surface Identification and characterization of late Quaternary faults in the repository block. If determined to exist, establish location, orientation, and probability of exceeding 7 cm displacement in areas of waste emplacement Design basis ground motion time histories and corresponding response spectra at underground facility locations Combined potential for vibratory ground motion at underground facility locations Probability of volcanic eruption through area of waste emplacement Stratigraphic contacts for top and bottom of the TSw2 formation within candidate areas for repository Identification of any fault within 100 m of facilities important to safety (FITS) with greater than 1 chance in 100 of producing more than 5 cm of surface displacement in 100 years. If determined to exist, establish location at surface, orientation at surface, and probability of exceeding 5 cm displacement under FITS Design basis ground motion time histories and corresponding response spectra Potential for exceeding design basis ground motion at FITS Probability vs. peak ground acceleration, peak ground velocity, and peak velocity response at selected frequencies at surface fits locations Probability of volcanic eruption that would disrupt surface facilities Design basis ash fall thickness Soil-structure interaction considering displacements and degree of yielding in soil beneath the base of the building Soil-structure interaction considering displacements and degree of yielding in soil adjacent to retaining walls Rock-structure interaction considering displacements and degree of yielding in rock beneath the base of the building Rock-structural interaction considering displacements and degree of yielding in rock adjacent to retaining walls Subsurface Fault properties Location

Table 8.3.5.7-7. Tectonics information considered in making the higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the tectonics guideline, and issues for which the information will be obtained (continued)

Issue	Information
4.4 (continued)	
	Subsurface, fault properties (continued) Orientation Physical, thermal, and mechanical properties of major faults

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.8, Strategy for Postclosure Performance Assessment

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.8 Strategy for postclosure performance assessment

As explained in the introduction to Section 8.3.5, assessments of the performance of a repository at Yucca Mountain are required for resolving the performance issues in the issues hierarchy; a major part of the performance-assessment program will examine the postclosure behavior of the repository. The detailed plans for the assessment of postclosure behavior are described as part of the issue-resolution strategies in Sections 8.3.5.9 through 8.3.5.18. The principal presentations of these plans are in Sections 8.3.5.9 and 8.3.5.10 for assessments of the waste package and in Sections 8.3.5.12 and 8.3.5.13 for assessments of the site. In addition, waste-package performance assessment is reviewed in Section 7.4.5.

This section describes strategic aspects of the performance-assessment program that are common to all those detailed plans for assessing postclosure performance. The first part of this section, a brief overview of the performance-assessment strategy, begins by explaining the relationships among the performance issues. The overview then describes the major steps in the iterative process by which final performance is assessed and performance issues resolved. At several points in the iterative process, the DOE must decide whether the available data are sufficient for carrying out the assessments; the overview emphasizes these steps because many of the needed data will be supplied by the site characterization program. The second part of this section reviews the conceptual models of a Yucca Mountain repository that have been used in the preliminary work underlying the detailed performance-assessment plans.

Overview of strategy

The primary objective of the Yucca Mountain Project postclosure performance assessment program is to resolve Key Issue 1 in the issues hierarchy, which is

> Will the mined geologic disposal system at Yucca Mountain isolate the radioactive waste from the accessible environment after closure in accordance with the requirements set forth in 40 CFR Part 191, 10 CFR Part 60, and 10 CFR Part 960?

The performance issues under Key Issue 1 parallel the regulatory criteria in 10 CFR Part 60 and 10 CFR Part 960. Each issue either asks whether specific performance objectives can be met or asks for analyses and qualitative judgments of the expected future conditions at Yucca Mountain after the repository at the site has been closed and decommissioned. These performance issues are the following:

Issue	Issue statement	SCP section
1.1	Will the mined geologic disposal system meet the system performance objective for limiting radionuclide releases to the accessible environment as required by 10 CFR 60.112 and 40 CFR 191.13?	8.3.5.13

Issue	Issue statement	SCP section
1.2	Will the mined geologic disposal system meet the requirements for limiting individual doses in the accessible environment as required by 40 CFR 191.15?	8.3.5.14
1.3	Will the mined geologic disposal system meet the requirements for the protection of special sources of ground water as required by 40 CFR 191.16?	8.3.5.15
1.4	Will the waste package meet the performance objective for containment as required by 10 CFR 60.113?	8.3.5.9
1.5	Will the waste package and repository engineered barrier systems meet the performance objective for radionuclide release rates as required by 10 CFR 60.113?	8.3.5.10
1.6	Will the site meet the performance objective for pre-waste emplacement ground-water travel time as required by 10 CFR 60.113?	8.3.5.12
1.7	Will the performance-confirmation program meet the requirements of 10 CFR 60.137?	8.3.5.16
1.8	Can the demonstrations for favorable and potentially adverse conditions be made as required by 10 CFR 60.122?	8.3.5.17
1.9	(a) Can the higher-level findings required by 10 CFR Part 960 be made for the qualifying condition of the postclosure system guideline and the disqualifying and qualifying conditions on the technical guidelines for geohydrology, geochemistry, rock characteristics, climate changes, erosion, dissolution, tectonics, and human interference; and (b) can the comparative evaluations required by 10 CFR 960.3-1-5 be made?	8.3.5.18

The flow of information among Issues 1.1 through 1.6 is depicted schematically in Figure 8.3.5.8-1, which also shows, in simplified form, the exchange of information with the group of three design issues under Key Issue 1. Even though the diagram indicates only one-way flow, some information flows backwards along the lines shown in the figure. This backward flow conveys the results of sensitivity analyses, which are carried out in each issue as part of its treatment of uncertainty. These sensitivity analyses reveal whether the information supplied to an issue is sufficient for its needs, and their results may, therefore, be conveyed from an issue back to the issue that supplied the information.

The connections among issues shown in Figure 8.3.5.8-1 achieve an important synergism. A single series of analyses may often answer questions that arise in solving more than one issue. Because of these close connections, the results of analyses performed in one issue are available to guide the work in other issues.


DESIGN ISSUES
1.10 WASTE PACKAGE CHARACTERISTICS - POSTCLOSURE (SECTION 8.3.4.2)
1.11 CONFIGURATION OF UNDERGROUND FACILITIES - POSTCLOSURE (SECTION 8.3.2.2)
1.12 SEAL CHARACTERISTICS (SECTION 8.3.3.2)
DESIGN FEATURES THAT AFFECT EXPECTED NEAR-FIELD CONDITIONS
ISSUE 1.4 WASTE PACKAGE CONTAINMENT (SECTION 8.3.5.9)
DESIGN FEATURES THAT AFFECT THE LOCATION OF THE DISTURBED ZONE
SCENARIOS THAT MIGHT AFFECT NEAR-FIELD CONDITIONS
DESIGN FEATURES THAT AFFECT EXPECTED NEAR-FIELD CONDITIONS
DISTRIBUTION OF TIMES TO LOSS OF SUBSTANTIALLY COMPLETE CONTAINMENT
DESIGN FEATURES THAT AFFECT NEAR-FIELD AND SITE CONDITIONS
ISSUE 1.6 PRE-WASTE-EMPLACEMENT GROUND-WATER TRAVEL TIMES (SECTION 8.3.5.12)
ISSUE 1.1 TOTAL SYSTEM PERFORMANCE (SECTION 8.3.5.13) ALSO ISSUE 1.2 INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION (SECTION 8.3.5.14) AND ISSUE 1.3 GROUND-WATER PROTECTION (SECTION 8.3.5.15)
SCENARIOS
SOURCE TERM
ISSUE 1.5 RELEASE RATES FROM ENGINEERED-BARRIER SYSTEM (SECTION 8.3.5.10)
DESCRIPTION OF GROUND-WATER MOVEMENT
IDENTIFICATION OF SOME SCENARIOS FOR ANALYSIS
ISSUE 1.8 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION SITING CRITERIA (SECTION 8.3.5.17)
ISSUE 1.9 HIGHER LEVEL FINDINGS - POSTCLOSURE (SECTION 8.3.5.18)

Figure 8.3.5.8-1. Simplified information flow among postclosure performance issues and their interaction with design issues.

The figure also shows an information flow path between the collective results of Issues 1.1 through 1.6 and Issues 1.8 and 1.9. This path is present because the insight and tools developed as a result of providing quantitative answers to Issues 1.1 through 1.6 will contribute to the evaluation of whether the waste-disposal system can meet the regulatory criteria addressed in Issues 1.8 and 1.9. Further discussion of this link appears in Sections 8.3.5.17 and 8.3.5.18.

The figure does not show Issue 1.7, which addresses the need to establish a performance confirmation program. The need for a performance confirmation will be identified from the performance assessment that will be conducted during site characterization. The approach to deciding what aspects of the program need to be confirmed after license application is discussed in Section 8.3.5.16.

Under each of the Yucca Mountain Project issues is a set of information needs. The information needs under each postclosure performance issue (presented in detail in Sections 8.3.5.9 through 8.3.5.18) are structured to reflect the iterative application of the general issue-resolution strategy described in Section 8.1.2. The next few paragraphs explain the structure and the iterations, shown schematically in Figure 8.3.5.8-2.

The figure presents five major steps in assessing postclosure performance. In actual practice, of course, many of the steps take place simultaneously and not necessarily in the strict order implied by arrows in the figure. For example, preliminary calculations are performed while models are being developed and tested and before scenarios have been completely identified. As the arrows on the right-hand side of the figure suggest, progress made in one step may indicate a need for further development in a step that is higher in the figure. For example, an attempt, in the fourth step, to calculate values for performance measures may point out a deficiency in a conceptual model developed in the third step; further work in model development would then be called for. Iterations also occur as data become available, and the following discussion describes three points at which the sufficiency of the available data can logically be judged in terms of the needs of performance assessment for doing the next step.

The first step in this process is the compilation of the relevant existing site and design information. The first information need under each issue is, therefore, a summary of the parameters for which data are needed. The information currently available is described in Chapters 1 through 7, but eventually, this information, augmented by the results of the data-gathering programs described in this site characterization plan, will be provided primarily through the reference information base (RIB). The RIB will be a compilation of the current best information to be used in design and performance analyses. This common source of information will help to ensure uniformity among the analyses carried out in separate issues.

The available information is used in the next step to develop conceptual models and scenarios including the sets of hypothetical events and processes that must be examined to resolve the issue and to develop boundary conditions for calculations. After the existing data have been compiled, the question is asked: "Are the data sufficient to continue with the next step?"


COMPILE SITE DATA FOR IN SITU CONDITIONS, MATERIAL PROPERTIES, PHYSICAL PROCESSES, & STRUCTURAL BOUNDARIES. DESCRIBE HOW WELL THE DATA ARE KNOWN.
DEFINE SCENARIOS & BOUNDARIES FOR CALCULATIONS
ARE THE DATA SUFFICIENT ?
NO
DEFINE ADDITIONAL REQUIRED SITE & DESIGN DATA, & STATE HOW WELL THE DATA MUST BE KNOWN
YES
DEVELOP, TEST, & VALIDATE CONCEPTUAL & NUMERICAL MODELS (WHICH MAY BE COMPUTER CODES) THAT DESCRIBE THE PHYSICAL SYSTEMS TO BE ASSESSED
ARE THE DATA SUFFICIENT ?
NO
YES
CALCULATE PREDICTIONS OF VALUES FOR PERFORMANCE MEASURES USED TO COMPARE WITH NUMERICAL CRITERIA
ASSESS UNCERTAINTY IN PREDICTED PERFORMANCE
ARE THE DATA SUFFICIENT ?
NO
YES
PROPOSE RESOLUTION OF ISSUE
POTENTIAL FOR INTERATIONS DURING DEVELOPMENT

Figure 8.3.5.8-2. Steps in performance assessment for post-closure performance issues

In the early iterations through the process, the data may be sufficient if there is at least a bounding value to use for every parameter that must be input for the analysis and for the selection of scenarios. In later iterations, the answer depends on whether the data provide usefully realistic values for those parameters. If the data are judged not sufficient, the performance assessors must call for additional data, as Figure 8.3.5.8-2 shows.

The third step shown in the figure includes the validation that must be attempted for the calculational models used to predict the values of the performance measures; this validation provides reasonable assurance in the predicted values of the performance measures. In addition, further model development may be necessary to modify or expand the existing conceptual models of the system or subsystem behavior. This development consists of describing the conceptual models in terms of mathematical equations and of constructing algorithms to solve the equations. The calculational-model development often must proceed in parallel with the scenario development, because details of a calculational model may depend on the particular scenario to be analyzed. Plans for validation of conceptual models of site characteristics are described in Section 8.3.1. Plans for validation of analytic techniques to be used in the performance assessments are summarized in Section 8.3.5.20.

Again the question is asked: "Are the data sufficient?" At this point, the data requirements are more stringent because the fourth step requires predictions for comparison with numerical criteria. The data must be certain enough to allow the assessors to draw conclusions about the events and processes being examined.

When sufficient confidence in the models has been attained, values for the performance measures are calculated to assess whether the performance goals are met with the desired confidence. (Explanations of these terms and of their role in issue resolution are in Section 8.1.2.) The uncertainty in the predictions is assessed, and the question is asked again: "Are the data sufficient?" The requirements for sufficiency are most stringent at this point. The data must allow the heterogeneity of the system to be realistically assessed and the effect of future conditions on the models and the material properties to be satisfactorily accounted for. As part of this process, the sensitivity of the performance measure to various parameters and conditions must also be assessed. In some scenarios, the uncertainty in a parameter may be shown insignificant because the behavior of the system under assessment is insensitive to the parameter; the requirements on data for such a parameter would accordingly be less stringent.

The process shown in Figure 8.3.5.8-2 requires numerous applications of judgment. Each decision on whether data are sufficient requires such judgment. The need for iterations and further developments will be decided through judgments of whether the work has provided a basis on which the NRC may find the "reasonable assurance" called for by 10 CFR Part 60. These decisions may involve the routine use of expert judgment, the formal use of expert judgment, or the use of peer review as defined in Altman et al. (1988). The DOE will subject the licensing assessment work to rigorous peer review, using experts from its repository programs as well as from the outside technical community. Review by the NRC will also take place continually

throughout site characterization and the development of a repository. The final licensing decisions by the NRC are based on their review. The processes of consultation with affected states and Indian tribes will also furnish technical review of these decisions. The use of subjective methods involving judgment through peer review is an important process in all the activities shown in Figure 8.3.5.8-2. The general role of subjective methods (i.e., use of expert judgment) in site characterization is discussed in Section 8.1.

The specific work for resolving each performance issue is explained in the individual information need discussions in Sections 8.3.5.9 through 8.3.5.18. They summarize the site and design data that are needed, the scenarios and models that will be used, the predictive analyses that will be performed, the performance measures, goals, and confidences that have been allocated, and the quantitative analyses and qualitative judgments that will be used to establish the degree of certainty in the results.

Summary of conceptual models that have been used for performance assessment

The current strategy for postclosure performance assessment and the identification of information needs are partially determined by the current conceptual models of the repository system and the evaluations to date of how this system is predicted to behave with respect to the performance objectives in 10 CFR Part 60. The bulk of the work in developing the preliminary conceptual models and the evaluation of the system based upon these models has been done for the Yucca Mountain environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b); for example, Oversby and McCright (1984), Montazer and Wilson (1984), Sinnock et al. (1984a), and Klavetter and Peters (1986).

The conceptual models that were developed in the preliminary work are summarized in the following paragraphs. These preliminary conceptual models contain assumptions that simplify the conceptual models described in Chapters 1 through 7, and the following description gives the simplifying assumptions and boundary conditions that have been used to date in performance assessments. Details of scenarios based upon these conceptual models that will ultimately be considered are being developed. Plans to further develop these scenarios are described under Issue 1.1 (Section 8.3.5.13).

The most important concept used in the performance-assessment models summarized here concerns the existing hydrogeologic conditions (i.e., flow paths and water fluxes). In addition, the models must account for the bounds on the natural geochemical and future hydrologic conditions, the possible repository-induced effects on existing hydrogeologic and geochemical conditions, and future tectonic and climatic conditions.

The most probable water flow path from the repository to the accessible environment is currently thought to be vertically downward through the unsaturated Topopah Spring, Calico Hills, and Crater Flat units to the water table, and then horizontal below the water table. Because of capillarity in unsaturated rocks and the low percolation rates in the unsaturated units, the steady-state water flow between the repository location and the water table occurs in the rock matrix (for instance, Montazer and Wilson, 1984; Klavetter and Peters, 1986). As discussed in Section 3.9.1, however, water flow in

some of the fractures in the Tiva Canyon, the Topopah Spring, and the zeolitized Calico Hills units may also occur and could affect radionuclide release and transport. Furthermore, water could flow laterally at some interfaces between rock units. The hypothesis that water movement in the Topopah Spring welded unit is dominated by evaporative vapor flux upward (Montazer and Wilson, 1984) is not currently used. This concept, if shown to be probable, would predict smaller releases of radioactivity than current models predict, because very little waste could ever be dissolved or transported in this concept. The preliminary performance-assessment models have assumed that all release of waste from the repository would be by dissolution in the ground water that flows through the Topopah Spring densely welded unit. The transport of the dissolved radionuclides, according to these models, would occur through the unsaturated zone and the saturated zone to the accessible environment. Current models also consider transport of gaseous radionuclides both by ground water and vertically upward through the unsaturated rock to the surface.

The amount and chemistry of water that contacts the waste will limit radionuclide releases. This contact water is limited by the flux that percolates through the Topopah Spring densely welded unit and by the geometry of the emplaced waste packages. The amount of contact water and time of contact may be reduced because of dry-out and changes in fracture apertures in the vicinity of the waste package. Water chemistry may also be influenced by thermally affected rock-water interactions. These thermal, mechanical, and chemical effects will be included in the analyses of the performance of the waste package and the engineered-barrier system.

With a few exceptions, it is thought that the release of radionuclides from spent fuel and glass waste form will be controlled by secondary phases bearing radionuclides and by the waste-form degradation. Some radionuclides, such as cesium-137, may never reach saturation and will be controlled by waste-form degradation and water flow. Some exceptions to these assumptions are the carbon-14 released from metal components and the mobile cesium, technetium, and iodine-129 that collect in gaps within the fuel and between the fuel pellets and the fuel cladding in spent-fuel rods.

The geochemical conditions that affect release rates are included in the analyses of the engineered-barrier system. Current waste-package-release models assume that the release from the waste package is controlled by water influx and waste-form release. Near the boundary of the engineered-barrier system current transport models assume that transport is driven by the water flowing near the package and by processes such as diffusion, dry-out, and resaturation in the near field.

The cumulative release of radionuclides is calculated at the accessible environment. Currently, the condition considered most probable, on the basis of data presented in Chapter 3, is that the percolation flux through any of the unsaturated units is less than the saturated conductivity of the rock matrix, resulting in one-dimensional water flow and radionuclide transport through the matrix. The effects of alternative conditions are as follows: for percolation fluxes higher than the saturated conductivity of the rock matrix, it is believed that flow would occur in the fracture system. The resulting paths and speeds of radionuclide transport might then be controlled

by diffusion of the radionuclides from the water in the fractures into the water in the matrix.

For intermediate fluxes, close to but not exceeding the saturated conductivity of the matrix, transport by diffusion would probably be on the same order as advective transport by convection of the water in the matrix. It is not clear whether mechanical dispersion, which is related to water velocity, would be a significant contributor to transport of radionuclides. For fluxes greater than the saturated conductivity of the matrix, mechanical dispersion in the fractures could contribute to radionuclide transport because of the higher velocities that may occur; however, the duration of the flow would probably be very short, so that dispersion in the fractures might not be an active mechanism for any significant length of time. The relative contributions of diffusion and dispersion to the transport of radionuclides in both the saturated and unsaturated zones will be studied in activities described in Section 8.3.1.2 (geohydrology program) and 8.3.1.3 (geochemistry program). The radionuclides are assumed to be retarded by the combined effects of sorption, diffusion from fractures into the matrix, mineral precipitation, and ion exchange. These effects, modeled by a bulk retardation factor and a concentration limit, are assumed to be operative in both the Topopah Spring welded unit and the Calico Hills nonwelded unit.

The conceptual models just described formed most of the bases for the performance allocation that has been done for postclosure performance Issues 1.1 through 1.9 and is described in the subsequent sections of this document. As explained in Section 8.1.2, performance allocation establishes a basis for planning site characterization work. It requires that the planners set specially defined "performance measures," "goals," and "indications of desired confidence." The "goals" are not criteria that the site must meet; they simply serve as guidance for a detailed derivation of the site characterization data needed for use in licensing a repository. As new data and a fuller understanding of the site are acquired, a new planning basis may well become appropriate, and some of the performance allocation will be revised.

One reason for reallocating performance could arise from the evaluation of the conceptual models used in the original allocation. An objective of the site characterization program will be the validation of these models. If, during site characterization, the experimental results indicate that the conceptual models that have been used are not valid, the allocation of goals and confidences to certain performance measures will be reconsidered. In addition, the performance measures themselves may have to be changed.

A second reason for reallocating performance measures, goals, and confidences will arise if new data show that (1) the ranges of values for the physical parameters are different from the ranges that have been assumed to date and (2) the measured ranges do not allow the performance goals to be met with the desired confidences.

Since considerable conservatism has been used in the performance allocation, future reassignments of goals and desired confidences, if any, are not expected to drastically change the kinds of data to be sought in site characterization. As the design and site characterization processes continue, it could, however, become necessary to call for additional tests to

broaden the data base and ensure that predictions of values for performance measures are based on values characteristic of the entire site.

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.9, Containment by Waste Package

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.9 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.4: Will the waste package meet the performance objective for containment as required by 10 CFR 60.113?

Regulatory basis for the issue

The NRC regulations set a performance objective for the waste packages to provide containment of the high-level waste (HLW) during the period after closure of the repository when the temperatures and radiation levels are highest. The performance objective for containment (10 CFR 60.113 (a)(1)(ii)) is

> the engineered barrier system shall be designed, assuming anticipated processes and events, so that: (A) Containment of HLW within the waste packages will be substantially complete for a period to be determined by the Commission taking into account factors specified in 60.113(b) provided that such period shall not be less than 300 years nor more than 1,000 years after permanent closure of the geologic repository

For the purposes of this discussion, the waste package is defined as in 10 CFR 60.2 as

> the waste form and any containers, shielding, packing and other absorbent materials immediately surrounding an individual waste container.

Graphic representations of the spent fuel and high level waste glass containers are given in Figure 8.3.5.9-1. The design configurations for both vertical and horizontal emplacement are shown in Figure 8.3.5.9-2.

Technical interpretation

The DOE understands substantially complete containment to mean that the set of waste packages will fully contain the total radionuclide inventory for a period of 300 to 1,000 years following permanent repository closure, allowing for recognized technological limitations. Implementation of this understanding will be based solely on reliance on the waste package as the major component of the engineered barrier system. The container is the primary barrier of the multiple barrier system for the purpose of containment of radionuclides. The waste package will be designed to be resistant to the degrading effects of the repository environment under anticipated processes and events. Containment will be based on the ability of the waste package, by virtue of its intrinsic properties and design, to maintain a continuous, sealed barrier around the waste.

The DOE intends to design the waste packages to provide total containment of radionuclides for a period of 300 to 1,000 yr after permanent closure of the repository. In a practical sense, however, considering the large number of waste packages, the large area of the repository horizon, and the long time period involved, it is not possible to precisely predict or demonstrate the endurance of an individual waste package. It is also reasonable to expect that some small number of packages will prematurely lose containment. The DOE will develop and conduct a test program to collect the



BWR BOILING WATER REACTOR
PWR PRESSURIZED WATER REACTOR

Fig. 8.3.5.9-1 Spent fuel and high-level waste glass containers



Figure 8.3.5.9-2. Design configurations for vertical and horizontal emplacement.

necessary information that will enable the designers to select materials and design the waste packages in a manner that will reduce the incidence of failure during the containment period to a reasonable minimum.

The DOE expects that the performance of the waste package during the containment period will be best achieved by minimizing the residual uncertainties. The residual uncertainties in predicting performance are due to several factors: (1) the inherent limitations associated with manufacturing, handling, and emplacement operations, (2) the uncertainty in developing a complete understanding of the behavior of waste package materials, and (3) the uncertainty in predicting the future environment of each waste package. These factors are recognized in the NRC Staff Analysis of Public Comments on Proposed Rule 10 CFR Part 60 (NUREG-0804), where it is stated that

> the staff does not intend that the containment time requirement be achieved absolutely for all of the waste (i.e., absolute proof of zero release for 1,000 years is not required). It is expected that containment of the waste will be substantially complete, with release during the containment time limited to a small fraction of the inventory present. It is intended that the waste package design have a high reliability, taking into account anticipated processes and events that would affect package performance. It is realized that a small fraction of the approximately 100,000 packages will be breached before 1,000 years due to variations in materials manufacturing processes, etc., that can only be estimated using statistical procedures. Similarly, a significant fraction of the packages may remain intact for much longer than 1,000 years.

More specifically, these uncertainties can be divided into preclosure and postclosure considerations. During the preclosure repository operation, the DOE will manufacture waste packages in accordance with detailed design specifications. Waste packages will be loaded, sealed, inspected, and moved through the repository surface and subsurface facilities, and be emplaced into boreholes for final disposition, using detailed operating procedures. The DOE will have in place a quality assurance program, including quality control (QC) procedures, that will ensure that emplaced waste packages meet detailed material, fabrication, closure, surface finish, and handling specifications. Even with a fully qualified QC program, however, it cannot be ensured with absolute certainty that packages with undetected flaws will not be emplaced. Throughout the preclosure period, appropriate monitoring will be conducted as part of the performance confirmation program to ensure that the waste packages "are functioning as intended and anticipated."

During the postclosure period, the performance of any waste package cannot be accurately predicted over the long time period of the performance objective because of (1) the problems associated with demonstrating the mechanisms of all possible material degradation modes under the range of future environmental conditions and (2) the difficulties in extrapolating short-term experimental data to predict long-term performance. Therefore, it is the goal of the waste package program to provide for complete containment, allowing for only residual uncertainties. The DOE will minimize the uncertainties associated with the technical limitations for the postclosure period through a defense-in-depth concept. This concept introduces conservatism in

demonstrating waste package performance through bounding assumptions, using multiple barriers to limit container degradation and waste form releases, and evaluating alternative materials and designs.

Design objective

The DOE will design the waste packages to provide total containment of the enclosed waste for the containment period under the full range of anticipated repository conditions. In addition, the DOE will use design features of the waste package to ensure, for any waste packages that prematurely fail, that (1) a large fraction of the radioactivity will be contained within the set of waste packages for the duration of the containment period and (2) any radioactivity released from the ensemble of waste packages will be released at a very low rate, relative to the total inventory. The waste packages, therefore, will be designed to provide a reasonable expectation that, should any individual waste package fail at any time following permanent closure, releases of radioactivity from the engineered barrier system will occur at very low rates.

The DOE has developed a performance allocation process that is the basis for the testing program. The process is designed to reduce uncertainties in demonstrating waste package containment through a comprehensive in situ and laboratory testing program. The performance allocation process identifies the system elements that contribute to the demonstration of substantially complete containment and that provide assurance that releases of HLW occur at very low rates. These elements include the engineered environment, the waste containers, and the waste forms. The performance allocation process also establishes the sensitivity allowed in testing parameters and explains the needed evaluations and assessments to show that uncertainties are minimized. Finally, the process considers possible material or design alternatives that may be used to supplement or replace the reference design. These alternatives include selection of various container materials and the use of alternative designs such as inner liners to contain significant radioactive gases and diffusion barriers to limit the inflow of water and the egress of radionuclides. For the purposes of the test program, however, the duration of the containment period, the fraction of the radioactivity that can be retained within the set of waste packages, the number of waste packages that can be reasonably expected to provide total containment, and the rate of release from any failed waste packages during this period cannot be reasonably determined until the site is sufficiently characterized and additional information is available regarding the performance of waste packages subject to the conditions of the site.

Testing program

In recognition of the limitations and uncertainties that prevent achieving complete containment, design and materials testing activities have been developed to quantify the expected performance of the waste packages. In order to build a comprehensive testing program, the DOE has developed quantitative estimates of system performance as a first step in the testing, design, and performance assessment process. It is important to note that these estimates are tentative. Their sole purpose is to allocate importance

to each of the system elements and thus enable the DOE to develop an acceptable testing program. The detailed allocations to each of the system elements is discussed later in this section.

The technological limitations inherent in package fabrication, closure, and inspection are addressed in the process reliability assessments that will be conducted in support of resolving Issue 4.3 (Section 8.3.4.4).

Additional limitations associated with the repository handling and emplacement operations that may have an effect on subsequent containment performance are discussed in conjunction with Issues 1.11 (Section 8.3.2.2) and 4.4 (Section 8.3.2.5).

The waste package materials testing activities are designed to aid in evaluating the uncertainties in the behavior of the materials under anticipated repository conditions. Those activities associated with the container materials are discussed in this section. The waste form testing activities are described under Issue 1.5 (Section 8.3.5.10). Similarly, uncertainties will exist in the characterization of the near-field environment. The activities aimed at quantifying the remaining uncertainties are described under Issue 1.10 (Section 8.3.4.2).

Inherent in the resolution of the containment issue is the requirement to predict the performance of the waste packages over the entire duration of the containment period. This requirement will necessitate predictive models that cannot be fully validated and will therefore contain additional residual uncertainties. The models that support predictions of the container performance are discussed in this section. Waste form and overall waste package performance assessment models, including sensitivity analyses, are described under Issue 1.5 (Section 8.3.5.10)

Figure 8.3.5.9-3 shows the hierarchy of models to be developed and employed in resolution of the issues relating to design and performance of the waste packages. To avoid duplication in the SCP of description of the development of the numerical models and the testing activities that provide their bases, the discussion in this section is limited to the models and submodels that are highlighted in the figure. These are the models that supply the simulations of the performance of the containers. The various other models needed to complete the predictions for containment are described under Issues 1.5 (Section 8.3.5.10) and 1.10 (Section 8.3.4.2). The testing and design activities described in this section are tentative and are subject to change. Any such change will be reported in semiannual progress reports.

This issue, as stated, is restricted to assessing waste package performance under anticipated processes and events, and only for the period up to 1,000 yr following closure of the repository. This is based on a performance allocation approach described below. Figure 8.3.5.9-4 shows the performance allocation approach to resolving this issue. The performance measures and goals are shown in Table 8.3.5.9-1. However, the performance of the waste packages during the containment period is intimately linked to the performance required thereafter by the engineered barrier system in controlling radionuclide releases in Issue 1.5 (Section 8.3.5.10). The level of performance needed during the containment period to establish conditions that will



Figure 8.3.5.9-3. Model hierarchy for Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package).


ISSUE 1.4
WILL THE WASTE PACKAGE MEET THE PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE FOR CONTAINMENT AS REQUIRED BY 10 CFR 60.113?
OBJECTIVE: PROVIDE TOTAL CONTAINMENT OF THE ENCLOSED WASTE FOR THE CONTAINMENT PERIOD UNDER ANTICIPATED REPOSITORY CONDITIONS RECOGNIZING TECHNOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS AND RESIDUAL UNCERTAINTIES
REFERENCE APPROACH
EXPECTED CASE
BOUNDING CASE
LIQUID WATER CONTACTING WASTE
PERFORMANCE GOAL: 0 LITERS PER YEAR
METALLIC CONTAINER
(SEE FIGURE CAPTION NOTE.)
MAXIMUM FRACTION OF CONTAINERS FAILED IN ANY GIVEN YEAR
FOR t ≤ 100 yr: < 0.0001/yr
FOR 100 < t ≤ 300: < 0.0005/yr
FOR 300 < t ≤ 1,000: < 0.001/yr
THE POTENTIAL FRACTION OF TOTAL FAILURES WILL BE DETERMINED AS PART OF THE CONTAINER MATERIAL STUDIES AND WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH REGULATORY INTENT
DRY CONTAINERS
ENGINEERED ENVIRONMENT
WATER CHEMISTRY ACCEPTABLE FOR CONTAINER AND WASTE FORM PERFORMANCE
FRACTION OF BOREHOLES THAT WILL BE INITIALLY CONTACTED BY LIQUID WATER < 0.01 PER YEAR
FOR t ≤ 300yr
NO LIQUID WATER CONTACTING CONTAINER FOR 95% OF PACKAGES, < 5 LITERS PER PACKAGE PER YEAR FOR REMAINING 5%
FOR 300 < t ≤ 1,000 yr
NO LIQUID WATER CONTACTING CONTAINER FOR 90% OF PACKAGES, < 5 LITERS PER PACKAGE PER YEAR FOR REMAINING 10%
GAS RELEASE ONLY
NO LIQUID RELEASE
WASTE FORM
FOR t ≤ 100 yr
RAPID RELEASE FRACTION OF C-14 < 0.01
FRACTION OF CLADDINGS FAILED < 0.002
RELEASE FRACTION OF Kr-85 < 1.0
FOR 100 < t ≤ 300 yr
RAPID RELEASE FRACTION OF C-14 < 0.002
FRACTION OF CLADDINGS FAILED < 0.05
RELEASE FRACTION OF Kr-85 < 0.2
FOR 300 < t ≤ 1,000 yr
RAPID RELEASE FRACTION OF C-14 < 0.001
WET CONTAINERS
METALLIC CONTAINER
(SEE FIGURE CAPTION NOTE.)
FRACTION OF CONTAINERS FAILED
FOR t ≤ 300 yr: < 0.0005/yr
FOR 300 < t ≤ 1000: < 0.001/yr
THE POTENTIAL FRACTION OF TOTAL FAILURES WILL BE DETERMINED AS PART OF THE CONTAINER MATERIAL STUDIES AND WILL BE CONSISTENT WITH REGULATORY INTENT
t = NUMBER OF YEARS AFTER REPOSITORY CLOSURE
WASTE FORM
FOR t ≤ 100 yr
RAPID RELEASE FRACTION OF C-14 < 0.01
FRACTION OF CLADDINGS FAILED < 0.02
FRACTION OF Kr-85 AND SOLUBLE SPECIES RELEASABLE < 1.0
FRACTION OF ACTINIDES RELEASABLE < 1x10-4
FRACTION OF OTHER MATRIX RADIONUCLIDES RELEASABLE < 0.01
FOR 100 < t ≤ 300 yr
RAPID RELEASE FRACTION OF C-14 < 0.002
FRACTION OF CLADDINGS FAILED < 0.05
FRACTION OF Kr-85 AND SOLUBLE SPECIES RELEASABLE < 0.2
FRACTION OF ACTINIDES RELEASABLE < 0.001
FRACTION OF OTHER MATRIX RADIONUCLIDES RELEASABLE < 0.001
FOR 300 < t ≤1000 yr
RAPID RELEASE FRACTION OF C-14 < 0.001
FRACTION OF CLADDING FAILED < 0.5
FRACTION OF SOLUBLE SPECIES RELEASABLE < 0.03
FRACTION OF ACTINIDES RELEASABLE < 0.01
FRACTION OF OTHER MATRIX RADIONUCLIDES RELEASABLE < 0.01
8359-4.PM3/SCP/11-20-88

Figure 8.3.5.9-4. Reference approach for Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package). For metallic container failures, simply multiplying the fraction of failed container values by the time durations does not correctly estimate the total (cumulative) number of container failures that can be tolerated during the containment period (see page 8.3.5.9-25)

Table 8.3.5.9-1. Performance measures and goals for Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package)

System element	Performance measure	Tentative goal[a]	Needed confidence
Engineered environment[b]	Quantity of liquid water that can contact the container	For t ≤300: No liquid water contacting the container for 95% of packages, <5 L per package per year for the remaining 5%	High
		and	
		<1.0%/yr of the total number of emplacement hole walls will be initially contacted by liquid water	High
		For 300 < t ≤ 1000: No liquid water contacting the container for 90% of packages, <5 L per package per year for the remaining 10%	High
		and	
		<1.0%/yr of the total number of emplacement hole walls will be initially contacted by liquid water	High
	Quality of liquid water that can contact the container	Constrain water chemistry to acceptable levels for performance of container and waste form	High
	Rock-induced load on waste package	Load less than design basis (see Table 8.3.4.2-3)	High

Table 8.3.5.9-1. Performance measures and goals for Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package) (continued)

System element	Performance measure	Tentative goal[a]	Needed confidence
Container	Maximum fraction of containers that failed in any given year[c]	For containers with no liquid water contact:	
		For $t \leq 100$: < 0.0001/yr	High
		For $100 < t \leq 300$: < 0.0005/yr	High
		For $300 < t \leq 1{,}000$: < 0.001/yr	High
		For containers with liquid water contact:	
		For $t \leq 300$: < 0.0005/yr	High
		For $300 < t \leq 1{,}000$: < 0.001/yr	High
Waste form	Cumulative release of radionuclides from the ensemble of breached packages	For $t \leq 300$ yr: $<2.0 \times 10^{-2}$ of the total curie inventory of the ensemble of breached packages	High
		For $300 < t \leq 1000$: $<1 \times 10^{-2}$ of the total curie inventory of the ensemble of breached packages	High

[a]t = years after repository closure.
[b]Envelope for anticipated processes and events.
[c]Failure is defined as a breach allowing air flow of 1×10^{-4} atm-cm^3/s. A value for the limit of cumulative failures will be determined as part of the container material studies and will be consistent with regulatory intent.

provide the required release rate control thereafter may require different goals than those used to resolve this issue. Other issues need information on the performance of the containers for longer time periods and under both anticipated and lower probability scenarios. These other issues are as follows:

1. Issue 1.1: This system performance issue needs information on predicted time to loss of containment by the waste packages for times up to 10,000 yr after closure due to both anticipated and unanticipated processes and events.

2. Issue 1.5: This issue addresses the release rates of radionuclides from the engineered barrier system, assuming anticipated processes and events for 1,000 to 10,000 yr after closure. The condition of the waste forms and containers will affect those release rates.

3. Issue 1.9: This issue addresses the higher-level findings that support site selection. Calculations of predicted releases to the accessible environment for 100,000 yr are required. These calculations will use release rate information from the engineered barrier system that is affected by the condition of the containers.

These issues are addressed in Sections 8.3.5.13 (Issue 1.1), 8.3.5.10 (Issue 1.5), and 8.3.5.18 (Issue 1.9).

Approach to resolving the issue

To resolve this issue, the DOE will use the following approach to the development of the engineered barrier system:

1. Enhance the natural features of the unsaturated zone repository by engineering the local environment to conditions favorable to waste package integrity.

2. Evaluate waste package container design to provide a highly reliable sealed containment barrier around the waste for at least 1,000 yr over the full range of repository conditions.

3. Evaluate alternative design concepts and materials and select a final design based on a comparison of waste isolation capabilities and other relevant factors.

4. Execute a thorough testing, evaluation, and characterization program (following approved quality assurance procedures) to evaluate waste package designs and estimate their expected performance in the repository.

5. Fabricate and close waste package containers using detailed specifications and procedures including stringent quality controls, to ensure high reliability in postclosure performance.

6. Identify uncertainties that influence performance predictions through performance assessment, quantify or bound the uncertainties,

and then reduce them to a practical minimum through testing and performance confirmation.

7. Utilize the characteristics of the waste form in conjunction with the other engineered waste package components and the unsaturated zone environment to ensure that any releases that may occur during the containment period occur at low rates.

The DOE considers that the activities just outlined will result in an engineered barrier system design that, through its many complementary and redundant characteristics, will satisfy all the criteria of 10 CFR 60.113, and in doing so, will resolve this issue with a high degree of assurance.

Engineered environment enhancement

As discussed in Section 8.4.1.1, the unsaturated zone environment is naturally dry, and it is likely to remain that way for 10,000 yr and more. This is expected to be confirmed by site characterization. Moreover, the characteristics of the tuff rock in the repository horizon are such that movement of water occurs generally by matrix flow rather than by flow in fractures. Since most waste package degradation modes and waste transport modes depend upon the presence and movement of ground water in the vicinity of the waste, these features create a very favorable environment for waste disposal.

The DOE plans to incorporate several additional features into the engineered barrier design to further enhance the natural characteristics of the unsaturated zone environment:

1. Construction and operation of the repository will further "dry out" the repository host rock by entrainment of the moisture in the air moved through the repository by the ventilation system.

2. The decay heat produced by the high-level waste will be used by designing the arrangement of emplacement locations to raise the temperature of the host rock above the local boiling point of water and to maintain it above that point for hundreds of years for most of the waste packages.

3. Other features, such as an air gap between the host rock and the waste containers, may be used to further militate against the contact of water with the waste packages.

4. Precautions will be taken to minimize changes to the water quality that would be deleterious to postclosure performance. Performance parameters and goals for water quality are given in Table 8.3.5.9-2.

Activities and performance allocation related to these factors are discussed in Section 8.3.4.2 under Issue 1.10.

Table 8.3.5.9-2. Water quality performance parameters and goals for Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package) (page 1 of 2)

Performance measure	Performance parameter	Tentative goals[a]	Needed confidence	Current estimated range	Current confidence
Quality of liquid water that can contact the container	pH	5.5 to 9	High	6.1 to 7.7	Medium
	Cl^-	<20 ppm	High	<10 ppm	Medium
	F^-	<6 ppm	High	<5.4 ppm	Medium
	NO_3^-	<15 ppm	High	0 to 11 ppm	Medium
	SO_4^{2-}	<50 ppm	High	15 to 35 ppm	Medium
	CO_3^{2-}, HCO_3^-	<200 ppm	Medium	90 to 160 ppm	Medium
	Total anions	<220 ppm	Medium	110 to 160 ppm	Medium
	Organics	TBD[b]	TBD	NA[c]	NA
	Colloids	TBD	TBD	NA	NA
	O_2	0.1 to 8 ppm	High	<6.5 ppm	Medium
	NH_3	<1 ppm	High	<1 ppm	Low
	Si^{4+}	>20 ppm	High	20 to 550 ppm	Medium
	Na^+	<100 ppm	High	30 to 80 ppm	Medium
	K^+	<50 ppm	High	1 to 30 ppm	Medium
	Na/Ca	>1	High	>2	Medium

Table 8.3.5.9-2. Water quality performance parameters and goals for Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package) (page 2 of 2)

Performance measure	Performance parameter	Tentative goals[a]	Needed confidence	Current estimated range	Current confidence
	Total heavy metals[d]	<2 ppm	High	NA	Low
	Total other cations	<50 ppm	High	<30 ppm	Low

[a]Not all combination of the limits on the goals given will result in acceptable water chemistries; see Section 8.3.4.2.
[b]TBD = to be determined.
[c]NA = not available.
[d]Atomic number >Fe.

Sealed containment barrier

The DOE has established, as a design basis, that a sealed barrier, a container, will be maintained around the waste for 1,000 yr following repository closure. This sealed barrier will be designed to survive without breach over the full range of expected repository environmental conditions.

In practice, because of uncertainties associated with the long time spans and technological limitations, not all containers will remain unbreached for 1,000 yr. But the actual fraction of containers that may breach will be a small number. Much of the waste package testing program activities will be aimed at determining the actual number with high confidence, and reducing that number to the lowest practical level.

Alternative designs

To be consistent with the requirements (10 CFR 60.21(c)(1)(ii)(D)), the DOE will evaluate alternative waste package and engineered barrier system designs, including material selections. Each design will provide a highly reliable containment barrier over the full range of repository conditions. Comparative evaluations of alternatives will be made at various points in the development process, with selections being made among them based on their relative waste isolation capabilities and other relevant factors. It is intended that these alternative designs will enhance the capability of waste isolation by reducing the sensitivity to residual uncertainties in the service environment.

Testing program

Performance is allocated to the container, waste form, and engineered environment as part of an overall strategy to ensure compliance with the substantially complete containment requirement. However, the emphasis on providing containment is placed on the waste container. The testing program under Issue 1.4 involves both literature and laboratory studies directed at bounding the uncertainties on container performance. As described earlier, these uncertainties include (1) preemplacement limitations, such as fabrication and handling, (2) the inability to definitively quantify waste package material performance, and (3) uncertainties in the near-field environment surrounding each waste package. The conceptual design of the waste package is based on the current understanding of the anticipated repository conditions (see Chapter 7). The test program is part of the iterative test, assessment, and design process that may be modified as more and better information is obtained during site characterization. As part of the development of detailed plans for testing, the DOE will determine a statistical basis for the number and types of tests conducted under appropriate activities to the extent practical. Information from other areas of investigation, such as Issues 1.5 (Section 8.3.5.10), 1.10 (Section 8.3.4.2), 2.6 (Section 8.3.4.3), and 4.3 (Section 8.3.4.4), will all be considered in the final waste package design. A full appreciation of the design process can only be gained by understanding all waste package performance and design issues. In addition, analyzed data from Issue 1.4 will be used to resolve other issues, including Issue 1.1 (Section 8.3.5.13), which will demonstrate total system performance over 10,000 yr, and Issue 1.5, the gradual release requirement of 10 CFR 60.113.

The current reference container design is based on a corrosion-resistant container fabricated from one of six possible metals, three iron-based or high-nickel austenitic alloys, and three copper or copper alloys. In addition, alternative materials and concepts are being evaluated, including other metal systems, ceramics, coatings, and fillers. Because of the possible range in the postemplacement repository environment and the preemplacement (fabrication, assembly, and handling) conditions affecting postemplacement processes, it is important to fully understand those features of the waste package container affecting performance. The mechanical, physical, and microstructural properties of the container base metal, welded materials, and exposed surfaces will be described. General and localized corrosion will also be evaluated. These results will aid in the understanding of the performance of the as-emplaced container and will be important inputs for the container material selection process, along with the characterization of the likely modes of container breach, and the modeling of container performance. These models will be used to assess (1) the rate of container degradation in the repository environment, under both anticipated and unanticipated processes and events, and (2) the failure rate of the containers over time, using both deterministic and probabilistic approaches.

The results of this work will be used to determine compliance with the substantially complete containment requirement and as input into the activities addressing gradual releases of radionuclides over 10,000 yr under Issue 1.5. Analyses will be conducted in order to understand and reduce the uncertainties associated with different waste package designs. Also, the DOE believes that releases from any failed containers will occur at a very low rate and, therefore, will meet the substantially complete containment requirement. To address this, the DOE will combine the results of studies, from Issue 1.5, that will predict the performance of the spent fuel and glass waste forms over all times up to 10,000 yr, with information from Issue 1.4, which emphasizes container performance.

Waste package design and fabrication program

The objective of the waste package design and fabrication program is to provide waste package containers of high quality that can be fabricated, closed, and inspected using available and accepted practices. This program includes the following activities: parametric studies to aid material selection, evaluation and selection of manufacturing processes, setting appropriate specifications for these materials and processes, and developing inspection techniques. These activities will be conducted under a sound quality control program. Other activities include fabricating full-scale prototypes and designing and implementing a program for monitoring the performance of representative waste packages during the repository preclosure period as a part of the performance confirmation program. Thermal parametric studies will also be conducted to evaluate the effects of variations in thermal properties, emplacement configuration, and heat transfer characteristics on waste form, container, and near-field rock temperatures. These studies will provide a basis for designs that are consistent with the postclosure containment strategy.

The container fabrication process development consists of multiyear multiphase activities to assess alternatives and to recommend and demonstrate a method for fabrication of containers through production of full-scale

prototypes. The container final closure development activity also involves a multiyear effort to recommend and demonstrate joining methods. Emphasis will be placed on a simple, reliable, maintainable system that (1) will provide the required throughput to support the projected disposal container production schedule, (2) is capable of operation in the repository hot-cell, and (3) will produce a defect-free closure that has a microstructure suitable for nondestructive evaluation (NDE).

Ultrasonic and dye penetrant techniques have been tentatively selected for NDE of the metallic container final closure. Similar techniques will be selected for alternates as appropriate. Techniques, such as mechanical testing or metallographic inspection, are destructive in nature and will be used on statistically sampled containers at the point of manufacture. Others, such as ultrasonic inspection for defects, are nondestructive and will be comprehensively performed on all the waste packages.

Container materials and prototypes will be procured for testing activities in accordance with detailed specifications. To ensure a high level of quality, materials and prototype container evaluations will include mechanical properties, chemical composition, microstructures, surface finish and cleanliness, closure quality, structural integrity, and physical dimensions. Other measurements may be required as the waste package designs evolve.

Provision will be made for transfer and rework or repackaging of the contents of completed packages that fail final inspection. Containers suspected of being damaged in handling at the repository after final inspection is completed would be reinspected and, if appropriate, disassembled, and the contents would be transferred to new containers.

These activities will ensure that the final products will perform as intended and serve their function to contain the radionuclides during the containment period.

Assessment and reduction of uncertainties

The stated containment performance goal, in effect, is that containment will be total, recognizing practical technological limitations. This goal requires (1) the calculation of the degree of containment, (2) the identification of sources of uncertainties, and (3) the quantification, to the extent practicable, of the contributions of each source of uncertainty to the overall uncertainty. In addition, once the contributing sources of uncertainty have been evaluated, the site characterization and experimental programs need to be reevaluated to determine what can reasonably be done to reduce those significant sources of uncertainties.

One methodology for analytically addressing containment is reliability analysis. This methodology has been suggested as an acceptable approach for addressing the regulatory containment requirement by the NRC staff in their "Generic Technical Position on Waste Package Reliability Analysis" (NRC, 1985). Reliability is the probability that a system or component, when operating under stated environmental conditions, will perform its intended function adequately for a specified interval of time. The NRC staff is, therefore, suggesting a probabilistic approach be taken to address the

deterministic containment requirement. In Chapter 7 of this SCP, the DOE stated its intent to use an appropriate reliability analysis approach.

The analysis of uncertainty supporting the determination of waste package reliability will follow a systematic approach as recommended in the conclusions of the Nuclear Energy Agency's workshop on uncertainty analysis (NEA, 1987). This means that the analysis of reliability, in terms of predicting containment time and evaluating the uncertainty in that prediction, will include the following aspects:

1. Combining deterministic modeling, probabilistic analyses, and uncertainty analyses to determine waste package reliability.

2. Using combinations of quantitative methods, recognizing the uses and limitations of each method and its results.

3. Minimizing the use of nonquantitative uncertainty analysis methods.

4. Using sensitivity analyses to identify important sources of uncertainty in parameters.

5. Treating correlations between parameters as part of the uncertainty analysis.

6. Systematically documenting and properly identifying the input data and process used to create subjective probability density functions describing parameter uncertainty.

7. Using quality assurance procedures to document and verify codes and to validate models to the extent practicable, taking into account their use and relative importance in demonstrating regulatory compliance.

In terms of minimizing uncertainties, combining uncertainty and sensitivity analyses appropriately will allow the modeling effort to feed information back to the design and testing effort regarding priorities in reducing those uncertainties that can be experimentally addressed. The iterative nature of this issue resolution strategy becomes evident in the identification of those sources of important uncertainties that may be amenable to reduction through experimental or design changes. It is expected that, at the time of licensing, this iterative approach will have determined that the preferred waste package design will meet the established performance goals. Given the ongoing in situ testing program that can help define expected conditions more closely, and the ongoing performance confirmation program with its continuing monitoring and testing, it would be expected that the uncertainties in the application for a license amendment for final closure of the repository would present waste-package containment-performance estimates with significantly reduced uncertainties.

Tentative goals for releases from the waste packages

As noted earlier, despite the best efforts during design, fabrication, handling, and emplacement, a small number of containers may be expected to breach during the containment period. Thus, a demonstration of substantially

complete containment must inevitably address possible releases during the containment period, as well as possible alterations of the waste form that may have an effect on subsequent releases after the containment period.

In 10 CFR Part 60, the NRC requires that any releases from the engineered barrier system be at a low rate. However, the NRC provided a numerical criterion only for releases following the end of the containment period. From the requirement for substantially complete containment, it is clear that the NRC intended that releases during the containment period also be low.

The DOE considers it appropriate to require that releases of isotopes with long half-lives from the waste packages be controlled at a stricter standard during the containment period than during the post-containment period. Thus, to guide the testing program, the DOE has established the tentative criterion that release of these isotopes from the waste packages will be controlled such that their annual rates of release are each less than 1 part in 1,000,000 for those isotopes present in sufficient quantity in the 1,000-yr inventory. The isotopes for which this criterion applies are listed in Table 8.3.5.10-3b. In establishing the requirement for substantially complete containment for 300 to 1,000 yr, the NRC indicated that this was intended to provide a period of greater isolation when concentrations of fission products were at their highest levels. However, no specific quantitative guidance was provided for releases during the containment period. Consistent with public health safety requirements, the DOE has tentatively elected to limit releases of all other radioactive isotopes to an annual release rate of less than 1 part in 100,000 of the current inventory of that isotope in the ensemble of all the waste packages. The performance parameters related to this performance measure on the waste form are given in Table 8.3.5.9-3.

Performance allocation

Performance is allocated to the engineered environment to provide a situation favorable to the performance of both the container and the waste form. The reference approach includes branches for both the expected case, in which no water contacts the container, and a bounding case, in which increasingly more containers could be exposed to an increasing but still limited amount of water with time. The in situ conditions provide a host rock only partially saturated with water and at atmospheric pressure, and a very low downward flux of water. These conditions are expected to apply over the range of all anticipated processes and events. For these conditions, the thermal field developed by the waste package thermal loading and the repository emplacement configuration will raise the temperature of the near-field rock above the boiling point, drying it out, and retarding the return of liquid water. Because of this combination of natural and engineered features, performance goals are set for the amount of liquid water per year that can contact the container, for the rate at which conditions permitting liquid water to contact packages is established, and for the chemical quality of the water. After cooling below the boiling point, most waste packages are not expected to be exposed to liquid water because of the limited water flux available in the host rock, the heat generation from the packages, and the air gap over most of the interface between the packages and the host rock.

Table 8.3.5.9-3. Waste form performance parameters and goals for Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package) (page 1 of 3)

Performance measure	Performance parameter	Tentative goals	Needed confidence	Current estimated range	Current confidence
		GLASS WASTE FORM			
Release rate from the ensemble of breached packages	Annual fraction of the radionuclide inventory in effluent solution from failed containers	For $t \leq 300$ yr: $<2 \times 10^{-4}$ per yr	High	$<1.0 \times 10^{-4}$ per yr	Medium
		For $300 < t \leq 1{,}000$ yr: $<1 \times 10^{-4}$ per yr	High	$<1.0 \times 10^{-5}$ per yr	Medium
		SPENT FUEL WASTE FORM			
	Fraction of cladding failed in failed containers[a]	For $t \leq 100$ yr: <0.02 failed	High	0.001 to 0.02	Medium
		For $100 < t \leq 300$; <0.05 failed overall	High	0.001 to 0.10	Medium
		<0.02 failed while dry	High	0.001 to 0.10	Low
		For $300 < t \leq 1{,}000$: <0.5 failed overall	High	0.1 to <0.9	Low

Table 8.3.5.9-3. Waste form performance parameters and goals for Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package) (page 2 of 3)

Performance measure	Performance parameter	Tentative goals	Needed confidence	Current estimated range	Current confidence
		SPENT FUEL WASTE FORM (continued)			
	Fraction of cladding failed in failed containers[a] (continued)	<0.02 failed while dry	High	0.001 to 0.10	Low
	Fraction of total inventory of gap and grain boundary elements available for rapid release from unoxidized fuel[b]	<0.02	High	0.005 to 0.04	Medium
	Fraction of C-14 inventory available for rapid release as a gas	<0.01	High	0.002 to 0.02	Low
	Solubility of U, Pu, and Am	For $t \leq 300$: $<2 \times 10^{-4}$ of a package inventory of these elements per L of water	High	$<1 \times 10^{-6}$ per L	High

Table 8.3.5.9-3. Waste form performance parameters and goals for Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package) (page 3 of 3)

Performance measure	Performance parameter	Tentative goals	Needed confidence	Current estimated range	Current confidence
		SPENT FUEL WASTE FORM (continued)			
	Solubility of U, Pu, and Am (continued)	For $300 < t \leq 1{,}000$: $<5 \times 10^{-4}$ of a package inventory of these elements per L of water	High	$<1 \times 10^{-4}$ per L	High
	Fractional release from failed containers of all other radionuclides not in the rapidly released gap and grain boundary inventory	For $t \leq 300$: $<2 \times 10^{-2}$	High	$<10^{-2}$	Medium
		For $300 < t \leq 1{,}000$: $<1 \times 10^{-2}$	High	$<10^{-3}$	Medium

[a]Numerical definition of cladding failure is to be determined.

[b]Fraction of total inventory of gap and grain boundary elements available for rapid release from oxidized fuel will depend on the degree of oxidation and other fuel conditions. For the purpose of the performance allocation a conservative value of 1.0 is used.

To provide bounding assumptions to control performance allocation to other system elements, bounding values of 5 L of water per package per year contacting 5 percent of the packages during the first 300 yr after closure, and 5 L of water per package per yr contacting 10 percent of the waste packages for the period from 300 to 1,000 yr after closure is assumed. This goal is consistent with that set in Issue 1.10 (Section 8.3.4.2), where the basis for selecting the goal and the performance parameters and model inputs that will be used to achieve this goal are discussed in more detail. A characterization goal is set for the mode of water flow into the borehole, to ensure that processes connected with fracture flow and concentration of the salts carried in low concentrations by the ground water do not upset the simple bounding process described (see discussion of the design envelope in Section 8.3.4.2). Performance is allocated to limit the rock-induced load to an amount accommodated by the waste package design. The loads may arise from block movement due to the rock responding to gravitational forces and the thermal cycle.

Performance is allocated to the waste package container to meet the design objectives. The containers will be designed with a design life goal that is consistent with the duration of the containment period. However, it is recognized that some preclosure container breaches will escape detection and that a very small fraction of containers will breach during the containment period. These breaches may not constitute failure since failure is defined as a breach large enough to allow significant air flow (1×10^{-4} atm-cm^3/s) into the container. The values given in Table 8.3.5.9-1 represent those that are conservative compared with those that are presently attainable given today's state of technology. This test is a general standard accepted by the nuclear industry.

Performance is allocated to the waste form, including the cladding of spent fuel, to aid in retaining radioactivity inside the waste packages and limiting radioactivity release rate from the engineered barrier system. Glass waste forms can release radionuclides only through alteration and transport by liquid water. The glass waste form, when exposed in failed packages, is allocated performance limiting the rate of release from the failed package; this rate is less stringent than the performance goal set (in Issue 1.5) for the controlled release period and is expected to be achieved.

Spent fuel has several potential modes of waste release; hence, performance parameter goals have to be set to limit the fractions of the total radioactivity available for these release modes to meet the waste form performance goal. The performance allocations change over time since the proportions of different radionuclides in the total inventory change over time. The fuel cladding is also allocated performance for several purposes. During the first 100 yr after closure, when there is still a significant amount of Kr-85 gas in the spent fuel, the intact cladding can help contain this nuclide. During the first 300 yr after closure, the fraction of intact cladding under liquid exposure conditions can help limit the release rate of Cs-137 and Sr-90, the major components of the radioactivity inventory during that period. For time periods when the fuel is still hot enough to oxidize appreciably if exposed to air (this temperature range is well above the boiling point of water), the intact cladding can prevent exposure of the fuel

matrix to air. The performance assigned to the cladding while still dry is improved by the absence of liquid-based corrosion modes.

The reasons these performance measures and their goal values were selected can be clarified by examining the strategy for satisfying the substantially complete containment requirement of this issue.

The design objective, limiting the rate of radioactivity release from the waste package, relies on performance allocated to the engineered environment, the waste package container, and the waste form. The performance allocation differs for three time periods during the first 1,000 yr of the postclosure period as the proportions of radionuclides of different types change, the environmental conditions change, and the container and fuel cladding are exposed for longer times to potential failure modes. The specific performance allocations for the three time periods are discussed in detail below.

The bounding values for many of the parameters discussed in this and the following sections are not expected to occur. Insufficient information is available to select more realistic values at this time, but it is expected that data gathered during the site characterization program and by the testing programs on performance of waste forms and container materials will provide the basis for determining the bounds for anticipated processes and events.

Rationale for division of the containment period into segments. As noted in the preceding sections, the up to 1,000-yr containment period will be one of continuously changing environmental conditions and rapidly changing radionuclide inventory. One of the most significant environmental aspects of this period will be an early high temperature peak during the first 100 yr after emplacement of the waste, followed by a much more gradual decline in temperature. The types and quantities of radionuclides that contribute to the total radioactivity also undergo major changes during this period, with early times dominated by relatively short-lived fission products and the late times dominated by long-lived actinides. Because the environmental conditions play a large role in determining the performance of the various components of the waste package, and the changing makeup of the radionuclide inventory imposes different demands on the containment barriers as a function of time, the containment period has been divided into three subperiods: 0 to 100-yr postclosure; 100- to 300-yr postclosure; and 300- to 1,000-yr postclosure. The rationale for selecting these divisions and the performance allocated to key system elements during each subperiod are discussed below. This is followed in subsequent sections by more detailed discussions of the performance allocated to each system element and the justification for the goals set for these allocations.

The reference performance allocation case given in Table 8.3.5.9-1 and Figure 8.3.5.9-4 uses bounding conditions based on the present understanding of the repository emplacement environment, the expected performance of the waste forms in that environment, and the data available on the performance of metals in similar environments. In setting the performance goals, allowance has been made for the uncertainties in the site and materials properties data.

Section 8.3.4.2 describes activities to establish the waste package environment. In order to establish the performance allocations discussed herein, certain assumptions about the repository environment were made based on current understanding of the site. The "expected case" describes the environment that would exist if site characterization activities confirm this understanding. The "bounding case" is believed to approximate the most limiting, adverse conditions that are consistent with the repository horizon remaining in the unsaturated zone. The bounding case will be used as the initial design basis.

The DOE intends to design, produce, and emplace the waste packages to ensure that only a small number of containers will fail during the containment period, and recognizes that a very low average failure rate (with many years of zero failures) will be necessary to achieve this. The "maximum failures in any given year" shown in Figure 8.3.5.9-4 and Table 8.3.5.9-1 are not related to this average failure rate. Instead, they are intended to limit spike releases for atypically grouped failures, which would not be repeated on an ongoing basis. These values represent the maximum allowable container failure rates in any given year based on "rapid release" fractions of some radionuclides, which may occur without exceeding the release rate goals assumed above for the containment period. It is not correct to simply multiply these values by the time durations listed to derive an estimate of the total (cumulative) number of container failures that can be tolerated during the containment period. Additional studies will be conducted to establish a bounding value for the cumulative number of container failures allowable. Alternative designs will be evaluated with the selection made on the basis of their relative waste isolation capabilities, and other relevant factors.

0- to 100-yr postclosure. During this time period, the waste packages and near-field rock will experience the highest temperatures achieved during the postclosure period. The temperature of the borehole wall is expected to be well in excess of the boiling point of water for a large majority of packages. The effect of this thermal pulse in the environment will be to dry out the surrounding rock and thus preclude the possibility of liquid water contacting the majority of the waste packages. In the absence of liquid water, there are few credible mechanisms for producing failure of the containers and no mechanisms for the release of radionuclides other than those that can exist in a gas phase.

The thermal pulse is a direct result of the high radioactivity of the waste during this period. The dominant contribution to the total radioactivity comes from the nuclides Cs-137, Sr-90, and their very short-lived daughter products, Ba-137m and Y-90. These four nuclides alone account for about 85 percent of the total activity at the start of this period, declining to about 50 percent of the total by 100 yr after closure. Cesium and, to a lesser extent, strontium can migrate during reactor operation to grain boundaries and the pellet-cladding gap in the fuel where they are readily accessible for release when contacted by water. Less than 2 percent of the inventory of those readily soluble "gap and grain boundary" elements is expected to be in this form in unoxidized fuel.

The fuel in pins with failed cladding within failed containers will be contacted by oxygen in the repository air. Because of the high temperatures

expected during this period, such conditions may result in the oxidation of the UO_2 fuel to higher oxidation states. This has two effects: (1) to increase the fraction of gap and grain boundary elements (i.e, cesium and strontium) that is available for subsequent rapid release in water and (2) to allow all the Kr-85 inventory in such oxidized fuel to be released rapidly as a gas. Fuel that might oxidize in the first 100 yr but does not contact water is assumed to have its entire inventory of gap and grain boundary elements available for rapid release at some later time. The conditions under which the gap and grain boundary elements can be released (conditions under which liquid water can enter a waste package, contact the waste form, and then exit) and the conditions under which the fuel can oxidize are mutually exclusive; if liquid water can contact the waste form, it will be too cold to oxidize the fuel significantly. Nevertheless, oxidation of the fuel early in the history of the repository will affect the performance of the spent fuel waste form at later times by increasing the size of the gap and grain boundary inventory of readily soluble elements like cesium, iodine, and technetium.

In addition, during this period, there are significant quantities of the radionuclides Kr-85 and H-3 (approximately 300 and 40 parts in 100,000 of the total inventory, respectively) present in the spent fuel waste form. In unoxidized spent fuel, about 1 to 2 percent of the Kr-85 may be present in the pellet-cladding gap as a gas and is available for immediate release without the mediation of liquid water. H-3 is thought to be fixed by the cladding and is unavailable for rapid gaseous release.

The requirements driving the performance goals set for the first 100 yr after closure are as follows:

1. Limit the quantity of fuel that can oxidize during this period to 2 percent of the total inventory of the failed containers.

2. Control the annual release of Cs-137, Sr-90, and their daughter products (as well as other gap and grain boundary elements).

3. Control the annual release of gaseous radionuclides (e.g., Kr-85).

The first requirement is met by the number of allowed cladding failures (less than 2 percent).

The second of these requirements is met by the combination of the goals for allowed container failure rates (0.0005 per yr), limited water availability (less than 5 percent of the packages being wet), number of cladding failures, and the total number of packages allowed to be initially contacted by liquid water in a single year (less than 1 percent per year). The need to control the release of the remaining fraction of these elements that is in the UO_2 matrix rather than in the rapidly released gap and grain boundary inventory requires that an additional goal for the fractional release for elements in the matrix be set at 2×10^{-2}. It is believed that this is achievable.

The final requirement is met by a combination of the allowed number of container failures per year, allowed number of cladding failures, limited quantity of Kr-85 available for rapid release from unoxidized fuel (less than

2 percent), and the first requirement to limit the amount of fuel that can oxidize.

From the foregoing, it can be seen that the container and the cladding are important both in limiting radionuclide releases and in preventing oxidation of the fuel during this period.

100- to 300-yr postclosure. The environmental conditions in the period 100 to 300 yr after closure are expected to be characterized by borehole temperatures considerably lower than in the first 100 yr, though still well in excess of the boiling temperature of liquid water for most of the packages. As in the first 100 yr, this will preclude the possibility of liquid water contacting the majority of the waste packages.

By 100 yr after closure, the inventory of Kr-85 will have decayed to an insignificant level and the inventory of gap and grain boundary radionuclides will have decayed to 50 percent of the total activity. By 300 yr, these elements will contribute less than 5 percent to the total radioactivity. The percentage of the inventory accounted for by the actinides rises from approximately 50 percent at year 100 to more than 95 percent at year 300, with approximately 90 percent of the total activity due to isotopes of americium and plutonium alone.

As in the first 100 yr, fuel exposed to the repository air has the potential to oxidize and redistribute radionuclides to locations where they are readily accessible for rapid release upon contact with water. Though the oxidation would proceed more slowly because of the lower temperatures, fuel exposed to air during this period may oxidize on a time scale of tens to hundreds of years. Thus, the cladding and containers must continue to protect the majority of the fuel from oxidation to avoid increasing the fraction of gap and grain boundary elements available for rapid release.

Because of the rapidly changing radionuclide inventory during this period, the requirements of containment are different at the start of the period than at the end. The requirements driving the performance goals set for this period can be summarized as follows:

1. Limit the quantity of fuel that can oxidize to less than 2 percent of the total inventory in the failed containers.

2. Limit the annual release of gap and grain boundary elements early in this period.

3. Limit the annual release of actinides, specifically plutonium and americium.

The first requirement is met by the number of cladding failures allowed to occur while the fuel is dry and therefore hot enough to oxidize significantly (less than 2 percent).

The second requirement is met by the combination of the goals for allowed container failures, limited quantity of water (less than 5 percent of the packages being wet), number of total cladding failures (less than 1 percent), and the total number of packages that are initially contacted by

liquid water in a single year (less than 1 percent). Note that overall, a goal of 5 percent failed cladding is set but only 2 percent of the cladding is allowed to fail while dry. This reflects the fact that once the waste has cooled sufficiently to allow liquid water to contact it, the cladding has fulfilled its primary function of preventing oxidation of the UO_2. Since the inventory of gap and grain boundary elements decays to a minor fraction of the total inventory during this period, the cladding is not as important in controlling the rapid release of these elements as it is in the first 100 yr after closure.

The release of the fraction of gap and grain boundary elements that are actually in the UO_2 matrix is controlled by the goal of a fractional release of 1×10^{-3} in addition to the goals for container failure, cladding failure, and water availability. It is believed that this is achievable.

The third requirement, control of the release of actinides, is met by the combination of goals for allowed container failures, the limited quantity of water, and the low solubility of these elements in ground water of the expected composition.

300- to 1,000-yr postclosure. The environmental conditions during the years 300 through 1,000 after closure are expected to be characterized by slow cooling of the repository. A substantial fraction of the waste packages are expected to remain above the boiling point of water throughout this period. Though the expected conditions are that no liquid water will contact any of the waste packages, a goal is set that allows a limited quantity of water (no liquid water contacting the container for 90 percent of the packages, and less than 5 L per package per year for remaining 10 percent of the packages) to contact all the packages in the repository in a time-distributed manner.

The radionuclide inventory of the waste at 300 yr after closure is dominated by the actinides, which account for about 95 percent of the total radioactivity. At 1,000 yr after closure, the total inventory is one-half that at 300 yr. The contribution of americium and plutonium isotopes to the total rises from about 93 percent at 300 yr to about 97 percent at 1,000 yr. By 300 yr after closure, the makeup of the dominant radionuclides in the gap and grain boundary inventory has changed significantly from earlier times; the contribution of Tc-99 to the fraction available for rapid release is comparable to that of cesium and strontium at 300 yr, and becomes the dominant radioactivity in this fraction by 1,000 yr at which time it comprises about 750 parts in 100,000 of the total inventory.

Fuel temperatures are expected to drop to values at which oxidation of UO_2 proceeds quite slowly. Nevertheless, significant oxidation may occur in fuel that experiences cladding failure at temperatures well above the boiling point of water during this 700-yr period.

Unlike the other radionuclides present in significant quantity between 300 and 1,000 yr after closure, C-14 can be released as a $^{14}CO_2$ gas without requiring liquid water to contact the waste. The available data, however, indicate that less than 1 percent of the C-14 inventory is readily available for rapid release in this manner at elevated temperatures, and smaller releases are expected at lower temperatures.

The requirements driving the performance goal set for this period can be summarized as follows:

1. Limit the annual release of actinides, particularly americium and plutonium.

2. Limit the annual release of gap and grain boundary elements (e.g., Tc).

3. Limit the annual release of C-14 as $^{14}CO_2$.

4. Limit the amount of oxidized fuel to less than 2 percent of the total amount of fuel.

The first requirement is met by a combination of the goal for container failure (less than 0.1 percent per year), the goal for the quantity of water that is allowed to contact a waste package (less than 5 L per year), and the low solubility of these elements in ground water of the expected pH and composition.

The second requirement is met by a combination of the goal for container failure, the goal for the fraction of these elements available for rapid release from unoxidized fuel, the number of packages initially contacted by liquid water, and the limit on the amount of oxidized fuel given in the fourth requirement. Release of the fraction of these elements not located in the pellet-cladding gap or on grain boundaries is controlled by the goal of less than 1×10^{-2} fractional release for the gap and grain boundary elements that are located in the UO_2 matrix and the above noted goals. It is believed that this achievable.

The third requirement is met by the combined goals for container failure and the quantity of C-14 that is available for rapid gaseous release.

The final requirement is met, as in previous time periods, by the goal for the fraction of cladding that is allowed to fail at high temperature (dry).

Performance parameter goals for the containment period. The following sections present more details on the performance allocated to each system element and the justification for the goals set for these allocations. In instances where the supporting information or activities for an allocation are drawn from another issue, that information is not repeated here. Instead, a brief summary of that material is given together with a reference to the appropriate section of the SCP.

Performance parameters goals for the engineered environment. As indicated in Table 8.3.5.9-1, performance measures and goals are set for both the quantity and quality of water than can contact a waste package during the containment period. Performance parameters and goals for water quality are given in Table 8.3.5.9-2.

The quantity of water that contacts a waste package will affect the degradation rates of both the container and the spent fuel cladding. In addition, with the exception of Kr-85 and C-14, significant release of

radionuclides from a package requires the mediation of liquid water. The expected case under anticipated conditions is that no liquid water will contact the waste packages during the entire containment period and beyond. Nevertheless, the goal for the quality of water that can contact a waste package is set to be none for 95 percent of the packages and less than 5 L per package per year for the remaining 5 percent of the packages during the first 300 yr after closure. The corresponding goal for years 300 to 1,000 after closure is less than 5 L per package per year for 10 percent of the packages and no water for the remaining 90 percent. These goals parallel those set in Issue 1.10, waste package characteristics (postclosure) (see discussion of design envelope in Section 8.3.4.2), where the basis for selecting the goal and the parameters and models that will be used to demonstrate that the goal has been met are discussed in more detail.

In addition to goals for the total quantity of water that can contact the waste packages, goals have been set for the rate at which the ensemble of packages is initially contacted by liquid water. As stated in Table 8.3.5.9-1, the goal for this process is to allow no more than 1 percent of all the emplacement hole walls in the repository to fall below the boiling temperature of water in a single year, subject to the restrictions on the total number of packages allowed to be contacted by water at a given time. This goal is selected in order to spread out in time the potential release of the readily soluble, gap and grain boundary radionuclides. The assumption that release of radioactivity from a failed container via aqueous transport could occur as soon as the package falls below the boiling point is extremely conservative. This assumption does not consider the fact that though the borehole wall might be below the boiling point, the container and the waste within the container might not necessarily be below the boiling point. Thus, even though liquid water might exist at the borehole wall, it is not necessarily available to contact or enter the container. In addition, any water that enters the container might be vaporized and would then not be available for liquid transport of radioactivity. Further, once the temperature of the waste falls below the boiling point, it might take a considerable amount of time for water to accumulate within a container to the level of the breach. Alternatively, if the breach is in a position to allow immediate drainage, the water would have limited contact time with the waste.

The chemistry of the water that can contact either the container or the waste can have a large effect on the performance of these materials. For instance, as is discussed in a later section, the corrosion behavior of the austenitic alloys under consideration is sensitive to the chloride content of the water with which they come in contact. Thus, goals are set for the composition of the water contacting the waste packages so that the water will be similar to that currently thought to exist within the undisturbed environment in the unsaturated Tonopah Spring tuff at Yucca Mountain. The detailed constraints are given in Table 8.3.5.9-2, and the characterization goals for water chemistry to be achieved during site characterization are given in Issue 1.10 (Section 8.3.4.2). Section 8.3.4.2 also provides the rationale for the selection of the goals listed in Table 8.3.5.9-2. The test and analyses to provide for the characterization of the water will be done under Characterization Program 8.3.1.3 (geochemistry) and Design Issue 1.10 (Section 8.3.4.2) and are not repeated here.

The method by which water is delivered to a waste package can affect both the corrosion rate and mechanism. Water that drips from a fracture onto a hot container surface might evaporate, leaving behind a residue of salts. These salts might accumulate and be dissolved in a later water flow, thereby creating small volumes of solutions with higher ionic strength than that given in Table 8.3.5.9-2 and discussed in the preceding paragraph. A characterization goal for the water flow mechanism has thus been set to determine whether dripping of water from fractures is likely under anticipated conditions. If it is likely, then the fraction of waste packages for which it will occur will be estimated. The activities dealing with this flow mechanism are described in Issue 1.10 (Section 8.3.4.2.4.3).

Performance parameter goals for the waste forms. As indicated in Table 8.3.5.9-1, a performance measure and goal has been set for the waste form during the containment period. The performance parameters and goals for this measure are given in Table 8.3.5.9-3.

The performance measure is based on the design objective of controlling the release of radionuclides from the ensemble of waste packages during the containment period to a small fraction of the radionuclide inventory present. The goal for the measure is expressed in terms of the allowed release from the ensemble of failed waste packages for the periods 0 to 300 yr and 300 to 1,000 yr after closure. The different numerical goals for these two periods reflect the increasing uncertainty in predicting the number of failed containers and the changing environmental conditions as a function of time.

Because of the difference in behavior of the glass and spent fuel waste forms, different performance parameters are assigned to them (Table 8.3.5.9-3). Because only one mechanism exists for release from the glass waste form (aqueous dissolution of the waste glass), only one parameter is given for the glass waste form: the fraction of the inventory of a glass-containing waste package in the effluent from such a package per year. A larger number of parameters are assigned to the spent fuel waste form because of the larger number of release modes possible for it. The different release modes possible for the spent fuel waste form arise from the fact that it is a heterogeneous material, consisting of several radionuclide-bearing components (cladding, assembly hardware, fuel, etc.). In addition, different radionuclides may be released from a single component by different mechanisms (e.g., gaseous release of Kr-85, rapid release of the gap and grain boundary inventory and release via dissolution of the UO_2 matrix). In contrast to this, the glass waste form is a relatively homogeneous material. It must be noted that the complexity of the description of the spent fuel waste form implies neither the superiority nor inferiority of the material in terms of the ultimate performance that will be demonstrated.

Glass waste form. The numerical goals for the glass waste form performance parameter (Table 8.3.5.9-3) are set so that the glass waste is not allowed to release more than its pro rata fraction of the repository inventory of radionuclides. The goals differ for the pre-300-yr and post-300-yr time periods because of the goal for a smaller number of wetted containers and a smaller number of failed containers in the first 300 yr after closure.

The glass performance parameter goal is very similar to the performance parameter goal set for the controlled release period under Issue 1.5 (Section 8.3.5.10). However, the small number of failed containers, because of the primary emphasis on design to attain total containment for the duration of the containment period, results in a net release rate substantially lower than the performance goal for the postcontainment period.

The tests, analyses, models, and model inputs that will be used to show that the goals for the glass waste have been met are the same as those used to resolve Issue 1.5 and are not repeated here. Detailed discussion of these items may be found under Issue 1.5 (Section 8.3.5.10).

Spent fuel waste form. Performance parameters are defined and goals set for several components of the spent fuel waste form in Table 8.3.5.9-3. Specific performance is assigned to the cladding, the gaseous release behavior of C-14, the fraction of the inventory of gap and grain boundary radionuclides available for rapid release, the solubility of actinides, and the reaction rate of the UO_2 matrix. Each of these are discussed in the following paragraphs.

Performance measure for cladding. Performance is assigned to the cladding in order to limit the oxidation of the UO_2 at high temperatures throughout the containment period, and to control the release of gaseous Kr-85 during the first 100 yr of the containment period. Cladding is also assigned performance in order to limit the release of gap and grain boundary radionuclides in the first 300 yr after closure. Different parameter goals for the allowed fraction of failed cladding have been set for the three different time periods of the containment period. A goal of less than 2 percent failed cladding in failed containers is assigned to the first 100 yr after closure. A small fraction of the cladding will have failed during reactor service or during storage and handling before emplacement in the repository. It is expected that less than 0.5 percent of the cladding will fall into this category. The remaining fraction of failed cladding allows for the unavoidable uncertainty in the fraction of as-received failed cladding and allows for the occurrence of additional failures after emplacement. As previously discussed, the majority of the waste packages are expected to remain dry during the first 100 yr after closure. In the absence of liquid water, the only mechanism for causing cladding failure is that of stress rupture. If the cladding on a fuel rod is to fail by this mechanism it will most likely do so at early times, when the fuel temperatures are highest and therefore the internal pressure in the fuel rod is highest. The available data on this failure mechanism suggest that it will not be an important factor in limiting the life of cladding provided the design goals on peak cladding temperature are met (Section 7.2.1.3.3). Hydride reorientation in the cladding has the potential for reducing cladding strength and thus decreasing its ability to resist stress rupture; however, data on the extent to which this process occurs imply that it will not be a significant factor in causing cladding failure in the repository. The goal of less than 2 percent cladding failures in the first 100 yr is thus judged to be achievable.

Goals of less than 5 percent total failed cladding and less than 2 percent "dry" cladding failures (in failed containers) are set for the period 100 to 300 yr after closure. A distinction is made between "dry" and "wet" cladding for two reasons: (1) once the fuel has cooled below the boiling

point of water, it will no longer oxidize at a rate sufficient to degrade its performance significantly, and the cladding has therefore fulfilled its primary purpose; and (2) once the cladding comes in contact with liquid water, additional mechanisms for failure, such as stress corrosion cracking, become possible. The limit on 2 percent dry cladding failures in failed containers limits the amount of oxidized fuel, a limit that is necessary to ensure the performance of the fuel at later times. Since few additional cladding failures by stress rupture are expected to occur after the temperature peak in the first 100 yr after closure (or during the preclosure period), the goal of 2 percent dry failures at 300 yr should be achievable. The limit of 5 percent on the total number of failed fuel rods at 300 yr was chosen to help limit the release of gap and grain boundary radionuclides during the first 300 yr after closure. The larger allowance given to the total number of failures versus dry failures reflects the possibility that some of the cladding may be contacted by liquid water during this period. Note that the packages whose temperatures fall below the boiling point and have the potential to become wet will be those that have a low radionuclide inventory, specifically the short-lived fission products Cs-137, Sr-90, and their daughter products. Since a primary concern during this time is to control the release of these radionuclides, the assumption that the cladding failures and the inventory in wet packages are randomly distributed is a conservative one.

After 300 yr postclosure, the performance requirement of less than 10 percent total failures is placed on the cladding; subject to the constraint that no more than 2 percent of the cladding is allowed to have failed when it is above the boiling point of water. This constraint, as discussed above, is imposed to ensure that no more than 1 percent of the fuel in the repository becomes significantly oxidized.

The tests, analyses, models, and model inputs that will be used to demonstrate that the goals on cladding failures have been met are discussed in detail under Issue 1.5 (Section 8.3.5.10), where they are grouped together with the other waste form characterization, testing, and modeling activities. That section also discusses the work planned for characterizing the oxidation rate of spent fuel and the effect of oxidation on the release of radionuclides. The reader is referred to that section for further information on these topics.

Performance measure for gap and grain boundary inventory rapid release. During reactor operation a fraction of certain volatile fission products that are not soluble in the the UO_2 matrix can migrate to the pellet-cladding gap or grain boundaries, where they are available for rapid release upon contact with water. Included in this group are the elements cesium, iodine, and to a lesser extent, strontium and technetium. As discussed in a preceding section, these nuclides dominate the radioactivity inventory of the fuel during the first 200 to 300 yr after closure. Control over their release is therefore a primary concern if the containment design objectives are to be met. In unoxidized fuel, the fraction of the inventory of these radionuclides that is in the gap and grain boundary (as opposed to remaining within the UO_2 matrix) appears to be approximately equal to the fraction of fission gases released from the fuel (the fission gas release). It is expected that, on average, the fission gas release of the fuel emplaced in the repository will be less than 1 to 2 percent; hence, a performance

parameter goal has been set that specifies that less than 2 percent of the inventory of these radionuclides will be available for rapid release in unoxidized fuel. This goal applies to both solid and gaseous radionuclides present in the pellet-cladding gap or on grain boundaries. For the purpose of setting goals, it has been assumed that once the fuel becomes oxidized, the entire inventory of fission gas and gap and grain boundary elements is available for rapid release. This is a conservative assumption because oxidation of the fuel is not a simple one-step process. During oxidation, UO_2 progresses through several intermediate phases (U_4O_9, U_3O_7, U_3O_8, then UO_3) and it is expected that much of the fuel will not become fully oxidized. It appears that gross redistribution of the fission products does not occur until the U_3O_8 stage of oxidation is reached; therefore, only in fuel that is oxidized to this stage will the entire inventory of gap and grain boundary elements be available for rapid release. Demonstration that the goal set for the rapid release fraction of the gap and grain boundary elements has been achieved will be done under Issue 1.5 (Section 8.3.5.10).

Performance measure for carbon-14 rapid release. Carbon-14 is present in the spent fuel waste form both in the fuel and on or near the exterior surfaces of the fuel cladding and assembly hardware. A fraction of C-14 can be released rapidly as $^{14}CO_2$ when air contacts the waste form at elevated temperatures. The presence of liquid water is not necessary for this release to occur. A goal has been set that would limit the release of C-14 in this way to less than 1 percent of the inventory of this radionuclide in spent fuel at elevated temperatures. The limited data in hand suggest that less than 0.3 percent of the C-14 is available for rapid release as $^{14}CO_2$. Release at lower temperatures is expected to be smaller. Demonstration that these goals have been met will be done under Issue 1.5 (Section 8.3.5.10).

Performance measure for actinide solubility. Goals have been set for the solubility of the elements plutonium, americium, and uranium. These elements constitute about 95 percent of the radioactivity in the spent fuel waste form after 300 yr postclosure. Goals were chosen to limit the release of these radionuclides based on very conservative values of solubility obtained from spent fuel dissolution experiments. The numeric values given in Table 8.3.5.9-3 are expressed in terms of a package inventory per liter of water and take into account both the goals on water quality and quantity and the number of container failures. Though the intermediate goal of limiting release of these elements remains the same, different numeric values are given for the time periods before and after 300 yr postclosure. The difference arises because of the different number of container failures and amount of liquid water available during these time periods. The concentrations of americium and plutonium will be limited to extremely low levels in ground water of the expected composition by the precipitation of phases containing these elements and current data indicate that this goal can be achieved. The tests, analyses, models, and model inputs used to demonstrate that the goal has been met will be conducted under Issue 1.5 and are not repeated here. The reader is referred to Section 8.3.5.10 for a detailed discussion of these topics.

Performance measure for the release of other radionuclides. The final performance parameter for the spent fuel waste form is the fractional

release of all radionuclides that are not accounted for by the other parameters. This category includes the remaining fraction of gap and grain boundary elements that are present in the UO_2 matrix, other fission products, activation products that are present in the fuel, cladding and hardware, and the other actinides and their intermediate decay products. The solution concentration of some of these elements is expected to be limited by their solubility (e.g., zirconium, tin, nickel) but a significant portion of the inventory will not be so limited (e.g., technetium). As before, different numerical goals are assigned for the periods 0 to 300 yr and 300 to 1,000 yr after closure because of the changing goals on water availability and number of container failures, as well as the changing composition of the radionuclide inventory.

The release of other radionuclides from the fuel itself will be governed by the reaction rate of the UO_2 matrix and the availability of water. For those nuclides that are not limited by their solubility to solution concentrations corresponding to fractional releases lower than the goals set for this parameter, it will be demonstrated that their release is controlled to the specified limits by a combination of the reaction rate of the UO_2 and the limits on the availability of water.

Release of radionuclides other than C-14 from nonfuel components (cladding and assembly hardware) will be governed by the generalized corrosion rate of the materials involved. As in the instance of radionuclides released from the fuel itself, many of the elements released from these sources will be limited by their solubility. Those that are not will be shown to have release fractions lower than that specified by the parameter goals.

The tests, analyses, models, and model inputs used to demonstrate that the goal for the release of other radionuclides from the spent fuel waste form has been met will be conducted under Issue 1.5. The reader is referred to Section 8.3.5.10 for a detailed discussion of these topics.

Performance parameter goals for the container. The performance measure allocated to the container in Table 8.3.5.9-1 is the fraction of containers that have failed. The performance goal is divided into two time intervals as follows:

1. For the first 300 yr after repository closure, less than 0.05 percent per year of the total population of emplaced containers will fail. A failed container is defined as one with a defect sufficiently large to sustain an air flow of 1×10^{-4} atm-cm^3/s. This test is a general standard accepted by the nuclear industry. (This flow rate is the same numerical value as the ASME leak tightness test described in ASME Section V, Article 10, Appendix IV, 1986 Edition.)

2. For the interval from 300 to 1,000 yr after repository closure, less than 0.1 percent per year of the total population of emplaced containers will fail. The same definition of a failed container applies in this time period.

This performance measure must be further divided to assign meaningful performance parameters and goals for those parameters. The division is along two lines: container material type and degradation modes. The container material has not yet been selected. Materials from two separate alloy families are under consideration. This is reflected in Figure 8.3.5.9-3 (model hierarchy) by the division of the container degradation model into the copper-based and austenitic alloy families. An alternate materials/concepts effort is being pursued concurrently. The reader is referred to Section 8.3.5.9.1 for a detailed discussion of these topics. A performance measure has not been assigned to the alternative materials. The performance parameters are divided into the two alloy families because the degradation behavior is substantially different between families and substantially similar within families. The performance measure is also divided into "submeasures" by degradation mode because different modes have different controlling parameters.

Table 8.3.5.9-4 lists the detailed degradation mode submeasures. One or more performance parameters are identified for each mode. In each case, these performance parameters were selected because they were regarded as the key measures for predicting the container degradation. Some failure modes have more than one parameter identified because a combination of these may be employed to establish the performance. Performance parameter goals are also listed. Table 8.3.5.9-5 lists the model inputs for each degradation mode. A brief explanation of the performance parameters follows. More detailed discussion of the performance parameters and explanation of the models is deferred to Information Needs 1.4.1, 1.4.2, and 1.4.3. (Sections 8.3.5.9.1 through 8.3.5.9.3).

In Table 8.3.5.9-4, a tentative goal is established for each performance parameter; this goal is established on the basis of what chemical, metallurgical, physical, or mechanical features of the container or the environment appear to be the key features in determining performance. The current estimated value, or range of values, is based in some instances on measurements that have been performed in the Yucca Mountain Project-sponsored work and discussed in Section 7.4.2. In other instances, the current estimated value is based on information from the technical literature. In all instances, the values indicated as performance parameter goals are estimates of points where discernible differences in performance of the metal container occur. Much of the work outlined under Information Needs 1.4.1 through 1.4.3 is concerned with establishing "critical" values of environmental, metallurgical, and mechanical parameters where the degradation behavior of the metal barrier will change significantly and to relate these critical values to the range of conditions that will occur in the Yucca Mountain repository. As discussed under Information Need 1.4.2, six candidate materials in two major alloy families are currently being evaluated for the container. A material selection process is outlined in Information Need 1.4.2. Part of the input to the selection process is determining which degradation modes are the most important and how the resistance of each candidate material to these degradation modes should be weighted in the selection process. A further consideration is the ability to model the various degradation modes. How accurately the values of these critical environmental, metallurgical, or mechanical parameters can be determined may limit the utility of the models.

Table 8.3.5.9-4 Performance parameters and goals for containers subdivided by alloy family and degradation mode[a] (page 1 of 4)

Performance measure	Degradation modes	Performance parameter	Tentative goals[b]	Needed confidence	Current estimated range	Current confidence
			COPPER BASED ALLOYS			
Fraction of containers that have failed	Metallurgical and mechanical effects	Brittle phase fraction	Phase fraction <0.01	High	Phase fraction <0.01	Medium
		Reduction in fracture toughness	J(emb)/J <0.7	High	To be determined	NA[c]
	Low temperature oxidation	Oxidation rate (R)	Average rate ≤0.1 d per 1,000 yr	High	R ≈ 0.03 to 3 μm/yr	Medium
	General aqueous corrosion	General corrosion rate (R)	Average rate ≤0.1 d per 1,000 yr	High	R ≈ 0.4 to 5 μm/yr	Medium
	Hydrogen effects	H content	[H] <0.1 [H(crit)]	Medium	To be determined	NA
		Oxide inclusion phase fraction	Phase fraction <0.01	High	Phase fraction <0.01	Medium
	Localized attack	Critical potential for initiation	E(crit) - E(corr) >100 mV	High	E(crit) - E(corr) ≈ (100 to 800) mV	Low

Table 8.3.5.9-4. Performance parameters and goals for containers subdivided by alloy family and degradation mode[a] (page 2 of 4)

Performance measure	Degradation modes	Performance parameter	Tentative goals[b]	Needed confidence	Current estimated range	Current confidence
	Stress corrosion cracking (SCC)	Critical potential	E(critSCC) - E(corr) > 100 mV	High	To be determined	Low
		Ammonia (NH_3) concentration	$[NH_3]$ <2 ppm	High	$[NH_3]$[d] < det. ≈ 2 ppm	Medium
		Stress intensity (K)	K < K(SCC)	Medium	K ≈ (0.1 to 3) K(SCC)	Low
	Other effects	To be determined	To be determined	To be determined	NA	NA
		AUSTENITIC ALLOYS				
	Metallurgical and mechanical effects	Brittle phase fraction	Phase fraction <0.01	High	Fraction ≈ 0 to 0.03	Medium
		Reduction in fracture toughness	J(emb)/J <0.7	High	J(emb)/J ≈ 0.5 to 1.0	Medium
	Low temperature oxidation	Oxidation rate (R)	Average rate ≤0.1 d per 1,000 yr	High	R ≈ 0.02 to 0.1 μm/yr	High

Table 8.3.5.9-4. Performance parameters and goals for containers subdivided by alloy family and degradation mode[a] (page 3 of 4)

Performance measure	Degradation modes	Performance parameter	Tentative goals[b]	Needed confidence	Current estimated range	Current confidence
		AUSTENITIC ALLOYS (continued)				
	General aqueous corrosion	General corrosion rate (R)	Average rate ≤0.1 d per 1,000 yr	High	R ≈ 0.04 to 0.3 μm/yr	Medium
	Intergranular attack and intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC)	Degree of sensitization, R(A) (activation ratio in EPR[e] test)	R(A) <5%	High	R(A) ≈ 0 to 20%	Medium
		Stress intensity, K	K < K(IGSCC)	Medium	K ≈ (0.1 to 3) K(IGSCC)	Low
	Hydrogen effects	H content	[H] <0.1 [H(crit)]	Medium	To be determined	NA
		Martensite fraction, M	M <0.01 by volume	High	M <0.01 by volume	Medium
	Localized attack	Critical potential	E(crit) - E(corr) >100 mV	High	E(crit) - E(corr) ≈ (0 to 900) mV	Low
		Chloride ion content	$[Cl^-]$ <100 ppm	High	$[CL^-]$ ≈ 5 to 150 ppm	Medium

Table 8.3.5.9-4. Performance parameters and goals for containers subdivided by alloy family and degradation mode[a] (page 4 of 4)

Performance measure	Degradation modes	Performance parameter	Tentative goals[b]	Needed confidence	Current estimated range	Current confidence
	Transgranular stress corrosion cracking (TGSCC)	Critical potential	E(critTGSCC) - E(corr) > 100 mV	High	To be determined	NA
		Chloride ion content	$[Cl^-]$ <50 ppm	High	$[Cl^-]$ ≈ 5 to 150 ppm	Medium
		Stress intensity	K < K(TGSCC)	Medium	K ≈ (0.1 to 3) K(TGSCC)	Low
	Other effects	To be determined	To be determined	To be determined	NA	NA

[a]See text discussion for explanations of degradation modes. Section 8.3.5.9.3 contains additional material explaining some of the interactions between the chemical, physical, metallurgical, or mechanical properties.

[b]Parameters not defined in table are as follows: J(emb) = impact strength of the embrittled material; J = normal impact strength; d = container wall thickness, 1 cm < d < 3 cm; H(crit) = critical hydrogen; E(crit) = critical potential; E(corr) = corrosion potential; K = stress intensity factor; K(SCC) = critical value of K at which stress corrosion cracking takes place; K(IGSCC) = critical value of K at which intergranular stress corrosion cracking takes place; E(critTGSCC) = critical potential with respect to transgranular stress corrosion; K(TGSCC) = critical value of K at which transgranular stress corrosion cracking takes place.

[c]NA = not applicable.

[d]det. = detection limit.

[e]EPR = electrochemical potentiokinetic reactivation.

Table 8.3.5.9-5. Container degradation model inputs

Model	Model inputs	Needed confidence	SCP section
	COPPER-BASED ALLOY FAILURE MODELS		
Metallurgical aging and phase stability	Temperature-time projections	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.1
	Quantity of phase segregation	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.1
	Mechanical properties of the segregation products	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.1.1
	Electrochemical differences between segregation products and base metal	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.1.1
	Strain in the container body material and in the heat affected zone around the closure	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.1.1
	Residual stress	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.1.1
Low temperature oxidation	Oxidation rate	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.2
	Temperature	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.2
	Radiation field intensity	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.2
	Identification and quantity of radiolysis products	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.1.2
General aqueous	General corrosion rate	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.3
	Composition of water	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.3
	Composition of corrosion product layers	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.1.3
	Identification and quantity of radiolysis products	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.1.3
Hydrogen entry and embrittlement	Hydrogen production rate by radiolysis and corrosion	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.1.4
	Hydrogen recombination rate	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.1.4
	Rate of hydrogen entry into the alloy	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.1.4
	Concentration of hydrogen in the alloy	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.4
	Phase structure of the alloy	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.4
	Mechanical property changes from hydrogen degradation	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.4
Pitting, crevice, and other localized attacks	Critical concentration of ions known to favor these modes of attack	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.5
	Temperature	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.5
	Solution pH	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.5

Table 8.3.5.9-5. Container degradation model inputs (continued)

Model	Model inputs	Needed confidence	SCP section
Pitting, crevice, and other localized attacks (continued)	Metal microstructure	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.5
	Corrosion potential	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.5
	Pitting (and other critical potentials)	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.5
Stress corrosion cracking	Concentration of ammonia (and other species) known to favor stress corrosion cracking	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.6
	Temperature	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.6
	Stress (and stress cracking)	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.1.6
	Alloy segrations	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.1.6
	Corrosion potential	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.6
	Critical potential for crack initiation	High	8.3.5.9.3.1.6
Other potential degradation modes	To be determined	Not applicable	8.3.5.9.3.1.7
	AUSTENITIC ALLOY FAILURE MODELS		
Metallurgical aging and phase transformation	Temperature-time projections	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.1
	Kinetics of phase transformation reactions	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.1
	Mechanical properties of the transformation products	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.1
	Alloy composition of the base metal and the weld metal	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.1
	Strain in the container body material and in the heat affected zone around the closure	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.1
	Residual stress	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.1
Low temperature oxidation	Oxidation rate loss or gain tests under relevant conditions	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.2
	Temperature	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.2
	Radiation field intensity	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.2
	Identification and quantity of radiolysis products	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.2

Table 8.3.5.9-5. Container degradation model inputs (continued)

Model	Model inputs	Needed confidence	SCP section
General aqueous corrosion	General corrosion rate	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.3
	Composition of water	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.3
	Composition of corrosion product layers	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.3
	Identification and quantity of radiolysis products	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.3
Intergranular attack and intergranular stress corrosion cracking	Temperature-time projections	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.4
	Diffusion rate of chromium in the metal as a function of temperature	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.4
	Diffusion mechanism for chromium in the metal	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.4
	Strain	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.4
	Alloy composition	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.4
	Effects of transformation products on diffusion rates	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.4
	Composition of carbide precipitates formed	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.4
	Amounts of sigma and chi phases	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.4
Hydrogen entry and embrittlement	Hydrogen production rate by radiolysis and corrosion	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.5
	Hydrogen recombination rate	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.5
	Rate of hydrogen entry into the alloy	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.5
	Concentration of hydrogen in the alloy	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.5
	Phase structure of the alloy	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.5
	Mechanical property changes from hydrogen degradation	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.5
Pitting, crevice, and other localized attack	Critical concentration of ions known to favor these modes of attack	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.6
	Temperature	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.6
	Solution pH	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.6
	Metal microstructure	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.6
	Corrosion potential	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.6
	Pitting potential	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.6

Table 8.3.5.9-5. Container degradation model inputs (continued)

Model	Model inputs	Needed confidence	SCP section
Transgranular stress corrosion cracking	Chloride concentrations of water	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.7
	Temperature	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.7
	Stress	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.7
	Alloy constituents	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.7
	Other ions in solutions	Medium	8.3.5.9.3.2.7
	Corrosion potential	High	8.3.5.9.3.2.7
Other potential degradation modes	To be determined	Not applicable	8.3.5.9.3.2.8

Many of the degradation modes have a time factor associated with them, because certain conditions must exist before the particular degradation mode can occur. For example, the aqueous corrosion degradation modes require the presence of an electrolyte on the metal surface. The return of the unconfined water boiling point isotherm will occur over a span of time so that there will be a distribution of the initiation of aqueous corrosion modes. Similarly, the performance parameter goals that are related to microstructural features in the metal (e.g., formation of brittle phases, degree of sensitization) are most often dependent on time-at-temperature to form the microstructural feature.

Some abbreviated notations are used in Table 8.3.5.9-4 for simplicity in the entries. These are briefly explained below, along with some remarks on their interpretation. The reader should refer to the full discussion on models of degradation modes (Information Need 1.4.3) for additional material that explains some of the interactions between the chemical, physical, metallurgical, or mechanical factors. The following discussion of the performance parameters is arranged by failure mode. In some cases, the discussion applies to both alloy families; in other cases, the remark is specific to only one family (and sometimes just to one metal or alloy in that family).

Metallurgical and mechanical effects. Under these effects in Table 8.3.5.9-4, for both the copper-based and austenitic materials, reduction in fracture toughness is indicated by the ratio J(emb)/J, where J is the normal impact strength and J(emb) is the impact strength of the embrittled material. Other indices of degraded mechanical properties affecting ductility or toughness may also be applied. For the austenitic materials, formation of sigma phase was used as the standard for establishing a critical value for loss in fracture toughness. A similar value is specified for copper-based materials. The likely embrittling species in copper and copper-based alloys are residual impurities, such as arsenic, selenium, and lead, that precipitate at grain boundaries. In some cases, oxide or other

inclusions could be the source of the embrittlement. These effects may be addressed by determining an appropriate specification on these residuals and inspection of the container material. Similarly for the austenitic materials, sigma (and other brittle) phase formation during fabrication can be detected as part of the container acceptance criteria. However, the concern here is formation of sigma phase if the appropriate metallurgical, strain, and time-at-temperature conditions are present after emplacement.

Oxidation and general aqueous corrosion. The entries in Table 8.3.5.9-4 on oxidation and general aqueous corrosion for both alloy systems express the time-average rate over a 1,000-yr period being such that 90 percent or more of the initial container thickness remains at all times up to 1,000 yr. The container thickness is considered a variable with the range of approximately one to three centimeters. For the purpose of this issue and information need, this range of container thicknesses allows (1) some options in the waste package design, (2) some options in processes for fabricating containers, (3) lower strength materials (such as high purity copper) to be accommodated, and (4) a somewhat higher oxidation-general corrosion rate for copper under some environmental conditions.

Hydrogen effects. In Table 8.3.5.9-4, these effects are indicated by the performance parameters relating to the amount of hydrogen absorbed by the metal. In most cases, hydrogen is preferentially absorbed and "trapped" by or associated with a particular microstructural constituent. In the instance of the metastable austenitic stainless steels, austenite transformation to martensite is the key to inducing a condition that may lead to hydrogen embrittlement. In the case of high purity copper (CDA 102), oxygen pickup during welding or hot forming may form copper oxide inclusions that are unstable in a hydrogen-containing environment, resulting in blistering of the copper. The parameter goal is set such that the hydrogen content in the metal should be less than 0.1 of the "critical" hydrogen content, but in both alloy families that amount is not yet determined.

Intergranular attack and intergranular stress corrosion cracking. For these effects on austenitic materials, the performance parameter in Table 8.3.5.9-4 is the degree of sensitization. (There is no corresponding sensitization phenomena in copper-based materials). There are a number of ways to define "degree of sensitization", but the one chosen here relates to the activation ratio as determined in an electrochemical potentiokinetic reactivation (EPR) test. The activation ratio relates to the electrochemical current required to "activate" a previously passivated specimen. The activation ratio is proportional to the degree of sensitization; the EPR test is particularly useful in discerning degrees of sensitization in low-carbon austenitic materials where only a fraction of the grain boundaries are attacked electrochemically. For intergranular stress corrosion cracking of the austenitic materials, the stress intensity factor (K) can also be used as an additional performance parameter. However, there are some difficulties associated with using K for this (and all the other stress corrosion cracking) modes(s). First, all of the candidate materials are normally very ductile materials so that there is the question of how to incorporate the plasticity contribution. Second, the parameter goal that K be below the (SCC) (the critical value of K at which stress corrosion cracking takes place) is sometimes difficult to show experimentally because stresses vary widely over small distances between the weld and the base metal and because

of the uncertainty in detecting the magnitude and distribution of all flaws. Hence, the current estimated range of K is quite large.

Localized attack. For localized attack in both alloy systems, one performance parameter is expressed in Table 8.3.5.9-4 as the difference between the "critical" potential, E(crit)and the corrosion potential, E(corr). The "critical" potential varies according to several physical, chemical, and metallurgical quantities (as does the corrosion potential). Also, different critical potentials exist according to the particular localized corrosion phenomena being studied. In the instance of copper-based materials, pitting corrosion and selective leaching (for the alloys only) need to be considered. The 100 mV difference has been set as the parameter goal; this value is based, in part, on previous work discussed in Chapter 7 and in other Yucca Mountain Project supported work, and, in part, what seems to be a reasonably conservative value from the literature in comparable environmental settings. It should be noted that the critical potential will include effects of microstructural features (inclusions, second phases, etc.). No particular chemical species are expected to be present naturally in the ground waters associated with the Yucca Mountain repository that are especially important in causing localized attack on copper-based materials. For the austenitic materials, pitting and crevice attack need to be considered as types of localized corrosion (selective leaching is not known in these materials). However, in the instance of the austenitic materials, chloride (and to a lesser extent, fluoride) ion is present in the natural environment and is of paramount concern in setting one of the parameter goals. Therefore a chloride ion content is set in the parameter goal for failure of the container by localized corrosion (pitting or crevice attack on these materials) and the value set is 100 ppm. This goal is tentative and must be viewed in the light of some controversy because the chloride ion threshold for the initiation of localized attack will depend on other chemical species present in the environment. The work proposed in Information Need 1.4.2 has the purpose of establishing the value of critical concentrations of causative ions for localized attack on the selected container material.

Transgranular stress corrosion cracking. For this effect in the austenitic materials, a difference between the critical and corrosion potential is set as the performance measure (Table 8.3.5.9-4). This approach has been demonstrated in concentrated chloride solutions, but has not yet been shown to be valid in dilute chlorides, hence the "to be determined" entry for the current estimated value. The 100 mV difference has been taken as the parameter goal from analogy to the localized corrosion failure mode. As in localized corrosion, chloride ion is the outstanding example of the causative species for initiating transgranular stress corrosion cracking (TGSCC), and a critical parameter goal is set at 50 ppm chloride. This parameter must also be considered as tentative for the same reasons given above, and the actual threshold will depend on several other factors (pH, temperature, other ions present). This threshold is established with the most susceptible candidate material in mind (AISI 304L). This threshold will be less controversial for the more resistant candidate material (alloy 825) in this alloy family. As in the discussion of the intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) for the austenitic materials, a stress intensity factor (K) is set as the third performance parameter. The comments made in that discussion also apply here.

Stress corrosion cracking. For copper-based materials, ammonia is the outstanding causative species for stress corrosion cracking (Table 8.3.5.9-4). (The crack propagation path is not distinguished as a fundamental characteristic of the degradation mode as it is for the austenitic alloys). Therefore, an ammonia concentration limit is set as one of the performance parameters. Because ammonia is not present in the natural environment (it would form because of radiolysis) and small amounts of ammonia cause stress corrosion cracking (SCC) in the most vulnerable candidate alloys in this family (CDA 102 and CDA 613), a very low threshold is set as the parameter goal. This level is believed to be the detection limit (2 ppm).

Models and model inputs

Models, model inputs, their needed confidence, and forward references to the information needs are given in Table 8.3.5.9-5 for the different failure modes in each alloy system. The model inputs are quantities that are measurable and quantifiable. The needed confidence is determined by considering how measurable the quantities are and how important they are in establishing the model.

Interrelationships of information needs

Information Needs 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 (Sections 8.3.5.9.1 and 8.3.5.9.2) will provide data to be used in the analysis of container performance under repository conditions. The conditions to be considered will include low probability scenarios (not required for resolution of this issue but needed for input to Issue 1.1, Section 8.3.5.13), as well as anticipated processes and events. Models will be developed under Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3) to allow extrapolation of the laboratory data to long times. The models and data will be combined in analyses to be done under Information Need 1.4.4 (Section 8.3.5.9.4) to provide a description of the condition of the container under anticipated processes and events for 10,000 yr (10 CFR 60.112 and 40 CFR 191.13), for low probability cases for 10,000 yr, and for expected conditions for 100,000 yr (10 CFR 960.3-1-5).

The issue will be resolved under Information Need 1.4.5 (Section 8.3.5.9.5), where the analyses from Information Needs 1.4.4 (Section 8.3.5.9.4) and 1.5.4 (Section 8.3.5.10.4) will be compared with the interpretation of substantially complete containment.

The schedule information for Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package) is presented in Section 8.3.5.9.6.

8.3.5.9.1 Information Need 1.4.1: Waste package design features that affect the performance of the container

Technical basis for addressing the information need

This information need addresses the important features of the waste package design that affect the performance of the container. Under this information need, the as-fabricated and as-assembled waste package is first characterized with respect to ensuring the integrity of the as-emplaced

container. A close relationship also exists between certain design parameters, the manufacturing processes by which the container is fabricated and closed, and the ultimate performance of the container in the preclosure and postclosure repository environment. Some decisions on design details will, therefore, depend on which metal of the several candidate materials is selected and how the waste package is fabricated, assembled, and emplaced in the repository. Characterization of the properties of the as-emplaced container is an important part of resolving this issue because many of these properties influence the behavior of the container during the containment and postcontainment periods. This information need addresses those features of both the reference and the alternative design that characterize the as-emplaced package and that influence the behavior in later periods. The reference design is a metal container, and the alternative design is to be chosen from one of the following: ceramic-metal systems, bimetallic/single metal systems, and coatings and filler systems.

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

The characteristics of the waste package are discussed in Chapter 7. Characterization and description of the waste form contents of the package are given in Section 7.4.3. The six candidate waste package container materials are introduced and discussed in Section 7.4.2 on the metal barriers. Representative mechanical properties and the metallurgical industry standard composition ranges are given in Section 7.3 for each candidate material. The waste package design and a brief discussion on fabrication and welding (or other closure) processes for producing the waste package are given in Section 7.3. Some aspects of the repository description and layout design influence this information need; these are found in Chapter 6. No previous work has been performed by the Yucca Mountain Project on other materials systems as container materials; thus, no discussion of other materials systems is presented in Chapter 7.

Parameters

Information needed from other information needs includes

1. The reference and alternative waste package designs, from Information Need 1.10.2 (Section 8.3.4.2.2).

2. The temperature at the container surface and projections of the change in temperature with time. This comes from Information Need 1.10.4 (Section 8.3.4.2.4) and is based on the thermal power load per container (Information Need 1.5.1, Section 8.3.5.10.1) and the areas power load (Information Need 1.10.3, Section 8.3.4.2.3).

3. The radiation field intensity in the near-package environment and projections of its change with time, from Information Need 1.10.2 (Section 8.3.4.2.2).

4. Emplacement configuration (horizontal or vertical) in the repository, from Information Need 1.10.3.

5. Thickness of the metal container, from Information Need 1.10.2.

6. Design configuration of the container-system developed under the alternate barriers investigations (Information Need 1.10.2).

7. The process history of the container body and other assembly components (e.g., bottom and top lids, weld filler metal) used in the assembled and closed waste package container, from Information Need 1.10.2.

Data for the following parameters are to be obtained:

1. The candidate container materials. The six candidate materials are classified into two broad alloy groups: (a) copper and copper-based alloys and (b) austenitic materials (iron- and nickel-based alloys). The specific candidates in the first group are oxygen-free high-conductivity copper CDA 102 (UNS C10200), aluminum bronze CDA 613 (UNS C61300), and 70/30 copper-nickel CDA 715 (UNS C71500). The candidates in the second groups are austenitic stainless steel AISI type 304L (UNS S30403), austenitic stainless steel AISI type 316L (UNS S31603), and nickel-based austenitic alloy 825 (UNS N08825).

2. Candidate container material systems being evaluated under the alternate barriers investigations include ceramic-metal systems, bimetallic/single metal systems, and coating and filler systems.

3. The mechanical properties of the container material in the as-emplaced condition, from which the relative projected changes of these are established for the repository preclosure, the containment, and the postcontainment periods.

4. The microstructural characteristics of the container material in the as-emplaced condition. Projections of any changes in the microstructure of the container after emplacement (Information Needs 1.4.2 and 1.4.3) are based on characterization of the as-emplaced microstructural condition.

5. Certain physical properties of the container material that are relevant to the waste package design analysis.

6. The state of stress (nature, magnitude, and distribution) that exists in the container at the time of emplacement and projections of the changes in the state of stress after emplacement.

7. The integrity of the assembled and closed waste package container as it is emplaced into the repository. The integrity of the closure weld or other closure process is of special importance.

8. The surface condition of the assembled, closed, and emplaced waste package container.

9. For the option of a container system being developed under the alternate barriers investigations, a similar set of properties and fabrication characteristics.

10. The effect of large-scale fabrication on the metallurgical condition and resultant performance.

Logic

The container temperature, radiation field, and state of stress and the expected range and variation of these parameters during the containment and postcontainment periods are used in establishing the test conditions that are part of the study areas more fully discussed under Information Needs 1.4.2 and 1.4.3. The emphasis of the present information need is characterization of the condition of the container as it is emplaced in the repository. In some instances, it will be appropriate to use standardized test methods and procedures governed and issued by the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM). The next two Information Needs (1.4.2 and 1.4.3) use this information for predicting the characteristics of the container in the later periods. In some instances, certain design features bear on the selection of the container material. Much of the information on mechanical and physical properties of the candidate container materials is available from published sources. These properties are not environmentally dependent and so are not site-specific to Yucca Mountain; therefore, compilation of existing information should suffice.

For the option included in the alternate barriers investigations, i.e., ceramic-metal systems, bimetallic/single metal systems, and coatings and filler systems, the important physical and mechanical properties are closely linked with the proposed feasibility study on this design option. These properties will be discussed in Activity 1.4.1.2 (Section 8.3.5.9.1.2).

Two activities are included in this Information Need (1.4.1). The first activity is based on using a container fabricated from one of the six candidate metallic materials. This includes both copper-based and austenitic alloys. Some activities are common to both alloy groups, and some are specific to (or are more emphasized in) one group, as indicated in the following descriptions.

The second activity is based on a waste package concept that will evolve from the alternate barriers investigations and be chosen from one of the three following groups: ceramic-metal systems, bimetallic/single metal systems, and coating and filler systems. This activity will introduce some unique features not found in the first activity and is less well-defined because the feasibility of producing such a waste package must first be evaluated.

Activities to be pursued to completion depend on which waste package concept, together with the appropriate materials, is eventually selected and the outcome of the feasibility study on the alternate barriers investigations. The activities that support the selection process for the metallic container materials are explained in the next Information Need (1.4.2).

The presently available information on the items discussed in this information need is probably adequate to serve the needs of material selection, except possibly in the area of welding effects. The Project intends to evaluate the existing information during the time up to material selection

and to undertake only those laboratory measurements needed to support material selection. After the final container material is chosen, a test plan will be developed for the selected material to supply the data needed to support the repository license application.

8.3.5.9.1.1 Activity 1.4.1.1: Integrate design and materials information (metal container)

The following subactivities support this activity.

8.3.5.9.1.1.1 Subactivity 1.4.1.1.1: Mechanical properties

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to compile available data on the mechanical properties of the candidate materials over the temperature range of interest (approximately room temperature to 300°C).

Parameters

The principal mechanical properties of interest are the following:

1. Yield strength.

2. Ultimate tensile strength.

3. Elongation (or other measure of ductility, such as reduction in area).

4. Modulus of elasticity.

5. Impact strength (or other measure of fracture toughness).

Knowledge of the effect of metal fabrication processing and interrelationships between mechanical properties and microstructural properties is also required. This includes the effect of such factors as phase distribution, grain size, inclusion content, and previous plastic deformation. The effect of the strain rate on the mechanical properties is also needed. While individual mechanical properties were just listed, the entire stress-strain relationship merits attention to enable the evaluation of the toughness of the material when subjected either to low strain rate or to high strain rate processes that can later develop in the containment period.

Description

Depending on the results of the compilation, experimental determination of any inadequately known mechanical properties will be performed. Extended time at temperature may change the values of the mechanical properties, and this effect will be considered in the compilation. For the austenitic materials (including alloy 825), there will be little need for additional

experimental work for this activity because of the extensive published information on this subject. However, some experimental work may be required to determine the properties of the welded-austenitic material because of the inherently more complex structure of the weld and its dependence on many process variables that will be determined in the future. Because the data on mechanical properties of the copper-based materials at the higher end of the repository-relevant temperature range is not as extensive as that for the austenitic materials, some experimental work may be needed to fill the information gaps.

The low strength of high-purity copper (CDA 102) suggests that a long-term, low-temperature creep phenomenon may lead to a degradation mode that would be most important for the "retrieval period" following emplacement of the container in the repository. The somewhat thicker container sections (approximately 2-3 cm) that likely will be required for a high-purity copper waste package because of its lower yield strength will likely impart greater creep strength as well. But this supposition will need to be supported by analysis of stresses (and strains) that will develop in the postemplacement period and by a comparison of the results with available creep rupture data for this material over the temperature range of interest. Creep appears to be a less significant potential degradation mode for the solid-solution hardened copper-based alloys and the austenitic materials.

8.3.5.9.1.1.2 Subactivity 1.4.1.1.2: Microstructural properties

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to compile available information and characterization of the microstructures of the candidate copper-based and austenitic materials to predict the microstructural properties of the as-emplaced container. Predictions of microstructural properties are compared with examinations of microstructures in prototype containers. The characteristics of the as-emplaced container microstructure serve as a basis for predicting what microstructural changes will occur in the postemplacement time periods.

Parameters

Because the microstructure is intimately related to fabrication process variables and, in some instances, to relatively small compositional variations, this dependence will be documented. The microstructures of the fusion zone and heat-affected zones around the weld must also be characterized; characterization of these microstructures depends strongly on the welding process variables and, in some welding processes, on the composition of the filler materials. The microstructural features of importance include the following:

1. Primary phases present and their distribution.

2. Secondary phases, their distribution, and evidence of precipitation reactions.

3. Segregation effects.

4. Grain size and distribution of grain size.

5. Evidence of preferred orientation.

6. Identification and distribution of nonmetallic inclusions.

The time at elevated temperature (during the container fabrication and closure process) is influential in determining these features.

Description

The work in this subactivity is primarily concerned with the microstructure of the emplaced container. Projections of microstructural changes from the time of emplacement form the basis of analysis for the different corrosion, oxidation, and embrittlement degradation modes that can occur after emplacement. These projections are pursued in Information Needs 1.4.2 (Section 8.3.5.9.2) and 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3) under the topic of aging phenomena.

A major emphasis in this subactivity is development of the ability to predict what the microstructural features should be for the as-emplaced container. These predictive abilities derive from an understanding of physical and mechanical metallurgy of the container material and the effect of the thermochemical process history on the microstructure of the container material. This will be substantiated by (1) examination of laboratory-size specimens that are produced to simulate the fabrication and welding processes to be used on actual size waste package containers and (2) examination of prototype containers (of the dimensions and process history as the actual production container but not filled with waste).

The experimental work in this subactivity will establish what population of examined microstructures of laboratory- and prototype-size containers constitutes a representative sample population of production-size containers. Standard laboratory metallographic and microscopic techniques are available for characterizing microstructures. Advanced microscopic techniques may be needed to the extent of resolving subcritical size particles that would later grow into potentially detrimental microstructural features. The need for these will be indicated by the modeling activities (Information Need 1.4.3) with regard to the container material and degradation mode(s) requiring this amount of attention. After a material is selected for the final design and after fabrication of prototype containers is undertaken, a through characterization of a representative as-fabricated and as-assembled container will be needed.

Most of the techniques for thorough characterization of microstructures involve destructive examination of the metal cross-section; therefore, quality control of the container production stream is obtained by periodic examination of unfilled quality control containers that have the same process history as the filled containers. Work in this subactivity will provide the technical basis for establishing the frequency of this inspection for process control. Some nondestructive, semiquantitative techniques can be routinely used in the production facility for evaluating certain microstructural

features (e.g., amount of ferrite in the weld determined by magnetic flux measurement techniques). Which features to pursue will depend on the outcome of the modeling activities in deciding which microstructural features are most important to affecting the container performance. Some destructive testing on prototype or witness specimens will be needed to confirm that the desired microstructure is obtained. For example, evidence of copper oxide inclusions in copper or significant sigma phase formation in candidate austenitic stainless steels during the fabrication and welding process would likely be considered detrimental and would be cause for rejection.

With respect to the copper-based materials, the microstructures are generally simpler than those for the austenitic materials; however, segregation effects in the alloys may be more important because of the electrochemical implications of the wide difference between the more noble copper and the active alloy additions. Because a high percentage of copper is produced by recycling, the accumulation of potentially harmful impurities and their effect on embrittlement is noted for evaluation. Specifications requiring virgin copper or high-purity remelt scrap might be necessary.

Detailed microstructural analyses will be conducted on base metal, weld metal, and weld heat-affected zones. These analyses will be conducted on material in the condition expected for the as-fabricated container and also in the condition expected after simulated long-term exposure in the repository. Advanced techniques, including transmission electron microscopy and scanning electron microscopy, can be used to resolve features 10 angstroms in size. Moreover, microchemical analysis techniques of the matrix, precipitate and dislocation and grain boundary structures will be conducted using scanning transmission electron microscopy and Auger electron spectroscopy. These techniques will allow full characterization of the morphology and chemistry of the microstructure. The overall program will allow assessment of the stability of these features over the long term in the repository.

Microstructural stability will be a criterion in the selection of the metal barrier. Further discussion is contained under degradation mode testing (Section 8.3.5.9.2.3.2) and degradation modeling (Section 8.3.5.9.3.2.1).

The microstructure of the as-fabricated and as-assembled (by welding or other process) prototype containers must be thoroughly characterized, because it is not always possible to perform successfully all the possible variations scaling up from specimen or coupon-size workpieces. This more extensive characterization will only be pursued on the material selected for the advanced design and the process selected for actually fabricating the waste package container.

8.3.5.9.1.1.3 Subactivity 1.4.1.1.3: Physical properties

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to compile those physical properties whose values are needed for design and for projections of changes in the container in the postemplacement environment (i.e., temperature field, radiation field, stress field).

Parameters

The physical properties of interest include

1. Thermal conductivity.
2. Density.
3. Coefficient of thermal expansion.

Description

These physical properties are not site or environment dependent, and so compilation from existing literature sources should be sufficient. How these properties depend on such factors as alloy compositions (and permissible variations) and temperature, however, is needed as waste package design information. These properties are not expected to be significantly affected by the fabrication processes for forming or joining the container materials.

8.3.5.9.1.1.4 Subactivity 1.4.1.1.4: State of stress in the container

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to analyze the state of stress at a number of locations in the container and to project the changes in the state of stress with time and temperature during the containment and postcontainment periods. When possible or feasible, the analysis will be supplemented by actual stress measurements on prototype containers.

Parameters

The initial state of stress at emplacement will depend on many processing variables in forming, assembling, joining, and handling the container and the residual stresses that these different processes impart to the container. The steady-state service load on the container (mostly due to its own weight and that of the contents) also figures in the analysis. Projections of the stress to different postemplacement time periods will consider the effects of any expected additional static or dynamic loads. The state of stress is concerned with the magnitude, nature (tensile, compressive, or shear), and axiality of the stresses, and the corresponding strains in the container materials associated with the stresses.

Description

The stress in the container is expected to vary considerably from location to location. The container lid and bottom will likely be designed with a thicker section than the main body in an effort to contour the stress. Different fabrication processes may be used for the main body (e.g., rolled and welded plate) and the lid and bottom sections (e.g., forgings), resulting in different stress and microstructure patterns. Other container fabrication processes under consideration eliminate some or all of the assembly welds, and it is possible to anneal the container body before the waste form is placed inside. These considerations have the objective of reducing residual stress in the as-fabricated container shell. The residual stress is expected

to be highest at the closure weld, since it will be impractical to relieve all this stress by a postweld heat treatment. (Some localized stress relieving may be possible, if this can be performed in a hot cell and without damaging the waste form.) Proper selection of the welding process and weld parameters can create less residual tensile stress at the surface. Another possibility is a postweld surface peening process to put the outside surface of the weld in compression. All the weld processes and processes to mitigate against high residual tensile stresses, such as surface peening, will have to be evaluated in terms of being practical in a hot cell and not creating an undesirable side-effect problem.

There may be significant differences in fabrication processes between the copper-based and austenitic groups, which may lead to separate stress analyses. The density of copper is higher than that of the austenitic materials, and a thicker wall section will probably be specified if high-purity copper (CDA 102) is selected. The yield stress of copper is considerably lower than that of the other candidate materials. The copper-based alloys have yield strengths comparable to those of the candidate austenitic materials.

Calculational analyses of the state of stress will be supported by actual strain gage measurements on prototype containers with simulated waste form contents and closure welds.

Because all the candidate materials are corrosion resistant, a criterion for selection will be that wall thinning due to corrosion processes during the containment period will not be of engineering significance. Part of the effort will be to consider the effect of pits and other localized corrosion phenomena as stress raisers and potential sites of crack nucleation. A fracture mechanics, crack-growth methodology will be used. Stress-corrosion crack growth rate data will be obtained for the base metal, weld metal, and weld heat-affected zone. The data will cover conditions expected in the as-fabricated container and also the condition expected after simulated long-term thermal exposure in the repository. Failure of the container by pitting and other forms of localized corrosion, as well as resultant effects such as nucleation of stress corrosion cracks, will be included in the selection criteria.

8.3.5.9.1.1.5 Subactivity 1.4.1.1.5: Characterization and inspection of weld integrity

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to determine the soundness of the weld joints, with primary emphasis on inspection of the final closure weld. Nondestructive evaluation techniques are available to make this inspection and to determine the nature, population, size, and distribution of flaws. Detection of flaws in the welded region is important in ensuring the initial integrity of the as-emplaced waste package; analyses of some of the possible degradation modes (in Information Needs 1.4.2 (Section 8.3.5.9.2) and 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3)) depend on whether flaws are present above a critical

size at which they might be expected to grow as cracks during later time periods.

Parameters

The parameters of this subactivity include

1. Weld process selected.
2. Weld process parameters (particularly those related to heat input).
3. Composition of filler material (for some weld processes).
4. Composition of weld cover gas.
5. Microstructure of weld.
6. Inspection method selected.

These parameters are interactive in determining the integrity of the weld. They influence how the weld can be inspected and how the signal or pattern from the technique used for the inspection can be interpreted.

Description

The welding process and welding parameters (such as heat input and the rate of heat input, which are often determined by the current and voltage, number of passes, and time of each pass) have an important effect on the weld integrity. Similarly, the cooling rate after welding is important. Both filler and autogenous processes are under consideration. The composition and microstructure in the fusion zone are important. The nature and composition of the protective cover gas are important to prevent significant oxidation in the weld region. The weld geometry, weld thickness, metallurgical composition, grain size, grain orientation, and other metallurgical and microstructural considerations govern the kinds of nondestructive evaluation techniques and the sensitivity and precision with which flaws can be detected.

Autogenous weld processes are commonly used for the copper-based materials. The welded microstructure is expected to be simpler for the copper-based materials than other materials considered, but any tendency for the alloying elements to segregate will need to be evaluated. The high heat input required to weld pure copper may cause possible problems for the waste form inside the container. Also, high-purity copper tends to pick up oxygen readily, and so control of the cover gas composition becomes very important. Small amounts of oxygen in the copper can cause embrittlement in some environments, but small additions of deoxidizing elements (most commonly phosphorus) alleviate the problem.

Autogenous and filler metal processes can be used to weld the austenitic materials. For welding some of the austenitic materials, a filler material of somewhat different composition from that of the base material is used to produce the desired microstructure or to compensate for alloying elements that are lost by oxidation or evaporation. It will be important to demonstrate that any compositional differences between the filler and base materials do not result in undesirable galvanic interaction between the two materials. Also, the composition and control of the composition of the cover gas during the welding operation is important in ensuring high weld integrity and process consistency. The number of alloy components (including the titanium addition used to stabilize carbide formation) and the all-austenitic

structure of alloy 825 sometimes presents concerns about weld cracking; these are overcome by control of the microconstituents (especially the carbon, phosphorus, and sulfur) and the cover gas composition.

Because the weld inspection technique is so closely tied to the material and process variables, selection and development of the inspection technique will parallel the efforts made on selecting the candidate container material and on selecting and developing the container fabrication and closure weld processes. Because of nondestructive inspection techniques, all the containers destined for the repository can be inspected. However, many details of conducting the inspection will need to be addressed in the future, including the constraints of remotely performing the operation. Interpretation of the signals or images produced by the nondestructive test will also have to be worked out. This will likely involve inspection of prototype weldments and container sections with intentional flaws of different kinds, sizes, and distributions.

Since welds and weld heat-affected zones often limit the performance of structures, particular attention will be focused on the properties and performance of these regions of the container. The material properties and degradation models are discussed in Sections 8.3.5.9.2 and 8.3.5.9.3.

8.3.5.9.1.1.6 Subactivity 1.4.1.1.6: Characterization of the container surface

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is the detection of potentially harmful surface conditions on the as-emplaced container, resulting from handling operations. These conditions (seemingly innocuous at emplacement and, therefore, not a cause of waste package rejection) may lead to conditions that will favor one of the degradation modes discussed in Information Needs 1.4.2 (Section 8.3.5.9.2) and 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3). Two classes of conditions are of concern: (1) mechanical defects such as scratches and gouges that could develop into crevices or into stress raisers and (2) chemical contamination of the surface. Of particular concern are residues of chloride ion that could result in locally high concentration of chloride ion developing at a later period. Both mechanical defects and chemical contamination will be of more concern with types 304L and 316L stainless steel (SS) materials, which are more susceptible than the other materials being considered.

Parameters

The production of surface defects and contamination depends on many process and operational variables. These will become better defined as decisions on process selections are made and details of the operations are more focused. The critical sizes of surface defect or levels of chemical contamination will be determined in activities dealing with the various degradation modes and with the sensitivities of accelerating the degradation modes (Information Needs 1.4.2 and 1.4.3).

Description

Much of the work in this subactivity will be directed toward developing ways of detecting small mechanical defects and surface residue concentrations. Detailed specifications for container handling in the surface facility and in the repository will be made in an effort to minimize potentially harmful surface effects. The extent to which the activity will be pursued also depends on the material ultimately selected. (Type 304L SS, for instance, will be much more susceptible to crevice effects and chloride residues than will alloy 825.) Characterization of the container surface may not be as critical for the copper-based materials because these materials are not nearly as susceptible to crevice-induced corrosion effects, or to chloride-induced corrosion problems, as other materials considered.

8.3.5.9.1.2 Activity 1.4.1.2: Integrate design and materials information (alternate barriers investigations)

This activity has been expanded into an alternate barriers investigations, to bring forward one or two viable material-system, design, and fabrication alternatives, in case a waste package fabricated from any of the six candidate materials cannot achieve the containment objectives allocated to the container. These investigations shall integrate design and materials information for waste package containers based on materials systems that fall in the following three classes:

1. Ceramic-metal systems.
2. Bimetallic/single metal systems.
3. Coatings and filler systems.

An obvious advantage of the alternate barriers investigations is the potential to clearly project repository performance that is superior to what is possible with the metal barrier candidates under consideration. Because of the large number of containers needed, cost-effective fabrication and material availability are also important considerations. To meet this challenge, the following concepts will be evaluated:

1. Ceramic-metal systems. Wherein the choice of a suitable ceramic, alumina (Al_2O_3) and titania (TiO_2), will provide the best possible long-term corrosion resistance because of higher chemical stability in the near field environment. Additionally, ceramic composites can increase the toughness and delayed fracture resistance of the ceramic. If required, a metal container for the ceramic monolith can serve as a fabrication aid and enhance the resistance to damage incurred during transportation and handling of the metal ceramic-metal container. A very important consideration is the ease and reliability of the closure in any container involving a ceramic. Both metallic closure concepts and ceramic closure concepts will be considered.

2. Bimetallic/single metal systems. Wherein a bimetallic system will use galvanic effects to provide long-term corrosion resistance. The inner liner, cathodic to the outer liner, will be designed for

long-term stability and corrosion resistance at lower temperatures. The outer liner will provide corrosion resistance in the short term at higher temperatures and higher gamma dose rates. Alternate single metals such as titanium, its dilute alloys, and high-nickel corrosion-resistant alloys, with high potential corrosion resistance compared with metal barrier selections, will be considered.

3. Coatings and filler systems. Wherein coatings will be used primarily to enhance the performance of a single metal barrier. Coatings must demonstrate closed porosity and long-term stability in regard to substrate adherence, resistance to cracking, and corrosion resistance. Fillers (metal or nonmetallic) will provide added mechanical support between spent fuel elements and the container. Thermal properties must be compatible with waste package design regarding maximum waste-form temperature. Fillers will also provide additional long-term protection against corrosion and control the release of radionuclides.

Five subactivities support this activity.

8.3.5.9.1.2.1 Subactivity 1.4.1.2.1: Survey of alternative barrier designs, materials, and processes to determine feasibility of fabricating a satisfactory waste package

The purpose of this subactivity is to first survey those designs, materials, and fabrication and closure methods that fall into the three categories just discussed and that have high potential for meeting the containment objectives. Because of the large number of containers needed, the impact of cost on container fabrication, closure, and material selection will also be carefully considered.

Fabrication studies will be divided into at-repository and off-repository categories with the goal of prefabricating and inspecting as much as possible off the site. Only closure and postclosure inspection would be completed at the repository. Cost assessments, as well as fabrication feasibility, will be considered. Economics of scale will be taken into account.

Alternate single and bimetal concepts will focus on three basic metal fabrication methods: (1) rolled and welded, (2) centrifugal casting, and (3) extrusion. Gas pressure bonding will be considered for bimetal concepts. For ceramic-related concepts, it is expected that (1) extrusion/slip cast/sinter, (2) cold press/sinter, and (3) hot isostatic pressing will be applicable. Special fabrication considerations will be required for composite candidates and coating/liner concepts.

Later in the survey, the fabrication survey will be more focused and more detailed regarding the specific requirements. For ceramic containers, an early assessment will be made to determine if current technology and industrial experience can produce ceramics in the size required and with microstructural integrity that will meet repository requirements.

After the screening of alternative candidates, two alternates from each category will be chosen for detailed study. A set of criteria will be developed to guide the selection process. Some of these guidelines will include

1. How will the container meet the performance objective of substantially complete containment?

2. Can long-term performance be predicted?

3. Is the material available and is fabrication practicable?

4. What are the estimated costs?

5. Can the fabricated and sealed container be adequately inspected?

Each alternative concept will be evaluated by a separate team of consultants, some with direct industrial experience fabricating the same materials in related product lines.

8.3.5.9.1.2.2 Subactivity 1.4.1.2.2: Mechanical properties

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to compile relevant data on the mechanical properties of the candidate materials over the temperature range of interest (approximately room temperature to 300°C).

Parameters

The principal mechanical properties of interest for both ceramic and metallic materials that may be used in the alternate barriers investigations are

1. Yield and ultimate strength in all stress modes, percent elongation, and reduction in area.

2. Strain rate effects on impact strength, fracture toughness, and ductility.

3. Elastic constraints.

4. Residual stress after fabrication and closure.

Knowledge of the effect of fabrication and closure on the microstructure and mechanical properties is needed.

8.3.5.9.1.2.3 Subactivity 1.4.1.2.3: Microstructural properties

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is the compilation of available information and the completion of required experimentation to characterize microstructure as it relates to mechanical properties, corrosion resistance, and ultimately to the overall performance of the as-emplaced waste package container. Because the microstructure is intimately related to fabrication process variables and, in some instances, to relatively small compositional variations, this dependence will be documented.

Predictions of microstructural properties are compared with examinations of microstructures in prototype containers. The characteristics of the as-emplaced container microstructure serve as a basis for predicting what microstructural changes will occur in the postemplacement time periods.

Parameters

The microstructural features that will impact the performance of ceramics, metallic alloys, and coatings and fillers that are candidates for inclusion in the alternative barriers investigations include

1. Primary and secondary phases, impurity phases, and segregation effects.

2. Grain size, its distribution, and any preferred orientations.

3. Discontinuities such as porosity and cracking (primarily in ceramics and coatings) and other flaws, their sizes, and size distributions.

Discussion

A major emphasis in this subactivity is development of the ability to predict what the microstructural features should be for the as-emplaced container. This will be accomplished by (1) examination of laboratory-size specimens that are produced to simulate the fabrication and closure processes to be used on actual size waste package containers and (2) examination of prototype containers.

The experimental work in this subactivity will establish what population of examined microstructures of laboratory- and prototype-size containers constitutes a representative sample population of production-size containers. Standard laboratory metallographic and microscopic techniques are available for characterizing microstructures. Advanced microscopic techniques may be needed to the extent of resolving subcritical size defects that would later grow into potentially detrimental microstructural features. The need for these will be indicated by the modeling activities with regard to the container material and degradation mode(s) requiring this amount of attention. After a material is selected for the final design and after fabrication of prototype containers is undertaken, a thorough characterization of a representative as-fabricated and as-assembled alternate container will be needed.

The microstructure of the as-fabricated and as-assembled prototype containers must be thoroughly characterized, because it is not always possible to perform successfully all the possible variations scaling up from specimen or coupon-size workpieces. This more extensive characterization will only be pursued on the material selected for the advanced design and the process selected for actually fabricating the waste package container.

8.3.5.9.1.2.4 Subactivity 1.4.1.2.4: Thermophysical properties

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to compile those physical properties whose values are needed for design and for projections of changes in the container in the postemplacement environment (i.e., temperature field, radiation field, and stress field).

Parameters

The physical properties of interest include

1. Thermal conductivity and radiation effects thereon.
2. Density.
3. Heat capacity.
4. Crystal structure.
5. Coefficient of thermal expansion.

Discussion

These physical properties are not site or environment dependent, and so compilation from existing literature sources should be sufficient. How these properties depend on such factors as composition and temperature, however, is needed as waste package design information. These properties are not expected to be significantly affected by the fabrication or closure processes.

8.3.5.9.1.2.5 Subactivity 1.4.1.2.5: Nondestructive characterization of the alternate barrier investigations waste package container

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is the development of nondestructive characterization methods and the application of these methods to the detection of potentially harmful internal and surface defects on the ceramic-metal, bimetallic/single metal, or coating and filler-based waste package container that evolve from the alternative barriers investigation. These potentially harmful interior and surface defects may result from container fabrication, post-fabrication closure, or handling operations.

Parameters

The nondestructive characterization methods of potential usefulness include

1. Visual inspection, with or without optical aids.
2. Liquid penetrant inspection.
3. Magnetic particle inspection.
4. Radiography.
5. Eddy current.
6. Ultrasonic.
7. Acoustic emission.

Depending on the particular candidate container material system being inspected, several of these nondestructive characterization methods will be selected for evaluation of intentionally introduced flaws that simulate the defect types that are expected (discussed below).

The emphasis in this subactivity will be on adaptation of presently operational nondestructive characterization methods to the alternative concepts, with the development of new characterization methods being undertaken only if a pressing need for such work is clearly identified.

Discussion

The presence of undetected and unremoved interior and/or surface defects could accelerate one or more of the degradation modes discussed in Information Needs 1.4.2 (Section 8.3.5.9.2) and 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3). Two classes of conditions are of concern to ceramic and metallic alternate barrier investigations designs:

1. Mechanical defects such as porosity, cracks, scratches, and inclusions, all of which could degrade container performance through delayed failure after emplacement.

2. Chemical contamination of the surface. Of particular concern here are impurity residues (such as chlorides) that could ultimately concentrate over time and contribute to container failure.

The production of surface defects and contamination depends on many process and operational variables. These will become better defined as decisions on process selections are made and details of the operations are more focused. The critical sizes of surface defect or levels of chemical contamination will be determined in activities dealing with the various degradation modes.

Much of the work in this subactivity will be directed toward developing ways of detecting small mechanical defects and surface residue concentrations. Detailed specifications for container handling in the surface facility and in the repository will be prepared to minimize potentially harmful surface effects. The extent to which the activity will be pursued also depends on the material ultimately selected.

8.3.5.9.1.3 Application of results

The results of these activities will be used to

1. Describe the as-emplaced container for use in predicting repository performance.

2. Establish meaningful laboratory test conditions for activities discussed under Information Need 1.4.2 (Section 8.3.5.9.2). Results from these tests input into the models for the different degradation modes (Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3)). These test conditions specify the metallurgical and strain conditions that govern the susceptibility to certain forms of localized corrosion, stress corrosion cracking, and hydrogen embrittlement. For some of the candidate alloys, projections of microstructures that may develop over the long-term containment period are important because of either potential embrittlement problems or greater susceptibility to different corrosion modes. Analysis of the expected as-fabricated, as-welded (or otherwise assembled), as-emplaced structure serves as the basis for beginning these projections.

3. Form part of the basis for materials selection for final waste package designs. The selection process is discussed in Information Need 1.4.2. That information need sets the basis for establishing selection criteria and the weighting factors for each criterion. The performance under anticipated repository conditions is expected to be the paramount criterion, but considerations of mechanical and physical properties plus many practical considerations under the category of fabricability and weldability may also play an important role in the selection process. An important part of the fabricability and weldability issues related to whether unfavorable mechanical-microstructural features are produced in an otherwise resistant material.

4. Form a basis for establishing any additional specifications on the composition and mechanical properties of the candidate materials beyond the normal industry specifications. The results from Information Need 1.4.2 will also be used as input for this basis.

5. Provide guidance in selecting the industrial processes for forming, joining, and handling the container. These results will further serve as input to information needs under Issues 2.4 (options for waste retrievability, Section 8.3.5.2), 2.6 (preclosure waste package characteristics, Section 8.3.4.3), and 4.3 (waste package production technologies, Section 8.3.4.4).

6. Complete certain elements of the design that are materials dependent. Most waste package design features, at the conceptual level, are not sensitive to the material eventually selected. At the advanced design stage, detail on the selected material and processes for producing and handling the container is needed. These results are input into Information Need 1.10.2 (Section 8.3.4.2.2).

7. Establish the feasibility for a spent fuel waste package based on one of the concepts developed under the alternative barriers-investigations. This feasibility evaluation is based on the physical, mechanical, and corrosion properties of one or more of the material systems to be evaluated in the alternative barriers investigations, as well as the feasibility of forming a waste package container. This feasibility determination supplies information to Information Needs 1.4.2 (Section 8.3.5.9.2) and 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3).

8.3.5.9.2 Information Need 1.4.2: Material properties of the container

Technical basis for addressing the information need

This information need addresses the material properties of the candidate metals that are needed to establish the prediction of the performance of the selected container material. Behavior of weld metal and weld heat-affected zones will be considered in addition to the base metal. Because the borehole liner will be made from the same alloy family as the container, information gathered here will provide a description of the performance of the borehole liner. Information from this testing program supplies the models discussed in the Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3) for each possible degradation mode that the container might experience in the postemplacement repository environment.

This information need also covers the characterization of the material systems proposed for use in an alternative design for spent fuel packages. This option will be pursued since the feasibility of producing such a liner is favorable if the demonstration that a metal-only waste package can meet the containment objectives proves too difficult.

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

The six candidate metallic container materials for the waste package are introduced and discussed in Section 7.4.2 on metal barriers. Representative mechanical properties and the metallurgical industry standard composition ranges are given in Section 7.3 for each candidate material. The postemplacement environmental conditions that will surround the containment barrier are discussed in Section 7.4.1; the geochemical modeling of the environment is described in Section 7.4.4. The waste package design and a brief discussion on fabrication and welding (or other closure) processes for producing the waste package are given in Section 7.3.

The material presented in Section 7.4.2 deals with experimental work performed by the Yucca Mountain Project from 1983 to 1986 and data available from other published sources. A large portion of this work is centered on austenitic stainless steels (including some work on austenitic alloy 825), with a smaller portion centered on copper and its alloys. Although the earlier emphasis was on the austenitic stainless steels, all candidate materials are being equally considered in the selection process for the material to be used in the license application design.

Parameters

Information needed from other information needs includes

1. The candidate container materials (Information Need 1.4.1, Section 8.3.5.9.1).

2. The design features that influence container material selection and performance of the container material (Information Need 1.4.1).

3. Characterization of the as-emplaced container with respect to its mechanical microstructural, and physical properties (Information Need 1.4.1).

4. Scenarios developed to describe the waste package near-field environment (Information Need 1.5.3, Section 8.3.5.10.3).

5. Results of geochemical modeling calculations to give the chemical composition and speciation of solutions that may contact the container (Information Need 1.5.3).

6. Feasibility of using a waste package selected from one of the three concept classes covered in the alternative barriers investigations (Section 8.3.5.9.1.2) (Information Needs 1.4.1 and 1.10.2, Section 8.3.4.2.2).

The following data are to be obtained:

1. A selection of the metallic container materials to be used for advanced design analysis. The basis on which the selection is made and the methodology used in carrying out the process are parts of this information need.

2. Analyses of the different degradation modes that the candidate container materials can undergo in the thermal and environmental conditions expected in the repository after waste package emplacement.

3. A laboratory testing program centered around the selected material and the assessment of its likely degradation modes. The results from the testing program are used in modeling activities to predict the rates at which the different degradation modes will operate in the container material.

4. A laboratory testing program conducted to evaluate the metallurgical condition and properties of the full size container. This work will be conducted only on the selected metal barrier alloy. The work will consist of detailed microstructural and microchemical analyses as well as corrosion and mechanical properties tests on coupons cut from the container.

The work in this information need is divided into four activities. The first activity concerns the process for selecting the material for the license application design. The next three activities are specific to the

container materials: (1) copper-based materials, (2) austenitic materials, and (3) material systems that evolve from work in the alternative barriers investigations. These three activities deal with the analyses of the different degradation modes and the testing program needed to provide data for the predictive performance models in Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3). The subactivities described in the material-specific activities will not all be completed. Some of the analyses for each material category need to be performed to provide input into the selection process, but the full range of testing activities and modeling activities will be carried out only on the material selected for the final design.

8.3.5.9.2.1 Activity 1.4.2.1: Selection of the container material for the license application design

This activity is focused on selection of the container material for more detailed characterization of its properties relevant to attaining the performance objectives of the postemplaced container. This activity involves the metallic materials and ceramic-metal systems, bimetallic/single metal systems, and coatings and filler systems. Two subactivities support this activity.

8.3.5.9.2.1.1 Subactivity 1.4.2.1.1: Establishment of selection criteria and their weighting factors

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to develop a methodology to select the container material from the list of candidate materials. A peer review group will be formed to review this methodology and its use to arrive at the final material choice.

Parameters

The following is a preliminary list of the criteria for selecting a container material for the license application design:

1. Which material will meet the performance allocated to the container in achieving the containment objectives (substantially complete containment under anticipated processes and events occurring in the repository)?

    a. Resistance to oxidation.

    b. Resistance to general aqueous corrosion.

    c. Resistance to environmentally accelerated cracking (stress corrosion cracking and hydrogen embrittlement).

    d. Resistance to pitting, crevice, or other localized attack.

e. Demonstration of adequate mechanical properties.

f. Resistance to mechanical embrittlement.

2. Can the performance of the material under repository conditions be adequately predicted?

   a. Predictability of physical and chemical properties of as-emplaced container.

   b. Existence of models to explain and predict degradation phenomena, or ability to develop such models.

   c. Existence of models to extrapolate laboratory data on degradation phenomena to repository time scales and conditions, or ability to develop such models.

3. Will the container material interact favorably with other components?

   a. Interactions with waste form.
   b. Interactions with borehole liner.
   c. Interactions with the package environment.

4. Can the container be made of this material?

   a. Fabricability of container body.
   b. Weldability of container (closeability if a nonwelded closure).
   c. Inspectability of closure.

5. Are the container material and process for fabricating it practicable?

   a. Availability of container material.
   b. As-fabricated container costs.
   c. Quality control requirements (and costs).
   d. Repository handling costs.

6. How can the confidence in the selection be gained?

   a. Previous engineering applications with the material.
   b. Available data base on material.
   c. Favorable (or unfavorable) experiences with material.

Weighting factors for each of the preceding criteria will need to be established. It is expected that criteria 1, 2, and 4 will have the heaviest weighting, but all the criteria have some importance. One approach is to assign a maximum number of points to each item in the criteria list and a minimum number for each item that the material must pass. As a rather extreme sample, it does no good to have a highly corrosion resistant material that cannot be fabricated and closed.

Where appropriate and available, examples of methods that have successfully been used to predict longer term behavior of materials from short-term

laboratory or field tests will be used. Examples may derive from atmospheric corrosion testing, marine corrosion testing, underground testing, chemical process industry testing, and nuclear and fossil fuel power plant testing. These examples will provide information to some of the items listed in criteria 2 and 6.

Description

Development of the selection criteria and organization of the peer review group are the first items to be completed in this subactivity. The Yucca Mountain Project will use its own staff and consultants to develop the selection criteria and weighting factors. The selection criteria and weightings will then be reviewed by the peer review panel. Following revision, if necessary, the criteria will be used to assess the candidate materials and select a material or materials. The peer review panel will then review the selection assessments. The peer review panel will consist of approximately seven individuals with backgrounds in different areas of metallurgy and materials science and with different work experiences to achieve a balance of viewpoints and perceptions.

8.3.5.9.2.1.2 Subactivity 1.4.2.1.2: Material selection

After the review panel is organized and selection criteria established, the next step is to perform the selection. Input into the selection process comes, in part, from (1) the Yucca Mountain Project analyses on the significance of different possible degradation modes (discussed in the next activity) and (2) available published literature concerning the performance of candidate materials in applications and environments that have analogies with expectations of conditions in the proposed Yucca Mountain repository. Depending on the outcome of the selection process, the Yucca Mountain Project may elect to carry more than one material forward for additional characterization for the license application design.

8.3.5.9.2.2 Activity 1.4.2.2: Degradation modes affecting candidate copper-based container materials

This analysis concerns the analysis of which degradation modes have any significant chance of occurring on the candidate copper-based materials in the postemplacement periods and laboratory testing activities to provide information for the modeling activities discussed in Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3). The candidate copper-based materials are Copper Development Association (CDA) 102 (high-purity, oxygen-free copper), CDA 613 (aluminum bronze), and CDA 715 (70/30 copper-nickel).

Eight subactivities address the evaluation.

8.3.5.9.2.2.1 Subactivity 1.4.2.2.1: Assessment of degradation modes in copper-based materials

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to evaluate the likelihood of each potential degradation mode occurring under conditions anticipated at Yucca Mountain.

Parameters

The parameters for this subactivity are

1. Literature data documenting the causes for failure of this class of materials.

2. Interpretation of these causes of failure in the context of fabricating a container (Information Need 1.4.1, Section 8.3.5.9.1) and emplacing it in the Yucca Mountain repository (Information Need 1.5.3, Section 8.3.5.10.3).

Description

The corrosion and oxidation resistance of the copper-based material relies first of all on the electrochemical nobility of copper and secondly on the formation of a protective surface layer. The protective layer is a thick oxide that forms on the copper-based materials and acts as diffusion barrier to mass transport. Thus, the rates of oxidation and general aqueous corrosion are initially high but become progressively lower with the growth of the protective layer. The rate of corrosion or oxidation is expected to be proportional to the oxidation-reduction potential of the environment, so that the oxidation or corrosion rate increases with an increase in the oxidizing nature of the environment. On the other hand, when the protective layer is broken, the underlying metal is not very active electrochemically. Hence, active-path corrosion phenomena (e.g., pitting and stress corrosion cracking) are usually not as severe as they are with active-passive materials such as the austenitic materials when the passive film is broken on these. A more complete discussion of these points is found in Section 7.4.2.

Copper and its alloys do have their vulnerabilities, and a substantial part of the laboratory testing program is focused on whether these vulnerabilities are substantive in the context of conditions at Yucca Mountain. There are three areas of particular concern:

1. The formation of strongly oxidizing species such as nitrogen dioxide or nitric acid in irradiated moist atmospheres is expected to increase the corrosion rates of copper.

2. The presence of ammonia, which can be formed by radiolysis of atmospheric gases in some circumstances, is a concern because it forms very soluble complexes with copper and destroys protective films. As a consequence, the general corrosion rate increases substantially, and ammonia provokes stress corrosion cracking (transgranular crack pattern) in copper and many copper-based alloys.

Other chemical species have been implicated in causing stress corrosion cracking in copper-based materials; as with ammonia, the role of these species is probably one of destabilizing the protective film. Whether the presence of any of these or similar species would be significant in the postemplacement environment at a Yucca Mountain repository needs to be demonstrated.

3. The presence of segregation effects in the long term, particularly if there is segregation of the less noble constituent from the copper, creating a large galvanic cell within the alloy. The segregation effects may be of concern even though copper and the two candidate alloys appear to have simple metallurgical microstructures.

Classification of degradation modes generally follows from the morphology of the attack (uniform, localized, stress-assisted, embrittlement) as indicated earlier in the material under the issue-level discussion. For the purposes of organizing the work in this and the next information need, the degradation modes have been placed into seven groups. This grouping is based on the performance models discussed in Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3). The analysis in this information need emphasizes the vulnerabilities of the materials, and much of the effort is directed toward establishing how much these vulnerabilities matter in demonstrating performance of the material.

Seven degradation modes of copper and copper-based alloys are being considered:

1. Metallurgical aging and phase stability.
2. Low temperature oxidation.
3. General aqueous corrosion.
4. Hydrogen entry and embrittlement.
5. Pitting, crevice, and other localized attack.
6. Stress corrosion cracking.
7. Other potential degradation modes.

The order these degradation modes were presented in does not imply a ranking according to importance, but rather was developed to streamline the discussion in this and the next Information Need (1.4.3). In summary, this activity reviews the pertinent literature on the different copper-based material degradation modes as well as the relevance of previous Yucca Mountain Project laboratory work (Section 7.4.2). This activity assesses the potential for occurrence of each mode and estimates the severity of attack. All this information provides input to the container material selection (Activity 1.4.2.1, Section 8.3.5.9.2.1).

8.3.5.9.2.2.2 Subactivities 1.4.2.2.2 through 1.4.2.2.8: Laboratory test plan for copper-based materials

The following subactivities cover the laboratory test plans and programs appropriate to each of the enumerated degradation modes:

Subactivity	Degradation mode
1.4.2.2.2	Metallurgical aging and phase stability
1.4.2.2.3	Low temperature oxidation
1.4.2.2.4	General aqueous corrosion
1.4.2.2.5	Hydrogen entry and embrittlement
1.4.2.2.6	Pitting, crevice, and other localized attack
1.4.2.2.7	Stress corrosion cracking
1.4.2.2.8	Other potential degradation modes

These subactivities will be discussed as a group and will be pursued (1) according to which material is selected for the advanced designs and (2) where literature review and analysis indicate the need to obtain data specific to Yucca Mountain conditions. The laboratory test plan will only be carried out in full for the material(s) selected for the advanced designs. The sequence of these major activities is given in the schedule and milestone section at the end of this information need.

Objectives

For the selected material, the objective of this group of subactivities is to develop and implement a laboratory test plan to provide information to the modeling activities in Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3). The test plan is oriented toward quantifying particular degradation modes or proving that the degradation mode(s) will not be operative under conditions anticipated at the Yucca Mountain repository.

Parameters

The expected important parameters for each of the degradation modes are listed under the respective activity for the modeling work in Information Need 1.4.3.

Description

The plan is to develop an experimental approach for each of the possible degradation modes. In many instances, the laboratory investigations are expected to be performed under environmental, metallurgical, or strain conditions that are intentionally made more severe than those expected to occur in the repository environment. This approach is used to accelerate the phenomenon under investigation so that measurement can be made in a reasonable amount of laboratory time (hours, days, weeks, months, and in some instances, up to a few years). Also, confidence in the modeling activities is gained by systematically extending the period of observation from shorter times with more aggressive conditions to making predictions for longer times with less aggressive conditions and then performing tests under these conditions for confirmation.

A technical review of the test plans and procedures will be conducted to assess the adequacy of the test conditions for the degradation modes. The review will be intended to ensure that the tests cover the range of conditions anticipated in the repository over the period of concern.

This approach requires sufficient understanding of the causative mechanisms for each of the degradation modes so that predictions for container failure can be made, as stated in the performance goals in Issue 1.4 and consistent with the required confidence level (Table 8.3.5.9-1). It is further recognized that several of the degradation modes are rather closely related, and it is possible that one or more can be operable under a given set of conditions. For example, aging and segregation reactions can lead to phases that create local electromechanical cells within the material.

Experiments will be performed to determine the nature of radiolytic products in the water or air that may be deleterious to copper-based alloys such as ammonia and other nitrogen-bearing compounds. Localized corrosion and stress corrosion tests in water and vapor containing these nitrogen-bearing compounds will be conducted. A criterion for selection of the metal barrier alloy will be broad resistance to these types of attack. Further details are provided in Sections 8.3.5.9.3.1.5 and 8.3.5.9.3.1.6.

The long-term, low-temperature oxidation is expected to condition the surface of the container and will influence all the other subsequent degradation modes. These points are also taken into account in the modeling activities.

In the category of "other potential degradation modes" particular corrosion and mechanical degradation processes are possible, but unlikely, based on the current understanding of conditions of Yucca Mountain. With regard to high-purity copper (CDA 102), the possibility of low temperature creep has been discussed previously and largely discounted because of the expected use of a somewhat thicker section (2-3 cm) for a container fabricated from this material. The relatively low temperatures that will occur on the container surface (maximum peak temperatures in the range of 230 to 250°C for the spent fuel packages with highest thermal loading) suggest that high-temperature metallurgical deformation and fracture processes are not significant. The possibility of a major change in the waste package environment caused by the multiplication of thermophilic bacteria has been raised. Copper and its alloys are usually resistant (although not entirely immune) to microbiological attack, probably because of the toxicity of copper compounds to lower life forms. To some extent the chemical effects of microbiological propagation can be evaluated by laboratory testing in simulated environments (for example, formation of sulfide by sulfate-reducing bacteria could be important for copper-bearing materials) if later Project analysis indicates that such microbiological entities could be introduced during the operational period and could survive in the thermal environment in Yucca Mountain. Galvanic effects will also be evaluated.

The rationale for choosing candidate copper-based alloys is described in Section 7.4.2.9.

8.3.5.9.2.3 Activity 1.4.2.3: Degradation modes affecting candidate austenitic container materials

This activity concerns the analysis to determine which degradation modes have a significant chance of occurring for the candidate austenitic materials

in the postemplacement periods and laboratory testing activities to provide information for the modeling activities discussed in Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3). The candidate austenitic materials are AISI types 304L and 316L stainless steels and the nickel-base austenitic alloy 825.

This activity consists of nine subactivities.

8.3.5.9.2.3.1 Subactivity 1.4.2.3.1: Assessment of degradation modes in austenitic materials

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to evaluate the likelihood of each potential degradation mode to occur under conditions expected at Yucca Mountain.

Parameters

The parameters for this subactivity are as follows:

1. Literature data documenting the causes for failure of this class of materials.

2. Interpretation of these causes of failure in the context of fabricating a container (Information Need 1.4.1, Section 8.3.5.9.1) and emplacing it in the Yucca Mountain repository (Information Need 1.5.3, Section 8.3.5.10.3).

Description

The fundamental feature in analyzing the behavior of the candidate austenitic materials is understanding that their oxidation and corrosion resistance depends on the formation and maintenance of a thin but protective passive film that slows down the reaction rate between the alloy and the environment. Mechanical or chemical processes that break down the passive film are responsible for initiation of degradation modes. Metallurgical reactions in the alloy fortify or weaken the stability of the passive film. Material on the analysis of potential degradation problems in the austenitic materials is given in Section 7.4.2.

Classification of degradation modes generally follows from the morphology of the attack (uniform, localized, stress-assisted, embrittlement) as indicated earlier in the material under the issue-level discussion. For the purpose of organizing the work in this and the next information need, the degradation modes have been placed into eight groups. This grouping is based in the performance models that are discussed in Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3).

The analysis of this information need emphasizes the vulnerabilities of the materials, and much of the effort is directed toward establishing how much these vulnerabilities matter in demonstrating performance of the container. The three prominent vulnerabilities of the austenitic materials that

are important in understanding the degradation modes in a variety of natural and chemical environments are (1) sensitivity to chloride ion in the environment, (2) tendency toward developing sensitized (chromium-depleted) microstructure, and (3) metallurgical metastability of austenite in the two candidate stainless steels. These vulnerability features influence the eight degradation modes around which the laboratory testing and modeling activities are centered.

The austenitic material degradation modes are the following:

1. Metallurgical aging and phase transformations.
2. Low temperature oxidation.
3. General aqueous corrosion.
4. Intergranular attack and intergranular stress corrosion cracking.
5. Hydrogen entry and embrittlement.
6. Pitting, crevice, and other localized attack.
7. Transgranular stress corrosion cracking.
8. Other potential degradation modes.

As noted previously in the discussion of the copper-based material, the presentation order is only to facilitate the discussion of the important parameters for causing the particular degradation modes and does not indicate the importance of the particular mode. In summary, this activity reviews the pertinent literature on the different austenitic material degradation modes, as well as the relevance of previous Yucca Mountain Project laboratory work (Section 7.4.2). The activity assesses the potential for occurrence of each mode and estimates the severity of attack. All this information provides input to the container material selection (Activity 1.4.2.1, Section 8.3.5.9.2.1).

8.3.5.9.2.3.2 Subactivities 1.4.2.3.2 through 1.4.2.3.9: Laboratory test plan for austenitic materials

The following subactivities cover the laboratory test plans and testing program appropriate to each of the potential degradation modes just presented. These subactivities will be discussed as a group.

Subactivity	Degradation mode
1.4.2.3.2	Metallurgical aging and phase transformations
1.4.2.3.3	Low temperature oxidation
1.4.2.3.4	General aqueous corrosion
1.4.2.3.5	Intergranular attack and intergranular stress corrosion cracking
1.4.2.3.6	Hydrogen entry and embrittlement
1.4.2.3.7	Pitting, crevice, and other localized attack

Subactivity	Degradation mode
1.4.2.3.8	Transgranular stress corrosion cracking
1.4.2.3.9	Other potential degradation modes

Subactivities 1.4.2.3.2 through 1.4.2.3.9 will be pursued (1) according to which material is selected for the advanced designs and (2) literature reviews and analyses that indicate the need to obtain data specific to Yucca Mountain conditions. The laboratory test plan will only be carried out in full on the material(s) selected for the advanced designs. The sequence of the major activities is given in the schedule and milestone section at the end of this information need.

Objectives

For the selected material, the objectives of this group of subactivities is to develop and implement a laboratory test plan to provide information to the modeling activities in Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3). The test plan is oriented toward quantifying a particular degradation mode(s) or proving that the degradation mode(s) will not be operative under conditions anticipated at the Yucca Mountain repository.

Parameters

The expected important parameters for each of the degradation modes are listed under the respective activity for the modeling work in Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3).

Description

The plan is to develop an experimental approach for each of the possible degradation modes. In many instances, the laboratory investigations are expected to be performed under environmental, metallurgical, or strain conditions that are intentionally made more severe than those expected to occur in the repository environment. This approach is used to accelerate the phenomenon under investigation so that measurement can be made in a reasonable amount of laboratory time (hours, days, weeks, months, and in some instances, up to a few years). Also, confidence in the modeling activities is gained by systematically extending the period of observation from shorter times with more aggressive conditions to making predictions for longer times with less aggressive conditions and then performing tests under these conditions for confirmation.

A technical review of the test plans and procedures will be conducted to assess the adequacy of the test conditions for the degradation modes. The review will be intended to ensure that the tests cover the range of conditions anticipated in the repository over the period of concern.

This approach requires sufficient understanding of the causative mechanisms for each of the degradation modes so that predictions for container failure can be made, as stated in the performance goals in this issue (Table 8.3.5.9-1) and consistent with the required confidence level (highest in

the containment period, lower in the postcontainment period). In addition, several of the degradation modes are rather closely related to one another, and it is possible that one or more can be operable under a given set of conditions. For example, aging and transformation reactions can lead to phases (e.g., martensite) that are more susceptible to one of the degradation modes (hydrogen embrittlement) than the parent phase. Some theories of transgranular stress corrosion cracking in stainless steels ascribe crack initiation from the bottom of a previously formed pit. The long-term, low temperature oxidation is expected to condition the surface of the container and will influence all the other subsequent degradation modes. These points are also taken into account in the modeling activities.

As discussed in the previous section on degradation modes for the copper-based materials, "other potential degradation modes" covers the corrosion and mechanical degradation modes that appear to be inconsistent with the present understanding of conditions in the Yucca Mountain repository. Creep and high-temperature deformation and fracture mechanisms on the austenitic materials appear unlikely because of the higher strength (compared with copper) of these alloys and the relatively low temperatures that will develop in the near-package environment. Galvanic effects will also be evaluated. Another example in this category is the propagation of microbiological entities that could exist in the thermal environment after waste package emplacement and that could cause significant changes in the chemical nature of the environment. With regard to the corrosion of stainless steels, some combination of circumstances could lead to aggressive environmental conditions that could result in the formation of more acidic environmental conditions that would intensify pitting, crevice, stress corrosion, and possibly hydrogen enbrittlement if sulfuric acid-forming bacteria could be introduced during the repository operational period, if a sulfur-containing food source were available, and if the bacteria could survive the long thermal period after container emplacement. The nickel-based alloy is more resistant to acid attack (and concentration of anionic species that would also occur). Bacteria that use nitrogen or iron as food sources may also attack iron-based materials. To some extent laboratory testing can simulate the chemical effects of the environment modification by microbiological entities. Further analysis of whether the correct conditions for microbiological life forms would ever occur in Yucca Mountain will be evaluated before initiation of this work.

One of the reasons for exploring the use of alternative container materials and designs is the potential occurrence of exceedingly aggressive conditions (such as those discussed previously) so that any of the candidate metals could not be successfully demonstrated to withstand these conditions. This is discussed in the next activity.

8.3.5.9.2.4 Activity 1.4.2.4: Degradation modes affecting ceramic-metal, bimetallic/single metal, or coatings and filler systems

This activity concerns potential degradation modes that can affect an alternative waste package container developed under the alternate barriers investigations, and the testing studies needed to quantify and model these

degradation phenomena. These degradation modes will apply to the post-emplacement periods and laboratory testing activities to provide information for the modeling activities discussed in Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3).

8.3.5.9.2.4.1 Subactivity 1.4.2.4.1: Assessment of degradation modes affecting ceramic-metal systems

Objectives

The first objective of this subactivity is to evaluate the potential degradation modes that are likely to occur in waste package containers fabricated from ceramic-metal systems under environmental conditions at Yucca Mountain. The second objective of this subactivity is to consider the experimental test programs needed to model and quantify these degradation phenomena. The ceramic-metal container may be pursued as an option if the technological feasibility study (Information Need 1.4.1, Section 8.3.5.9.1) indicates such an alternate package is feasible. The two ceramics, alumina (Al_2O_3) and titania (TiO_2), are initial candidates because of their excellent chemical stability in many aqueous environments. Other ceramic materials may be evaluated if they, too, are chemically resistant and if they meet the containment objectives.

Parameters

The parameters for this subactivity are

1. Literature data documenting the modes for failure of candidate ceramic-metal systems.

2. Interpretation of these causes of failure in the context of fabricating a waste package container (Information Need 1.4.1, Section 8.3.5.9.1) and emplacing it in the Yucca Mountain repository (Information Need 1.5.3, Section 8.3.5.10.3).

Description

At the present time, the degradation modes believed to be significant are (1) chemical dissolution of alumina and titania under repository environmental conditions and (2) delayed crack propagation and fracture driven by preexisting residual stresses at the time of emplacement and by postemplacement stresses.

In regard to corrosion, the Yucca Mountain repository, located more than 100 m above the water table, presents a relatively dry environment. Furthermore, only after several hundred years will the temperatures of most of the containers have declined sufficiently to allow water condensation and the possibility of continuous liquid contact with the container surface. This scenario presents a very challenging problem to corrosion considerations. Liquid and gas-phase reactions, as well as radiolysis effects at the container surface, must be taken into account.

Alumina (Al_2O_3) and titania (TiO_2) are believed to exhibit excellent corrosion resistance in aqueous environments when compared with other materials. Both of these compounds have been studied for waste containment application. Bulk corrosion rates on the order of 1×10^{-1} to 1×10^{-4} μm/yr have been reported and are very encouraging. However, special consideration must be given to the more localized corrosion of ceramic closures. Closure composition (metallic versus ceramic) and the possibility of localized stress-corrosion effects will be taken into consideration.

Fracture via delayed crack propagation under stress is believed to be a more limiting property of these ceramic materials than is bulk corrosion. There are two potential fracture sources to consider: (1) preexisting defects at the time of emplacement and (2) defects formed or extended by expanding corrosion products after emplacement.

It is important to emphasize that slow crack growth cannot occur without stress. Of paramount importance is an understanding of the nature and magnitude of residual stresses in the container at the time of emplacement and the stresses imparted by the repository after emplacement. All fabrication and closure methods under consideration will have to be modeled to quantify residual stresses. Once stress levels have been determined, corrosion contributions can be added and determinations can be made of the maximum allowable initial defect size to prevent failure over a given life span. We expect that corrosion factors will only apply in the case of tensile or shear stresses, and not in the case of compression.

For low levels of stress, generation of crack growth data for the long lifetimes required in this application will not be possible. Extrapolations will be required from the data base at higher levels of crack velocity. Additional data may be required. New mechanisms that could cause accelerated growth rates at lower stress must be considered. Proof testing to minimize delayed crack growth uncertainties will need to be considered.

After consideration of these fracture-mechanic studies, safety factors and maximum-permissible flaw sizes will be obtained. The plausibility of detecting flaws on the order of the maximum-permissible flaw size using current nondestructive characterization methods will be investigated.

8.3.5.9.2.4.2 Subactivity 1.4.2.4.2: Laboratory test plan for ceramic-metal systems of the alternate barriers investigations

The objective of this group of subactivities is to develop and implement a laboratory test plan to provide information for modeling activities in Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3). The test plan is oriented toward quantifying particular degradation modes or showing that the degradation modes will not be operative under conditions anticipated at the Yucca Mountain repository.

The plan is to develop an experimental approach for each of the possible degradation modes. In many instances the laboratory investigations are expected to be performed under simulated environmental conditions that are intentionally made more severe than those expected to occur in the repository

environment. This approach is used to accelerate the phenomenon under investigation so that measurement can be made in a reasonable amount of laboratory time. Confidence in the modeling activities is gained by systematically extending the period of observation from shorter times with more aggressive conditions to making predictions for longer times with less aggressive conditions, and then performing tests under these conditions for confirmation.

This approach requires an understanding of the mechanisms for each of the degradation modes so that predictions for container failure can be made, as stated in the performance goals in Issue 1.4 and consistent with the required confidence level (Table 8.3.5.9-1). It is further recognized that corrosion and delayed fracture are closely related, and it is possible that one or more can be operable under a given set of conditions.

In the category of "other potential degradation modes" particular corrosion and mechanical degradation processes are possible, but unlikely, based on the current understanding of conditions of Yucca Mountain.

8.3.5.9.2.4.3 Subactivity 1.4.2.4.3: Assessment of degradation modes affecting bimetallic/single metal systems

Objectives

The objectives of this subactivity are to evaluate the likelihood of each potential degradation mode occurring under conditions anticipated at Yucca Mountain.

Parameters

The parameters for this subactivity are

1. Literature data documenting the causes for failure of this class of materials.

2. Interpretation of these causes of failure in the context of fabricating a container (Information Need 1.4.1, Section 8.3.5.9.1) and emplacing it in the Yucca Mountain repository (Information Need 1.5.3, Section 8.3.5.10.3).

Description

The reason for choosing a waste package container design concept that involves the use of two different metallic alloys is to be able to match the anticipated performance of the inner container and outer container to environmental conditions, as in the following:

1. Inner container -- The material will be chosen for long-term microstructural and mechanical stability and corrosion resistance at lower temperatures where significant quantities of liquid water are possible.

2. Outer container -- The material will be chosen for shorter-term microstructural and mechanical stability and corrosion resistance at higher temperatures and gamma radiation fields.

The inner container material will be chosen to be cathodic to the outer container material for additional corrosion protection and additional assistance in meeting performance goals.

Since neither materials for the inner container nor the outer container have been chosen at this time, descriptions of detailed analyses for possible degradation modes of any potentially useful bimetallic combination are premature. However, it is appropriate to point out that, in addition to any degradation modes inherent to the candidate materials as "single metal barriers" (discussed in Subactivities 1.4.2.2.1 and 1.4.2.3.1), the following factors unique to operation of bimetallic (or ceramic-metal) systems will be carefully analyzed for any specific choice of material couple:

1. The "corrosion potentials" of the metals, M_A and M_B, forming the couple under conditions anticipated in the Yucca Mountain repository.

2. The nature and kinetics of the cathodic reaction at the surface of the more electropositive metal, and the nature and kinetics of the anodic reaction at the surface of the more electronegative metal.

3. Operation of the catchment-area principle, which involves the direct proportionality of the galvanic corrosion rate to the area of the cathodic metal, under conditions of the galvanic current being limited to the diffusion rate of dissolved oxygen to the cathode.

4. The nature and conductivity of the impurity-laden water in contact with the waste package container.

The reason for choosing a waste package container design concept that involves the use of an alternate single metallic alloy, such as a nickel-based corrosion-resistant alloy, or one of the newer duplex or "super ferritic" stainless steels, is to have available a fully characterized material system that will resist much higher levels of water, a more aggressive water chemistry, and higher mechanical loads than are presently anticipated.

The fundamental feature in analyzing the behavior of candidate alternate single materials is understanding that their oxidation and corrosion resistance depends on the formation and maintenance of a thin but protective passive film that slows down the reaction rate between the alloy and the environment. Mechanical or chemical processes that break down the passive film are responsible for initiation of degradation modes. Metallurgical reactions in the alloy fortify or weaken the stability of the passive film.

Classification of degradation modes generally follows from the morphology of the attack (uniform, localized, stress-assisted, embrittlement). For the purpose of organizing the work in this and the next information need, the degradation modes have been placed into groups. This

grouping is based on the performance models that are discussed in Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3).

The plan is to develop an experimental approach for each of the possible degradation modes. Laboratory investigations will be performed under environmental, metallurgical, or strain conditions that are intentionally made more severe than those expected to occur in the repository environment, to accelerate the phenomenon under investigation so that measurement can be made in a reasonable amount of laboratory time. Confidence in the modeling activities is gained by systematically extending the period of observation from shorter times with more aggressive conditions to making predictions for longer times with less aggressive conditions and then performing tests under these conditions for confirmation.

8.3.5.9.2.4.4 Subactivity 1.4.2.4.4: Laboratory test plan for bimetallic/ single metal material systems

The following subactivities cover the laboratory test plans and testing program appropriate to each of the potential degradation modes. These subactivities are discussed as a group.

Subactivity	Degradation mode
1.4.2.4.4.1	Metallurgical aging and phase transformations in base metals, heat-affected zones, and welds
1.4.2.4.4.2	Low temperature oxidation
1.4.2.4.4.3	General aqueous corrosion
1.4.2.4.4.4	Intergranular attack and stress corrosion cracking
1.4.2.4.4.5	Hydrogen entry and embrittlement
1.4.2.4.4.6	Pitting, crevice, and other localized attack
1.4.2.4.4.7	Gamma flux effects
1.4.2.4.4.8	Galvanic effects at welds, oxide-inclusions, and surface oxides

Each of these subactivities will be pursued according to (1) the specific choices of metallic materials selected for the advanced designs and (2) literature reviews and analyses that indicate the need to obtain data specific to Yucca Mountain conditions. The laboratory test plan will only be carried out in full on the material(s) selected for the advanced designs. The sequence of the major activities is being developed.

Objectives

For the selected material, the objectives of this group of subactivities are to develop and implement a laboratory test plan to provide information to the modeling activities in Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3). The test plan is oriented toward quantifying a particular degradation mode(s) or proving that the degradation mode(s) will not be operative under conditions anticipated at the Yucca Mountain repository.

Parameters

The expected important parameters for each of the degradation modes will be developed once choices of specific metallic materials are made.

Description

The plan is to develop an experimental approach for each of the possible degradation modes. The laboratory investigations are expected to be performed under environmental, metallurgical, or strain conditions that are made more severe than those expected in the repository environment to accelerate the phenomenon under investigation so that measurement can be made in a reasonable amount of laboratory time. Confidence in the modeling activities is gained by systematically extending the period of observation from shorter times with more aggressive conditions to making predictions for longer times with less aggressive conditions and then performing tests under these conditions for confirmation.

This approach requires sufficient understanding of the causative mechanisms for each of the degradation modes so that predictions for container failure can be made, consistent with the required confidence level (highest in the containment period, lower in the postcontainment period). In addition, several of the degradation modes are rather closely related to one another, and it is possible that one or more can be operable under a given set of conditions.

8.3.5.9.2.4.5 Subactivity 1.4.2.4.5: Assessment of degradation modes in coatings and filler systems

Coatings are expected to be either ceramic or metallic. Their primary purpose would be to substantially enhance the corrosion resistance of metal containers. We do not expect their application to the ceramic-metal systems. Coatings must demonstrate closed porosity and long-term stability in regard to substrate adherence, resistance to cracking, and corrosion resistance.

Fillers (metal or nonmetallic) will provide added mechanical support between spent fuel elements and the container. Thermal properties must be compatible with waste package design regarding maximum waste-form temperature. Fillers should also provide additional long-term protection (post 1,000-yr performance) against corrosion and control the release of radionuclides.

8.3.5.9.2.4.6 Subactivity 1.4.2.4.6: Laboratory test plan for coatings and filler systems of the alternate barriers investigations

The following subactivities cover the laboratory test plans and testing program appropriate to each of the potential degradation modes. These subactivities are discussed as a group.

Subactivity	Degradation mode
1.4.2.4.6.1	Low temperature oxidation
1.4.2.4.6.2	Metallurgical stability and toughness under repository conditions
1.4.2.4.6.3	General aqueous corrosion
1.4.2.4.6.4	Hydrogen entry and embrittlement
1.4.2.4.6.5	Gamma flux effects
1.4.2.4.6.6	Mechanical degradation
1.4.2.4.6.7	Galvanic corrosion
1.4.2.4.6.8	Localized corrosion

These subactivities will be pursued according to (1) which coating or filler is selected for the advanced designs and (2) literature reviews and analyses that indicate the need to obtain data specific to Yucca Mountain conditions. The laboratory test plan will only be carried out in full on the material(s) selected for the advanced designs. The sequence of the major activities is given in the schedule and milestone section at the end of this information need.

Objectives

For the selected material, the objectives of this group of subactivities are to develop and implement a laboratory test plan to provide information to the modeling activities in Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3). The test plan is oriented toward quantifying a particular degradation mode(s) or proving that the degradation mode(s) will not be operative under conditions anticipated at the Yucca Mountain repository.

Parameters

The expected important parameters for each of the degradation modes will be developed once choices of specific materials are made.

Description

The plan is to develop an experimental approach for each of the possible degradation modes. The laboratory investigations are expected to be performed under environmental, metallurgical, or strain conditions that are more severe than those expected to occur in the repository environment. This approach is used to accelerate the phenomenon under investigation so that measurement can be made in a reasonable amount of laboratory time. Confidence in the modeling activities is gained by systematically extending the period of observation from shorter times with more aggressive conditions to making predictions for longer times with less aggressive conditions and then performing tests under these conditions for confirmation.

This approach requires sufficient understanding of the causative mechanisms for each of the degradation modes so that predictions for container failure can be made, consistent with the required confidence level (highest in the containment period, lower in the postcontainment period). In addition, several of the degradation modes are rather closely related to one another, and it is possible that one or more can be operable under a given set of conditions.

8.3.5.9.2.5 Application of results

The results of this information need are used in the scenario and modeling activities in Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3), which in turn provide information for the estimates of rates and mechanisms of container degradation (Information Need 1.4.4, Section 8.3.5.9.4) and determination of the time to loss of substantially complete containment (Information Need 1.4.5, Section 8.3.5.9.5). Because alternative materials and designs are being currently pursued to meet the containment objectives, decisions on material selection in this information need and in the Design Information Need 1.10.2 (Section 8.3.4.2.2) will determine which of the specific testing and modeling activities will be followed. Further compositional, mechanical, and microstructural specifications may be required on the selected container material to ensure a high degree of precision in making performance predictions. These will be established by the testing activities in this information need and the modeling activities in the next information need.

8.3.5.9.3 Information Need 1.4.3: Scenarios and models needed to predict the rate of degradation of the container material

Technical basis for addressing the information need

This information need combines the scenarios and conditions for the near-field provided by Information Need 1.5.3 (Section 8.3.5.10.3) and the performance of metal materials under a range of conditions provided by Information Need 1.4.2 (Section 8.3.5.9.2). Behavior of weld metal and weld heat-affected zones will be considered in addition to the base metal. The models developed here, together with data developed in Information Needs 1.4.1 and 1.4.2 (Sections 8.3.5.9.1 and 8.3.5.9.2), will be used to predict the

performance of the container during both the containment period and the postcontainment period.

Deterministic models linked to the relevant degradation modes will be developed for the selected specific container material for advanced design work. The modeling activities discussed in Section 7.4.5.4.6 and in the remainder of this section will be based on physical, chemical, metallurgical, and mechanical parameters covering the range of expected repository conditions.

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

The scenarios and conditions for container degradation are derived from the information onsite geology (Chapter 1), hydrology (Chapter 3), geochemistry (Chapter 4), emplacement environment (Section 7.1), waste package design (Section 7.3), and waste package postemplacement environment (Section 7.4.1). Some of the scenarios requiring analysis will arise from information needs of the total system performance assessment (Issue 1.1), which is discussed in Section 8.3.5.13.

Performance assessment models that will be used to predict metal barrier performance are discussed in Section 7.4.5. Design inputs to those analyses appear in Section 7.3. Details of activities that will develop waste package process models that will be implemented in performance assessment modeling appear in waste package environment (Section 7.4.1), metal barrier studies (Section 7.4.2), and geochemical modeling (Section 7.4.4). Further details are provided in information needs under Issues 1.5 (Section 8.3.5.10) and 1.10 (Section 8.3.4.2).

Parameters

The information needed from other information needs includes

1. Scenarios developed under Information Need 1.5.3 (Section 8.3.5.10.3) to describe the waste package near-field environment before container failure.

2. Results of geochemical modeling calculations from Information Need 1.5.3 to characterize the chemical composition and speciation of the solutions that might contact the container.

3. The container design characteristics from Information Need 1.4.1 (Section 8.3.5.9.1)

4. The container material properties from Information Need 1.4.2 (Section 8.3.5.9.2).

The output parameters for container performance models are tools that will allow the performance of the container to be predicted under repository postemplacement conditions.

The scenarios developed under Information Need 1.5.3 (Section 8.3.5.10.3) will define the range of conditions that correspond to the anticipated processes and events for 10,000 and 100,000 yr. The models

developed here will be used in combination with the waste package performance assessment code to provide the predictions of the conditions of the container for the first 1,000 yr after repository closure and for the postcontainment period. This will provide the information needed to calculate potential releases from waste packages during the containment period and thereafter. The parameters used in the performance assessment calculations will contain probabilistic information.

Logic

Prediction of the long-term performance of the metal barrier under repository conditions requires that all significant degradation mechanisms be identified and the probability of their occurrence be quantified. For all degradation modes that might be significant, a physical-chemical model must be developed that will allow extrapolation of data gathered in the laboratory to the times and conditions relevant to the repository. In many instances, the analysis to determine whether the degradation mode might occur requires the same model that will allow prediction of long-term behavior. Thus, in this information need, activities are included that both assess the relevance of particular degradation processes and develop models to describe their action under repository conditions. The tools developed under this information need will be used in Information Need 1.4.4 (Section 8.3.5.9.4) to predict the condition of the containers as a function of time for both anticipated processes and events and for other, low probability cases for which source term data is requested by the total system performance assessment task.

There are three activities in this information need. The first covers the investigation of copper-based materials, while the second covers the investigation of the austenitic materials. After alloy selection, only one of these activities will continue, and only one (or at most two) material will be the subject of intensive study. Other members of the alloy family may be included in testing activities if they provide insight into the behavior of the candidate materials. The third activity concerns models to predict the performance of an alternative material system.

The modeling activities discussed in this information need and the laboratory testing activities discussed in Information Need 1.4.2 (Section 8.3.5.9.2) are closely related. They are both described in fairly general terms in this document with much greater detail to be provided in the laboratory test plan that will be written for the material(s) selected for the advanced designs. Particularly for localized corrosion and stress corrosion cracking there is a considerable need to select test methods as well as materials, and this selection is best left until after the final material is selected. The sequence of activities is indicated in the schedule and milestone section at the end of this information need.

8.3.5.9.3.1 Activity 1.4.3.1: Models for copper and copper alloy degradation

Seven subactivities support this evaluation.

8.3.5.9.3.1.1 Subactivity 1.4.3.1.1: Metallurgical aging and phase stability

Objectives

This subactivity will examine the kinetics of segregation effects in the high-purity oxygen-free copper (CDA 102) and the segregation and possible precipitation kinetics in the candidate alloys CDA 613 and CDA 715. The objective is to determine whether any significant segregation or precipitation of secondary phases could occur under disposal conditions; if they occur, to what extent; and what the consequences of these reactions are on induced embrittlement or enhanced susceptibility of the metal to corrosion processes.

Parameters

Information needed from other information needs includes

1. Description of the near-field waste package environment (especially the projections of time-temperature profiles).

2. Laboratory data on the kinetics of phase segregation reactions.

3. Mechanical properties of the segregation products.

4. Electrochemical effect of segregation products on the base metal.

5. Strain in the container body material and in the heat-affected zone around the closure.

6. Residual stress.

The output parameters are the prediction of the phases that might be present in the metal container and the abundance of those phases as a function of time and repository conditions.

Description

In general, there are fewer considerations (compared with those for the other candidate materials) in the modeling of the long-term behavior of the copper systems because of the simple structure of the materials. Copper has no phase transformations, and high-purity copper has no intentional alloy constituents. The main concerns are (1) the possibility of segregation in the copper alloys over long periods of time and the effects of this on corrosion performance and (2) the precipitation of minor alloy constituents, such as iron in CDA 715 and tin in CDA 613, and their effects on corrosion and embrittlement. The aluminum content in CDA 613 approaches the solubility limit, and the effect of other alloy constituents may favor the precipitation of second phases in this alloy under some conditions.

This activity will first assess the possibility for alloy constituent precipitation and segregation in the alloys. If any of these separation effects are found to be likely, then an appropriate nucleation or diffusion-based model for the separation will be developed. Results from this model

will then be used with the models for other degradation modes (such as pitting corrosion and stress corrosion) to assess the potential for container degradation. For high-purity copper it may be necessary to model the low temperature creep of the material because of the comparatively low strength of pure copper. Although the waste package will not be under large static loads in the environment expected at Yucca Mountain, the thicker walls considered for a pure copper container may create sufficient self loading to allow significant low temperature creep over very long times. Again, the first step will be to assess the need for the model and, if necessary, develop the model. It may be advantageous to add a small amount of deoxidizer (e.g., phosphorus, beryllium, aluminum, chromium, and rare earth elements) to the high-purity copper to prevent oxygen pickup during hot working or welding. In this instance, a model for the long-term effect of the deoxidizing element in the metallurgical microstructure may be needed.

8.3.5.9.3.1.2 Subactivity 1.4.3.1.2: Low-temperature oxidation

Objectives

The objectives of this subactivity are to (1) determine the amount of metal loss by oxidation and the rate law explaining the oxidation behavior of the copper-based material over the relevant times and temperatures for the repository and (2) characterize the oxide or other protective layer formed.

Parameters

The information needed from other information needs includes

1. Results of weight loss or gain tests under relevant time-temperature conditions.

2. Description of the container environment.

3. Description of oxidation product layers.

4. Effect of radiation on moist air.

The output parameters are rate laws for the degradation of the metal by oxidation and a model for predicting the behavior of oxide layers under repository conditions. Occasionally, depending on environmental species present, other anionic species are incorporated into the oxidation product, so that a basic copper nitrate, basic copper carbonate, basic copper chloride, or basic copper sulfate is found in the oxidation product layers.

Description

Tests will be conducted under Information Need 1.4.2 (Section 8.3.5.9.2) to determine the rates of oxidation over the temperature range of interest. These data will be used to develop a model for the oxidation process under Yucca Mountain conditions. Of particular concern with copper and copper-based alloys is the rate of oxidation that will occur in the time period just after emplacement when both the temperature and the radiation dose rate is

highest. Radiolysis of the expected moist atmosphere can produce oxides of nitrogen that could cause high oxidation rates and formation of nonprotective oxides. The limited amount of testing performed in a high gamma radiation field thus far (discussed in Section 7.4.2) does not indicate excessive oxidation rates.

Oxidation studies performed on copper and copper-based alloys at temperatures generally less than 300°C (low-temperature oxidation) indicate that the oxide growth kinetics follow a cubic (or higher order) rate law. The oxide layer is dominantly Cu_2O. No indications of spilling or exfoliation of the oxide are given. Very little information on oxidation in the presence of gamma radiation is available.

The main work in the oxidation studies will most probably involve characterizing the properties of the oxide that would develop on the container surface during the long period when the surface temperature is above the boiling point of water and the environment is relatively dry. This oxide film then establishes the surface characteristics of the metal when the temperature has cooled enough that liquid water can enter the near-package environment.

8.3.5.9.3.1.3 Subactivity 1.4.3.1.3: General aqueous corrosion

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to determine the amount of metal loss by general aqueous corrosion and to establish whether a uniform pattern of attack occurs. Aqueous corrosion can occur when a more or less continuous moisture film is present on the container surface or when some portion of the container surface is immersed in water.

Parameters

The information needed from other information needs includes

1. Results of weight loss tests.
2. Description of the environment near the waste package surface.
3. Description of corrosion product layers.
4. Chemical modeling of solution composition.
5. Radiolysis effects in aqueous media.

The output parameters are estimates of the wastage of the metal container that can occur during the containment and postcontainment periods. The Project would like to be able to characterize both oxidation and general aqueous corrosion well beyond the thousand-year postclosure period. Most of the container surface will still be present in this period, and could thus provide a catchment location for water. The controlled release rate models for radioactive nuclides will depend on the potential of the container to affect water movement to and from the waste form.

Description

Many of the same points of discussion made on the low-temperature oxidation of copper and copper-based alloys apply to the discussion on general aqueous corrosion. Indeed, it is difficult to draw a hard line between oxidation and corrosion, and from the point of view of model development, many of the same features will be found in both phenomena. An important link between corrosion and oxidation is development of a thin-film electrolyte model where the "dry" oxidation case is given by the limit of a zero thickness film. Because an electrolyte is present in the aqueous corrosion case, the model is amenable to experimental verification by measurements of corrosion potentials and corrosion currents.

The characterization of the corrosion product layers in general aqueous corrosion is also important to establish whether the patinas formed on a corroding copper surface are protective. In addition, the oxide (including whatever anionic species may be incorporated with it) characteristics (e.g., composition, thickness, and defect structure) govern its behavior with regard to models for localized corrosion and stress corrosion. Models for these nonuniform kinds of corrosion will include the treatment of the breakdown and repair of protective films or layers on the metal surface.

Tests will be conducted under Information Need 1.4.2 (Section 8.3.5.9.2) to determine the rates of general corrosion over the range of temperature and water composition that could be expected in the repository. These data will be used to develop a model for the corrosion process under Yucca Mountain conditions. The general features of the model will include

1. Prediction of the oxidation-reduction potential in the environments of interest.

2. Prediction of the corrosion potential for the metal in the environments of interest.

3. Prediction of the corrosion current (and hence the corrosion rate) as a function of potential.

The oxidation-reduction potential is a measure of the oxidizing or reducing nature of the environment, and the corrosion potential is a measure of the response of the metal to the environmental oxidation-reduction potential. This model will establish boundaries for the possible range of corrosion potentials as a function of temperature and the nature and concentration of chemical species in the water (including effects of pH and dissolved atmospheric gases). Also, the residual effect of radiolysis in the environment will be considered. By the time the temperature permits liquid water in the near-package environment, the radiation field is expected to have decayed to a level at which radiolysis effects are small. The model for corrosion potentials will also be related to models being developed for localized corrosion, hydrogen embrittlement, and stress corrosion. Prediction of corrosion susceptibility depends on the values of the critical potentials required to initiate and propagate these kinds of corrosion relative to the value of the corrosion potential.

DECEMBER 1988

8.3.5.9.3.1.4 Subactivity 1.4.3.1.4: Hydrogen entry and embrittlement

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to assess what level of hydrogen in copper-based materials is necessary to cause embrittlement of the material and to significantly affect other degradation rates and mechanisms. The subactivity will then examine the environmental conditions at Yucca Mountain to determine whether that amount of hydrogen could conceivably enter the metal structure. If the required hydrogen would be available, the necessary laboratory studies will be conducted under Information Need 1.4.2 and a model developed in this subactivity to determine the effects of hydrogen embrittlement.

Parameters

The information needed from other information needs includes

1. Hydrogen production rate by radiolysis and corrosion.
2. Hydrogen recombination rate by all processes.
3. Maximum rate of hydrogen entry into the alloy.
4. Maximum concentration of hydrogen in the alloy.
5. Phase structure of the alloy.
6. Effects of hydrogen in copper-based materials.

The assessment of hydrogen effects centers around a bounding calculation for the maximum availability of atomic hydrogen at the metal surface. (Molecular hydrogen does not diffuse into the metal.) The analysis will consider both the external and internal container environments. The latter is necessary because some fuel rods that breached in reactor service may contain water that would be released to the container inner atmosphere under disposal conditions.

The model will consider the maximum rate of hydrogen permeation in the metal (i.e., the net result of hydrogen entry and loss by outward diffusion). The total trapped hydrogen will be compared with the level that produces significant effects on the container material performance under Yucca Mountain conditions. If the amount of trapped hydrogen is less than the critical level, no further work will be done. If the amount is greater, the effects of the hydrogen will be assessed. An early determination concerning the probability for embrittlement of copper should be possible and no further work will be needed.

One particular effect that occurs in high-purity copper is that of "hydrogen sickness." This is caused by the copper picking up oxygen during a hot forming or welding operation. The oxygen forms oxides in the copper that are unstable in the presence of a hydrogen-containing environment. The result is formation of water vapor blisters in the copper. Addition of a small amount of deoxidizing element (e.g., aluminum, phosphorus, beryllium, chromium, and rare earths) to the copper appears to prevent hydrogen sickness.

8.3.5.9.3.1.5 Subactivity 1.4.3.1.5: Pitting, crevice, and other localized attack

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to determine whether the necessary environmental conditions will exist to initiate pitting, crevice, or other localized corrosion attack under Yucca Mountain repository conditions. If pitting or crevice corrosion were predicted to occur, then the rate of propagation of the attack would be determined. Another kind of localized attack that is specific to some copper-based alloys is selective leaching of the less noble constituent (aluminum from aluminum bronze, nickel from copper-nickel). Therefore, this activity will assess whether selective leaching could occur in the repository environment.

Parameters

The information needed from other information needs includes

1. Near-field waste package environment conditions, especially the concentration of ions known to favor these modes of attack.

2. Quantities of electrolyte needed to set up localized corrosion cells.

3. Temperature.

4. Solution pH.

5. Metal microstructure.

6. Corrosion potential.

7. Pitting (and other critical potentials).

Description

Pitting attack occurs when the temperature and aggressive ion concentrations are sufficiently high and the pH sufficiently low to cause localized corrosion cells to initiate and propagate on the metal surface. The metal microstructure can also be important because it can lead to local breakdown of the passive corrosion films and to the establishment of galvanic cells. Precipitates and inclusions can be particularly important in favoring pitting corrosion. The ions of concern for copper and its alloys are sulfide and certain heavy metal ions (e.g., ferric and manganese). These ions are not present in the waters beneath Yucca Mountain in significant quantities, and they are not expected to be present in the vadose water at levels great enough to cause concern. (These species could possibly be introduced during the repository construction and operational periods.) Metallurgical effects on localized corrosion initiation will be assessed; these include inclusions in the metal, precipitation reactions in the metal, and segregation reactions.

The model for pitting corrosion will determine critical values for the electrochemical potential above which pitting occurs and will determine whether this potential could be reached in the system under anticipated Yucca Mountain conditions.

Crevice corrosion is not commonly observed in copper and copper-based alloys, but a full assessment of whether it can occur under repository conditions will be undertaken. Models for crevice corrosion will use critical potential analysis combined with an analysis for the potential for propagation of the crevice attack. The latter analysis will use the crevice geometry and the local chemical conditions as its basis. The data for this model development will be collected in activities described under Information Need 1.4.2 (Section 8.3.5.9.2).

Selective leaching effects are possibly tied to the segregation effects in alloys or to codissolution of both the copper and other alloy constituents with later redeposition of the copper as a sponge-like material. Selective leaching effects are most commonly associated with copper-zinc alloys; of the candidate materials, the aluminum bronze would appear to have the greatest susceptibility because of the large electrochemical potential between copper and aluminum. However, the expected oxidizing conditions in the repository would be expected to passivate the alloy and mitigate against selective leaching. This will need to be demonstrated. Severe metallurgical or environmental inhomogeneity could conceivably initiate and drive a selective leaching reaction. Selective leaching effects are also potential dependent, and so a model for this kind of localized attack will be based on analyses of critical potentials for initiating and propagating the phenomenon.

The probability of localized forms of corrosion appears to be of lesser concern than other corrosion and degradation mechanisms for copper-based materials. Any modeling activities undertaken for these materials will determine the critical potential over a wide range of environmental conditions and alloy compositions, and relate those potentials to the expected range of conditions for the repository and for the as-assembled container. Successful validation of the model in water with relatively high ionic contents will add confidence to the extrapolations needed to reach the expected repository conditions of low ionic contents.

8.3.5.9.3.1.6 Subactivity 1.4.3.1.6: Stress corrosion cracking

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to determine the potential for stress corrosion cracking to occur under the repository disposal conditions, and if it occurs, to provide a prediction for the rate of crack initiation and growth.

Parameters

The information needed from other information needs includes

1. Ammonia concentrations that could contact the container.
2. Temperature.
3. Stress (and stress intensity).
4. Alloy segregations.
5. Other ions in solutions.
6. Corrosion potential.
7. Critical potential for crack initiation.

Description

By far the most important documented failures and research investigations on stress corrosion cracking (SCC) of copper and its alloys are in ammonia and ammonia-containing environments. Ammonia (and ammonium ion, and in some instances, organic compounds that decompose to form ammonia) form highly soluble complexes with copper. These complexes destabilize the otherwise protective patinas on copper in most environments and create very active sites where the stressed protective layer is broken and rapid anodic dissolution occurs to initiate the crack. Ammonia is effective in initiating SCC in the most susceptible materials (brasses) at small concentrations. There are possible occurrences for ammonia formation in the waste package environment. For example, radiolysis of atmospheric gases (N_2 and H_2O) could produce NH_3. Although the dominant oxidizing conditions are thought to mitigate against significant ammonia formation, ammonia could form as a transient species and be present on the container surface in sufficient amounts and for sufficient times to initiate cracking. Experimental determination of these critical concentrations and times can be compared with calculations of the radiolysis reaction yield rates for ammonia.

Ammonia could also possibly form inside those waste package containers containing water-logged spent fuel. Even though the spent fuel water packages will be backfilled with argon, nitrogen will be present as an impurity, and irradiation of the internal atmosphere can produce ammonia, particularly since the absence of oxidizing conditions will favor a longer residence time or higher concentrations of ammonia.

The usual stress corrosion crack propagation mode is transgranular, but occasionally an intergranular path is observed. Oxygen (or other oxidizing species) in conjunction with ammonia also appears to be necessary for crack formation and likely influences the crack path. Segregation effects in the alloys (particularly those at grain boundaries) would influence the crack propagation path, as will the stress (or stress intensity) to maintain crack growth. Both high-purity copper and aluminum bronze are quite susceptible t ammonia-induced SCC; copper-nickel is more resistant but not immune to SCC caused by ammonia.

Besides ammonia, other chemical species have occasionally been implicated in causing SCC in copper and some of its alloys. Nitrite ion has beer reported to cause SCC in pure copper; the vadose water associated with Yucca Mountain naturally contains nitrate ion and radiolysis of atmospheric nitrogen may produce various oxides of nitrogen. In the presence of a metal

container (as a reducing agent), some amount of nitrite ion is likely to be produced.

Many of these important environmental and metallurgical parameters can be expressed in terms of critical electrochemical potentials that would correspond to SCC initiation and propagation, and a model for SCC in copper and the candidate alloys would logically begin with determination of these critical potentials in ammonia-containing environments and possibly in other environments free of ammonia.

The addition of tin (in the approximate 0.2 to 0.5 percent range) to commercial aluminum bronzes is important to prevent SCC in steam environments. The CDA 613 and 614 grades contain tin in this range.

There has been one reported occurrence of intergranular cracking of a laboratory heat of pure 70/30 copper-nickel in a high temperature steam environment (≈300°C). This might have been caused by the absence of alloy additions (especially iron) that are present in the commercial version of the alloy. This occurrence will be investigated and assessed. The role of small alloying additions may need to be investigated further if one of the copper alloys is selected for advance designs to ensure understanding of how these additions work.

8.3.5.9.3.1.7 Subactivity 1.4.3.1.7: Other potential degradation modes

This subactivity will screen other potential degradation modes not discussed previously to determine whether there is a cumulative probability of occurrence greater than 0.01 over the time interval of interest. If the probability exceeds that level, a model will be developed for the corrosion or degradation mode. Examples of models to be screened are mechanical fracture (e.g., low temperature creep) and the effect of microbiological activity on the previously discussed corrosion mechanisms. Another model for a possible degradation mode involves galvanic interaction of the metal container with other metallic components in the engineered barrier system and affiliated repository components. As mentioned in Section 8.3.4.2, the borehole liner and container material are proposed to be made from materials in the same alloy family to minimize galvanic effects.

8.3.5.9.3.2 Activity 1.4.3.2: Models for austenitic material degradation

The following eight subactivities support this evaluation.

8.3.5.9.3.2.1 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.1: Metallurgical aging and phase transformations

Objectives

This subactivity will examine the kinetics of phase transformations in the austenitic materials AISI types 304L, 316L, and alloy 825. The objective is to determine (1) whether phase transformations occur under disposal conditions; (2) if they occur, to what extent; and (3) the consequences of these phase transformations on the susceptibility of the metal to degradation by other processes.

Parameters

The information needed from other information needs includes

1. Description of the near-field waste package environment (especially the projections of time-temperature profiles).

2. Laboratory data on the kinetics of phase transformation reactions.

3. Mechanical properties of the transformation products.

4. Alloy composition of the base metal and the weld metal.

5. Strain in the container body material and in the heat affected zone around the closure.

6. Residual stress.

The output parameters are the prediction of the phases that might be present in the metal container and the abundance of those phases as a function of time and repository conditions.

Description

This subactivity will address the concern that metastability in some of the austenitic materials, particularly in types 304L and 316L, might lead to the production of brittle phases that can significantly degrade the mechanical properties of the material during the containment period. Alloy 825 is considered a stable alloy; no phase transformations should occur. (However, some precipitation reactions will occur in this alloy; these are usually thought to be beneficial (i.e., formation of tic rather than chromium-rich $M_{23}C_6$). The long-term effect of possible intergranular reactions involving aluminum, titanium, molybdenum, and other alloying elements in this material will need to be investigated.) Changes in mechanical properties could affect preclosure considerations such as ability to retrieve the waste packages. In the postclosure period, changes in mechanical properties are only of concern if they result in changes in the degradation rate of the container material by other processes. This is true because the waste packages will not be subjected to large static or dynamic loads under anticipated conditions at Yucca Mountain.

The model to be developed will address the issue of whether the long times at elevated temperature change the microstructure of the metal to the extent that the corrosion and oxidation behavior of the material is changed. Some examples of the consideration are the effect of martensite on hydrogen embrittlement (especially in type 304L), the effect of sigma phase on enhancing intergranular attack (especially in type 316L), and the effect of possible intergranular precipitates in alloy 825. The basic features of the model to be developed include the following:

1. The kinetics of the phase transformations with time due to combined effects of radiation, temperature, stress, alloy composition, and initial metallurgical structure.

2. The change in mechanical properties as a result of transformations.

Changes in corrosion performance resulting from phase transformations will be modeled under the applicable degradation mode.

The transformations to be considered are as follows:

1. Austenite to martensite (especially strain induced).
2. Austenite to ferrite.
3. Austenite to ferrite to sigma.
4. Austenite to sigma.
5. Austenite to other brittle phases (chi, Laves).
6. Austenite to intergranular precipitates (especially in alloy 825).

The transformations to sigma, ferrite, chi, an Laves are nucleation and growth reactions that will be modeled by diffusional processes. The transformation to martensite is diffusionless and will be modeled by critical temperature analysis for the start and end of the reaction.

8.3.5.9.3.2.2 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.2: Low-temperature oxidation

Objectives

The objectives of this subactivity are to determine the amount of metal loss by oxidation and the kinetics of metal oxidation and to characterize the properties of the protective films and the aging of the films with long times at the repository temperatures.

Parameters

The information needed from other information needs includes

1. Results of weight loss or gain tests under relevant conditions.
2. Description for the container environment.
3. Description of oxidation product layers.
4. Effect of radiation on the atmosphere surrounding the waste package.

The output parameters are rate laws for the degradation of the metal by oxidation and a model for the behavior of passivating oxidation product layers under repository conditions.

Description

Tests will be conducted under Information Need 1.4.2 (Section 8.3.5.9.2) to determine the rates of oxidation under repository relevant temperature, environmental, and radiation dose rate conditions. Because of the low rates expected, the oxidation rate is not expected to be a degradation mode that will cause breach of the container in 1,000 yr. Characterization of the oxidation product layers is important in establishing the conditions that will prevail on the container surface at a time when water can intrude into the waste package environment, wet the surface, and allow various aqueous corrosion processes to occur.

As discussed in the parallel activity for the copper-based materials, a model for oxidation (and for general aqueous corrosion, described in the next section) will be developed.

8.3.5.9.3.2.3 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.3: General aqueous corrosion

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to determine the amount of metal loss by general aqueous corrosion and to establish whether a uniform pattern of attack occurs. Aqueous corrosion can occur when a more or less continuous moisture film is present on the container surface or when some portion of the container surface is immersed in water.

Parameters

The information needed from other information needs includes

1. Results of weight loss tests.
2. Description of the environment near the waste package surface.
3. Description of corrosion product layers.
4. Chemical modeling of solution composition.
5. Radiolysis effects in aqueous media.

The output parameters are estimates of the wastage of the metal container that can occur during the containment and postcontainment periods. The Project would like to be able to characterize both oxidation and general aqueous corrosion well beyond the thousand-year postclosure period. Most of the container surface will still be present in this period, and could thus provide a catchment location for water. The controlled release rate models for radioactive nuclides will depend on the potential for the container to affect water movement to and from the waste form.

DECEMBER 1988

Description

Much of the discussion on general corrosion of copper-based materials applies to the discussion on austenitic materials with respect to data acquisition and model development. General aqueous corrosion is not expected to be a container failure mode during (and well beyond) the containment period, but characterization of the corrosion behavior and passive films formed on these materials are of interest in the models being developed for the different kinds of localized corrosion and stress corrosion discussed in the next several sections.

The general features of the model will include the following:

1. Prediction of the oxidation-reduction potential of the environment.

2. Prediction of the corrosion potential for the metal in the environment.

3. Prediction of the corrosion current (hence the corrosion rate) as a function of potential.

4. Prediction of the total loss of material for the containment and post-containment periods.

8.3.5.9.3.2.4 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.4: Intergranular attack and intergranular stress corrosion cracking

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to determine whether sensitization is a necessary precursor to intergranular attack and intergranular stress corrosion cracking under the conditions anticipated for the repository at Yucca Mountain. This subactivity will also determine the model to predict the time to sensitization for materials under those conditions. For conditions where cracking might be expected, a model will be developed to predict the rate of crack growth.

Parameters

The information needed from other information needs includes

1. Postemplacement environment conditions.

2. Diffusion rate of chromium in the metal as a function of temperature.

3. Diffusion mechanism for chromium in the metal.

4. Strain.

5. Alloy composition.

6. Effects of transformation products on diffusion rates.

7. Composition of carbide precipitates formed.

8. Amounts of sigma and chi phases.

The output parameters are a model to predict time to sensitization, a model to predict the probability of intergranular stress corrosion cracking and intergranular attack, and a crack propagation model.

Description

For the conditions expected at Yucca Mountain, sensitization is thought to be a necessary precursor (a prerequisite) for the intergranular stress corrosion cracking and intergranular attack of the candidate alloys. This subactivity will examine the premise that sensitization is a necessary precursor and document the conclusions of that analysis. If sensitization is determined to be a necessary precursor, a model will be developed to determine the time to sensitization under the relevant time-temperature conditions for the repository. The model will be based on the diffusion of chromium out of the metal matrix and the precipitation of carbides on the grain boundaries of the metal structure. The model will determine the time at which a continuous layer of material with chromium content less than 12 percent exists. This value is the boundary for which the passive film formed by uniform corrosion becomes unstable and leads to localized attack, especially in oxidizing environments.

The most important parameters in the model development are temperature, strain, and alloy composition. Temperature is important because the process is controlled by an activation energy. Strain is important because this can result in defects in the metal that lower the activation energy for diffusion, and alloy composition is important because of its effects on the diffusion rate of chromium and the availability of carbon to form the grain boundary chromium carbides.

The model development activities will begin with types 304 and 304L stainless steel (SS) and then extend to the molybdenum-bearing type 316 and 316L SS. The higher alloying content of the 316 types is expected to increase the activation energy for the diffusion process and thereby increase the time to develop a sensitized microstructure. The molybdenum additions also modify the chromium activity in the matrix and the carbide phases. Next, the model will be extended to the high-nickel alloy 825. In this alloy, other kinds of carbides and more complex carbides can form. The higher alloy content and more complex carbides will require a more complex model than that for types 304 and 316 SS. While alloy 825 is generally very resistant to sensitization, it is possible to sensitize this alloy.

Phases formed by transformation processes, such as discussed in Subactivity 1.4.3.2.1 (Section 8.3.5.9.3.2.1), can affect the susceptibility to intergranular attack in two ways. First, they can have different diffusion rates for chromium and can alter the time to sensitization of the metal microstructure. Second, some of the phases form at grain boundaries and are themselves subject to preferential attack under some environmental conditions. Examples of the latter are the sigma and chi phases.

Crack initiation does not necessarily imply a defect through the container wall. To determine the rate of failure of the container by cracking, it is necessary to model the crack growth process. This model will consider the role of stress and oxidation-reduction potential on the rate of crack growth.

While sensitization appears to be the most important cause for intergranular attack modes, the possibility exists that other grain boundary precipitates could favor localized attack paths in these candidate materials. Sigma phase formation could be a possible intergranular precipitate in type 316L SS, as well as some of the aluminum, titanium, or molybdenum-rich phases in alloy 825. The possibilities of these will be investigated here and in conjunction with the activities discussed under metallurgical aging and transformation.

8.3.5.9.3.2.5 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.5: Hydrogen entry and embrittlement

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to assess what level of hydrogen in austenitic materials is necessary to cause embrittlement of the material and to have a significant effect on other degradation rates and mechanisms. The subactivity will then examine the environmental conditions at Yucca Mountain to determine whether that amount of hydrogen would be available. If the level of hydrogen is available, then the necessary laboratory studies will be conducted under Information Need 1.4.2, and a model developed to determine the effects of hydrogen embrittlement.

Parameters

The information needed from other information needs includes

1. Hydrogen production rate by radiolysis and corrosion.
2. Hydrogen recombination rate by all processes.
3. Maximum rate of hydrogen entry into the alloy.
4. Maximum concentration of hydrogen in the alloy.
5. Phase structure of the alloy.
6. Effects of hydrogen in austenitic materials.

Description

The assessment of hydrogen effects centers around a bounding calculation for the maximum availability of atomic hydrogen at the metal surface (molecular hydrogen does not diffuse into the metal). The analysis will consider both the external and internal container environments. The latter is necessary because some fuel rods that breached in reactor service may contain water that would be released to the container inner atmosphere under disposal conditions.

The model will consider the maximum rate of hydrogen permeation in the metal (i.e., the net result of hydrogen entry and loss by outward diffusion). The total trapped hydrogen will be compared with the level that produces

significant effects on the container material performance under Yucca Mountain conditions. High nickel materials (e.g., alloy 825) are sometimes more susceptible to hydrogen embrittlement than the types 304L and 316L stainless steels. If the amount of trapped hydrogen is less than the critical level, no further work will be done; if the amount is greater, the effects of the hydrogen will be assessed.

8.3.5.9.3.2.6 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.6: Pitting, crevice, and other localized attack

Objectives

The objective of the subactivity is to determine whether the necessary environmental conditions will exist to initiate pitting and crevice corrosion under Yucca Mountain repository conditions.

Parameters

The information needed from other information needs includes

1. Near-field waste package environment conditions, especially the concentration of ions known to favor these modes of attack.
2. Temperature.
3. Solution pH.
4. Chloride and fluoride ion concentration.
5. Metal microstructure.
6. Corrosion potential.
7. Pitting potential.

Output parameters are quantities of electrolyte needed to set up localized corrosion cells and a model to predict the likelihood of pitting or crevice corrosion.

Description

Pitting attack occurs when the temperature and chloride concentrations are sufficiently high and the pH sufficiently low to cause localized corrosion cells to be set up on the metal surface. The metal microstructure can also be important because it can lead to local breakdown of the passive corrosion films and to the establishment of galvanic cells. Sulfide inclusions can be particularly important in favoring pitting corrosion.

The model for pitting corrosion will determine critical values for the electrochemical potential above which pitting occurs and will determine whether this potential could be reached in the system under anticipated Yucca Mountain conditions.

The model for crevice corrosion will use critical potential analysis combined with an analysis for the potential for propagation of the crevice attack. The latter analysis will use the crevice geometry and the local chemical conditions as its basis. The data for this model development will be collected in activities described under Information Need 1.4.2 (Section 8.3.5.9.2).

The model will determine the critical potential over a wide range of environmental conditions and alloy compositions and relate those potentials to the expected range of conditions for the repository and for the as-assembled container. Successful validation of the model at relatively high ionic strengths of relevant ions will add confidence to the extrapolations needed to reach the expected repository conditions of low chloride and other ionic contents.

8.3.5.9.3.2.7 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.7: Transgranular stress corrosion cracking

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to determine the potential for transgranular stress corrosion cracking to occur under the repository disposal conditions, and if it occurs, to predict the rate of initiation and growth of transgranular cracks.

Parameters

The information needed from other information needs includes

1. Chloride concentrations of water that could contact the container.
2. Temperature.
3. Stress.
4. Alloy constituents.
5. Other ions in solutions.
6. Corrosion potential.

The output parameters will be critical potentials for crack initiation and propagation.

Description

The most significant parameters for this mode of degradation are the chloride ion concentrations in solutions in contact with the metal and the stress. At very high chloride concentrations, the critical stress is below the yield stress, while in dilute solutions it is above the yield stress. There is considerable uncertainty about the level of chloride that would cause the critical stress to be at the yield stress. This is important because the welded zone of a container would be at or near the yield stress. Therefore, this model development activity will attempt to determine the critical chloride level for Yucca Mountain disposal conditions.

The model will consider the initiation of transgranular cracking to occur when the critical chloride concentration is reached. The concentration of oxygen, nitrate, and other oxidizing species is expected to influence the critical chloride level for crack initiation. The model will then provide the means to extrapolate to more dilute solutions, similar to those expected in the repository, and to provide a probability for the occurrence of transgranular cracking under those conditions. Crack growth, following crack initiation, will be modeled as a function of stress (or stress intensity), chloride content, pH, temperature, applied electrochemical potential, and content of other ionic species in solution.

The slip dissolution model for understanding the basic mechanism of stress corrosion cracking accounts for the environmental, metallurgical, and mechanical contributions in promoting stress corrosion cracking, and it treats both the properties of the metal and the oxide film on the metal surface. This model has been most extensively used in explaining stress corrosion cracking in Fe-Cr-Ni alloys, but it has been extended to other alloy systems (Staehle, 1971).

The propagation of stress corrosion cracks is determined by using sensitive techniques to measure the growth. Various geometries of test specimens are used; some types of specimens are self-loaded and others are stressed by application of a load external to the test cell environment. Some test techniques follow the growing crack directly by optical means (i.e., traveling microscope); other methods measure the crack growth by indirect means. Measurement of changes in the electrical resistance is probably the most sensitive of these techniques (Shreir, 1976).

8.3.5.9.3.2.8 Subactivity 1.4.3.2.8: Other potential degradation modes

This subactivity will screen other potential degradation modes not discussed previously to determine whether there is a cumulative probability of occurrence greater than 0.01 over the time interval of interest. If the probability exceeds that level, a model will be developed for the corrosion or degradation mode. Examples of models to be screened are mechanical fracture and the effect of microbiological activity on the previously discussed corrosion mechanisms. Another model for a possible degradation mode involves galvanic interaction of the metal container with other metallic components in the engineered barrier system and affiliated repository components. As mentioned in Section 8.3.4.2, the borehole liner and container material are proposed to be made from materials in the same alloy family to minimize galvanic effects.

8.3.5.9.3.3 Activity 1.4.3.3: Models for degradation of ceramic-metal, bimetallic/single metal, and coatings and filler alternative systems

With the introduction of alternative waste package container concepts based on ceramic-metal, bimetallic/single metal, and coatings and fillers, the spectrum of potential degradation modes for these three classes of

materials systems will strongly depend on the materials chosen for inclusion as a result of the feasibility study described in Information Need 1.4.1 (Section 8.3.5.9.1). This activity, which is divided into three subactivities (one for each class of material system), will be developed in more detail in progress reports.

8.3.5.9.3.3.1 Subactivity 1.4.3.3.1: Models for degradation of ceramic-metal systems

At least two plausible degradation modes can be identified for the ceramic element of ceramic-metal systems: (1) aqueous corrosion and (2) delayed fracture in the presence of residual and applied stresses. Brief discussions of these degradation modes follow.

1. Aqueous corrosion. The objective is to determine for very long lifetime material the amount of loss by general aqueous corrosion and to establish whether a uniform pattern of attack occurs. Aqueous corrosion can occur when a more or less continuous moisture film is present on the container surface or when some portion of the container surface is immersed in water.

The information needed from other information needs includes

1. Results of weight loss tests.
2. Description of the environment near the waste package surface.
3. Description of corrosion product layers.
4. Chemical modeling of solution composition.
5. Radiolysis effects in aqueous media.

The output parameters are estimates of the material loss from containers that can occur during the containment and postcontainment periods. The Project would like to be able to characterize aqueous corrosion well beyond the thousand-year postclosure period. The controlled release rate models for radionuclides will depend on the potential for the container to affect water movement to and from the waste form.

2. Delayed fracture in the presence of residual and applied stresses. The objective is to model and determine the long range failure potential of the ceramic element in ceramic-metal systems due to effects such as pores, weakened or stressed grain boundaries, inclusions, and cracks. These defects cause stress concentrations when the material is subjected to load. Locally the theoretical strength is exceeded and the defect grows until failure occurs.

8.3.5.9.3.3.2 Subactivity 1.4.3.3.2: Models for degradation of bimetallic/single metal systems

Depending on the particular materials chosen, the identification of critical degradation modes, and the results of laboratory programs for each of these critical degradation modes, models will be developed and validated.

The potential critical degradation modes that may require detailed modeling are enumerated below.

Bimetal container	Single metal container	Potential critical degradation mode
X	X	Metallurgical aging and phase transformations in base metal, heat-affected zones, and welds
X	X	Low temperature oxidation
X	X	General aqueous corrosion
X	X	Intergranular attack and stress corrosion cracking
X	X	Hydrogen entry and embrittlement
X	X	Pitting, crevicing, and other localized attack
X	X	Gamma flux effects
X		Galvanic effects at welds, oxide inclusions, and surface oxides

8.3.5.9.3.3.3 Subactivity 1.4.3.3.3: Models for degradation of coatings and filler systems

Depending on the particular materials chosen, the identification of critical degradation modes, and the results of laboratory programs for each of these critical deformation modes, models will be developed and validated. The potential critical degradation modes that may require detailed modeling are

1. Low temperature oxidation.
2. Metallurgical stability and toughness under repository conditions.
3. General aqueous corrosion.
4. Hydrogen entry and embrittlement.
5. Gamma flux effects.
6. Mechanical degradation.
7. Galvanic corrosion.
8. Localized corrosion.

8.3.5.9.3.4 Application of results

Only one of the container evaluations described for this information need will be carried out in full. The evaluations carried to completion will

be that for the alloy or other material system selected for use as the final container material. The results of that investigation will be used to predict the degradation rate of the container material in Information Need 1.4.4 (Section 8.3.5.9.4).

8.3.5.9.4 Information Need 1.4.4: Estimates of the rates and mechanisms of container degradation in the repository environment for anticipated and unanticipated processes and events, and calculation of the failure rate of the container as a function of time

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and the applicable support documents

The bases for the models required to obtain these estimates have been discussed in Section 7.4.5. The activities that develop data, parameters, and models to obtain these estimates are described in Sections 8.3.3., 8.3.4, 8.3.5.9, and 8.3.5.10.

Parameters

Parameters needed for estimating rates and mechanisms of container degradation include the following:

1. Waste package design (Information Need 1.10.2, Section 8.3.4.2.2).

2. Waste package design features affecting the performance of the container (Information Need 1.4.1, Section 8.3.5.9.1).

3. Material properties of the container (Information Need 1.4.2, Section 8.3.5.9.2).

4. Scenarios for anticipated and unanticipated processes and events, and models for extrapolation of container performance (Information Need 1.4.3, Section 8.3.5.9.3, and Activity 1.5.3.1.1, Section 8.3.5.10.3.1.1).

5. Characteristics of the shaft and borehole seals that may affect waste package container performance (Information Needs 1.12.1, 1.12.2, and 1.12.4 in Section 8.3.3.2.1, 8.3.3.2.2, and 8.3.3.2.4).

6. Waste package system model and uncertainty methodology (Information Need 1.5.3, Section 8.3.5.10.3).

7. Waste package environment description (Information Need 1.10.4; Section 8.3.4.2.4).

The output parameters are the rates of container degradation and container failure rate.

Logic

Once the environmental scenarios for calculating time to failure of containers and the models for predicting failure of containers have been developed and tested, the rates of container degradation may be estimated. These estimates will then be used to calculate the failure rate of the container as a function of time. The models and methodologies used for this calculation are developed in Section 8.3.5.10.3 under Information Need 1.5.3 and applied here for the container failure rate calculation.

One activity will be performed under this information need. It will exercise both the deterministic system model and its associated uncertainty methodology developed in Information Need 1.5.3.

8.3.5.9.4.1 Activity 1.4.4.1: Estimate of the rates and mechanisms of container degradation in the repository environment for anticipated and unanticipated processes and events, and calculation of container failure rate as a function of time

The following two subactivities support this analysis.

8.3.5.9.4.1.1 Subactivity 1.4.4.1.1: Deterministic calculation of rates of container degradation in the repository environment for anticipated and unanticipated processes and events, and calculation of container failure rate as a function of time

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to use the deterministic waste package system model developed in Activity 1.5.3.5 (Section 8.3.5.10.3.5) and the scenarios developed in Activity 1.5.3.1 (Section 8.3.5.10.3.1) to estimate (1) the container degradation rates and (2) the time to initiation of release of radionuclides from the waste package. This system model incorporates models for container performance developed in Information Need 1.4.3 (Section 8.3.5.9.3).

Parameters

The parameters required for this activity are given in the preceding combined list in the technical basis section for the information need. The output parameters are the times at which the corrosion modes can be initiated (due to aging, sensitization, and environmental conditions), the rates of container degradation, and time to initiation of release of radionuclides from the waste package under specified conditions for the scenarios representing anticipated and unanticipated processes and events.

Description

The system model is discussed in Section 8.3.5.10.3. The estimates of container performance will be made in three phases: (1) for the design

concepts discussed in Section 7.3, (2) for the advanced conceptual design, and (3) for the license application design. The later phases will use modeling concepts developed in the previous phases, and therefore are difficult to discuss at this point. However, it is likely that analyses in all phases will incorporate many of the same elements.

The analysis of waste package designs will proceed by assembling sets of system model input parameters developed in Section 8.3.5.9.3 (Information Need 1.4.3) and executing the system model code to obtain estimates of rates and mechanisms of container degradation. These estimates will be calculated for the range of values of those parameters determined to be important to container performance. These estimates will be calculated for scenarios that represent both anticipated and unanticipated processes and events. In addition, in the earlier phases of waste package design, information developed in the system model calculations will be available as input to later design phases.

8.3.5.9.4.1.2 Subactivity 1.4.4.1.2: Probabilistic calculation of rates of container degradation and distribution of time to initiation of release of radionuclides from the waste packages

Objectives

Because of heterogeneities in both the environment and components of the waste package design, deterministic calculation of performance alone will not be sufficient to provide the performance measures for the set of waste packages for this issue and to support the reasonable assurance standard required by the NRC. The objective of this subactivity is to provide a probabilistic analysis of waste package container performance addressing these uncertainties, using the uncertainty modeling methodologies developed in Activity 1.5.3.5 (Section 8.3.5.10.3.5).

Parameters

The input parameters for the activity are given in the preceding combined list for the information need. The output parameter is the cumulative distribution function for time to initiation of release of radionuclides from the waste package.

Description

The uncertainty methodologies developed in Activity 1.5.3.5 (Section 8.3.5.10.3.5) will be employed using the waste package system model to assess the reliability of the waste package with respect to failure of the container. This task will be accomplished in concert with the phases of system model development and application. Development of the waste package system model is discussed in Section 8.3.5.10.3, in the context of a model for release calculations. However, the waste package system model will also provide the time to failure of the container. The most likely approach for determining the distribution for time to failure of the container and initiation of the release of radionuclides from the waste package will be to exercise the system model for a range of model inputs selected by a procedure

for sampling from distributions of input variables. The input variables may be random variables having probability distributions, or they may be variables that range over known actual distributions. The latter case might apply for example, to the distribution of package heat generation rates after all the packages have been loaded and documented. For less important input variables, bounding distributions may be used.

The uncertainty calculations will be performed for each of the design phases, although they are only required for the license application design analysis. This procedure will allow testing on the early design phases, and modifications of other methodology during later phases. At least two types of uncertainty will be addressed. First, the uncertainty in the predicted times to failure of the containers resulting from uncertainties in the fabrication and environment of the waste packages will be calculated. Then the secondary uncertainty (that is the confidence in the best estimate of cumulative distribution function for time to failure of the containers) will be assessed. Together with the deterministic simulations for bounding cases for time to container failure, these results will provide the time of initiation of the radionuclide release from the waste package. Thus, these results will address container failures, whose limitations during the containment period is one of the design objectives for resolution of this issue.

8.3.5.9.4.2 Application of results

The estimates of container degradation developed in these activities will be used as inputs to the activities under Information Needs 1.4.5 and 1.5.4 (Sections 8.3.5.9.5 and 8.3.5.10.4).

8.3.5.9.5 Information Need 1.4.5: Determination of whether the set of waste packages meets the performance objective for substantially complete containment for anticipated processes and events

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and the applicable support documents

The basis for the models required to perform these calculations has been discussed in Section 7.4.5. The activities that perform these calculations are described in Sections 8.3.5.9.4 and 8.3.5.10.4. The activities that develop data, parameters, and models to support the calculations in Sections 8.3.5.9.4 and 8.3.5.10.4 are described in earlier sections of 8.3.5.9 and 8.3.5.10, respectively.

Parameters

The parameters needed for the determination of whether the substantially complete containment performance objective for anticipated processes and events is met are as follows:

1. Quantitative interpretation of substantially complete containment.

2. Calculation of times to initiation of release of radionuclides from the waste package from Section 8.3.5.9.4 (Information Need 1.4.4).

3. Release rate of radionuclides from failed waste packages from Section 8.3.5.10.4 (Information Need 1.5.4).

The output parameter is a determination of whether substantially complete containment has been satisfied during the containment period. If not satisfied, a second output parameter is the earliest time at which the requirement is not satisfied.

Logic

The design requirements set to fulfill substantially complete containment (discussed in Section 8.3.5.9, under Regulatory basis for the issue) will impose quantitative requirements on performance measures to be maintained during the containment period up to 1,000 yr after closure. To evaluate these design requirements, the following quantities are required:

1. The fraction of radioactivity retained within the set of waste packages for the duration of the containment period.

2. The annual release rate of radioactivity from the engineered barrier system.

The results of calculations to determine the percentage of containers that will not provide total containment of radionuclides for the duration of the containment period and times to container failure are taken from Information Need 1.4.4, Section 8.3.5.9.4. The release rate of radionuclides summed over the subset of failed containers and the total quantity of radioactivity inside the waste packages are taken from Information Need 1.5.4, Section 8.3.5.10.4. These calculational results are compared with the design objectives of the interpretation of substantially complete containment to determine whether this issue (1.4) has been resolved.

One activity will be performed under this information need. It will compare the calculation of performance of the repository ensemble of waste packages with the interpretation of substantially complete containment.

8.3.5.9.5.1 Activity 1.4.5.1: Determination of whether the substantially complete containment requirement is satisfied

Objectives

Waste package system modeling results developed in Activity 1.4.4.1 (Section 8.3.5.9.4.1) and Information Need 1.5.4 (Section 8.3.5.10.4) will be used to predict waste package containment performance using the scenarios and models developed in Section 8.3.5.10.3. The results of these calculations will then be compared with the interpretation of substantially complete containment to determine whether the performance objective has been met for all times during the containment period.

Parameters

The parameters required for this investigation are given in the technical basis section for this information need. The output parameter is the determination of substantially complete containment under specified conditions represented by the scenarios.

Description

The calculation of waste package container performance was made in Information Need 1.4.4 (Section 8.3.5.9.4), and the calculations for release of radionuclides from failed waste packages are performed in Information Need 1.5.4 (Section 8.3.5.10.4). Comparison of these results with the interpretation of substantially complete containment (Section 8.3.5.9) will complete this investigation.

8.3.5.9.5.2 Application of results

The results of this information need will provide resolution to this Issue (1.4).

8.3.5.9.6 Schedules for containment by waste package (Issue 1.4)

Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package) includes five information needs. The schedule information for these information needs is summarized i Figure 8.3.5.9-5. This figure includes the information need number and a brief activity description, as well as major events associated with each information need activity. A major event, for purposes of these schedules, may represent the initiation or completion of an activity, completion or submittal of a report to the DOE, an important data feed, or a decision point. Solid lines on the schedule represent information need activity durations and dashed lines show interfaces among activities as well as data transferred into or out of this performance assessment issue. The events shown on the schedule and their planned dates of completion are provided in Table 8.3.5.9-6.

The schedules, in combination with information provided in the logic diagram for this issue (Figure 8.3.5.9-1), are intended to provide the reade with a basic understanding of the relationships between major elements of th site, performance, and design programs. The information provided in Table 8.3.5.9-6 and Figure 8.3.5.9-5, however, should be viewed as a snapshot in time.

The overall program schedule presented here is consistent with the Draf Mission Plan Amendment (DOE, 1988a). The site characterization program will undergo a series of refinements following issuance of the statutory SCP. Refinements will consider factors both internal and external to the site characterization program, such as changes to the quality assurance program. Such refinements are to be considered in ongoing planning efforts, and changes that are implemented will be reflected in the semiannual progress


1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
DEIS
LA
INFORMATION NEED
START WASTE PACKAGE ACD
COMPLETE WASTE PACKAGE ACD; START WASTE PACKAGE LAD
COMPLETE WASTE PACKAGE LAD
1.4.1 WASTE PACKAGE DESIGN FEATURES NEEDED
Glass and Spent Fuel Waste Form Models (Activities 1.5.3.3 and 1.5.3.4)
1.4.2 MATERIAL PROPERTIES OF CONTAINMENT BARRIER
to Glass and Spent Fuel Waste Form Models (Activities 1.5.3.4 and 1.5.3.3)
Data from Waste Package Near Field Environment (Information Need 1.10.4)
1.4.3 SCENARIOS AND MODELS NEEDED
to Development of System Models (Activity 1.5.3.5)
to Scenarios for Release from Waste Package (Activity 1.5.3.1)
to Waste Package Design (Information Need 1.10.2) and Waste Package System Model (Activity 1.5.3.5)
1.4.4 AND 1.4.5 CONTAINMENT BARRIER DEGRADATION: TIME TO LOSS OF CONTAINMENT
Waste Package Ensemble Performance Assessment Model for ACD (Activity 1.5.3.5)
Final Waste Package Ensemble Model for LAD (Activity 1.5.3.5)
Ensemble/Uncertainty Code and Process Models (Activity 1.5.3.5)
to Waste Package Design (Issue 1.10)
to Waste Package Design (Information Need 1.10.2)
LEGEND
FLOW OF WORK
INTERFACE OF TRANSFER OF INFORMATION
A MAJOR EVENT
DEIS - DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
LA - LICENSE APPLICATION
ACD - ADVANCED CONCEPTUAL DESIGN
LAD - LICENSE APPLICATION DESIGN

Figure 8.3.5.9-5. Schedule and milestones for Issue 1 4 (containment by waste package) See Table 8 3 5 9-6 for descriptions of major events This network is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE. 1988a) schedule Revisions will be published in semiannual site characterization progress reports as new information becomes available

Table 8.3.5.9-6. Major events and planned completion dates for information needs in Issue 1.4 (waste package performance) (page 1 of 3)

Information need number	Brief description of information need	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.4.1	Waste package design features needed	A	Information on waste package material selected feeds to waste package advanced conceptual design (ACD); information on alternative barriers recommended for further testing feeds to waste package ACD	10/89
		B	Final selection of waste package material and design concept feeds to waste package license application design (LAD)	1/92
1.4.2	Material properties of containment barrier	A	Provide information on parametric testing to container materials modeling	12/88
		B	Information on the preliminary results of parametric testing available for use in material selection	8/89
		C	Metal barrier material selected	10/89
		D	Test plan available to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for metal barrier testing	3/90
		E	Initiate license application testing of metal barriers	5/90

Table 8.3.5.9-6. Major events and planned completion dates for information needs in issue 1.4 (waste package performance) (page 2 of 3)

Information need number	Brief description of information need	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.4.2	Material properties of containment barrier (continued)	F	Complete testing of alternative barriers; results of testing feed to development and testing of materials models	9/91
		G	Container material test data update available to DOE	11/91
		H	Complete parametric studies of container materials	3/92
		I	Complete metal barrier data acquisition to support draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) performance calculations	9/92
1.4.3	Scenarios and models needed	A	Information from parametric testing available for container materials model development	12/88
		B	Complete corrosion modes model studies	11/89
		C	Complete preliminary metal barriers models	7/91
		D	Materials modeling update available to DOE; begin update of materials modeling incorporating information available on alternate barriers	11/91
		E	Provide results of metal barriers testing to waste package performance assessment	10/92

Table 8.3.5.9-6. Major events and planned completion dates for information needs in Issue 1.4 (waste package performance) (page 3 of 3)

Information need number	Brief description of information need	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.4.3	Scenarios and models needed (continued)	F	Final report on oxidation and corrosion performance of selected container materials available to DOE	1/94
1.4.4; 1.4.5	Containment barrier degradation; time to loss of containment	A	Begin ensemble and uncertainty analysis for conceptual design following development of uncertainty codes and process models	2/89
		B	Complete performance assessment of waste package ACD	1/92
		C	Complete assessment of ACD ensemble performance against regulatory criteria using uncertainty models	10/92
		D	Complete performance assessment of waste package LAD	1/94
		E	Complete analysis of LAD ensemble performance using uncertainty models	10/94
		F	Complete report on LAD ensemble performance for defining source term from waste package	1/95

[a]The letters in this column key major events shown in Figure 8.3.5.9-3.

reports. Summary schedule information for this issue can be found in Section 8.5.2.2.

DOE/RW-0199

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.10, Engineered Barrier System Release Rates

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

.3.5.10 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.5: Will the waste package and repository engineered barrier systems meet the performance objective for radionuclide release rates as required by 10 CFR 60.113?

egulatory basis for the issue

The NRC regulations will set a performance objective for control of the elease rate of radionuclides from the engineered barrier system for the time eriod following the end of the containment period. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has determined that the duration of the period of regulatory concern extends for 10,000 years following permanent closure of the epository. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act requires that the NRC regulations ot be inconsistent with the EPA standards (NWPAA, 1983). Therefore, the DOE nfers that the performance objective for controlled release extends from the nd of the containment period to 10,000 years following permanent closure of he repository.

The portion of 10 CFR Part 60 that sets the performance objective for ontrol of radionuclide release rate is Section 60.113(a)(1)(ii), and it tates, in part, the following:

> the engineered barrier system shall be designed, assuming anticipated processes and events, so that...(B) The release rate of any radionuclide from the engineered barrier system following the containment period shall not exceed one part in 100,000 per year of the inventory of that radionuclide calculated to be present at 1,000 years following permanent closure, or such other fraction of the inventory as may be approved or specified by the Commission; provided that this requirement does not apply to any radionuclide which is released at a rate less than 0.1 percent of the calculated total release rate limit. The calculated total release rate limit shall be taken to be one part in 100,000 per year of the inventory of radioactive waste, originally emplaced in the underground facility, that remains after 1,000 years of radioactive decay.

This issue is specifically restricted to showing that the engineered arrier system is designed in conformance with the statement quoted in the receding paragraph; however, there are other needs for release rate information to support resolution of other issues. To simplify the presentation f the plans and to minimize redundancy in the discussion, the information eeds under this issue will include plans to gather data to support resolution of the following issues:

1. Issue 1.1: This issue requires source term data for use in the system analysis calculations. Data on the release rate of radionuclides from the engineered barrier system for a period of 10,000 yr under anticipated processes and events to support these calculations will be provided. Data on release rates of radionuclides under lower probability scenarios (unanticipated processes and events) for 10,000 yr will also be provided. Plans for collection of the data will be given in Information Needs 1.5.4 and 1.5.5 (Sections 8.3.5.10.4 and 8.3.5.10.5).

2. Issue 1.4: This issue requires information on the rate of cladding failure and radionuclide release rate data from failed containers during the containment period. Plans for collection of the data will be given in Information Needs 1.5.1 through 1.5.4 (Section 8.3.5.10.1 through 8.3.5.10.4).

3. Issue 1.9: This issue deals with the higher level findings required under 10 CFR Part 960. In particular, 10 CFR 960.3-1-5 requires calculation of the cumulative releases to the accessible environment during 100,000 yr. The data gathered in Issue 1.5 will be used to support resolution of Issue 1.9.

These issues are addressed in Sections 8.3.5.13 (Issue 1.1), 8.3.5.9 (Issue 1.4), and 8.3.5.18 (Issue 1.9).

Approach to resolving the issue

The overall waste package compliance strategy was shown in Figure 8.3.4-1 with further details in Section 8.3.4. The essence of the waste package strategy lies in an iterative process of performance allocation, performance assessment, and testing to determine if the goals are met. If not, changes are made in design, materials, etc., and the process is repeated until the design objectives are met. Within this overall waste package compliance strategy, the strategy for resolution of Issue 1.5 is based on present knowledge of the repository emplacement environment, the data gathered on waste form performance in environments that can be related to the projected repository environment, and the use of models to assess the performance of various system elements. The testing and design activities described in this section are tentative and are subject to change. Any such change will be reported in semiannual progress reports.

Figure 8.3.5.10-1 shows the hierarchy of models. The highlighted portion is used in the resolution of Issue 1.5 and to provide input to Issues 1.1, 1.4, and 1.9. The lower levels of detailed models support the higher levels of aggregated models. The system model and the flow and transport model are used to assess the net performance with respect to regulatory issues. The experimental studies and activities (not shown in the figure) support the detailed models by explaining mechanisms and processes, guiding model development, examining processes to make sure that no important phenomena are being overlooked, providing data for models, and validating models.

Principal input parameters for the highlighted models are presented in Table 8.3.5.10-1. Other models that support the resolution of Issue 1.5 are found in Sections 8.3.4.2 and 8.3.5.9.

Under the current conceptual model, the repository horizon is located in the unsaturated zone in an area in which the downward vertical water flux is believed to be less than 0.5 mm/yr. Thus, negligible water is expected to contact the containers throughout the post-containment period. However, the potential release of radionuclides has been analyzed for the case in which some water may contact the waste packages as the repository cools. During



Figure 8.3.5.10-1. Model hierarchy for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates).

Table 8.3.5.10-1. Input to predictive models for Issue 1.5, engineered barrier system release rates (page 1 of 7)

Model	Model input	Needed confidence	SCP section
Scenarios	Parameters for nominal case and for potentially significant disturbed scenarios	High	8.3.5.13
	Parameters for modeling changes in geologic, hydrologic, and geomechanical conditions	Medium to high	8.3.1.4, 8.3.1.5, 8.3.1.6, 8.3.1.7, 8.3.1.8
	Parameters for modeling changes in geo-hydrologic geochemical conditions	Medium to high	8.3.1.2, 8.3.1.3
	Characteristics of shaft and borehole seals	Medium to high	8.3.3.2
	Characteristics of repository and engineered barriers	Medium to high	8.3.2.2
	Characteristics of waste package designs	High	8.3.4.2.2, 8.3.4.2.3, 8.3.4.2.4
	Waste package container failure modes and times	High	8.3.5.9.4
Waste package performance assessment	Scenarios	High	8.3.5.10.3.1
	Waste package geometry model	High	8.3.5.10.3.5
	Radiation attenuation model	Medium	8.3.5.10.3.5
	Heat transfer model	High	8.3.5.10.3.5
	Mechanical stress model	High	8.3.5.10.3.5
	Waste package environment (water movement and chemistry) model	High	8.3.4.2.4
	Container corrosion and degradation model	High	8.3.5.9.3
	Waste form release model	High	8.3.5.10.3.5, 8.3.5.10.3.2, 8.3.5.10.3.3

Table 8.3.5.10-1. Input to predictive models for Issue 1.5, engineered barrier system release rates (page 2 of 7)

Model	Model input	Needed confidence	SCP section
Waste form release	EQ3/6 model for glass and spent fuel	High	8.3.5.10.3.5
	Gas release model	High	8.3.5.10.3.3
	Container failure rate	High	8.3.5.9.4
	Container configurations after failure	High	8.3.5.9.4
	Temperature from heat transfer model	High	8.3.5.10.3.5
	Water flow quantity	High	8.3.4.2.4.2
	Mechanism of water contact with waste package	High	8.3.5.9.4, 8.3.4.2.4.2
	Water quality	High	8.3.4.2.4.1
EQ3/6 waste model	Waste form degradation models		8.3.5.10.3
	Spent fuel	High	8.3.5.10.3.3
	Hardware and cladding	High	8.3.5.10.3.3
	Glass	High	8.3.5.10.3.4
	Temperature	High	8.3.5.10.3.1
	Water flux contacting waste	High	8.3.4.2.4.1
	Water chemistry contacting waste	High	8.3.4.2.4.1
	Thermodynamic data for solids, gases, and aqueous species resulting from waste release	High	8.3.5.10.3.2.1
	Waste degradation scenarios	High	8.3.5.10.3.1
Spent fuel release	Water flux contacting waste		8.3.4.2.4.1
	Near-field flux	High	8.3.4.2.4.1
	Water entering container	High	8.3.5.10.3.5.3
	Water contact scenario	High	8.3.5.10.3.1
	Water chemistry contacting waste		8.3.4.2.4.1
	Initial chemistry	High	8.3.4.2.4.1.3

Table 8.3.5.10-1. Input to predictive models for Issue 1.5, engineered barrier system release rates (page 3 of 7)

Model	Model input	Needed confidence	SCP section
Spent fuel release (continued)	Radiation-induced changes	Medium	8.3.4.2.4.1.5
	Repository material-induced changes	High	8.3.4.2.4.1.2
	Temperature-induced changes	High	8.3.4.2.4.1.1
	Corrosion-induced changes	High	8.3.4.2.4.1.6
	Temperature	High	8.3.5.10.3.1
	Fuel composition	High	8.3.5.10.1.1.1
	Fission gas release	High	8.3.5.10.1.1.1
	Oxidation state	High	8.3.5.10.2.1.2
	Cladding condition	Medium	8.3.5.10.2.1.3
	Fuel degradation rate constants	High	8.3.5.10.2.1
	Fuel dissolution rates	High	8.3.5.10.2.1.1
	Effect of		
	Burnup	High	8.3.5.10.2.1.1
	Oxidation state	High	8.3.5.10.2.1.1
	Reactor type	Medium	8.3.5.10.2.1.1
	Grain size	High	8.3.5.10.2.1.1
	Radiation field	Medium	8.3.5.10.2.1.1
	Radionuclide content (at time of water contact)	High	8.3.5.10.1.1.1
	Container material	Medium	8.3.5.10.1.1.1
	Other waste characteristics	Medium	8.3.5.10.1.1.1
	Other repository characteristics	Medium	8.3.5.10.1.1.3
Glass release	Water flux contacting waste		8.3.4.2.4.1
	Near field flux	High	8.3.4.2.4.1
	Water entering container	High	8.3.5.10.3.5.3
	Water contact scenario	Medium	8.3.5.10.3.1

Table 8.3.5.10-1. Input to predictive models for Issue 1.5, engineered barrier system release rates (page 4 of 7)

Model	Model input	Needed confidence	SCP section
Glass release (continued)	Water chemistry contacting waste		8.3.4.2.4.1
	Initial chemistry	High	8.3.4.2.4.1.3
	Radiation-induced changes	Medium	8.3.4.2.4.1.5
	Repository material-induced changes	High	8.3.4.2.4.1.2
	Temperature-induced changes	High	8.3.4.2.4.1.1
	Corrosion-induced changes	Medium	8.3.4.2.4.1.6
	Temperature	High	8.3.5.10.3.1
	Glass composition	High	8.3.5.10.1.1.2
	Glass degradation rate constants	High	8.3.5.10.2.2
	Glass dissolution rates	High	8.3.5.10.2.2.1
	Effect of interactions on rates	High	8.3.5.10.2.2.2
	Radionuclide content (at time of water contact)	High	8.3.5.10.1.1.2
	Ratio of glass surface area to water volume	High	8.3.5.10.3.1
	Container material	Medium	8.3.5.10.1.1.2
	Pour canister material	High	8.3.5.10.1.1.2
	Glass handling history	High	8.3.5.10.1.1.2
	Conformation with waste acceptance specifications	High	8.3.5.10.1.1.2
	Other waste characteristics	Medium	8.3.5.10.1.1.2
	Other repository characteristics	Medium	8.3.5.10.1.1.3
Hardware and cladding release	Water flux contacting waste		8.3.4.2.4.1
	Near field flux	High	8.3.4.2.4.1
	Water entering container	High	8.3.5.10.3.5.3
	Water contact scenario	High	8.3.5.10.3.1
	Water chemistry contacting waste		8.3.4.2.4.1
	Initial chemistry	High	8.3.4.2.4.1.3
	Radiation-induced changes	Medium	8.3.4.2.4.1.5

Table 8.3.5.10-1. Input to predictive models for Issue 1.5, engineered barrier system release rates (page 5 of 7)

Model	Model input	Needed confidence	SCP section
Hardware and cladding release (continued)	Repository material-induced changes	High	8.3.4.2.4.1.2
	Temperature-induced changes	High	8.3.4.2.4.1.1
	Corrosion-induced changes	Medium	8.3.4.2.4.1.6
	Temperature	High	8.3.5.10.3.1
	Hardware and cladding composition	High	8.3.5.10.1.1.1
	Degradation rate constants	High	8.3.5.10.2.1.3, 8.3.5.10.2.1.4
	Humidity	Medium	8.3.5.10.2.1.3, 8.3.5.10.2.1.4
	Metal compatibilities	High	8.3.5.10.2.1.3, 8.3.5.10.2.1.4
	Radiation field	Medium	8.3.5.10.2.1.3, 8.3.5.10.2.1.4
	Irradiation history	High	8.3.5.10.2.1.3, 8.3.5.10.2.1.4
	Oxide thickness on cladding	High	8.3.5.10.2.1.3
	Hydride content of cladding	Medium	8.3.5.10.2.1.3
	Radionuclide content (at time of water content)	High	8.3.5.10.1.1.1
	Container material	Medium	8.3.5.10.1.1.1
	Other waste characteristics	Medium	8.3.5.10.1.1.1
	Other repository characteristics	Medium	8.3.5.10.1.1.3
Spent fuel gas release	Gas release scenario	High	8.3.5.10.3.1
	Temperature	High	8.3.5.10.3.1
	Fuel composition	High	8.3.5.10.1.1.1
	Cladding composition	High	8.3.5.10.1.1.1
	Hardware composition	High	8.3.5.10.1.1.1

Table 8.3.5.10-1. Input to predictive models for Issue 1.5, engineered barrier system release rates (page 6 of 7)

Model	Model input	Needed confidence	SCP section
Spent fuel gas release (continued)	Fuel oxidation state	High	8.3.5.10.2.1.2
	Cladding condition	Medium	8.3.5.10.2.1.3
	Humidity	Medium	8.3.5.10.2.1.3, 8.3.5.10.2.1.4
	Radiation field	Medium	8.3.5.10.2.1.3, 8.3.5.10.2.1.4
	Irradiation history	High	8.3.5.10.2.1.3, 8.3.5.10.2.1.4
	Oxide thickness on cladding	High	8.3.5.10.2.1.3
	Radionuclide content	High	8.3.5.10.1.1.1
	Container material	Medium	8.3.5.10.1.1.1
	Other waste characteristics	Medium	8.3.5.10.1.1.1
	Other repository characteristics	Medium	8.3.5.10.1.1.3
Waste package geometry and thermal/mechanical properties	Geometry model	High	8.3.5.10.3.5
	Radiation attenuation model	Medium	8.3.5.10.3.5
	Heat transfer model	High	8.3.5.10.3.5
	Mechanical stress model	High	8.3.5.10.3.5
Geometry	Borehole and waste package configuration, dimensions	High	8.3.4.2.2, 8.3.4.2.3
	Waste package content		
	Materials	High	8.3.4.2.2
	Mass	High	8.3.4.2.2
	Elemental composition	Medium	8.3.5.10.1.1, 8.3.4.2.2

Table 8.3.5.10-1. Input to predictive models for Issue 1.5, engineered barrier system release rates (page 7 of 7)

Model	Model input	Needed confidence	SCP section
Geometry (continued)	Isotopic composition		
	Important constituents	High	8.3.5.10.1.1
	Minor constituents	Medium	8.3.5.10.1.1
Radiation attenuation	Radiation source strength	High	8.3.5.10.1.1
	Gamma ray attenuation coefficients of materials	Medium	8.3.4.2.2
	Dose rate at waste form surface	Medium	8.3.5.10.1.1
	Dose rate at package surface	Medium	8.3.4.2.2
	Decay heat generation rates	High	8.3.4.2.2
Heat transfer (thermal) model	Thermal properties (heat capacity, conductivity) of single materials	High	8.3.4.2.2
	Effective thermal properties of composite materials	High	8.3.4.2.2
	Surface properties for convective and radiative heat transfer	Medium	8.3.4.2.2
	Interaction with host rock heat transfer	High	8.3.4.2.4.3
	Decay heat generation rate	High	8.3.4.2.4.3
Mechanical model	Mechanical properties of single materials	High	8.3.4.2.2
	Mechanical properties of composite materials	Medium	8.3.4.2.2
	Mechanical loads	High	8.3.4.2.2, 8.3.4.2.4.3
	Temperature field within package	Medium	8.3.4.2.4.4

the containment period, a maximum of 5 L/yr was allowed to contact up to 10 percent of the packages. In the post-containment period, the allowable quantity of water has been increased to reflect the possible increased capacity of existing water flow paths due to contraction cooling of the rock mass that causes increased fracture aperture, or the anticipated range of changes in climate during the post-containment period.

Figures 8.3.5.10-2 and 8.3.5.10-3 show the overall outline for the reference and alternative approaches to be used in the resolution of this issue. The reference approach includes branches for both the expected case, in which the amount of water contacting the waste form is negligible, and a bounding case (bounding for anticipated processes and events), in which 20 L/yr is allowed to contact the waste forms in up to 10 percent of the waste packages. The approach taken to resolve Issue 1.5 takes into account both a transition period, when the fraction of failed containers may increase and the fraction of wetted containers may increase, and an upper-limit period considering the environment and container performance limits of Table 8.3.5.10-2 as a steady state. Possible pulse releases from spent fuel of fractions of carbon-14 and of gap and grain boundary elements must be considered during the transition period. No assumption is made about the container performance during the containment period for the assessment of Issue 1.5; all possibilities between 0 and 1 fraction of containers failed and between 0 and 0.10 of waste packages in contact with liquid water at the start of the controlled-release period will be considered.

The data presented in Section 7.4.3 indicate that it is very likely that the performance objective for control of release rate from the engineered barrier system can be met by the waste forms in an unprotected condition, provided that the analysis is done using the conditions of the expected case. For the bounding case, the performance objective can be met provided credit can be taken for the fraction of waste packages where the waste form is not contacted by water, and for the mass-transfer resistance of breached containers and cladding. This resistance to release of radionuclides can be provided by breached containers and cladding, even in their degraded condition.

The limitation of wetted waste forms to 10 percent of the total depends on environmental and engineered elements. The existing information is not sufficient to allow a final selection of the components and performance measures. Several components and processes may provide barriers to water contact. These include

1. Hydrological--alteration of flow paths by the dehydration-rehydration cycle, and limited water flux available to reestablish pre-repository partial saturation levels.

2. Water flux retained in porous rock component; not enough water flux for fracture flow or dripping.

3. Container and waste form are hotter than surroundings, can evaporate water.


ISSUE 1.5
WILL THE WASTE PACKAGE AND REPOSITORY ENGINEERED BARRIER SYSTEMS MEET THE PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE FOR RADIONUCLIDE RELEASE RATES AS REQUIRED BY 10 CFR 60.113?
OBJECTIVE: SHOW THAT FOR TIMES GREATER THAN 1,000 YEARS AFTER CLOSURE, THE RELEASE OF RADIONUCLIDES FROM THE ENGINEERED BARRIER SYSTEM (EBS) DOES NOT EXCEED 1 PART IN 100,000 OF THE RADIONUCLIDE'S 1,000 YR INVENTORY
REFERENCE APPROACH
EXPECTED CASE
BOUNDING CASE
LIQUID WATER CONTACTING WASTE
PERFORMANCE GOAL: 0 LITERS PER YEAR
ENGINEERED ENVIRONMENT
WATER CHEMISTRY ACCEPTABLE FOR CONTAINER AND WASTE FORM PERFORMANCE
FRACTION OF FAILED DRY PACKAGES BECOMING WET <0.01 PER YEAR OF TOTAL PACKAGES
NO LIQUID WATER CONTACTING WASTE FORMS FOR 90% OF THE PACKAGES THAT MAY BE CONTACTED BY NEGLIGIBLE QUANTITIES OF WATER. FOR THE REMAINING PACKAGES, <20L OF LIQUID WATER PER PACKAGE PER YEAR CONTACTS THE WASTE FORM
DRY
GAS RELEASE ONLY
NO LIQUID RELEASE
FRACTION OF METALLIC CONTAINERS FAILED <0.001 PER YEAR
RAPID RELEASE FRACTION OF C-14 <0.001
PERFORMANCE GOAL: LESS THAN 1 PART IN 100,000 RELEASE PER YEAR
20 LITERS PER PACKAGE PER YEAR IS DERIVED FROM A CONSERVATIVE 80-TIMES-GREATER WATER FLUX THAN ANTICIPATED, AND IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENT PLACED ON REPOSITORY SEALS
WET
METALLIC CONTAINER
FRACTION OF WET CONTAINERS FAILING <0.01 PER YEAR
FRACTIONAL RELEASE DUE TO MASS TRANSFER RESISTANCE OF WET FAILED CONTAINERS (AND CLADDING) <0.1
WASTE FORM
RAPID RELEASE FRACTION OF C-14 <0.001
FRACTION OF GAP-GRAIN BOUNDARY ELEMENTS RELEASABLE <0.02
FRACTION OF SOLUBLE MATRIX RADIONUCLIDES RELEASABLE <0.001 PER YEAR
FRACTION OF OTHER RADIONUCLIDES (Ni, Zr, ACTINIDES, ETC.) RELEASABLE <1X10-5 PER YEAR

Figure 8.3.5.10-2 Reference approach to resolving issue 1.5 (barrier) (waste system performance).


ISSUE 1.5
WILL THE WASTE PACKAGE AND REPOSITORY ENGINEERED BARRIER SYSTEMS MEET THE PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE FOR RADIONUCLIDE RELEASE RATES AS REQUIRED BY 10 CFR 60.113?
OBJECTIVE: SHOW THAT FOR TIMES GREATER THAN 1,000 YEARS AFTER CLOSURE, THE RELEASE OF RADIONUCLIDES FROM THE ENGINEERED BARRIER SYSTEM (EBS) DOES NOT EXCEED 1 PART IN 100,000 OF THE RADIONUCLIDE'S 1,000 YR INVENTORY
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
ALTERNATIVE CONTAINER (SEE SECTION 8.3.5.9)
GAS RELEASE
LIQUID RELEASE
ALTERNATIVE 1
VARIATION IN ALLOWED RELEASE OF CARBON-14 FROM EBS UNDER 10 CFR 60.113(b)
PERFORMANCE GOAL: NEW PERFORMANCE GOAL TO BE DETERMINED
ALTERNATIVE 2
REMOVAL OF RAPID RELEASE FRACTION OF CARBON-14 FROM SPENT FUEL
PERFORMANCE GOAL: LESS THAN 1 PART IN 100,000 RELEASE PER YEAR
ALTERNATIVE 1
SPENT FUEL IN CLADDING
(DECREASE IN RELEASE RATE OVER THAT OF BARE FUEL, DUE TO CLADDING OR OTHER BARRIERS)
PERFORMANCE GOAL: LESS THAN 1 PART IN 100,000 RELEASE PER YEAR
ALTERNATIVE 2
SPENT FUEL IN CLADDING PLUS INCLUSION OF ROCK IN EBS
(ROCK CONTRIBUTION TO LIMITING RELEASE RATE)
PERFORMANCE GOAL: LESS THAN 1 PART IN 100,000 RELEASE PER YEAR

Figure 8.3.5.10-3. Alternative approaches to resolving Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system performance), assuming case of maximum water flux per package (20 liters per year).

4. Air gap will separate partially saturated rock from waste form over most of the perimeter of the waste package.

5. Liner and container, even with breaches, will provide a function of separation of partially saturated rock from waste form.

6. Limited surface area of waste form contacted by water.

Because the repository horizon is in the unsaturated zone, release into the gas phase must be considered. For the expected case, negligible flux of liquid water, this may be the dominant release mechanism. Because of its long half-life, carbon-14 is the only significant radionuclide available for gas-phase release during the controlled release period. Because of the lower gamma fluxes and temperatures in the controlled release period, present data suggest that the release rate will be sufficiently low to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 60.113, based on the low release fraction and the low annual container failure rate.

Figure 8.3.5.10-3 outlines the various alternatives to be used if the reference approach proves inadequate to resolve the issue. The principal concerns are for carbon-14 on the exterior of cladding and assembly components and the readily soluble radionuclides present in the fuel.

Currently, there is considerable uncertainty in the release rates (dry and aqueous), mechanisms, and locations of carbon-14; because of this, two alternative approaches to carbon-14 control are given in Figure 8.3.5.10-3. These will be used if the carbon-14 release rates from failed containers are found to exceed the 10 CFR 60.113(a) limits and re-allocation of performance does not result in compliance. The first alternative would be to request a new allowed release rate for carbon-14 under the provisions of 10 CFR 60.113(b), provided that it can be shown that such a release rate does not compromise the overall system performance. The second alternative would be to remove carbon-14 from the exterior of the cladding and assembly components by heating (and oxidizing the carbon to carbon dioxide) before emplacement. The carbon-14 could then be dealt with separately from the spent fuel or solidified as calcium carbonate and disposed of in standard containers.

Two alternatives are shown in Figure 8.3.5.10-3 in the event that liquid release from the reference design is not low enough to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 60.113. The first is to take into account other components and processes to limit access of water to the spent fuel, while the second takes into account the possible contribution of the rock in the EBS in limiting release (contingent on an interpretation through a mechanism such as rule-making that the EBS can include a portion of the host rack).

There are limited quantities of highly soluble radionuclides that are present in the spent fuel waste form at 1,000 yr after closure. These isotopes, primarily Tc-99, I-129, Cs-135, and Mo-93, account for about 0.8 percent of the total 1,000 yr inventory. Under the expected case of the reference approach (no liquid water), these nuclides would not be released from the engineered barrier system because there is no aqueous medium for dissolution and transport. Under the bounding case, in which bare spent fuel

is contacted by as much as 20 L of liquid water per container per year for up to 10 percent of the packages, the solubility and availability of the nuclides may result in a short term release from the gap-grain fraction plus an annual release from the matrix fraction at 1×10^{-3} per year. The short-term release is reduced to the performance objective (1×10^{-5} per year) by scenario-dependent factors (e.g., timing of breach or wetting). The matrix release component is reduced by a factor of ten due to the absence of water and a further factor of ten due to these other barriers (i.e., cladding and container breaches and their mass transfer resistance).

The existing information is not sufficient to allow a final selection of the components. Several components and processes are available to provide barriers to the release of gap and grain boundary radionuclides. These include

1. The rate of breach of the containers that are intact at the end of the containment period.

2. The rate of breach of fuel cladding during the entire period following closure.

3. The fraction of water that contacts and enters breached containers and claddings and contacts the waste form.

4. Dilution of concentration of radionuclides in solution within breached containers before release, in a scenario with standing water in a container.

5. The limited surface area of fuel contacted by water in trickle-through and unsaturated-contact scenario.

Several components and processes are available to reduce the engineered barrier system release rate due to soluble elements released from the waste form matrix. The existing information is not sufficient to allow a final selection of the components and performance measures, but as an overall performance measure, a factor of 10 reduction is assigned. Possible contributing components and processes include

1. Mass transfer rate through breached cladding.

2. Mass transfer rate through breaches in containers, or mass transfer rate along available diffusion pathways of partially saturated rock in contact with partially saturated waste form.

3. Limited surface area of fuel contacted by water.

4. Limited time periods of contact of water with fuel surface.

Tests and analyses to support the basis for allocating performance to these potential barriers are described under Information Needs 1.4.2 through 1.4.4 (Sections 8.3.5.9.2 through 8.3.5.9.4) and 1.5.2 through 1.5.4 in this section.

Another alternative (which applies to both waste forms) would be to include a portion of the host rock as part of the engineered barrier system. This rock is expected to significantly limit the release rate.

In the event of failure to demonstrate all the previous approaches, an alternative container with considerably greater expected lifetime before breach might be used. A longer-life container could be developed as one alternative that might be considered in the alternate materials and containers program discussed in Section 8.3.5.9.

The strategy for meeting the controlled release requirements of 10 CFR 60.113 is based on the bounding assumption that less than 10 percent of the packages will be contacted by less than 20 L of water per package per year. This value was obtained by multiplying the cross sectional area of a vertical borehole by 80 times the maximum anticipated flux (9 times the flux for a horizontal borehole) passing downward through the cross-sectional area. The strategy applies only to an unsaturated repository.

For the reference approach, a performance allocation has been made to system elements on the basis of both the expected and the bounding case (see Figure 8.3.5.10-2). The performance measures and goals associated with the reference approach are listed in Table 8.3.5.10-2. Releases for various release scenarios are based on values given in the table, which are equal to or less than the regulatory requirement. Control of the quantity of water contacting the container to less than 20 L/yr requires that the engineered environment have several performance measures and related goals. These are further discussed in Issue 1.10 (Section 8.3.4.2) and are not addressed in detail here. There are seven performance goals and measures in the reference case. These apply to the quantity and quality of water contacting waste, the containers, and the waste forms. The performance parameters needed to evaluate some of these performance measures are listed in Table 8.3.5.10-3a. As discussed above, for some other performance measures, existing information is not sufficient to allow selection of components and allocation of the parameters' performance. The table also lists parameters that are consistent with meeting the performance goals of Table 8.3.5.10-2.

The first set of parameters (Table 8.3.5.10-3a) refers to the quality of the water contacting the waste. The goals for the constituents of the water are set so that they are consistent with the composition of well J-13 water as possibly modified by the thermal loading history of the repository (Chapter 4). These goals are used as a basis for setting goals for the other parameters. The information needs to establish both the quantity and quality of the water are discussed in Section 8.3.4.2.

The second and third sets of parameters are given in Table 8.3.5.10-3b. The second set of parameters is a list of the maximum concentrations of radionuclides permissible in effluent solutions exiting the engineered barrier system. The values given for the goals are the concentrations necessary to meet the design objectives of the controlled-release period. The third set of parameters is the analogous information for the glass waste form. These concentrations are for the upper-limit water flux of 20 L/yr contacting waste in 10 percent of the waste packages. For lower water fluxes through different waste packages, correspondingly higher concentrations are allowed.

Table 8.3.5.10-2. Performance measures and goals for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates)

System element	Performance measure	Tentative goal[a]	Needed confidence
Engineered environment[b]	Quantity of liquid water that can contact the container	No liquid water contacting waste forms for 90% of packages that may be contacted by negligible quantities of water. For the remaining 10% of the packages, <20 L of liquid water per package per year contacts the waste form	High
		Rate of breached dry packages becoming wet <0.01/yr	High
	Water quality	Constrain water chemistry to acceptable levels for waste form performance	High
	Rock-induced load on waste package	Load less than design basis (see Table 8.3.4.2-3)	High
Container	Fraction of containers that have breached[c]	For t >1,000 for containers with no liquid water contact: <0.001/yr	High
		For t >1,000 for containers with liquid water contact: <0.01/yr	High

Table 8.3.5.10-2. Performance measures and goals for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (continued)

System element	Performance measure	Tentative goal[a]	Needed confidence
	Fractional release due to mass transfer resistance of breached containers (and cladding)	For t >1,000 for containers with liquid water contact: <0.1 (see Section 8.3.5.10.3)	High
Waste Form	Release fractions or rates from waste form components	Release rates from breached packages via all mechanisms, together with the mass transfer resistance of packages, of <1 part in 10,000 (of 1,000 yr inventory) per year for each radionuclide	High

[a]t = years after repository closure.
[b]Envelope for anticipated processes and events.
[c]Breach is defined as allowing air flow of 1 x 10^4 atm-cm^3/s. The maximum fraction of total failures will be determined as part of the container material studies and will be consistent with regulatory intent.

For diffusional contact scenarios, a corresponding limit in curies per package per year is allowed.

The maximum radionuclide concentrations per liter of effluent (or per package per year) are based on release requirements that yield limits for the sums from all contributing modes of waste release. For spent fuel these sums include rapid fractional releases due to container breaches or to breached dry containers becoming wet, plus the gradual releases per year from the accumulated number of breached and wet containers. Performance goals for the rates of container failures and wetting were listed in Table 8.3.5.10-2. The performance measures and goals for the waste form components are listed in Table 8.3.5.10-3c.

Table 8.3.5.10-3a. Performance parameters and goals for water composition for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates)

Performance measure	Performance parameters	Tentative performance parameter goal	Needed confidence	Current estimated range	Current confidence
Water quality[a]	pH	5.5-9	High	6.1-7.7	Medium
	Cl^-	<20 ppm	High	<10 ppm	Medium
	F^-	<6 ppm	High	<5.4 ppm	Medium
	NO_3^-	<15 ppm	High	0-11 ppm	Medium
	$SO_4^=$	<50 ppm	High	15-35 ppm	Medium
	$CO_3^=, HCO_3^-$	<200 ppm	Medium	90-160 ppm	Medium
	Total anions	<220 ppm	Medium	110-160 ppm	Medium
	Organics	TBD[b]	TBD	NA[c]	NA
	Colloids	TBD	TBD	NA	NA
	O_2	0.1-8 ppm	High	<6.5 ppm	Medium
	NH_3	<1 ppm	High	<1 ppm	Low
	Si	>20 ppm	High	20-550 ppm	Medium
	Na	<100 ppm	High	30-80 ppm	Medium
	K	<50 ppm	High	1-30 ppm	Medium
	Na/Ca	>1	High	>2	Medium
	Total heavy metals (>Fe)	<2 ppm	High	TBD	Low
	Total other cations	<50 ppm	Medium	<30 ppm	Low

[a]Not all combinations of the limits on the goals given in the above table will result in acceptable water chemistries (See Section 8.3.4.2).
[b]TBD = to be determined.
[c]NA = not applicable.

Table 8.3.5.10-3b. Performance parameters and goals for spent fuel and glass waste forms for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (page 1 of 8)

Performance measure	Performance parameter	Performance goal (Concentration of radionuclide in effluent water) (mg/L)	Performance goal (Concentration of radionuclide in effluent water) (Ci/L) (see note a)	Needed confidence	Current estimated range (mg/L)	Current confidence
SPENT FUEL WASTE FORM (see notes b and c)						
	(see note d)				(see note e)	
Release rate from bare waste form inside failed container	C-14[f]	2.06	1.80E-05[g]	High	<40	Low
	Cl-36	5.61E-01	1.80E-05	High	To be determined	Low
	Ca-41	1.65E-01	1.80E-05	High	<20	Medium
	Ni-59		5.28E-05	High		
	Ni-63	127	1.80E-05	High	<4	Medium
	Se-79	8.55E-01	1.80E-05	High	<6.0E-3	Low
	Zr-93	1900	1.99E-05	High	<1	High
	Nb-93m		1.89E-05	High		
	Nb-94	7.32	1.80E-05	High	<1	High
	Mo-93	2890	1.80E-05	High	To be determined	Low
	Tc-99	7.98	1.34E-04	High	<0.8	Low
	Pd-107	220	1.80E-05	High	<10	Low
	Sn-126	88.1	1.80E-05	High	<.010	High
	I-129	110	1.80E-05	High	<0.2	Low
	Cs-135	79.3	1.80E-05	High	<1.6	Low
	Sm-151	94.9	1.80E-05	High	<1	High
	Ho-166m	1.00E-02	1.80E-05	High	<1	Low
	Pb-210	2.22E-04	1.80E-05	High	<4.0E-8	Medium
	Ra-226	1.82E-02	1.80E-05	High	<8.0E-2	Low
	Ac-227	2.47E-04	1.80E-05	High	To be determined	Low

Table 8.3.5.10-21. Performance parameters and goals for spent fuel and glass waste forms for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (page 2 of 8)

Performance measure	Performance parameter	Performance goal (Concentration of radionuclide in effluent water) (mg/L)	(Ci/L) (see note a)	Needed confidence	Current estimated range (mg/L)	Current confidence
		SPENT FUEL WASTE FORM (continued)				
Release rate from bare waste form inside failed container (continued)	Th-230	8.91E-01	1.80E-05	High	<1.0E-08	
	U-233		1.80E-05			
	U-234		2.10E-05			
	U-235	9970	1.80E-05	High	<10	High
	U-236		1.80E-05			
	U-238		1.80E-05			
	Np-237	25.5	1.80E-05	High	To be determined	Medium
	Pu-238		1.80E-05			
	Pu-239		3.15E-03			
	Pu-240	77.8	4.94E-03	High	<5.0E-3	High
	Pu-241		1.80E-05			
	Pu-242		1.80E-05			
	Am-242m		1.80E-05			
	Am-243	8.08E-01	1.61E-04	High	<1.0E-2	High
	Cm-245		1.80E-05			
	Cm-246	1.28E-01	1.80E-05	High	<1.0E-3	Medium

Table 8.3.5.10-3b. Performance parameters and goals for spent fuel and glass waste forms for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (page 3 of 8)

Performance measure	Performance parameter	Performance goal (Concentration of radionuclide in effluent water) (mg/L)	(Ci/L) (see note b)	Needed confidence	Current estimated range (mg/L)	Current confidence
SPENT FUEL WASTE FORM (see notes b and c) (continued)						
Release rate from bare waste form inside failed container (continued)	Activity of $^{14}CO_2$ released as a gas (gaseous release)	(see note f)		High	To be determined	Low
GLASS WASTE FORM (see notes h and i)						
	Ni-59 Ni-63	1.4E-01	1.09E-05 8.78E-07	High	3.3E-04 to 4.9E-03[j]	Medium
	Se-79	8.1E-03	5.62E-07	High	1.9E-05 to 2.9E-04[j]	Medium
	Rb-87	2.1E+03	1.76E-07	Low	1.1E-03 to 1.6E-01[k]	Medium
	Zr-93	2.4E-00	6.22E-06	High	5.8E-03 to 8.8E-01[j]	High
	Nb-93m Nb-94	9.5E-04	6.22E-06 1.76E-07	High	2.3E-06 to 3.4E-05[k]	Medium

Table 8.3.5.10-3b. Performance parameters and goals for spent fuel and glass waste forms for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (page 4 of 8)

Performance measure	Performance parameter	Performance goal (Concentration of radionuclide in effluent water) (mg/L)	Performance goal (Concentration of radionuclide in effluent water) (Ci/L) (see note a)	Needed confidence	Current estimated range (mg/L)	Current confidence
		GLASS WASTE FORM (continued)				
Release rate from bare waste form inside failed container (continued)	Tc-99	6.1E-01	1.03E-05	High	1.5E-03 to 2.2E-01[k]	Low
	Pd-107	3.4E-01	1.76E-07	Medium	2.4E-04 to 3.6E-03[k]	Medium
	Sn-126	2.9E-02	8.22E-07	High	7.0E-05 to 1.0E-03[j]	Medium
	Cs-135	5.3E-01	4.66E-07	High	1.3E-03 to 1.9E-01[j]	Medium
	Sm-151	1.5E-05	3.83E-07	High	3.5E-08 to 5.3E-07[j]	Medium
	Pb-210	2.3E-06	1.76E-07	Medium	1.9E-10 to 2.8E-09[k]	Medium
	Ra-226	1.8E-04	1.76E-07	Medium	1.9E-08 to 2.9E-07[k]	Medium
	Ac-227	2.4E-06	1.76E-07	Low	4.7E-12 to 7.1E-11[k]	Low

Table 8.3.5.10-3b. Performance parameters and goals for spent fuel and glass waste forms for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (page 5 of 8)

Performance measure	Performance parameter	Performance goal (Concentration of radionuclide in effluent water) (mg/L)	(Ci/L) (see note a)	Needed confidence	Current estimated range (mg/L)	Current confidence
		GLASS WASTE FORM (continued)				
Releaase rate from bare waste form inside failed container (continued)	Th-230	8.6E-03	1.76E-07	Medium	8.5E-10 to 8.5E-09[l]	High
	Pa-231	3.7E-03	1.76E-07	Low	9.5E-09 to 1.4E-07[k]	Low
	U-232		1.76E-07			
	U-233		1.76E-07			
	U-234	8.5E+01	4.54E-06	High	2.6E-01 to 2.6E-01[l]	Medium
	U-235		1.76E-07			
	U-236		1.85E-07			
	U-238		1.76E-07			
	Np-237	2.5E-01	1.76E-07	Medium	3.2E-04 to 4.8E-03[k]	Medium
	Pu-238		1.20E-06			
	Pu-239		5.14E-05			
	Pu-240	1.0E-00	3.00E-05	High	1.2E-06 to 1.2E-05[l]	Low[m]
	Pu-241		1.76E-07			
	Pu-242		1.76E-07			

Table 8.3.5.10-3b. Performance parameters and goals for spent fuel and glass waste forms for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (page 6 of 8)

Performance measure	Performance parameter	Performance goal (Concentration of radionuclide in effluent water) (mg/L)	Performance goal (Concentration of radionuclide in effluent water) (Ci/L) (see note a)	Needed confidence	Current estimated range (mg/L)	Current confidence
			GLASS WASTE FORM (continued)			
Release rate from bare waste form inside failed container (continued)	Am-241	1.5E-02	5.01E-05	High	3.7E-05 to 5.6E-04[j]	Low[m]
	Am-242m		1.76E-07			
	Am-243		1.76E-07			
	Cm-245	1.0E-03	1.76E-07	Low	4.7E-10 to 7.1E-09[k]	Low

[a]The concentrations are derived from the 1 x 10^{-5} per year or 0.1% calculated release rate limit (CRRL) (1.8 x 10^{-6}) requirement for each individual radioisotope based on 20 liters per package per year flux for up to 10 percent of the packages together with the package loading assumptions in notes c and h.

[b]Limiting concentrations include stable isotopes of an element and were calculated assuming that all isotopes of an element are released congruently at a level determined by the limiting concentration of the radioisotope of that element requiring the most stringent control.

[c]All calculations based on 33,000 MWd/MTU fuel at 1,000 yr out-of-reactor. Inventory includes cladding and hardware. Calculations assume 62,000 MT of unoxidized spent fuel in 30,000 containers of which 10 percent are contacted by 20 liters of liquid water per year. Issue 1.4 allocates performance to the cladding in order to limit the quantity of oxidized fuel to less than 1 percent of the repository inventory, thereby controlling the release of those radionuclides in the fuel that are made more available for aqueous release by oxidation (e.g., Tc-99).

[d]Table includes all radionuclides that have half-lives greater than 10 yr and have total inventories per package such that, at the allowed release rate, it would take more than 10 yr to release the entire inventory.

Table 8.3.5.10-3b. Performance parameters and goals for spent fuel and glass waste forms for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (page 7 of 8)

Footnotes (continued)

[e]Current estimated ranges are based on experimental results discussed in Chapter 7, Section 7.4.3.1.1, and theoretical modeling of phase solubility. Ranges for Se, Tc, Pd, I, Cs, and Pb were estimated assuming that 1 g of U reacts per liter of water entering a container. The inventory of these elements associated with 1 g of U was then assumed to remain in solution. Note that 1 g of U per liter is far in excess of the expected U solubility.

[f]The allowed aqueous concentration of C-14 assumes that no C-14 is released as a gas. Similarly, the allowed gaseous release was calculated assuming no C-14 is released in solution. To meet the actual release requirements, the sum of the aqueous plus gaseous release must total <3.6E-05 Ci/yr per package.

[g]1.80E-05 is notation for 1.8×10^{-5}.

[h]Allowed maximum concentration in mg/L for all the radioisotopes of each element. Note that nonradioactive isotopes are not included.

[i]Inventory data for Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) glass taken from 1,000-year inventory, Table 7-21. Allowed effluent per container in the maximum 20 liters water per package per year for 10 percent of the packages is calculated from the allowed release; 1 part in 100,000 or 0.1% of the calculated release rate limit (CRRL). Radionuclides whose total inventory could be released from the waste package at the allowed rate, in less than 10 yr, have been excluded from this table (e.g., Sr-90). Radionuclides whose half-lives are less than 10 yr (short-lived daughter products) have also been excluded; they are controlled by controlling the parent nuclide.

[j]Estimated range in concentration based on the congruent breakdown of glass. The allowed total for each radionuclide (note i) is equivalent to a silica concentration in solution of 4,150 mg/L (approximately 50 percent of the 1,660 kg glass in each DWPF container is silica; one part in 100,000, times the 10 percent of the containers that are contacted by water, partitioned into 20 liters, is 4,15o mg/L). Silica releases of this magnitude are not anticipated. Estimated ranges were obtained by considering that total silica released from glass (including that recrystallized) would not exceed that equivalent to 150 mg/L. This is the upper limit in the estimated range. The lower limit assumes that glass dissolves slowly at long times, and an equivalent silica release of 10 mg/L was used.

[k]For these radionuclides, the allowed release is 0.1 percent of the CRRL. However, the estimated release reflects the actual inventory (see Table 7-21, 1,000-yr inventory), which may be much smaller.

Table 8.3.5.10-3b. Performance parameters and goals for spent fuel and glass waste forms for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (page 8 of 8)

Footnotes (continued)

[l]For these radionuclides, the estimated concentrations based on either (j) or (k) exceeded the expected solubility of these elements in well J-13 water, as calculated using EQ3/6. The estimated range given is the calculated solubility at 25C, pH 7.6, with 1 order of magnitude uncertainty.

[m]Although these radionuclides are at or near the current predicted solubility limit, the current confidence is given as low because of the possibility that additional solution species (other ligands) may be found that raise the solubility, and the possibility that colloid transport may contribute significantly to release.

Table 8.3.5.10-3c. Performance parameters and goals for components of spent fuel waste for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates)

Performance measure	Performance parameter	Tentative goals	Needed confidence	Current estimated range	Current confidence
Release fractions or rates from components waste form	Fraction of total inventory of gap and grain boundary elements available for rapid release from unoxidized fuel	< 0.02	High	0.005 to 0.04	Medium
	Fraction of C-14 inventory available for rapid release as a gas under temperatures prevailing after 1,000 yr	< 0.001	High	<0.002	Low
	Fraction of soluble matrix radionuclides releasable to water within waste package	< 0.001/yr	High	0.0001 to 0.002/yr	Medium
	Fraction of other radionuclides releasable to water within waste package	< 1×10^{-5}/yr	High	<1×10^{-5}/yr	Medium

Releases for various failure scenarios are based on rates given in the performance allocation tables.

The performance analyses linking the allocated values of the performance parameters to the higher-level measure of performance will consider several possible scenarios of component conditions and water contact modes. The container will be assumed to have failed at one or more locations, but the bulk of the container body has a wall thickness greater than one-tenth of the initial thickness, and remains structurally intact. The failure locations may allow the following water contact modes:

1. Water accumulates inside the package up to the level of the lowest breach and exits the package.

2. Water trickles or seeps through the container and drains out of a low-elevation breach.

3. A water contact without moving water exists between the partially saturated rock, container and corrosion product surfaces, and waste form, due to capillarity in these components.

No air-tight sealed condition is assumed for any spent fuel cladding or glass waste pour canisters.

The data in hand are insufficient to choose with high confidence of success a final licensing approach for rapid gaseous release of carbon-14. Several alternatives are under study (Figure 8.3.5.10-3). The development of a better understanding of the distribution and release characteristics of carbon-14 in Zircaloy cladding and assembly hardware is needed, since the relatively large release observed in the fuel temperature test may be due to the high temperature or the high radiation field or both. Another area of investigation is the breach rate of containers, since a time-distributed failure rate for containers would minimize the pulsed carbon-14 release. The interaction of carbon-14 releases from waste packages with natural carbon in the repository air and rock-water system will also be studied (Information Need 1.5.5, Section 8.3.5.10.5). Although these items are not part of the reference case, they are discussed along with the reference case items with which they are associated.

To satisfy the needs for information to be used in resolution of Issues 1.1 (Section 8.3.5.13) and 1.9 (Section 8.3.5.18), a more realistic estimate of release rates and total releases is needed. Some of the system components that could provide additional control on the release rate have not been included in the reference case calculations. Inclusion of an analysis of the condition of the containers would allow credit to be taken for intact containers. Zircaloy or stainless steel cladding, either intact or with minor defects, will provide an additional control on the rate of dissolution of the pellets contained within the cladding. All these factors would result in lower estimates of the amount of waste elements leaving the container and the engineered barrier system. The Yucca Mountain Project adopted the current DOE interpretation of the EBS system boundary to coincide with the surfaces of the excavations within the underground facility. The DOE, however, requires the Project to reevaluate the interpretation before the completion of repository and waste package advanced conceptual design. If,

in the future, portions of the host rock are to be included in the EBS, the near-field radionuclide transport studies will be needed to resolve this issue (1.5) and to provide the realistic source term to Issues 1.1 and 1.9.

Radionuclide source term calculations will examine the transport processes active in the first few meters of host rock surrounding an emplaced waste package. These calculations are required to provide detailed information on the anticipated response of the hydrogeologic and geochemical systems to the maximum design thermal loading, and to provide a basis for the assessment of the effectiveness of natural and engineered barriers against the release of radioactive materials to the environment (10 CFR 60.21). The release to the accessible environment will be calculated in activities described under Issue 1.1 (Section 8.3.5.13). A realistic source term will serve as a basis for establishing bounding conditions, and for demonstrating that predicted performance under those conditions is bounding. For radionuclide transport, many species exhibit a strong affinity for sorption onto the host rock. Under anticipated conditions, it is expected that these species will interact with rock that is within meters of the waste package, as opposed to hundreds or thousands of meters from the repository. Therefore, a radionuclide source term calculated across a boundary relatively near the waste package will serve as a realistic, although not necessarily bounding, source term for transport calculations to the accessible environment.

Table 8.3.5.10-4 presents the performance measure for this activity. The measure is the relative concentrations of radionuclide species as a function of time and distance from an emplacement hole that are adsorbed to host rock, dissolved in pore and fracture water, and in the pore and fracture gases. This activity will provide characterization of the effectiveness of the host rock against radionuclide transport. The parameters required for these assessments are host rock hydrologic properties, thermal properties, transport properties, and radionuclide sorption and exchange properties. Further, release of radionuclides from the engineered barrier system and a set of conditions representing anticipated and unanticipated processes and events are required. Table 8.3.5.10-5 provides the linkages to those parameters developed in other sections of this document. The parameters of Table 8.3.5.10-5 are developed in greater detail in Sections 8.3.4 and 8.3.5.13.

To ensure that the testing program and analyses would provide the information needed to resolve this issue and to support the resolution of Issues 1.1 (Section 8.3.5.13) and 1.9 (Section 8.3.5.18), characterization goals were set for the description of the waste form in its as-received condition, the handling and storage of the waste form before sealing it in a container, and the characterization of the physical and chemical processes that could affect radionuclide release rates. These topics are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.

A. Waste form definition

The characteristics of the waste forms when they are received at the repository must be known to ensure proper handling, interim storage, packaging, and disposal conditions. A number of the characteristics are interrelated, such as radionuclide inventory, burnup, and waste age for spent

Table 8.3.5.10-4. Performance allocation for radionuclide migration in near-field host rock

SCP section requesting parameter	System element	Function	Process or condition	Performance measure	Goal	Needed confidence
8.3.5.13	Topopah Spring tuff	Limit migration of radionuclides through the near-field host rock	Radionuclide transport	Concentrations of radionuclide species in gas phase, liquid water, and adsorbed to solid phases within the near-field host rock	Adequate to determine effectiveness of natural barriers	High

Table 8.3.5.10-5. Performance measures, parameters, and parameter goals for calculating radionuclide source term for near-field host rock (page 1 of 2)

System element	Performance measure	Parameter	Parameter goal	Current confidence	Needed confidence	Sections where parameters are developed
Topopah Spring tuff	Concentrations of radionuclide species in gas phase, liquid water, and adsorbed to solid phases within the near-field host rock	Host rock hydrologic properties	Properties known with accuracy sufficient to calculate differences in flow through the near-field rock resulting from anticipated and unanticipated events	Low	High	8.3.1.2.2
		Radionuclide sorption properties	Properties known with accuracy sufficient to calculate radionuclide sorption to the near-field rock resulting from anticipated and unanticipated events	Low	High	8.3.1.3.4
		Radionuclide transport properties	Properties known with accuracy sufficient to calculate transport through the near-field rock resulting from anticipated and unanticipated events	Low	High	8.3.1.3.1, 8.3.1.3.4, 8.3.1.3.5, 8.3.1.3.6, 8.3.1.3.7
		Host rock thermal properties	Properties known with accuracy sufficient to calculate heat flow and temperature in the near-field rock resulting from anticipated and unanticipated events	Medium	High	8.3.1.15.1, 8.3.1.15.2, 8.3.4.2.4

Table 8.3.5.10-5. Performance measures, parameters, and parameter goals for calculating radionuclide source term for near-field host rock (page 2 of 2)

System element	Performance measure	Parameter	Parameter goal	Current confidence	Needed confidence	Sections where parameters are developed
Topopah Spring tuff (continued)	Concentrations of radionuclide species (continued)	Releases from engineered barrier system	Knowledge of the engineered barrier system release rate	Medium	High	8.3.5.10.4
		Anticipated and unanticipated processes and events	Events described in detail sufficient for resolution of Issues 1.1 and 1.5 (Section 8.3.5.13 and this section)	Medium	High	8.3.5.10.3

fuel. In this instance, a characterization goal was set for one of these parameters: the radionuclide inventory. This parameter was selected because it is likely to be the least well known, and its value is used in the greatest number of cases in the performance analyses.

Data will need to be collected to allow description of a number of the characteristics of spent fuel. At present, there is insufficient information about the variability of the waste form, and the sensitivity of waste form performance to that variability, to allow a sensible goal for characterization to be set. Where this is the case, the most complete characterization consistent with the resources for information will be provided. As information on the relative importance of the various parameters becomes available, more precise characterization goals will be set.

There are two parameters known to be important with respect to spent fuel performance under disposal conditions: elements that migrate as gases during use in the reactor and the population of cladding that contains defects. The former is needed to allow prediction of the rapid release fraction of a small number of radionuclides (isotopes of cesium, iodine, and technetium); the latter is needed to allow estimation of the number of fuel rods for which water can immediately gain access to the spent fuel. For each of these parameters, a characterization goal is assigned. This information is required for resolution of both Issue 1.4 and this issue.

For glass waste forms, the characterization goals will be given in the waste acceptance specifications. The specifications relevant to resolution of Issue 1.5 given in the waste acceptance preliminary specifications (WAPS) (Klein, 1988) are as follows:

> Specification 1.1 -- Chemical composition, requiring the producer to provide sufficient chemical and microstructural information necessary to characterize the elemental composition and crystalline phases for the product glass and expected variations in these characteristics during the life of the production facility.
>
> Specification 1.2 -- Radionuclide inventory, requiring the producer to provide estimates of the total radionuclide inventory to be sent to the repository, estimates of the radionuclide concentration in each canister, and expected variations in these quantities during the life of the production facility.
>
> Specification 1.3 -- Leaching properties, requiring the producer to control the leaching characteristics of the glass waste form during production such that the normalized release rates for sodium, silicon, boron, cesium-137, and uranium-238 in a 28 day MCC-1 leach test in deionized water do not exceed one gram per square meter per day averaged over the duration of the test.
>
> Specification 1.4 -- Chemical and phase stability, requiring the producer to provide glass transition temperatures and time-temperature-transformation data necessary to define the duration at any specific temperature which causes significant changes in the microstructure or phase compositions of the glass waste forms within the anticipated range of compositions.

WAPS specifications 1.1 and 1.2 allow the selection of input data (e.g., :hermodynamic and kin' ic properties) for glass waste form degradation mod-els. Such data are largely a function of glass composition. The range of expected glass compositions must be known i order to guide the development and application of a glass properties degradation data base (Activity ..5.2.2.2).

Specifications 1.3 and 1.4 are necessary to limit the classes of models that must be developed to resolute Issue 1.5. These specifications ensure that the glass waste form sent to the repository by the producer is, on the basis of durability and microstructure, similar to those glasses used in developing glass degradation models and a glass properties degradation data base for repository specific release rate predictions. The leach rates referenced in specification 1.3 are not intended to be a measure of the glass waste form performance in the repository or to act as a source term for the performance of the engineered barrier system. This specification in intended to discriminate between well-made glasses and nonvitreous products that may result from variations in process feed composition, process upsets during vitrification, and/or post-vitrification handling.

The goals for spent fuel description are as follows:

1. The inventory of radionuclides at emplacement will be established to within <20 percent for each radionuclide that will constitute more than 5 percent of the activity at any time during the first 10,000 yr after disposal.

2. The condition of the cladding will be described so that the number of rods containing defects in the cladding at the time the waste package is assembled can be estimated to within a factor of 2, or be shown to be less than 1 percent of the population.

3. The fission gas release to the pellet-cladding gap will be determined so that the gap inventory of cesium can be estimated to within a factor of 5.

3. Postacceptance, pre-emplacement storage, and handling of waste forms

Certain storage and handling conditions can cause changes in the waste forms that would be detrimental to long-term performance under disposal conditions. To prevent the occurrence of those conditions, goals have been set on the handling and storage of the waste forms after receipt at the repository. These goals have been assigned on the basis of the current knowledge of waste properties and taking into consideration the present understanding of the relative importance of factors affecting performance.

The goals on the number of preemplacement cladding failures are motivated by requirements on the amount of fuel that can be allowed to oxidize. Goals for cladding failures are also set under Issue 1.4.

The goals for handling and storage conditions are as follows:

1. The temperature of the spent fuel waste form and the access of air to the waste form will be controlled during transport, handling, and storage before emplacement such that oxidation of spent fuel through existing cladding defects is less than the amount that would result in 5 percent cladding strain.

2. The processes used to transport and handle spent fuel at the surface handling facility will be designed so that cladding failure from mechanical abrasion or deformation considering thermally induced effects will result in less than 5 percent cladding strain.

3. For glass waste forms, the storage conditions will be such that the transition temperature of the glass is not exceeded.

Analyses to define the temperature and air access limits required under goals 1, 2, and 3 are conducted under Information Need 1.5.2. Analyses conducted to resolve Issue 4.4 (Section 8.3.2.5) will show that the surface handling facility will comply with the temperature and air access goals determined for the spent fuel and glass waste forms.

C. Chemistry of water that enters the failed containers

Waste form dissolution rates and the solubility of mobilized radionuclides can be sensitive functions of the chemistry of the water that contacts the waste forms. The chemistry of water that contacts the containers and alterations to the water chemistry due to container corrosion will be determined in the resolution of Issue 1.10 under Information Need 1.10.4. (Section 8.3.4.2.4). The chemistry of water that could enter failed containers at a rate greater than 0.5 L/yr will be characterized to within the following limits.

pH	±1 pH unit
Anions:	±1 mg/L for fluoride, chloride, and phosphate
	±10 mg/L for nitrate and sulfate
	±30 mg/L for carbonate and bicarbonate
Cations:	±1 mg/L for species originally present at less than 6 mg/L. (Nickel and chromium are excluded from this requirement.)
	±5 mg/L for species originally present at between 6 and 40 mg/L
	±20 mg/L for species originally present at greater than 40 mg/L.

D. Dissolution rate of the components of the waste forms and solubility of mobilized radionuclides

The long-term dissolution rate of the glass waste form is expected to be controlled by saturation-limited kinetics; as the solution in contact with

he glass waste form approaches saturation with amorphous silica, the rate of issolution is expected to drop to very low values. A model for glass dissolution by this mechanism has been developed and appears to yield a reasonble fit to the laboratory data (Grambow, 1984; Grambow et al., 1985, 1987). he long-term dissolution rate of spent fuel (UO_2) is also expected to follow kinetic rate law; however, the available experimental evidence suggests hat the forward dissolution rate of UO_2 under oxidizing conditions does not pproach zero when the solution in contact with the waste reaches saturation ith respect to secondary uranium-bearing phases.

For both waste forms, for any radionuclide shown to have a dissolution r mobilization rate greater than 1 part in 100,000 per year under the onditions given in the bounding case in Figure 8.3.5.10-2, the solubility nd speciation of that radionuclide under anticipated conditions will be etermined. in this case, the solubility of the radionuclide combined with he low water flow rate will act to limit the release rate of the adionuclide.

The spent fuel waste form is more complicated than the glass waste form ecause it has a number of components, each with different release or dissoution rates, for which account must be given. Note that complexity of description implies neither inferiority nor superiority of the waste form in erms of the ultimate performance that will be demonstrated.

The performance goal for the spent fuel waste form is to show that the um of the radioactivity for the solutions and gases exiting the waste packges will contain no more than one part in 100,000 per year of the inventory f each radionuclide present in the total repository 1,000 yr after closure.

For glass waste forms, the performance goal is to show that the dissoution rate of the matrix and the mobilization of elements from the matrix ill be low enough to ensure that water exiting a failed container will carry ith it no more than 1 part in 100,000 per year of the container inventory of otal radionuclides.

Tests and analyses to show that these goals are achieved will be conucted under Information Needs 1.5.1, 1.5.2, and 1.5.3 (Sections 8.3.5.10.1 hrough 8.3.5.10.3)

. Additional barriers available to be used to resolve this issue

The following additional barriers are available to resolve the issue, if eeded, under the reference approach for liquid releases.

1. The container failure rate under anticipated conditions and under unanticipated conditions will be described. Tests and analyses to provide estimates of the container failure rate will be done under Information Needs 1.4.2 through 1.4.4 (Sections 8.3.5.9.2 through 8.3.5.9.4).

2. Cladding failure rate will be determined from the results of tests and analyses done under Information Needs 1.5.2 and 1.5.3 (Sections 8.3.5.10.2 and 8.3.5.10.3).

3. For water that encounters a breach in the container (and cladding), the fraction of water that enters the container (and cladding) and fraction that passes by the breach site without entering the container (and cladding) will be characterized. Tests to provide data for this analysis will be done under Information Need 1.5.3 (Section 8.3.5.10.3).

4. Water that accumulates within a failed container will provide variable dilution factors for different radionuclides. The concentration of readily soluble radionuclides due to the rapid release fraction will be diluted in proportion to the quantity of water that accumulates. This will have the effect of reducing the release rate from the container for these nuclides. Tests and analysis to support estimation of the dilution factors will be done under Information Need 1.5.3 (Section 8.3.5.10.3).

F. Potential barriers that will not be characterized

The following potential barriers will not be characterized:

1. The flow of air into a container for which a breach sufficiently large to sustain a flow of air at 1×10^{-4} atm-cm^3/s will be assumed to proceed without impediment.

2. The pour canister on the glass waste form will be assumed to provide no barrier to fluid flow.

G. Transport of radionuclide-bearing solutions through the near-field environment

The system model for performance assessment will require a source term to represent the radionuclides released across some boundary in the repository and to help provide an assessment of the effectiveness of natural and engineered barriers against release of radionuclides to the environment. To accommodate the needs of the system model for a source term, tests and analyses will be conducted to show the effects of transport of solutions that leave the waste package and migrate through the near-field environment. These tests and analyses will be done under Information Need 1.5.5 (Section 8.3.5.10.5).

No specific goals will be set for the results of these analyses; however, emphasis will be placed on actinides for which the EPA release limits to the accessible environment are a small fraction of the amount that could be released from the engineered barrier system under the performance objective for radionuclide release rate of 10 CFR 60.113. Data will be gathered predominantly for plutonium and americium (Oversby, 1986).

Interrelationships of information needs

Information Needs 1.5.1 and 1.5.2, and parts of 1.5.3 and 1.5.4 will be used for resolving Issue 1.4 and this issue (1.5). The data from Information Needs 1.5.3 and 1.5.4 not used for this issue (1.5) and all of Information Need 1.5.5 will be used in the resolution of Issues 1.1, 1.4, and 1.9, which are addressed in Sections 8.3.5.13, 8.3.5.9 and 8.3.5.18, respectively.

DECEMBER 1988

The schedule information for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) is presented in Section 8.3.5.10.6.

8.3.5.10.1 Information Need 1.5.1: Waste package design features that affect the rate of radionuclide release

Technical basis for addressing the information need

This information need addresses the condition of the waste (spent fuel or glass) as it arrives at the repository, and the Yucca Mountain Project waste package design features important to determining radionuclide release. To model the performance of the waste forms under repository conditions, reliable data are required on the population statistics for the parameters listed in the following parameters section.

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

The characteristics of the waste form are discussed in Chapter 7, Section 7.4.3. Glass waste forms will be further described in the waste qualification report from the waste producer. The waste container design is described in Section 7.3, and the behavior of the metal barrier components of the waste package are discussed in Section 7.4.2.

Parameters

For the spent fuel waste form, parameters are required for the fuel itself, the fuel cladding, and other assembly parts.

The fuel parameters are as follows:

1. As-fabricated fuel characteristics (composition, density, etc.).
2. Peak and average burnup.
3. Radionuclide inventory.
4. Peak linear heat generation rate (LHGR).
5. Reactor type: pressurized water reactor (PWR), boiling water reactor (BWR), or other.
6. Fission gas release.
7. Microstructural changes in the fuel due to irradiation.
8. Discharge date.
9. Storage medium and access of air or water to the fuel.
10. Mean and peak storage temperature.
11. Pre-emplacement releases of radionuclides, if any.

The cladding parameters are as follows:

1. Chemical composition.

2. Rod pressurization.

3. Percentage of rods with defected cladding, types of defects, and circumstances under which failure occurred.

4. Degree of oxidation.

5. Amount and type of crud deposits.

6. Radionuclide inventory of cladding.

7. Degree of hydrogen embrittlement or hydride formation, if known.

8. Peak and average storage temperature.

9. Discharge date.

10. Degree of mechanical damage to cladding that does not result in immediate cladding failure.

11. Preemplacement releases of radionuclides from cladding or cladding deposits, if any.

The parameters required for other assembly parts are

1. Chemical composition.

2. Location in assembly.

3. Discharge date.

4. Chemical or physical changes in assembly components due to irradiation or storage.

5. Preemplacement releases of radionuclides from assembly components, if any.

The parameters for glass waste forms are

1. Chemical composition.
2. Radionuclide inventory.
3. Chemical and phase stability.
4. Pour canister design.
5. Pour canister material.
6. Pour canister material properties.
7. Pour canister closure data.
8. Content of free liquids.
9. Gas content in canister voids.

10. Explosive, pyrophoric, or combustible material content.
11. Organic material content.
12. Free volume.
13. Decay heat generation rate.
14. Radiation dose rates.
15. Chemical compatibility of waste form with pour canister.
16. Weight of glass.
17. Cracking and fine particle production.
18. Chemical compatibility of pour canister and container.
19. Shipment, storage, and repository handling thermal history.

The parameters for both waste forms are

1. Timing of delivery of the various waste types to the repository.
2. Container design.
3. Container materials.
4. Chemical compatibility of waste forms with container.
5. Container orientation.
6. Borehole liner design.
7. Borehole liner materials.
8. Compatibility of waste form with borehole liners.
9. Borehole liner corrosion rate.
10. Borehole liner corrosion products.
11. Borehole shield plug design.
12. Borehole shield plug materials.
13. Compatibility of waste forms with borehole shield plugs.
14. Alteration or corrosion products of borehole shield plugs.
15. Repository thermal loading.
16. Package thermal cycle in repository.

Logic

The parameters just listed will provide a complete description of the waste as emplaced in the repository and provide the data to determine how the waste characteristics will change during the lifetime of the repository.

8.3.5.10.1.1 Activity 1.5.1.1: Integrate waste form data and waste package design data

This activity accumulates the information in the parameters listed previously from waste producers, fuel manufacturers, and other repository studies. No tests or analyses are performed in this activity.

8.3.5.10.1.1.1 Subactivity 1.5.1.1.1: Integrate spent fuel information

This subactivity will involve participation in the Spent Fuel Working Group, liaison activities with the DOE Office of Storage and Transportation Systems and other groups that may provide data on spent fuel, and review and accumulation of spent fuel data and results to determine whether information

specified in the parameters listed previously is adequately provided by producers and other repository studies.

8.3.5.10.1.1.2 Subactivity 1.5.1.1.2: Integrate glass waste form information

This subactivity will involve participation in the waste acceptance process; liaison activities with West Valley Demonstration Project (WVDP), Savannah River Laboratory (SRL), and the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF); and review and accumulation of glass waste form data and results to determine whether information specified in the parameters listed previously is adequately provided by producers and other repository studies. Most of the information specified in the glass waste form parameters is expected to be provided in the Waste Qualification Report as part of the waste acceptance process. The major goal of this activity is to ensure that the needed data are provided.

8.3.5.10.1.1.3 Subactivity 1.5.1.1.3: Integrate waste package and repository design information

This subactivity will involve review and accumulation of data other than that provided by waste producers and the Yucca Mountain Project waste form studies, including the parameters common to spent fuel and glass waste forms in the list given earlier.

8.3.5.10.1.2 Application of results

The results of this information need will determine the characteristics of the waste forms as received and emplaced at the repository, and provide the data to determine how those characteristics will change with time. Because they will establish important parameters such as waste form weight, radiation dose rates, and thermal properties, these activities are important to all design and safety issues. The data will be used as the basis for the testing and modeling of waste form performance, and thus will be used in resolving Issues 1.1 (Section 8.3.5.13), 1.4 (Section 8.3.5.9), 1.5, and 1.9 (Section 8.3.5.18), as well as issues requiring knowledge of the radionuclide release source term.

8.3.5.10.2 Information Need 1.5.2: Material properties of the waste form

Technical basis for addressing the information need

This information need covers the experimental work carried out to determine the material properties of the spent fuel and glass waste forms and to assess how these properties would affect the behavior of the waste forms under the Yucca Mountain Project repository conditions. The data generated

y these activities will be used under Information Need 1.5.3 (Section 8.3.5.10.3) to develop models for the long-term performance of the waste orms.

ink to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

The available data on spent fuel dissolution are discussed in Section 7.4.3.1.1, and data on the degradation and leaching of the glass waste orm in Section 7.4.3.2. The available data on the oxidation of irradiated ranium dioxide (UO_2) fuel are discussed in Section 7.4.3.1.2. The available ata on the corrosion of Zircaloy are discussed in Section 7.4.3.1.3.

arameters

The information needed from other information needs includes the ollowing:

1. Waste form characteristics and waste package design features (Information Need 1.5.1, Section 8.3.5.10.1).

2. Chemistry of the water contacting the waste form (Information Need 1.10.4, Section 8.3.4.2.4).

3. Temperature as a function of time (Information Need 1.10.4, Section 8.3.4.2.4).

4. Release scenarios (Information Need 1.5.3, Section 8.3.5.10.3).

The information that will be obtained in this information need includes he following:

1. Release rate of radionuclides from the spent fuel waste form (includes both fuel and nonfuel components).

2. Mechanisms of release from spent fuel.

3. Oxidation rate of spent fuel as a function of temperature.

4. Primary mechanisms and rates of Zircaloy cladding failure.

5. Release rate of radionuclides from the glass waste forms.

6. Mechanisms of release from the glass waste forms.

Logic

The parameters given in the preceding list define the material properties of the waste forms that will determine their performance in the repository.

The primary mechanism for the transport of radioactivity from a failed waste package is dissolution of the waste form into ground water followed by migration due to the natural flow of ground water. It is thus important to determine both the release rate of the radionuclides of interest from the

waste form as a function of time as well as the equilibrium solubilities of these elements in ground water of appropriate composition.

Because the spent fuel waste form in a failed container may be exposed to the oxygen in air for a period of time before its initial contact with ground water, it is necessary to determine the oxidation rate of uranium dioxide and the effect of oxidation on dissolution. In addition, the volume change attendant upon the conversion of UO_2 to U_3O_8 may cause gross failure of the Zircaloy cladding on a fuel rod with preexisting minor cladding defects. This would expose a much greater area of fuel to both oxygen and ground water than would be the case for an essentially intact fuel rod and would affect both the oxidation rate and the dissolution rate. This affects the resolution of both this issue and Issue 1.4 (Section 8.3.5.9).

The Zircaloy cladding in the spent fuel waste form may provide a barrier for the release of radionuclides, especially those elements present in the rapidly released, gap and grain boundary inventory such as cesium and iodine. The corrosion rate of Zircaloy will be studied to determine the effectiveness of the cladding in retarding the release of radionuclides. The nonfuel components of the spent fuel waste form (including cladding) that contain activation products will also contribute to the radionuclide inventory of the repository. Corrosion of these assembly parts is likely to be a major source of several radionuclides (nickel-59, niobium-94, carbon-14).

Radionuclide release from glass waste forms can only occur after breach of both the container and the pour canister, and subsequent entry of water.

8.3.5.10.2.1 Activity 1.5.2.1: Characterization of the spent fuel waste form

The purpose of this activity is to conduct tests that will provide data on the release rate of radionuclides from the spent fuel waste form. In all, this activity consists of six subactivities; however, the bulk of the experimental effort is covered by the first three subactivities discussed.

8.3.5.10.2.1.1 Subactivity 1.5.2.1.1: Dissolution and leaching of spent fuel

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to determine the release rate of radionuclides from spent UO_2 fuel. Tests will be conducted to determine the effect on the release rate of the parameters in the following list. The results of these tests will be used to develop models of spent fuel dissolution and radionuclide release under Information Need 1.5.3 (Section 8.3.5.10.3).

?arameters

Information is required for the following parameters:

1. Fuel burnup.

2. Fission gas release of the fuel during reactor operation.

3. Temperature.

4. Oxidation state of the uranium in the spent fuel.

5. Water chemistry.

6. Reactor type: pressurized water reactor (PWR), boiling water reactor (BWR), or other.

7. Grain size of the fuel.

8. Radiation field.

escription

The basic methodology of the tests will be to subject specimens of spent uel rods to contact with the Yucca Mountain Project reference ground water well J-13 water). Tests will be conducted using a variety of spent fuel ypes that are typical of the population of fuel expected to be emplaced in he repository. Periodic samples of the solution will be analyzed for water hemistry and radionuclide content. At the end of the tests, samples of the eached fuel will be examined with the scanning electron microscope and optical microscope to determine, if possible, the location of any preferential issolution. An effort will be made to identify any phases that precipitate uring the test. The results of two series of tests using these methods are ummarized in Section 7.4.3.1.1.

Additional tests will be conducted to determine the rate of reaction of he uranium oxide matrix during oxidative dissolution. These tests will omprise both "static" dissolution tests using an isotope dilution technique Bruton and Shaw, 1987) and flow-through tests. Experiments will be performed on both unirradiated uranium oxides and spent fuel. The effects on he reaction rate of temperature, solution chemistry, and the oxidation state f the uranium in the solid reactant will be determined. Combined electrochemical/spectroscopic techniques (Russo et al., 1987) will be used in other xperiments to determine the chemical species present in solution and on the ranium oxide surface during the oxidative dissolution process. These data ill be used in constructing a mechanistic model for the dissolution of the pent fuel matrix.

8.3.5.10.2.1.2 Subactivity 1.5.2.1.2: Oxidation of spent fuel

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to determine the oxidation rate of irradiated UO_2 fuel as a function of the parameters in the following list. The results of these tests will be used to support the development of release models under Information Need 1.5.3 (Section 8.3.5.10.3). Some of the oxidized fuel produced by this activity will be used in spent fuel dissolution tests.

Parameters

Information is required for the following parameters:

1. Temperature.
2. Grain size of the fuel.
3. Particle size of the fuel (fracture density).
4. Atmospheric humidity.
5. Radiation field.
6. Burnup of the fuel.
7. Fission gas release of the fuel.

Description

Two types of tests are planned: (1) thermogravimetric analyses (TGA) and (2) long-term dry-bath oxidation tests. Both techniques maintain the spent fuel specimen at a constant temperature and humidity in a 20% O_2 + 80% N_2 atmosphere. The primary means of determining the degree of oxidation is by monitoring the weight gain of the sample over the course of the test. The two methods are complementary. The TGA tests provide continuous monitoring of weight changes of small samples for periods up to approximately three months. The dry-bath oxidation tests use larger samples and can be run for longer periods of time (two or more years) and can, therefore, provide information on oxidation rates at lower temperatures than the TGA system; however, the record of weight gain by the sample is not continuous. After oxidation, fuel specimens from both types of tests will be examined using x-ray diffraction, ceramography, SEM, TEM, and the ion-microprobe. Einziger (1985) presents a more complete technical description of the tests to be conducted under this subactivity.

8.3.5.10.2.1.3 Subactivity 1.5.2.1.3: Corrosion of Zircaloy

Objectives

The objectives of this subactivity are to determine the principal modes of Zircaloy cladding degradation and to determine the failure rate of cladding due to these modes. The results of these tests will be used to support the development of release models under Information Need 1.5.3 (Section 8.3.5.10.3). Those release models are needed to resolve both this issue and Issue 1.4 (Section 8.3.5.9).

CEMBER 1988

rameters

Information is required for the following parameters:

1. Presence or absence of liquid water.
2. Water chemistry, especially iodine and fluorine content.
3. Stress levels in the cladding (includes pressurization and pressure due to fission gas release).
4. Temperature.
5. Compatibility of Zircaloy with other metals in the waste package.
6. Hydrogen (hydride) content of the cladding.
7. Thickness of the external oxide layer on the cladding.
8. Radiation field.
9. Irradiation, storage, and handling history of the cladding.
10. Presence and composition of residues or deposits (crud) on the cladding.

scription

Smith (1985) has summarized the conditions in a tuff repository as they rtain to Zircaloy corrosion and has identified the corrosion processes ex- cted to operate under these conditions. As discussed in Section 7.4.3.1.3, e likely modes of cladding failure are (1) stress corrosion cracking, (2) her forms of electrochemical corrosion, and (3) hydride reorientation.

Stress corrosion cracking from the fuel side of the cladding is not nsidered a likely mode of failure in the repository. Existing models asooji et al., 1984) suggest that the fuel rod temperature and stress istories are below threshold limits for initiation of failure by stress rrosion cracking. Additional experiments and analyses are planned, wever, to support these indications. Uniform corrosion is thought to be o slow to be an important mode of cladding degradation. Nevertheless, the te at which the Zircaloy corrodes will be studied as part of a series of lectrochemical corrosion tests. These tests will also examine the potential r pitting corrosion. Within the range of expected water and vapor chem- stry in the candidate repository, fluoride, and to a lesser extent chloride, dine, cesium, and cadmium (the last three from the waste form) ions are the gents most likely to have an adverse effect on cladding integrity. Stress pture of the cladding may occur if a small defect exists and the fuel oxi- izes or if undefected rods are subjected to high temperatures. The hydrogen ntent of the cladding, particularly if the hydrogen is present as reori- ted hydride platelets, may alter the susceptibility of the cladding to this de of failure. Tests are planned to study each of the preceding modes of ailure and to quantify the rate at which they occur. The effect of each of e relevant parameters given above will be examined. To obtain results on a

laboratory time scale, it is likely that testing will need to be carried out under conditions more extreme than those anticipated for the tuff repository. Extrapolation of the results to repository conditions will require mechanistic models for the various failure modes and will be carried out under the activities for Information Need 1.5.3 (Section 8.3.5.10.3).

The report by Smith (1985) discusses the planned test matrix. Three types of tests are currently planned:

1. Electrochemical corrosion tests will involve the exposure of Zircaloy cladding to ground water in the presence of air, tuff, and candidate container materials at a variety of temperatures and pressures. As discussed above, the effect of particular ions thought to be important will be evaluated by modifying the chemistry of the solutions used in these tests. These tests will examine the rate of generalized corrosion and the susceptibility of the cladding to pitting corrosion under repository-relevant conditions. Post-test examination of the specimens will focus on any changes in the structure of the passivating oxide film and/or the growth of such a film for cases in which the pre-existing film was purposely removed.

2. Stress corrosion cracking testing will be carried out using C-rings of Zircaloy, which will be stressed to near their yield point in the presence of ground water, and by the use of an apparatus allowing cladding segments to be overpressurized in the presence of liquid water. The effect of initiating agents such as fluorine and iodine will be examined by altering the chemistry of the water. Other test methods, including standard methods where applicable, may be used to supplement these tests.

3. The role of stress rupture will be evaluated by overpressurizing Zircaloy-clad fuel rod segments. Tests will be conducted using cladding with a range of hydrogen content, hydride density, and hydride orientation to determine the effect of hydride reorientation on the mechanical strength of the cladding.

In all these tests, the Zircaloy will be examined after testing by a variety of techniques, including, but not limited to, metallography, scanning electron microscopy, transmission electron microscopy, and a scanning Auger technique. Additional tests may be undertaken as a better understanding of the behavior of Zircaloy under tuff repository conditions develops.

8.3.5.10.2.1.4 Subactivity 1.5.2.1.4: Corrosion of and radionuclide release from other materials in the spent fuel waste form

Objectives

The objectives of this subactivity are to quantify the corrosion rate and consequent release of radionuclides from components of the spent fuel waste form not included in the studies on the uranium dioxide fuel itself and its Zircaloy cladding. The primary components to be studied are stainless steel, Inconel, and naval brass parts used as spacers, fittings, and other structural elements of reactor fuel assemblies. The results of these tests will be used to support the development of radionuclide release models under Information Need 1.5.3 (Section 8.3.5.10.3).

Parameters

Information is required for the following parameters:

1. Composition of material.
2. Water chemistry.
3. Temperature.
4. Radiation field.
5. Irradiation history of the material.
6. Atmospheric humidity.

Description

At present, the tests to evaluate the release of radionuclides from assembly materials are in the planning stage. Some form of semistatic leach testing under conditions similar to those anticipated in the tuff repository will probably be performed. The tests will need to identify both the corrosion rate of the various assembly materials and the rate of radionuclide release from the materials and their corrosion products.

8.3.5.10.2.1.5 Subactivity 1.5.2.1.5: Evaluation of the inventory and release of carbon-14 from Zircaloy cladding

Objectives

The objectives of this subactivity are to determine the source, inventory, and location of carbon-14 in Zircaloy cladding. In addition, the potential for release of carbon-14 in the form of carbon dioxide from cladding will be studied. The parameters in the following list are presently thought to be of importance in determining both the inventory and release characteristics of carbon-14 in Zircaloy cladding. The results of these tests will be used to support the development of radionuclide release models under Information Need 1.5.3 (Section 8.3.5.10.3).

Parameters

Information is required for the following parameters:

1. Reactor type: pressurized water reactor (PWR), boiling water reactor (BWR), or other.

2. Irradiation history.

3. Extent and nature of crud deposits on the cladding.

4. Thickness of oxide film on the cladding.

5. Temperature.

6. Radiation field.

7. Nature of atmosphere surrounding the cladding (oxidizing or inert).

Description

Experiments are planned to determine the release characteristics of carbon-14 from Zircaloy cladding. These involve heating whole assemblies, individual rods, or rod segments in an oxidizing atmosphere and measuring the release of carbon-14 as a function of time and temperature. Other studies are aimed at establishing how much of the carbon-14 is located within the Zircaloy and how much is carried by the external coatings of crud and zirconium oxide. These studies involve controlled etching of cladding segments before heating to release the carbon as carbon dioxide. In both types of test, the cladding will be examined to document the nature and extent of any surface deposits as well as any microstructure within the body of the cladding. Additional tests may be conducted as more information on carbon-14 in Zircaloy is gathered.

The source of the carbon-14 has a large role in determining whether the radioactive carbon is within the Zircaloy or is in surface deposits. If the carbon-14 is produced primarily by (n,p) reactions on nitrogen-14 impurities within the cladding, then most of the carbon-14 would be expected to be located there. If, on the other hand, (n,alpha) reactions on oxygen-17 in the reactor cooling water are the dominant source, then the carbon-14 will probably be mainly located in surface deposits. The relative importance of these sources may depend on the type of reactor involved. The release characteristics of the carbon-14 will depend strongly on the relative importance of these two sources; the carbon-14 should be released from surface deposits much more quickly than if the carbon must diffuse through a significant thickness of cladding. Isotopic analyses of the stable carbon-12 and carbon-13 associated with the released carbon-14 may aid in identifying the source of the latter.

8.3.5.10.2.1.6 Subactivity 1.5.2.1.6: Other experiments on the spent fuel waste form

Objectives

As testing continues on the properties and behavior of the spent fuel waste form, it is possible that additional tests not covered by the other

five subactivities in this activity will be required. Those tests will be conducted under this subactivity. Currently, only one area of investigation falls into this category: the behavior of stainless steel-clad fuel under tuff repository conditions.

)escription

Test descriptions will be issued as the need arises.

.3.5.10.2.2 Activity 1.5.2.2: Characterization of the glass waste form

The purpose of the subactivities in this analysis is to provide the data required to calculate release rates from glass waste forms.

.3.5.10.2.2.1 Subactivity 1.5.2.2.1: Leach testing of glass

Objectives

The objectives of this subactivity are to (1) use static leach testing to provide high-quality, high-precision data on the rates and amounts of radionuclide release from waste glass in contact with standing water, and (2) use unsaturated leach testing to provide data on the rates and amounts of radionuclide release from waste glass that is contacted by water, which then flows off the glass without remaining for long periods of time.

Parameters

The information needed from other information needs includes

1. Waste glass composition.
2. Leaching water composition.
3. Temperature.
4. Ratio of water-to-glass surface area.
5. Container material.
6. Pour canister material.
7. Other waste form characteristics from Information Need 1.5.1 (Section 8.3.5.10.1).

The output parameters for this activity are the rates of release of radionuclides from waste glasses in contact with water and in the presence of important materials such as the container material.

Description

Leaching of glass in contact with standing water may occur when water fills a breached container and pour canister. Leach testing under static conditions will provide constraints on the release rate under these conditions. In addition, leach testing under static conditions is the simplest form of leach testing, and the results may be generally applied to provide constraints upon other leaching scenarios. The simplicity of these experiments makes them the most reproducible form of leach testing. The testing done in this activity is intended to test the most important scenarios for release (e.g., temperature, water chemistry, and interaction with repository materials). Accordingly, long-term test matrices will be set up drawing upon the information obtained from the materials interactions tests (Subactivity 1.5.2.2.2, Section 8.3.5.10.2.2.2) that will examine a broad range of possible leaching conditions.

A possible scenario for release from glass may be that in which water enters a breached pour canister and reacts with the glass (but is not held in contact with the glass) and then flows away. Water dripping onto and off glass is one example. Because of the extremely high glass-to-water ratios that may occur under these conditions, a special test called the Project Unsaturated Test Method has been developed to examine the effects of release under these conditions (Section 7.4.3.2). As part of this activity, unsaturated testing will be performed to provide the complementary data to that described for static leach testing.

Glasses to be tested in this subactivity will include both radioactive and simulated-waste glasses. A range in compositions representing the range to be produced (as described by the producer in the Waste Compliance Plan and Waste Qualification Report) will be used. All related confirmation testing will be conducted under this activity (refer to milestones in Section 8.3.5.10.2.4).

8.3.5.10.2.2.2 Subactivity 1.5.2.2.2: Materials interactions affecting glass leaching

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to examine a broad range of factors that may influence glass leaching and degradation. Those determined to be most important will be tested further in Subactivity 1.5.2.2.1 (Section 8.3.5.10.2.2.1). This activity will provide information on mechanisms for input to development of the glass leaching model, Activity 1.5.3.4 (Section 8.3.5.10.3.4). Both calculational and experimental techniques will be used to examine the effects of possible interactions so that no important mechanisms for glass release will fail to be considered by the testing and modeling programs.

Parameters

The information needed from other information needs includes

1. Waste glass composition.

2. Leaching water composition.

3. Temperature.

4. Ratio of water-to-glass surface area.

5. Container material.

6. Pour canister material and heat-treated canister material.

7. Radiation effects on leachant composition.

8. Cracking and disaggregation of glass.

9. Changes in fluid composition caused by other repository components such as grout and concrete.

10. Other waste form characteristics from Information Need 1.5.1 (Section 8.3.5.10.1).

The output parameters for this activity are the effects on glass teration rate, and on glass leaching rate and mechanism caused by the nteractions of the studied materials.

escription

A large number of interactions may affect the rate of glass degradation the repository. Among the most important are interactions involving the rameters in the preceding list. Other interactions will be identified and amined as part of this activity.

Two types of experimental work will be conducted. In the first type, aching experiments will be performed in which the interacting material, or diation, is present with the glass. Several leaching tests will be used cluding static testing, unsaturated testing, and pulsed flow testing. In e second type of testing, fluid chemistries will be altered to simulate pository influences. In both tests, EQ3/6 modeling will be used to aid in signing the experiments, and the results will then be used to aid in the velopment of the glass modeling EQ3/6 package of codes. Container materi- s will be added to the experiments based on the metal selection process ssue 1.4, Section 8.3.5.9). Until the metal is selected, type 304L stain- ss steel (the pour canister material) will be used.

.3.5.10.2.2.3 Subactivity 1.5.2.2.3: Cooperative testing with waste producers

bjectives

The objective of this subactivity is to conduct a cooperative testing rogram with the waste producers to allow for the testing of full-scale waste

forms and to ensure that the laboratory-scale test results obtained by the producers are consistent with those obtained by the Yucca Mountain Project.

Parameters

The most important parameters for this subactivity are the following:

1. The effect of scale (full-scale versus laboratory-scale) tests on leaching rates.

2. Water flow and contact with glass in a pour canister.

3. Reproducibility and accuracy of testing.

4. Glass compositional effects on leach rates.

Other parameters are the same as those listed for Subactivity 1.5.2.2.2 (Section 8.3.5.10.2.2.2).

Description

This subactivity involves cooperation with the waste form producers in designing and interpreting leach tests on laboratory-scale and full-scale waste forms. No testing under this subactivity will be performed by the Yucca Mountain Project. Testing will be performed by the waste producers on pieces cut from full-scale canisters to ensure that the laboratory-scale measurements can be adequately applied to actual leaching in the repository. The Yucca Mountain Project will provide the following: (1) assistance in designing the experiments, (2) assistance in interpreting the results including geochemical analysis using EQ3/6 and the glass modeling codes, and (3) repository relevant materials to be used in testing possible repository interactions.

The waste producers are also conducting laboratory-scale tests similar to those done by the Yucca Mountain Project. In this subactivity, those results will be compared to ensure that the waste producers and the Yucca Mountain Project both observe similar behavior in glass leaching experiments. Additional tests may be added to the other two Yucca Mountain Project glass testing activities to confirm these results or to resolve inconsistencies.

Because a large body of consistent data on glass leaching behavior is required, the cooperation with waste form producers is important to confirm that the data provided by waste-producer tests will be usable in licensing the repository.

8.3.5.10.2.3 Application of results

The information generated under this information need will be used to develop models and scenarios for the release of radionuclides in Information Need 1.5.3, Section 8.3.5.10.3. This information is also the primary input to those models. Other performance issues that are directly affected by the

material properties of the waste form are Issues 1.1 (Section 8.3.5.13), 1.2 Section 8.3.5.14), and 1.4 (Section 8.3.5.9).

8.3.5.10.3 Information Need 1.5.3: Scenarios and models needed to predict the rate of radionuclide release from the waste package and engineered barrier system

Technical basis for addressing the information need

This information need will draw together the scenarios and conditions for radionuclide release provided by information needs or investigations under the the following issues or characterization programs:

Issue or program	Short title
1.1	Total system performance (Section 8.3.5.13)
1.4	Containment by waste package (Section 8.3.5.9)
1.10	Waste package characteristics (postclosure) (Section 8.3.4.2)
8.3.1.2	Geohydrology
8.3.1.3	Geochemistry
8.3.1.4	Rock characteristics
8.3.1.5	Climate
8.3.1.6	Erosion
8.3.1.8	Postclosure tectonics

This information will be combined with the models that will be used to predict radionuclide release under anticipated and unanticipated conditions for 10,000 yr (10 CFR 60.112 and 40 CFR 191.13) and under expected conditions for 100,000 yr (10 CFR 960.3-1-5).

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

The scenarios and conditions for radionuclide release are derived from the information on site geology (Chapter 1), hydrology (Chapter 3), geochemistry (Chapter 4), climatology (Chapter 5), repository design (Chapter 6), emplacement environment (Section 7.1), waste package design (Section 7.3), waste package environment (Section 7.4.1), and metal barriers studies (Section 7.4.2). Some scenarios requiring analysis will arise from information needs of total system performance assessment, which are discussed in Section 8.3.5.13.

Performance assessment models that will be used to predict radionuclide release from the engineered barrier system have been discussed in Section 7.4.5 and the interrelationships are shown in Figure 8.3.5.10-1. The design-related inputs to these analyses appear in Section 7.3. Details of activities that will develop waste package process models that will be implemented in performance assessment modeling appear in waste package environment (Section 7.4.1), metal barrier studies (Section 7.4.2), waste form degradation (Section 7.4.3), and geochemical modeling (Section 7.4.4). Model inputs are shown in Table 8.3.5.10-1.

Parameters

Input parameters for scenario development are the following:

1. Output parameters from Issue 1.1 (conditions that reflect climatic, geohydrologic, or geologic phenomena in the far field but which result in changes at the repository level computed by total system performance models) (Section 8.3.5.13).

2. Output parameters from Information Need 1.4.4 (waste package container failure modes and times) (Section 8.3.5.9.4).

3. Output parameters from Issue 1.10 (configurations and characteristics of waste package designs) (Section 8.3.4.2).

4. Output parameters from Issue 1.11 (characteristics of the repository and engineered barriers) (Section 8.3.2.2).

5. Output parameters from Issue 1.12 (characteristics of the shaft and borehole seals that may affect waste package performance) (Section 8.3.3.2).

6. Output parameters from Characterization Programs 8.3.1.2 and 8.3.1.3 (changes in geohydrologic and geochemical conditions).

7. Output parameters from Characterization Programs 8.3.1.4, 8.3.1.5, 8.3.1.6, and 8.3.1.8 (changes in geologic, hydrologic, and geomechanical conditions that may directly affect waste package performance).

Output parameters for scenario development are

1. Identification of scenarios due to all anticipated processes and events, in terms of qualitative features and far-field or other controlling parameters.

2. Parameters of the near-field environment and of the waste package, describing scenarios due to anticipated processes and events.

3. Parameters of the near-field environment and of the waste package, describing scenarios due to unanticipated processes and events to the extent needed by Issue 1.1 (total system performance).

4. A determination of whether the parameters of the scenarios due to all anticipated processes and events fall within the design envelope assumed for waste package design and performance allocation (see Section 8.3.4.2).

Data needed for the geochemical modeling of the reaction of waste forms with water are the following:

1. The equilibrium aqueous speciation of solutes.

2. The equilibrium solid and aqueous compositions of systems consisting of mixtures of gas, liquid, and solids.

3. The thermodynamic and kinetic data for solid and liquid species required to calculate equilibria and reaction rates in gas-liquid-solid systems.

The output parameters from geochemical modeling are the following: fluid compositions, amount and composition of solids, and overall rates of reaction and approach to equilibrium for complicated systems.

The input parameters for waste form release models are the following:

1. The waste form characterization parameters specified in Information Need 1.5.1.

2. The waste form material properties specified in Information Need 1.5.2.

3. The parameters specified previously in this information need (1.5.3).

The output parameters from waste package release models are the rates of release of radionuclides from waste packages.

The performance assessment models will require two kinds of input parameters, both of which have been described earlier in this section. First, the parameters describing anticipated and unanticipated events (i.e., the scenarios) serve to establish the range of cases for which performance must be calculated. These parameters also specify the range of conditions under which the waste package must perform. Second, the remaining parameters for release and geochemical interactions provide the mechanisms of waste release that will be integrated by the performance assessment calculation of release from the engineered barrier system. The parameters required by performance assessment will contain the probabilistic information necessary to meet the reasonable assurance standard required by the NRC.

The output parameters obtained from the waste package performance assessment model are cumulative distribution functions for the time to failure of the container, the release rates of radionuclides from failed waste packages, and release rates of radionuclides from the engineered barrier system.

Logic

Calculation of the release rates of radionuclides from the engineered barrier system requires an integrated analysis of all the significant factors affecting loss of waste package containment. Significant factors include scenarios encompassing anticipated processes and events, near-field environments due to interactions between waste packages and the scenario-driven conditions, and geochemical system states and reactions. Processes in the loss of waste package containment include the release of radionuclides from the waste form and the movement of radionuclides away from a breached package. Release begins with container failure. Gaseous radionuclides may be assumed to leave the package upon loss of containment. Solid phase radionuclides that are contained within the waste form will require contact with ground water for release to occur. Therefore, the amount and chemistry of ground water as influenced by the waste package environment, the condition of the container, the nature of the interaction between waste form and ground water, and the inventory of waste present will affect the availability of radionuclides for transport. Once the radionuclides are in solution, pathways by which the waste may leave the waste package will complete the determination of releases from the engineered barrier system.

The information provided under this information need constitutes the basic models needed to assess waste package performance. They incorporate all applicable information from characterization, design, and performance studies.

There are five activities in this information need. Each of the first four activities addresses a specific modeling need, and they are all combined in the fifth activity (1.5.3.5) (Section 8.3.5.10.3.5).

8.3.5.10.3.1 Activity 1.5.3.1: Integrate scenarios for release from waste package

This activity consists of four subactivities.

8.3.5.10.3.1.1 Subactivity 1.5.3.1.1: Develop scenario identifications

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to identify scenarios for all anticipated and unanticipated processes and events.

Parameters

The input parameters for this subactivity are listed in the combined list in the technical basis section for this information need. The input parameters for this subactivity are identified anticipated processes and events from Issue 1.1 and other processes and events that will be screened to determine whether they should be considered anticipated.

Description

This subactivity will identify scenarios in terms of far-field or controlling parameters. This will be done for a super-set of processes and events, which will include all anticipated processes and events, and additional processes and events that are to be screened as to whether they are to be considered anticipated. This subactivity will also accept scenario descriptions from Issue 1.1 (total system performance) that are to be processed for application in Issue 1.1.

The process for this subactivity will be to accept scenario descriptions for credible processes and events from Issue 1.1, to consider scenarios that may have been screened out from Issue 1.1 on the basis of consequences to Issue 1.1 rather than on the basis of probability, and to search systematically for scenarios that may be due to near-field processes in addition to those developed by Issue 1.1.

8.3.5.10.3.1.2 Subactivity 1.5.3.1.2: Separate scenarios into anticipated and unanticipated categories

Objectives

The purpose of this subactivity is to determine the types and extent of scenarios covering all anticipated processes and events.

Parameters

The input parameters for this subactivity are listed in the combined list in the technical basis section for this information need. These include scenarios identified in Subactivity 1.5.3.1.1.

The output parameters are

1. A binary value of anticipated or unanticipated for all scenarios identified in Subactivity 1.5.3.1.1.

2. The maximum amplitude that falls within the anticipated range, for those scenario categories spanning the anticipated and unanticipated while covering a range of amplitudes (e.g., amount and timing of climate change).

Description

Issue 1.1. has a category of scenarios, expected case, that incorporates anticipated processes and events. The separation of this category is just a convenience for Issue 1.1, since probability values are attached to all scenarios and are used in constructing a complementary cumulative distribution function in Issue 1.1. This issue (1.5) will independently determine what scenarios and scenario values are to be included in the group of anticipated processes and events.

The first step is to develop a decision criterion on how to separate processes and events into the anticipated or unanticipated categories. The NRC regulation 10 CFR Part 60 defines anticipated processes and events as those reasonably likely to occur during the period to which the regulations apply. This definition is qualitative; a clear-cut decision criterion must still be developed. Practice from other fields of engineering design will be considered in developing a decision criterion.

The second step is to develop data (or bounding estimates on the data) of parameters needed for the decision criterion. Depending on the criterion developed, these may be probabilities of events, curves of amplitude versus recurrence time, other data from the geologic record, or other data from geologic or physical first principles.

8.3.5.10.3.1.3 Subactivity 1.5.3.1.3: Development of parameters describing the scenarios

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to develop and assemble the parameters of the near-field environment and of the waste package describing scenarios covering anticipated processes and events.

Parameters

The input parameters for this subactivity are listed in the combined list in the technical basis section for this information need. The most important parameters include scenarios for anticipated processes and events, waste package environment, waste package configuration, and containment performance.

Description

This subactivity will develop and assemble the parameters of the near-field environment and of the waste package, describing the scenarios identified in Subactivity 1.5.3.1.2 as anticipated and also those needed by Issue 1.1 (total system performance). This subactivity will develop how parameters of the far field influence the near field, taking into account interactions of the waste package with its environment; what parameters are determined by repository and waste package design; and how parameters of the near field and the waste package evolve under processes at the waste package scale.

The near-field parameters of the scenarios will be developed in conjunction with Information Need 1.10.4 (Section 8.3.4.2.4). Issue 1.1 will identify scenarios and determine their average impacts at the repository horizon, in most instances without waste-package-environment interactions or waste-package-scale variations in properties. This subactivity will transfer the information to Information Need 1.10.4, where the interactions between the waste packages and their environment for the given scenarios will be evaluated. These evaluations will then be combined in this subactivity with

waste package and other parameters to complete the scenario description in terms of its parameters.

Some parameters of the scenario will evolve with time depending on waste package and near-field processes. This subactivity, together with model applications of the waste package system model, will track the evolution of these parameters. These parameters will determine the range of conditions for which near-field, waste package, and waste form detailed calculations will have to be established in support of waste package system assessments. This subactivity will assemble and transmit to the detailed tasks the conditions under which processes will have to be evaluated. As an example, time of container failure and amount of corrosion products still present will be transmitted to the waste form alteration and release activities.

For unanticipated scenarios needed in Issue 1.1, the degree of specificity in the near-field characterization of the scenario may be less than for the scenarios in Issues 1.4 and 1.5, depending on the extent of performance allocated to the waste package in these scenarios by Issue 1.1.

The parameter (of near-field and waste package) development for scenarios will be done both for anticipated and unanticipated processes and events. The parameter descriptions of scenarios due to anticipated processes and events will be used in evaluations for this issue (1.5) and Issue 1.4 (containment by waste package, Section 8.3.5.9). The parameter descriptions of scenarios due to both anticipated and unanticipated processes and events will be used in evaluations of radionuclide source term for use in Issue 1.1.

The parameter values will include point estimates and probabilistic characterizations. The point estimates will be either best estimates, high percentile probability estimates, or bounding values as appropriate for the application. The probabilistic characterizations will lead to probabilistic descriptions of results. These will be directly transmitted to Issue 1.1; that issue is concerned with performance in terms of an Environmental Protection Agency performance criterion phrased explicitly in probabilistic terms. The probabilistic characterizations will also be used in Issues 1.4 and 1.5 in providing evidence to support a determination that the performance issues will be satisfied with a safe margin that is, that there is reasonable assurance that the performance objectives will be met.

8.3.5.10.3.1.4 Subactivity 1.5.3.1.4: Determine adequacy of design envelope of waste package

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to determine the adequacy of the design envelope of waste package for design and testing activities.

Parameters

The input parameters for this subactivity are listed in the combined list in the technical basis section for this information need. These include

scenarios from anticipated processes and events and conditions and processes in the near-field of the waste package.

Description

The design envelope for waste package design (Section 8.3.4.2) and for performance allocation (Sections 8.3.5.9 and 8.3.5.10) was selected to be an envelope of conditions for all anticipated processes and events. In selecting the envelope, due consideration was given to present uncertainties. When the anticipated processes and events and the resulting scenarios are determined, confirmation or adjustment of the design envelope will be required.

This subactivity will examine the near-field conditions determined under Subactivity 1.5.3.1.3 due to anticipated processes and events and their interaction with waste package influences on the near-field environment, and determine whether the near-field conditions fall within the design envelope assumed in Section 8.3.4.2 and the performance allocations assigned in Sections 8.3.5.9 and 8.3.5.10. If they do, this will confirm the adequacy of the design envelope for design and testing activities. If not, this subactivity will determine the range of conditions that must be considered in design and testing. The range may be amenable to more detailed specification in terms of more parameters and correlations among parameters.

8.3.5.10.3.2 Activity 1.5.3.2: Develop geochemical speciation and reaction model

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to further develop the geochemical modeling code EQ3/6 for use in modeling of waste form radionuclide release and the behavior of released radionuclides. The need to make long-term predictions of release rates and the fate of released radionuclides requires the use of a geochemically sound model that accounts for the perturbations that may exist within the repository and is consistent with existing thermodynamic and waste form experimental data. For use in understanding long-term behavior, geochemical modeling codes must be capable of modeling processes already identified as major factors affecting radionuclide behavior, such as dissolution and precipitation. For use in modeling waste form release, the codes must be capable of modeling the dissolution behavior of the waste in ways that are consistent with experimental data and that provide information about the important factors affecting radionuclide release.

The EQ3/6 code package, the associated data base, and the use of the code in geochemical applications have been described in Section 7.4.4. The codes have already been used to interpret the results of rock-water interactions tests, to evaluate ground-water analyses and determine whether equilibrium conditions exist, to determine solubility limits for radionuclides under various realistic conditions, and to aid in the design of laboratory experiments by identifying parameters that need to be measured to understand the chemical processes that drive the experimental system. The EQ3/6 package may be used to calculate the fluid compositions and solid phases with their amounts and their radionuclides content that would result

from the equilibration of hypothetical solutions resulting from the dissolution of waste forms in water. Similarly, it may be used to calculate the changes in composition of a water as it flows through and reacts with repository rock, engineered barrier materials, or a waste form. The codes are also useful for testing the thermodynamic feasibility of proposed mechanisms and for identifying the equilibrium reactions that control a given process. Two subactivities support this evaluation.

8.3.5.10.3.2.1 Subactivity 1.5.3.2.1: Develop data base for geochemical modeling

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to develop a supporting data base containing thermodynamic and kinetic information on aqueous species and solids that may occur in the repository.

The application of EQ3/6 to modeling of fluids important to radionuclide release behavior requires this data base, which is accumulated through review and verification of published values and through determination and validation of new data determined to be of the highest importance in continuing the modeling goals outlined in the other investigations in this information need and in Information Need 1.5.5, (Section 8.3.5.10.5). An important aspect of this activity is a sensitivity analysis to determine which data are the most critical to achieving modeling needs described under Subactivity 1.5.3.2.2 (Section 8.3.5.10.3.2.2).

Description

EQ3/6 data files contain the standard thermodynamic data that are reported in the literature for solids, aqueous species, and gases. These values have been gathered from the available literature as an ongoing effort. Despite a doubling in the total species in the data base and many improvements in consistency, organization, and documentation, data base work has lagged behind code development. Therefore, a significant increase in effort will be directed toward improving and upgrading the data base.

Requisite thermodynamic values for aqueous species and solid phases specific to nuclear waste that are reported in the literature will be critically evaluated for instances where data are missing or inadequate for modeling needs. In these instances, laboratory work will be conducted to obtain that data. Full compatibility with the key values recommended by the Committee on Data for Science and Technology (CODATA) task group and the thermodynamic data base sponsored by the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) will be developed. The validation of the data base will be carried out by comparing the results of theoretical calculations using the EQ3/6 package with experimental results and field data.

The implementation of the aspects of the EQ3/6 package required to adequately model radionuclide behavior will require other types of information in addition to that currently contained in the thermodynamic data base. This information includes kinetic rate constants, nucleation rates, and

sorption coefficients. When required by the modeling efforts supported by EQ3/6, these data will also be evaluated and experimentally determined.

The data base experimental and analytical activities have been divided into five principal areas of study.

1. Thermodynamic data analysis: Sensitivity, uncertainty, and estimation/correlation studies for the radionuclides of regulatory concern, and the solution and solid species affecting them (25 to 30 elements). Review existing data, make estimates and correlations to existing data for missing data, and constrain required new data in terms of uncertainties associated with the data (or lack of data). In addition to guiding experimental studies, this activity will produce an uncertainty map for the data base.

2. Actinides and technetium: Thermodynamic data for the aqueous and solid species expected to occur at Yucca Mountain. Elements are those that require high confidence (Table 8.3.5.10-3b). Actinide species to be considered are U^{4+}, UO_2^{2+}, Np^{4+}, NpO_2^+, Pu^{4+}, PuO_2^+, PuO_2^{2+}, Am^{3+}, and TcO_4^-.

3. Nonradioactive species required to support calculations for radionuclides: Make minor additions to the thermodynamic data for the Yucca Mountain ground-water aqueous species, and for a few solid species for which inadequate data exist. Elements and species to be considered (Tables 8.3.4.2-4 and 8.3.5.10-3a) are HCO_3^-, OH^-, SO_4^{2-}, NO_3^-, PO_4^{3-}, Cl^-, F^-, $SiO_2(aq)$, Na^+, Ca^{++}, K^+, and Mg^{++}

4. Data base validation: Controlled laboratory experiments to confirm results of calculations using the data base. Several sets of measurements for the elements listed here, at several temperatures and pH values, will required.

5. Other waste radionuclides: Thermodynamic data for the fission and activation products in spent fuel, which require high confidence (Table 8.3.5.10-3b). Nuclides to be considered are Zr-93, C-14, Sn-126, Se-79, Cs-135, Pd-107, Th-230, Ra-226, Pb-210, Ni-59, and Nb-94.

(The maintenance of the computerized data base is handled under Subactivity 1.5.3.2.2. This keeps experimental and analytical work in this subactivity and computer-dependent activities in Subactivity 1.5.3.2.2.)

8.3.5.10.3.2.2 Subactivity 1.5.3.2.2: Develop geochemical modeling code

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to upgrade the EQ3/6 package to model important chemical processes in a nuclear waste repository. These codes will then be used in the other waste package modeling efforts (this information need) to aid in design and interpretation of experimental work on waste form degradation (Information Need 1.5.2, Section 8.3.5.10.2), to model

the behavior of radionuclides after release from the waste package (Information Need 1.1.4, Section 8.3.5.13.4 and Information Need 1.5.5, Section 8.3.5.10.5), and to aid in the description of the waste package environment (Information Need 1.4.2, Section 8.3.5.9.2 and Information Need 1.10.4, Section 8.3.4.2.4). Code documentation and verification will be done concurrently with development.

Description

The following capabilities will be added to the EQ3/6 code package to achieve the objectives:

1. Upgrade data management capabilities. In conjunction with Subactivity 1.5.3.2.1, the current EQ3/6 data base will be combined with new data and stored in a relation data base package that is capable of audit tracking; controlled access; output of data files in various formats, including the EQ3/6 format; automatic conversion of units and standard states so that only values directly from the reports are added without hand calculations; retrieval of data by type, such as all data from one report; complete reference control on all data; flagging for data review status and quality assurance level; and reporting and pass-through of error bars and limits to use of estimated data. The entire data base will then be processed according to the data review and analysis methods used by the Committee on Data for Science and Technology (CODATA), the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), and the National Bureau of Standards to ensure that appropriate data are being used and that they are completely compatible with data from the international data review groups (CODATA and NEA).

2. Extend the geochemical flow model. The current flow model may be used to examine the evolution of a packet of ground water as it moves along a flow path. A different flow model is required to model the interaction of a stationary object, such as the waste form, with successive packets of water. This models the evolution of the waste form (formation of precipitates and loss of soluble elements), and provides solution compositions leaving the waste package.

3. Extend the kinetics capabilities. The current capabilities will be tested and modified to include the effects of nucleation and substances inhibiting precipitation. Kinetic data will be accumulated from published work, and the possibility of extracting kinetic information from dissolution data will be examined and implemented if appropriate. New kinetics data on important systems will be collected as part of Subactivity 1.5.3.2.1.

4. Complete model for systems open to gases. The present fixed-fugacity option will be upgraded to better model the expected scenarios in Yucca Mountain. Currently, equilibrium with an unlimited gas reservoir may be modeled. The option will be expanded to permit modeling of closed systems containing varying amounts of gas.

5. Extend solid solutions to include site mixing concept. This addition would make the modeling of intermediate-composition phases more accurate and provide a better way to handle the substitution of radionuclides into specific sites in minerals. The current method calculates properties of intermediates using both ideal and nonideal (as appropriate) mixing of end members. The new capability would deal explicitly with intrasite mixing (where an ion can occur on more than one site in a mineral) and will be selectively applied to cases where substitutions result in structural changes in a mineral that are not present in any end-member phases.

6. Add equilibrium sorption model. A model for sorption onto waste package and repository materials is required to adequately model radionuclide concentrations in water and the migration of radionuclides. A suitable model will be identified and incorporated into the EQ3/6 code package. Sorption data available in the literature will be adopted as appropriate. New sorption data on important systems will be collected as part of Information Need 1.5.5 and Characterization Program 8.3.1.3.

7. Extend the code for compatibility with other models. Because EQ3/6 is used in support of other modeling efforts, revisions or additions for compatibility and flexibility may be required.

8.3.5.10.3.3 Activity 1.5.3.3: Generate models for release from spent fuel

8.3.5.10.3.3.1 Subactivity 1.5.3.3.1: Generate release for spent fuel models

Objectives

The primary mechanism for the release of radionuclides from spent fuel is via water that has come in contact with the waste form through a breach in a container. A few radionuclides such as carbon-14 (or krypton-85 in the containment period) can be released in the gas phase in the absence of liquid water. The objective of this activity is to develop models for the release of radionuclides from the spent fuel waste form as a function of time using the scenarios identified in Activity 1.5.3.1 of this issue. This development will require the development of submodels for oxidation and radionuclide release from spent UO_2 fuel, the corrosion and failure rates of Zircaloy cladding, and the release rate of radionuclides from nonfuel assembly parts. These submodels will be based on the experimental data generated under Information Need 1.5.2. The models developed in this activity will be used in resolving both Issues 1.4 and 1.5.

Parameters

The parameters required for this activity are given in the combined list for this information need. The most important input parameters are expected to be the water contact rate and mechanism, water chemistry, temperature, and time. The output parameter provided by this activity will be a model for

radionuclide release from the spent fuel waste form within breached containers.

Description

Tests to determine the behavior of the spent fuel waste form under the anticipated conditions at Yucca Mountain are described in Sections 7.4.3.1 and 8.3.5.10.2 (Information Need 1.5.2). These tests form the basis for the modeling to be carried out under this activity. To extrapolate the observations made in the laboratory to the time scale for which the performance of the repository must be specified to satisfy the 10 CFR Part 60 requirements, it will be necessary to develop predictive models based on an understanding of the mechanisms involved in the degradation of the waste form. Several submodels will be generated describing the behavior of each component of the waste form that affects the release of radionuclides.

The largest reservoir of radionuclides in the waste form is the spent UO_2 fuel, and the primary barrier to the release of radionuclides is the fuel material itself. Thus, the most important submodel to be generated under this activity is the one for the dissolution of and radionuclide release from the spent fuel. This model will yield predictions of the concentration of radionuclides as a function of time in the ground water that has come in contact with spent fuel. Analyses of the available data (Section 7.4.3.1.1) indicate that the radionuclides of interest occur in two regions within the spent fuel, and are released at different rates, depending on the region. One group of radionuclides is present within the UO_2 fuel matrix, and therefore has a release rate that is limited by the dissolution of that matrix. The other group of radionuclides is located both in the matrix and along fuel grain boundaries or in the gap between the fuel pellets and the cladding. The grain boundary and gap inventory of these nuclides is typically 1-2 percent of their total inventory. This function is released rapidly upon contact of the fuel by water. The latter group also includes those that are present in a gaseous phase and can, therefore, be released from a breached container even without the presence of water as a solvent and transport medium. The submodels will account for all of these release mechanisms.

Development of the submodel will be assisted by the use of EQ3/6 code analyses. These analyses will provide insight into the role of solid phases in determining the equilibrium solution concentrations of elements present in sufficient quantity to saturate the ground water. The final submodel will incorporate EQ3/6 calculations of the dissolution rate and solution concentrations of radionuclides of interest in performance assessment. The usefulness of the EQ3/6 code to this effort is critically dependent upon the availability of good thermodynamic data for the chemical elements and saturating phases of interest.

Since the transport of most radionuclides from spent fuel requires that water come in contact with the fuel, the presence of undefected cladding would provide a second barrier (after the container) between the fuel and the environment. The failure rate of the cladding will have a large effect on the release rate of the gap and grain boundary inventory of the fuel as discussed previously. A second submodel will be developed that will estimate the failure rate of Zircaloy cladding as a function of time. This submodel

will incorporate the results of experimental tests aimed at identifying the important modes of corrosion resulting in failure of the cladding and the rates of those modes. Mechanistic models of Zircaloy failure will be developed to extend the laboratory measurements to the time scale of the repository isolation period.

The third submodel will quantify the oxidation rate of spent UO_2 fuel exposed to an atmosphere containing oxygen. Because the ground-water infiltration rate at Yucca Mountain is low, if both the container and cladding fail, fuel may be exposed to the air for some time before it is contacted by water. The higher oxides of uranium may have different leaching behavior than UO_2. In addition, oxidation of fuel in slightly defected cladding could lead to gross failure of the cladding due to expansion of the fuel during oxidation. The oxidation submodel will be based on the results of oxidation experiments on spent fuel discussed in Information Need 1.5.2. The oxidation rate of UO_2 strongly depends on temperature; the model, therefore, will be time dependent. At some time after emplacement, the temperature of the fuel is expected to be sufficiently low that no significant oxidation of the fuel will occur in the time available. After that time, this submodel will not play an active role in determining the release of radionuclides from the waste form.

The fourth and final submodel will describe the release of radionuclides from cladding and other fuel assembly hardware (mostly Zircaloy, Inconel and stainless steel).

The submodels will be combined to make a single model for the release of radionuclides from the spent fuel waste form. Obviously, there will be significant interactions between the submodels. For example, the release of most radionuclides cannot occur until the fuel is exposed by cladding failure and water contacts the fuel. Thus, the predictions of the Zircaloy submodel must be used as input for the submodel describing the release of radionuclides from the fuel.

8.3.5.10.3.4 Activity 1.5.3.4: Generate models for release from glass waste forms

8.3.5.10.3.4.1 Subactivity 1.5.3.4.1: Generate release models for glass waste forms

Objectives

The release of radionuclides from glass waste forms may occur if water contacts a container that has breached. The objective of this activity is to design models for glass release based on the scenarios identified in Activity 1.5.3.1 (Section 8.3.5.10.3.1). The geochemical modeling codes described in Activity 1.5.3.2 (Section 8.3.5.10.3.2) will be an important part of these models. The models generated by this activity will provide estimates of radionuclide release as a function of repository conditions and will be used in resolving Issue 1.4 and this issue (1.5).

Parameters

The parameters required for this activity are given in the combined list for this information need. The most important input parameters are expected to be water contact rate and mechanism, water chemistry, temperature, time, and interactions with repository materials. The parameter provided by this activity will be a model for radionuclide release from glass waste within breached containers.

Description

The behavior of glass waste forms under the expected conditions at Yucca Mountain is described in Section 7.4.3.2. The extension to long times of the semiempirical relationships discovered by laboratory testing cannot be made without understanding the mechanisms involved and assessing the effects of factors such as the slow buildup of crystalline layers. The model to be developed will account for glass degradation and radionuclide release using geochemically sound methods that incorporate expected perturbations in the repository environment, and will be consistent with the existing laboratory and natural analog studies.

Glass performance modeling will depend upon two basic concepts. First, the rate of release from the thermodynamically unstable waste glass is a kinetically controlled process. No formal equilibrium can exist. Second, once components are released from glass, the formation of solids and composition of fluids may be modeled by equilibrium processes. The final outcome of these equilibrium processes will be modeled, providing important limits on the behavior of radionuclides. In addition, the kinetics of these processes may be modeled to provide more accurate estimates of radionuclide concentrations in waste package fluids as a function of time throughout the life of the repository.

The model for glass degradation will incorporate the following items, presented here in the order in which they will be developed:

1. Calculation of the composition of the solutions that are in true equilibrium with the solid phases that precipitate on the surface of nuclear waste glasses.

2. Calculation of the rate of degradation of glass using kinetic rate laws based on transition state theory, deriving rate constants from experimental and natural-analog studies.

3. Calculation of the rate of formation of solid precipitates and the concomitant rate at which radionuclides are permanently sequestered in those stable phases.

4. Calculation of the effects of repository materials on the previously stated items, including heat-affected stainless steel from the pour canister.

5. Calculation of the composition of fluids leaving a glass waste package by combining the preceding items.

In each item, the appropriate analytical expressions will be identified from experimental work, from review of the glass degradation literature, and from geochemical modeling concepts incorporated in the EQ3/6 code. Calculations will be performed using EQ3/6.

Validation of the glass model will be done in two stages. First, the model will be developed in concert with experimental work and will be tested for its ability to describe accurately the experimental work. An important aspect of this is the use of modeling to aid in understanding the physical processes important in glass degradation. Second, the results of long-term modeling will be compared with extrapolations of laboratory data, and with natural analogs. This second effort will both test the validity of the model and, more importantly, examine whether the experimental work has examined all the important geochemical interactions that are predicted to occur over long periods of time.

8.3.5.10.3.5 Activity 1.5.3.5: Waste package performance assessment model development

Three subactivities support this performance evaluation.

8.3.5.10.3.5.1 Subactivity 1.5.3.5.1: Development of system model

Objectives

The development of the system model for waste package performance assessment is the subactivity that integrates into a single deterministic model the submodels of processes that affect waste package releases. Models for waste form degradation and radionuclide release will be combined with mechanistic representations of waste package environment, waste package design features and mechanical models, and container degradation models. The resulting waste package system model will calculate (1) the performance-related parameters used in evaluating compliance with Issue 1.4, substantially complete containment (Section 8.3.5.9), and (2) the release rates of radionuclides from failed waste packages as a function of scenario inputs, for use in evaluating compliance with this issue and Issue 1.1.

The design objectives for satisfying Issue 1.4 recognize that among the tens of thousands of waste packages there will be differences in individual performance. The design objectives are set in terms of percent of waste packages, or releases or release rates summed over the set of waste packages. To reflect these differences in individual waste package characteristics in the modeling, the deterministic system model can be executed a number of times with different inputs. Alternatively, the probabilistic system model may be used with inputs appropriate to the problem and to the use in issue resolution, as discussed in the following paragraphs.

The design objectives for satisfying Issue 1.4 admit either a partially probabilistic interpretation (with probability distributions of key input

waste package parameters supported by measurements to be done) or a deterministic interpretation (with established distributions of key input parameters; for example, the heat loading per package could be established based on the projected waste form characteristics). In either interpretation, the approach to resolution of the issue will use only those distributions that are established or well supported by documentation or measurements. Other input parameters that may have distributions will be represented by bounding distributions or bounding values; the purpose of this is so that the calculated result will be a found on the true result. The calculated bound will then be compared to the limiting value set in the design objectives for the issue.

The system model will be constructed from simplified submodels of the processes affecting waste package life and performance. These submodels will be derived from studies performed under this investigation as well as those satisfying needs under Issues 1.4 (Section 8.3.5.9) and 1.10 (Section 8.3.4.2). They will be derived through sensitivity analysis of the processes modeled, and, therefore, will be composed of relationships incorporating the most sensitive parameters. Each submodel will be subjected to verification and validation exercises.

Parameters

The system model will combine the submodels to calculate waste package integrity as a function of time, before and up to containment failure. After failure, release rates will be determined for each radionuclide. This model will produce deterministic predictions of radionuclide release for a set of parameters describing a given scenario. The submodels that make up the system model will include the following models (refer to the listed information needs and sections for parameters of the models):

1. Waste package geometry and thermal/mechanical properties.

    a. Waste package geometry

        i. Waste package and borehole configuration and dimensions (Information Needs 1.10.2 and 1.10.3 in Sections 8.3.4.2.2 and 8.3.4.2.3, respectively)

        ii. Waste package contents (materials, mass, elemental and isotopic composition) (Information Needs 1.10.2 and 1.5.1 in Sections 8.3.4.2.2 and 8.3.5.10.1, respectively)

        iii. Changes to waste package geometry over time.

    b. Radiation (Information Needs 1.5.1 (Section 8.3.5.10.1) and 1.10.2 (Section 8.3.4.2.2) and calculations as part of this activity.

        i. Gamma ray source.
        ii. Gamma ray attenuation.
        iii. Heat source from radioactive decay.

c. Heat transfer (thermal) (Information Needs 1.10.2, 1.10.4, and 1.5.1 in Sections 8.3.4.2.2, 8.3.4.2.4, and 8.3.5.10.1, respectively) and calculations as part of this subactivity.

   i. Heat transfer from waste forms to host rock, temperature field effects.

d. Mechanical (Information Needs 1.10.2, 1.10.4, and 1.5.1 in Sections 8.3.4.2.2, 8.3.4.2.4, and 8.3.5.10.1, respectively) and calculations as part of this subactivity.

   i. Loads (external, internal, thermal).
   ii. Yielding (ductile and brittle failure).

2. Container degradation (corrosion) (Information Needs 1.4.2 and 1.4.3 in Sections 8.3.5.9.2 and 8.3.5.9.3, respectively).

   a. Corrosion modes in aqueous conditions.
   b. Corrosion modes in unsaturated conditions.

3. Water package environment (ground water movement and chemistry) (Information Need 1.10.4 in Section 8.3.4.2.4).

   a. Flow surrounding the engineered barrier system.

   b. Flow mechanisms for water contacting the waste package.

   c. Flow mechanisms for water within the waste package after loss of containment.

   d. Water volume available for contact with waste package and waste form.

   e. Transport in near-field host rock.

   f. Temperature in host rock at borehole wall.

4. Radionuclide release from waste forms (this activity).

   a. Spent fuel waste form.
   b. Glass waste form.

Description

The system model will be constructed in a computational efficient manner so that a set of scenarios and conditions sufficiently large to span the range of anticipated and unanticipated events can be considered. After formulation and initial testing of the system model is complete, verification and validation exercises will be performed on the system model as a whole. Verification exercises will concentrate on the numerical accuracy of the logic linking together the system model components. Validation of the system model, in the sense of comparing system model output to experiments that

represent an integration of the processes expected to be active in the repository, will not be possible because of the long time scales required. Therefore, validation of the system model will be performed ultimately by peer review.

8.3.5.10.3.5.2 Subactivity 1.5.3.5.2: Development of uncertainty methodology

Objectives

Because of heterogeneities in the environment and in components of the waste package, deterministic calculations of performance alone may not suffice to provide resolution of Issue 1.4 and this issue and to provide the reasonable assurance standard required by the NRC. Therefore, a method for analyzing waste package performance that addresses these uncertainties must be developed. The objective of this study is to develop such a method so that the performance assessment calculations for the waste package will provide probability distributions for individual package and ensemble performance parameters, incorporating these uncertainties in conditions and package parameters.

With appropriate structuring of the questions and input distribution values, the uncertainty methodology can be used to answer these types of questions: (1) how does the performance of the different individual waste packages roll up to form the performance of the set of waste packages, to be compared to regulatory requirements and (2) what are the probability distributions of the performance measures of the set of waste packages. The answer to the latter question can provide a part of the support for a reasonable assurance that the performance requirements will be satisfied. A third type of question is what are the probability distributions for the release rates over time of radionuclides from the waste package. This last answer will be provided to Issue 1.1 to help resolve that issue of the EPA limit on cumulative releases to the accessible environment. That EPA requirement is stated in explicitly probabilistic terms.

Parameters

The input parameters are the same as those developed under Subactivity 1.5.3.1.1 (Section 8.3.5.10.3.1.1). The output parameters are cumulative distribution functions for performance measures and for radionuclide release from the engineered barrier system as a function of time.

Description

The uncertainty methodology will use the deterministic system model as a means to predict performance from a given parameter set. Through appropriate sampling procedures, parameter sets will be assembled that represent the anticipated and unanticipated events, as well as variations in waste package components. Examples of this overall approach include the Latin Hypercube and Monte Carlo methods. By repeatedly computing performance with the system model for the sample of inputs, representative probability distributions for

release performance may be computed. Because the number of sensitive parameters affecting waste package performance is not expected to be small, the number of performance calculations using the system model is expected to be very large, perhaps several thousand simulations. Therefore, the derivation of a practical but representative sampling method is central to prediction of release distributions.

The uncertainty methodology will be part of the waste package performance assessment model. Therefore, verification and validation of the methodology will be required. After development, verification exercises will be conducted to ensure the mathematical accuracy of the methods. Validation of the model will be accomplished by validation of the system model and through other means as available. As for the system model, the final validation of the uncertainty model will be performed through peer review.

8.3.5.10.3.5.3 Subactivity 1.5.3.5.3: Water flow into and out of a breached container

Objectives

Although the capillary barrier of the unsaturated zone will normally prevent liquid water from contacting the waste container, under some conditions water flow in the unsaturated zone can result in several mechanisms for water contact with the container. The most likely mechanism for expected flow rates is by wicking from the partially saturated rock where the container is in direct contact with the rock. A second possible mechanism, which would operate at higher flow rates, would be by dripping of water from a fracture onto the container. The objective of this activity is to determine what fraction of the water that drips onto a container would enter the container through a breach in the container wall.

Parameters

Input parameters for this subactivity include the following:

1. Water drip rate.
2. Water temperature.
3. Container orientation.
4. Container breach location.
5. Container breach geometry.

The output parameter will be water flow rates into and out of a failed container and quantity of water that can accumulate in a failed container.

Description

Experiments will be conducted under this subactivity to determine the effect of each of the parameters on the fraction of water that drips onto a container but does not enter a breach in the container. The initial experiments will be conducted using small metal cylinders that contain a well-characterized defect that has been intentionally induced into the cylinder. The fraction of water that enters through the breach will be determined as a

function of breach size, breach location, drip rate, and orientation of the container (and breach) relative to the water source. Results of these experiments will be modeled to predict how the results should scale with size. On the basis of the results of the model calculations, some larger scale tests will be designed and executed. The effect of water temperature will be studied in a separate series of experiments using one or two configurations selected to be most probable for the repository situation.

The information developed in the study will be used in the determination of the concentration of radionuclides in solution in failed containers, dilution factors, and release rates of radionuclides from the engineered barrier system for anticipated and unanticipated processes and events (Information Need 1.5.4, Section 8.3.5.10.4). These results in the form of distributions of releases will form a part of the source term for calculation for total system performance assessment conducted to satisfy Information Needs 1.1.5 and 1.1.6 (Sections 8.3.5.13.5 and 8.3.5.13.6).

8.3.5.10.3.6 Application of results

The activities and information needs discussed in this section, along with their subject and SCP section number, are as follows:

Activity or information need	Subject	SCP section
1.1.5	Probabilistic release assessments	8.3.5.13.5
1.5.4	Release rates from waste package and engineered barrier system	8.3.5.10.4
1.5.5	Radionuclides leaving waste package near-field environment	8.3.5.10.5
1.10.4	Description of near-field environment	8.3.4.2.4
1.5.3.1	Integrate scenarios for release	8.3.5.10.3.1
1.5.3.2	Develop geochemical speciation and reaction model	8.3.5.10.3.2
1.5.3.3	Release model for spent fuel	8.3.5.10.3.3
1.5.3.4	Release model for glass waste forms	8.3.5.10.3.4
1.5.3.5	Waste package performance assessment modeling	8.3.5.10.3.5

The information developed in Activity 1.5.3.1 will be used by Activities 1.5.3.3, 1.5.3.4, and 1.5.3.5.

The information in Activity 1.5.3.2 will also be used by Activities 1.5.3.3, 1.5.3.4, and 1.5.3.5 and for Information Needs 1.1.5 and 1.10.4.

The information in Activity 1.5.3.3 will be used by Activity 1.5.3.5 and Information Need 1.5.5.

The information in Activity 1.5.3.4 will be used by Activity 1.5.3.5 and Information Need 1.5.5.

The information developed in Activity 1.5.3.5 will be used in the determination of the release rates of radionuclides from the engineered barrier system for anticipated and unanticipated processes and events (Information Need 1.5.4). These results in the form of distributions of releases will form a part of the source term for total system performance assessment calculations conducted to satisfy Information Needs 1.1.5 and 1.1.6 (Sections 8.3.5.13.5 and 8.3.5.13.6).

8.3.5.10.4 Information Need 1.5.4: Determination of the release rates of radionuclides from the waste package and engineered barrier system for anticipated and unanticipated events

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

The bases for the models required to perform these calculations have been discussed in Section 7.4.5. The studies that develop data, parameters, and models necessary to perform the calculations are described in Sections 8.3.4, 8.3.5.9, and 8.3.5.10.

Parameters

Parameters needed for the calculation of waste package releases include

1. Waste package design (Information Need 1.10.2; Section 8.3.4.2.2).
2. Waste package design features affecting radionuclide release (Information Need 1.5.1).
3. Waste package system model and uncertainty methodology (Information Need 1.5.3).
4. Release scenarios for anticipated and unanticipated events (Information Need 1.5.3).
5. Performance of the waste forms under the scenarios in item 4 (Information Need 1.5.2).
6. Probability distributions for system model inputs (Information Need 1.5.3).

Logic

After the scenarios for release resulting from anticipated and unanticipated events have been assembled and the models for predicting release have been developed, verified, and validated, releases from the engineered barrier system may be calculated. These releases will be calculated for each radionuclide using both deterministic and uncertainty models. These releases will form the source term to be provided to the analyses for the total system performance assessment. Further, during the earlier waste package design phases, these integrated performance calculations will provide input to later waste package designs.

Two activities will be performed under this information need. The activities will respectively exercise the deterministic system model and the uncertainty methodology developed for waste package performance assessment in Section 8.3.5.10.3.

8.3.5.10.4.1 Activity 1.5.4.1: Deterministic calculation of releases from the waste package

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to use the waste package system model developed in Activity 1.5.3.5 (Section 8.3.5.10.3.5) to predict waste package performance using the scenarios developed in Activity 1.5.3.1 (Section 8.3.5.10.3.1).

Parameters

The input parameters needed for this activity are given in the combined list in the technical basis section for this information need. The output parameters obtained are the predicted waste package release performance under specified scenarios.

Description

The calculations of waste package performance will be made in three phases: (1) for the design concepts discussed in Section 7.3, (2) for the advanced conceptual design, and (3) for the license application design. The later phases will use modeling concepts developed in the previous phases, and therefore are difficult to discuss at this point. However, it is likely that analyses in all phases will incorporate many of the same elements.

The analysis of waste package designs will proceed by assembling sets of model input parameters developed in Information Need 1.5.3 and executing the system model to obtain predictions of waste package release. Releases will be calculated for scenarios that represent both anticipated and unanticipated events. Some of the calculations will represent bounding performance calculations, but the bulk of the analyses will support the uncertainty analysis required for probabilistic calculation of releases. In addition, in the earlier phases of waste package designs, information developed in the system model calculations will be available as input to later design phases.

8.3.5.10.4.2 Activity 1.5.4.2: Probabilistic calculation of releases from the waste package

Objectives

Because of heterogeneities in both the environment and components of the waste package, deterministic calculations of performance alone may not be sufficient to provide the performance measure for the set of waste packages for this issue and to support the reasonable assurance standard required by the NRC. The objective of this activity is to provide a probabilistic analysis of waste package performance addressing these uncertainties and the probability distribution of release rates for use in Issue 1.1 (Section 8.3.5.13), using the uncertainty model developed in Activity 1.5.3.5 (Section 8.3.5.10.3.5).

Parameters

The input parameters needed for this activity are given in the combined list in the technical basis section for this information need. The output parameters obtained are cumulative distribution functions for radionuclide release rates from the engineered barrier system as a function of time, and for the maxima over time of the annual release rates.

Description

The uncertainty methodologies developed in Activity 1.5.3.5 will be employed using the system model to assess the reliability of waste package release predictions. This task will be accomplished in concert with the phases of system model development and application. The exact procedure to be followed in these analyses is partially the subject of activities under Activity 1.5.3.5. However, the most likely approach will be to exercise the system model for a range of model inputs selected by a procedure for sampling from distributions of input random variables. From the system model simulations it will be possible to construct the probability distributions for engineered barrier system releases required by the reasonable assurance standard.

The uncertainty calculations will be performed for each of the design phases although they are only required for the license application design analysis. This procedure will allow testing on the early design phases and modification of the methodology during later phases. At least two types of uncertainty will be addressed. First, the uncertainty in the predicted release rates as a result of uncertainties in the fabrication and environment of the waste package will be calculated. Then the secondary uncertainty, that is the confidence in the best estimate of complementary cumulative distribution function for releases, will be assessed. Together with the deterministic simulations for bounding case releases, these results will provide a source term for total system performance assessment and will support the reasonable assurance standard set by the NRC.

8.3.5.10.4.3 Application of results

The releases calculated in these studies provide resolution of this issue (1.5). They will also be used as input to the resolution of issue 1.4, the studies under Information Need 1.5.5 and as input to total system performance assessment performed under Issue 1.1 (Section 8.3.5.13).

8.3.5.10.5 Information Need 1.5.5: Determination of the amount of radionuclides leaving the near-field environment of the waste package

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

Section 7.4.1 discusses the fluid flow model to be developed in Information Need 1.10.4. The model validation efforts are also discussed in Section 7.4.1 and collected in studies under Information Need 1.10.4. Data acquisition for radionuclide transport properties was begun in FY 1986. No published results were available at the time of the writing of Chapter 7.

Parameters

The data needed for determination of the amount of radionuclides leaving the near-field environment of the waste package are

1. Scenarios for release events (Information Need 1.5.3).

2. Hydrologic parameters for host rock (Investigation 8.3.1.2.2) and Information Need 1.10.4 (Section 8.3.4.2.4)).

3. Waste package environment tests (Information Need 1.10.4, Section 8.3.4.2.4).

4. Near-field flow and transport model (Information Need 1.10.4).

5. Radionuclide release predictions (Information Need 1.5.4, Section 8.3.5.10.4).

The output parameters are transport properties of radionuclides and radionuclide concentrations in the near-field environment.

Logic

The purpose of this investigation is to provide a source term for use in the 100,000-yr described in 10 CFR 960.3-1-5.

Several processes may act locally to retard the movement of waste in the first few meters of host rock after the radioactive material is released from the engineered barrier system. These processes include sorption mechanisms and, under some conditions, matrix diffusion. Depending on the scenario for transport from the waste package, either or both of these processes may be effective for many waste species.

The source term derived from the release calculations performed for Information Need 1.5.4 will not account for sorption and matrix diffusion effects occurring in the first few meters of rock surrounding the waste package, without modification of the waste package environment component to account for these effects. Flow and transport calculations will be made as described in Information Need 1.10.4 (Section 8.3.4.2.4) to include the hydrologic and geochemical environment immediately surrounding the waste package. These calculations are required to understand the boundary conditions required for the reliability analysis of the waste package. These calculations will not, however, include the transport of radionuclides through the near-field rock following release from the waste package.

To perform these calculations, parameters describing transport mechanisms active in the near-field environment must be determined. These parameters include the formation and transport properties of radionuclide-containing colloids, radionuclide solubilities in repository ground water, diffusivities of waste species, and effective partition coefficients for waste species in Topopah Spring tuff. The colloid and solubility data will be developed in activities described in Information Need 1.5.3 and Investigation 1.14.5 (Section 8.3.1.3.5). Laboratory measurements of apparent diffusion coefficients and distribution coefficients for radionuclides will be done using rock wafers and rock cores. The wafers are rock samples that have been part of waste form dissolution tests discussed in the following section. The effect of transport scale on transport processes will be studied by using different size rock cores.

8.3.5.10.5.1 Activity 1.5.5.1: Determine radionuclide transport parameters

This activity will measure the distribution of actinides and fission products in rock samples. The rock samples will be subjected to contact with radionuclides under a variety of conditions so that the effects of degree of saturation and transport scale can be evaluated. Two subactivities support this analysis.

8.3.5.10.5.1.1 Subactivity 1.5.5.1.1: Radionuclide distribution in tuff wafers

Many of the waste-form dissolution tests include pieces of the Topopah Spring tuff in the test solution. These tuff pieces are included to determine the effect of the presence of rock on the dissolution rate of the waste form. The rock sample is, therefore, sitting in a solution of dissolved waste form and simulates the condition where local saturation of a portion of the repository occurs. For long-term tests, the solution concentrations are relatively constant, and the test conditions approximate those of steady-state diffusive flow. At the conclusion of the test, the rock wafer is examined with an ion microscope to determine the location of the radionuclides as a function of depth in the sample. A brief description of the method and some preliminary results are in the paper by Finny et al. (1986). The position of the radionuclides in the wafer can be combined with the test duration to calculate the effective diffusion rate for the radionuclide. The

concentration of the radionuclide at the surface of the rock can be combined with the solution concentration to give an effective distribution coefficient. The shape of the diffusion profile near the surface of the rock can be used to assess whether sorption or precipitation are controlling the retardation process.

8.3.5.10.5.1.2 Subactivity 1.5.5.1.2: Radionuclide distribution in tuff cores

The tuff-wafer experiments just discussed only examine transport on a small scale (a few micrometers) and under saturated conditions. To determine the effects of transport scale on transport properties, tuff core samples are being used. Solutions of radionuclides are forced through the core sample at a fixed water-flow rate. The water flow is monitored using tritium. Solutions of other radionuclides are compared with the flow rate for tritium to determine retardation parameters. Plans to evaluate retardation properties as a function of water flow rate and solution composition are in the development stage.

Transport properties may also be a function of degree of saturation of the rock. To investigate this possibility, the tuff core experiments will be modified to allow for unsaturated flow. In these experiments the effects of flow rate and degree of saturation will be studied. The goal is to develop a sufficient understanding of the unsaturated flow properties to allow coupling of these experiments with the unsaturated flow studies described in Information Need 1.10.4 (Section 8.3.4.2.4). This will allow monitoring of water movement with resistivity imaging techniques (the impedance camera), tracking of solute transport by the radioactivity (for gamma emitters), and finally, location of the radionuclide distribution in the rock using the ion microscope.

8.3.5.10.5.2 Activity 1.5.5.2: Radionuclide transport modeling in the near-field waste package environment

This activity will use the flow and transport model for hydrologic representation of the near-field host rock developed under Information Need 1.10.4 (Section 8.3.4.2.4). The model will be validated using data from integrated testing activities and tracer tests planned in the exploratory shaft.

8.3.5.10.5.2.1 Subactivity 1.5.5.2.1: Validation of near-field transport model using laboratory and field experimental data

The hydrothermal flow and transport model developed for detailed analysis of the near-field waste package environment will require validation before it is used to determine releases from the near field. This subactivity will provide model validation by comparison to hydrothermal tracer experiments performed on laboratory core samples, and in situ tracer

experiments currently planned for the exploratory shaft (Section 8.3.4.2). In performing these comparisons, split sample techniques will be used to provide for both model calibration and validation.

8.3.5.10.5.2.2 Subactivity 1.5.5.2.2: Application of near-field transport model to waste package releases

After model validation, the near-field flow and transport model will be applied to simulate transport of radionuclides through the first few meters of rock surrounding the waste package. Predictions of package release from the waste package system model will be used as the source term. Particular attention will be given to the effects of sorption processes and diffusion of material into the matrix. The interaction of flow in the rock matrix and flow in fractures is expected to be an important factor in assessing potential transport paths for radionuclides. The degree of importance of fracture flow will be coupled to the scenarios examined in Section 8.3.5.10.4. Final results of these calculations will determine the most likely source term for total system performance calculations.

8.3.5.10.5.3 Application of results

The results of this analysis will be applied to determine the effects on the radionuclide source term caused by the host rock in the immediate vicinity of the waste package. There are two methods by which this may be accomplished. The first is to modify the waste package source term calculations (Section 8.3.5.10.3) to account for sorption and precipitation processes active in the host rock immediately surrounding the waste package. The second is to examine the possibility of using the results of the present investigations to modify the calculation of releases within the waste package system model to account for the retarding processes active in the host rock. The point at which the application is made does not affect the structure or schedule for the activities.

The purpose of this information need is to provide a source term for use in the 100,000-yr evaluations described in 10 CFR 960.3-1-5.

8.3.5.10.6 Schedule for containment by waste package

Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) include 5 information needs, which contain 12 activities. The schedule information for these activities is summarized in Figure 8.3.5.10-4. This figure includes the activity number and a brief description, as well as major events associated with each activity. A major event, for purposes of these schedules, may represent the initiation or completion of an activity, completion or submittal of a report to the DOE, an important data feed, or a decision point.


1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
DEIS
LA
ACTIVITY
START WASTE PACKAGE ACD
COMPLETE WASTE PACKAGE ACD; START WASTE PACKAGE LAD
COMPLETE WASTE PACKAGE LAD
1.5.1.1 INTEGRATION OF WASTE FORM DATA AND WASTE PACKAGE DESIGN DATA
EDB/G CODE (1.5.3.2)
to Waste Package LAD (1.10)
1.5.2.1 CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SPENT FUEL WASTE FORM
1.5.2.2 CHARACTERIZATION OF THE SPENT FUEL WASTE FORM
1.5.3.1 INTEGRATION OF SCENARIOS FOR RELEASE FROM WASTE PACKAGE
to 8.3.1.3.5 and 8.3.1.3.7 data to 1.5.5.2
to 8.3.1.3.5 and 8.3.1.3.7
data to 1.5.3.5
1.5.3.2 DEVELOPMENT OF GEOCHEMICAL SPECIATION AND REACTION MODEL
data on Container Materials Modeling (1.4.3)
to Container Materials Modeling (1.4.3)
data to 1.5.5.2
1.5.3.3 GENERATION OF MODELS FOR RELEASE OF SPENT FUEL WASTE FORMS
data to 1.5.3.5
1.5.3.4 GENERATION OF MODELS FOR RELEASE FROM GLASS WASTE FORMS
LEGEND
FLOW OF WORK
INTERFACE OF TRANSFER OF INFORMATION
MAJOR EVENT
ACD - ADVANCED CONCEPTUAL DESIGN
DEIS - DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
LA - LICENSE APPLICATION
LAD - LICENSE APPLICATION DESIGN

Figure 8.3.5.10-4. Schedule information for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) See Table 8.3.5.10-6 for descriptions of major events This network is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE, 1988a) schedule Revisions will be published in semiannual site characterization progress reports as new information becomes available (page 1 of 2)


1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
DEIS
LA
ACTIVITY
(CONTINUED)
START WASTE PACKAGE ACD
COMPLETE WASTE PACKAGE ACD; START WASTE PACKAGE LAD
COMPLETE WASTE PACKAGE LAD
1.5.3.5 WASTE PACKAGE PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT MODEL DEVELOPMENT
data to 1.5.3.4
data from 1.5.3.4
data from 1.5.3.3
Final Waste Package Environment Definition (Information Need 1.10.4)
Metal Barrier Models (Information Need 1.4.3)
Rock-Water Interaction Model (Information Need 1.10.4)
data from 1.5.3.1 and 1.5.3.3
Final Oxidation/Corrosion Models Confirmation (Information Need 1.4.3)
1.5.4.1 DETERMINISTIC CALCULATION OF RELEASES FROM THE WASTE PACKAGE
to Waste Package Design (Information Need 1.10.2)
to Waste Package Design (Information Need 1.10.2)
1.5.4.2 PROBABILISTIC CALCULATION OF RELEASES FROM THE WASTE PACKAGE
Performance to Waste Package Design (Information Need 1.10.2) and ACD Source Term to Total System Performance (Issue 1.1)
Performance to Design Reports (Information Need 1.10.2) and LAD Source Term to Total System Performance (Issue 1.1)
Preliminary Source Term to Total System Performance (Issue 1.1)
1.5.5.1 DETERMINATION OF RADIONUCLIDE TRANSPORT PARAMETERS
data from 1.5.3.2
data on Rock/Water Interactions (1.10.4)
data on Rock/Water Interactions (1.10.4)
1.5.5.2 RADIONUCLIDE TRANSPORT MODELING IN THE NEAR-FIELD WASTE PACKAGE ENVIRONMENT
data from 1.5.3.2
to Waste Package Design (1.10.2 and 1.10.3)

Figure 8.3.5.10-4. Schedule information for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) See Table 8.3.5.10-6 for descriptions of major events This network is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE 1988a) schedule Revisions will be published in semiannual site characterization progress reports as new information becomes available (page 2 of 2)

Solid lines on the schedule represent activity durations and dashed lines show interfaces among activities as well as data transferred into or out of this performance assessment issue The events shown on the schedule and their planned dates of completion are provided in Table 8.3.5.10-6.

The activity-level schedules, in combination with information provided in the logic diagram for this issue (Figures 8.3.5.10-1), are intended to provide the radar with a basic understanding of the relationships between major elements of the site, performance, and design programs. The information provided in Table 8.3.5.10-6 and Figure 8.3.5.10-4, however, should be viewed as a snapshot in time.

The overall program schedule presented here is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE, 1988a). The site characterization program will undergo a series of refinements following issuance of the statutory SCP. Refinements will consider factors both internal and external to the site characterization program, such as changes to the quality assurance program. Such refinements are to be considered in ongoing planning efforts, and changes that are implemented will be reflected in the semiannual progress report. Summary schedule information for each information need of this issue can be found in Section 8.5.2.2.

Table 8.3.5.10-6. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (page 1 of 8)

Activity number	Brief description of activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.5.1.1	Integration of waste form data and waste package design data	A	Draft report available to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Valley glass waste form qualification; begin accumulation of spent fuel and glass waste form data	3/89
		B	Compile current spent fuel, glass waste form, and waste package and repository design information for use in modeling activities	5/93 8/93
1.5.2.1	Characterization of the spent fuel waste form	A	Initiate dissolution testing of oxidized spent fuel	10/88
		B	Parameter data on spent fuel dissolution available to DOE	5/89
		C	Zircaloy corrosion data available to DOE	8/89
		D	Information on low temperature oxidation of spent fuel available to DOE	1/90
		E	Information on spent fuel dissolution of partially oxidized fuel available to DOE	3/90
		F	Complete spent fuel waste form testing for advanced conceptual design (ACD)	6/90

Table 8.3.5.10-6. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (page 2 of 8)

Activity number	Brief description of activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.5.2.1	Characterization of the spent fuel waste form (continued)	G	Initiate long-term zircaloy corrosion confirmation tests	3/91
		H	Complete fuel oxidation tests using thermogravimetric analysis	7/91
		I	Draft of final report on oxidation rates and mechanisms for spent fuel available to DOE	11/91
		J	Spent fuel test results available for input to draft environmental impact statement (DEIS)	9/92
		K	Complete documentation of spent fuel waste form testing	12/93
1.5.2.2	Characterization of the glass waste form	A	Continue experiments of dissolution in release from glass waste form	10/88
		B	Initiate long-term confirmation testing of West Valley high level waste glass	11/90
		C	Complete West Valley glass waste form testing for design	8/91
		D	Interim report available to DOE on the results of long-term testing	9/92

Table 8.3.5.10-6. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (page 3 of 8)

Activity number	Brief description of activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.5.3.1	Integration of scenarios for release from waste package	E	Complete long-term confirmation dissolution tests on glass waste forms	8/93
		A	Begin identification of near-field scenarios	12/88
		B	Complete assessment of scenario near-field impacts	6/89
		C	Complete updated assessment of scenario near-field impacts	8/82
		D	Complete integration of scenarios	8/93
1.5.3.2	Development of geochemical speciation and reaction model	A	Initiate thermodynamic properties measurement of fission product nuclides	10/88
		B	Draft EQ3/6 user's manual available to DOE	11/88
		C	EQ3/6 code release	3/90
		D	Initiate thermodynamic properties measurements of containment materials	5/90

Table 8.3.5.10-6. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (page 4 of 8)

Activity number	Brief description of activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.5.3.2	Development of geochemical speciation and reaction model (continued)	E	Updated draft of EQ3/6 user's manual available to DOE	3/91
		F	Revised EQ3/6 code complete	9/91
		G	Final EQ3/6 code release to DOE	7/92
		H	Final EQ3/6 data base revisions available to DOE	5/93
1.5.3.3	Generation of models for release of spent fuel waste forms	A	Continue development and validation of fuel oxidation and dissolution models and zircaloy failure models	10/88
		B	Begin modeling long-term expected performance of spent fuel waste forms under repository conditions	9/90
		C	Preliminary results of modeling long-term expected performance of spent fuel waste forms available for testing and for waste package system model	3/91
		D	Complete modeling of long-term expected performance of spent fuel waste forms under repository conditions	8/93

Table 8.3.5.10-6. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (page 5 of 8)

Activity number	Brief description of activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.5.3.4	Generation of models for release from glass waste forms	A	Continue development and validation of models for radionuclide release from waste forms and glass dissolution	10/88
		B	Begin modeling long-term performance of glass waste forms under repository conditions	4/90
		C	Preliminary results of modeling long-term performance glass waste forms available for testing and for waste package system model	4/91
		D	Complete refinement and validation glass waste form models	7/93
		E	Complete modeling long-term performance of glass waste forms under repository conditions	9/93
1.5.3.5	Waste package performance assessment model development (continued)	A	Complete development of the first ensemble/uncertainty code and process model	2/89
		B	Finalize ACD ensemble/uncertainty code and second system model	4/92

Table 8.3.5.10-6. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (page 6 of 8)

Activity number	Brief description of activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.5.3.5	Waste package performance assessment model development (continued)	C	Complete verification of ACD ensemble/ uncertainty code and second system model	11/92
		D	Finalize deterministic waste package code for LAD	10/93
		E	Complete development of ensemble/ uncertainty code for LAD	2/94
		F	Complete documentation of waste package assessment codes	8/94
		G	Complete documentation of the verificaation and validation of waste package assessment codes	1/95
1.5.4.1	Deterministic calculation of releases from the waste package	A	Begin sensitivity analysis of long-term performance assessment of waste package conceptual design	10/88
		B	Complete performance assessment of waste package ACD	1/92
		C	Complete performance assessment of waste package license application design (LAD)	1/94

Table 8.3.5.10-6. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (page 7 of 8)

Activity number	Brief description of activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.5.4.2	Probabilistic calculation of releases from the waste package ensemble	A	Begin ensemble and uncertainty analysis for conceptual design following development of an uncertainty code and process model	2/89
		B	Preliminary source term description available	7/91
		C	Complete assessment of ACD ensemble performance against regulatory criteria using uncertainty models	10/92
		D	Complete analysis of LAD ensemble performance using uncertainty models and analysis of LAD ensemble performance for defining source term from the waste package	10/94
		E	Complete report on LAD ensemble performance for defining source term from the waste package	1/95
1.5.5.1	Determination of radionuclide transport parameters	A	Continue investigation of materials interactions among engineered barrier system (EBS) components	10/88
		B	Complete investigation of materials interactions among EBS components	1/92

Table 8.3.5.10-6. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates) (page 8 of 8)

Activity number	Brief description of activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.5.5.2	Radionuclide transport modeling in the near-field waste package environment	A	Begin development of waste package radionuclide release and transport model; continue to investigate materials interactions among EBS components	10/88
		B	Begin refinement and validation of the waste package radionuclide release and transport model	1/91
		C	Complete model for integrated testing of waste forms with ground water and container materials	12/92
		D	Begin conducting integrated testing of waste package components to validate radionuclide release and transport model calculations	4/93
		E	Complete documentation of radionuclide transport models and results of integrated testing	1/94

[a]The letters in this column key major events shown in Figure 8.3.5.10-4.

DOE/RW-0199

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.11, Seal Performance

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.11 Plans for assessing seal system performance

The seal system is composed of the shafts and ramps, exploratory boreholes and their seals, and the sealing components associated with the underground facility. The portions of 10 CFR Part 60 that are related to the shafts, boreholes, and their seals are Sections 60.134(a) and (b). Section 60.113 relates a performance criterion on the engineered barrier system. Because the engineered barrier system comprises the waste package and the underground facility, the seals in the underground facility are indirectly affected by this performance criterion. The approach to establishing the performance goal for the Yucca Mountain Project seal program is described in Section 8.3.3.2 of this document. The approach and plans for assessing the performance of seal designs is described in the following.

Figure 8.3.5.11-1 illustrates the overall logic currently being used to arrive at seal designs that can achieve a desired level of performance. This figure also correlates the six steps in the Yucca Mountain Project repository seal program with these design- and performance-related efforts. These steps are defined in the following paragraphs and are presented in more detail elsewhere (Fernandez, 1985) and in Section 8.3.3.

The first four steps are performed during advanced conceptual design and are as follows:

1. Assess the need for sealing.

2. Define the performance goals and design requirements.

3. Measure material properties.

4. Define sealing designs, assess the performance of these designs, and select the suitable sealing designs.

The last two steps are performed during the license application design (LAD):

5. Perform laboratory analyses and field testing, if required.

6. Reassess the performance of sealing designs (including reallocation of performance, if needed) and select the suitable design.

The focus of this section is to briefly summarize plans for assessing the performance of sealing components. Section 8.3.3 provides more explanation of planned seal performance analyses and information on (1) type of seal, (2) function of seal, (3) location of seal, (4) physical process by which the seal functions, (5) material properties key to seal performance, (6) performance measures for the seal, and (7) goals and desired confidence. The remainder of this section summarizes the broad outline of the overall strategy and the plans for assessing seal performance. A preliminary evaluation of the performance of sealing components will be made as part of step 2. In this step, design options will be rank ordered considering the relative performance of the evaluated design options and the ease in meeting the goal. The logic to be used in this step is presented in Figure 8.3.5.11-2. A detailed evaluation of the performance of sealing components will be made while developing the LAD. This evaluation will consider initial



Figure 8.3.5.11-1. Flowchart illustrating the approach for answering the performance-related questions (modified from Fernandez, 1985).


ALLOCATE PERFORMANCE TO SEALING COMPONENTS
SELECT DESIGNS FOR SEALING COMPONENTS
EVALUATE PERFORMANCE OF SEALING COMPONENTS
IS PERFORMANCE GOAL MET?
NO
YES
RANK ORDER DESIGN OPTIONS BY CONSIDERING PERFORMANCE OF DESIGN OPTION AND EASE IN MEETING GOAL
HAS A BROAD RANGE OF DESIGN OPTIONS BEEN EVALUATED?
NO
YES
HAS A BROAD RANGE OF PERFORMANCE ALLOCATIONS BEEN CONSIDERED?
NO
REALLOCATE PERFORMANCE GOALS TO SEALING COMPONENTS
YES
SELECT PREFERRED PERFORMANCE GOAL ALLOCATION AND DESIGN OPTION

Figure 8.3.5.11-2. Logic to select preferred performance goals for seal program.

and altered seal material properties. To establish these altered properties, it will be necessary to evaluate how the initial material properties are altered by processes and events.

The effect of designs on performance will also be evaluated. Following the reassessment of performance, it may be determined that reallocation of the performance goals is desired. For instance, if the performance goal is only marginally achieved, it may be prudent to reallocate performance or change the design that was evaluated. If the performance goals can be achieved, then the designs evaluated will be proposed as part of the LAD. Additional verification activities may be required if, through the parametric analyses, it can be shown that a higher degree of confidence is required to achieve the performance goal. This higher degree of confidence can be achieved through laboratory, field testing, or both. A reassessment of the designs will be made using the data obtained through verification testing.

The strategy used in the sealing program to evaluate performance of sealing components is to use analytical solutions in a sensitivity analysis and, when appropriate a combination of numerical and analytical models. The numerical and analytical approaches used to date are in Section 6.4.3.1. It is anticipated that no new fluid-flow codes will be required specifically for use in the seal program. Rather, codes that are being developed, verified, and validated for use in other hydraulic performance analyses needed for the Yucca Mountain Project will be used for sealing analyses. Input to verification and benchmark problems will be made by the seal program to ensure the applicability of the codes to the seal environment.

The following subtasks will be performed in evaluating the performance of the sealing system:

1. Develop the following matrices for the materials and designs specified in the advanced conceptual design report:

    a. Events versus processes. (Which likely natural events initiate or enhance processes affecting seal system performance?)

    b. Processes (static, dynamic, and man-induced) versus failure mechanisms. (Which processes contribute to specific failure mechanisms?)

    c. Failure mechanisms versus potential materials and designs. (Which materials or designs will resist, partially resist, or will not resist specific failure mechanisms?)

2. Use the results from the following laboratory and field testing to develop models for use in assessing seal performance:

    a. Laboratory tests to evaluate the following:

        (1) Alteration of sealing materials (cementitious materials) in contact with tuff.

(2) Consolidation behavior of mined tuff as a function of particle size distribution (this mined tuff will be obtained from the excavation of the exploratory shaft).

(3) Early curing behavior of cementitious materials.

(4) Durability of concrete emplaced on the ground surface.

b. Field tests of the Topopah Spring Member and the tuffaceous beds of Calico Hills to evaluate the hydrologic behavior of these units (described in Section 8.3.1.2, geohydrology program).

3. Use the matrices developed in part (1) together with potential scenarios to predict the alteration of seal performance.

4. Calculate the effect of the postclosure sealing system on radionuclide release. This effort will be coordinated with the total system performance assessments (Section 8.3.5.13) for a repository at Yucca Mountain.

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.12, Ground-water Travel Time

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.12 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.6: Will the site meet the performance objective for pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time as required by 10 CFR 60.113?

Regulatory basis for the issue

One of the NRC performance objectives for high-level waste repositories is stated in 10 CFR 60.113(a)(2) as

> The geologic repository shall be located so that pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time along the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment shall be at least 1,000 years or such other time as may be approved or specified by the Commission.

The disturbed zone has been defined qualitatively in 10 CFR 60.2 as

> That portion of the controlled area the physical or chemical properties of which have changed as a result of underground facility construction or as result of heat generated by the emplaced radioactive wastes such that the resultant change of properties may have a significant effect on the performance of the geologic repository.

The accessible environment has been defined in 10 CFR 60.2 to mean the atmosphere, the land surface, surface water, oceans, and the portion of the lithosphere that is outside the controlled area. The controlled area, defined in 40 CFR 191.12(g), means

> (1) A surface location, to be identified by passive institutional controls, that encompasses no more than 100 square kilometers and extends horizontally no more than five kilometers in any direction from the outer boundary of the original location of the radioactive wastes in a disposal system, and (2) the subsurface underlying such a surface location.

The current reference locations of the boundaries of the disturbed zone and accessible environment at Yucca Mountain are subject to change and are established now only to provide a planning basis for a site specific approach to resolution of this issue. Solely for the purposes of this discussion, a distance of 50 m below the midplane of the repository is used as the boundary of the disturbed zone (see Section 8.3.5.12.5 for discussion of plans for defining a more formal boundary of the disturbed zone). A preliminary definition of the boundary of the accessible environment, taken from Rautman et al. (1987), is shown in Figure 8.3.5.12-1. The final definition of the boundary of the accessible environment will be determined by Subactivity 1.6.3.1.2 (Section 8.3.5.12.3.1.2).

The fastest path of likely radionuclide travel is not defined in the regulation. For the purpose of resolving this issue, the DOE assumes that it is possible to identify geographically or geometrically distinct pathways for likely radionuclide travel at the Yucca Mountain site. One of these pathways is the generally downward flow of liquid water through unsaturated zone



Figure 8.3.5.12-1. Preliminary definition of the boundary of the accessible environment (Rautman et al., 1987 and the location of section B-B', Figure 8.3.5.12-2.

hydrostratigraphic units underlying the repository level to the water table and then to the accessible environment. The flow in this pathway could be through pores in the rock matrix and through fractures in these units. Pathways may also be identified with potential fracture zones associated with the Ghost Dance fault or other faults that may significantly affect flow times through the site. In addition, there may be local zones within the heterogeneous system in which the necessary values of hydrologic parameters are sufficiently correlated that a discrete, rapid velocity pathway can be identified. The "fastest path of likely radionuclide travel" will be the path (or set of paths from the total set of possible paths) where radionuclides will move with the least travel time.

The approach described here and the activities within this issue will support a demonstration of compliance with 10 CFR 60.113 requirements by providing for the determination of the distribution of pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel times along the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment. Though water may move through the unsaturated zone in both liquid and vapor phases, this issue is concerned only with the travel time of liquid water. The direct effects on performance of vapor flux through the unsaturated zone are addressed by Issue 1.1 (Section 8.3.5.13). Vapor flux through the unsaturated zone at Yucca Mountain may significantly influence both the magnitude and direction of liquid water flux and will therefore be considered in determining ground-water (liquid) travel time.

Within the following text of this overview section, the background of this issue is discussed followed by a discussion of the issue resolution strategy, and the relationship between the issue and the information needs.

Background

The present understanding of hydrogeologic conditions at Yucca Mountain is described in Chapter 3. The proposed repository will be located in the unsaturated zone, and liquid-phase releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment will probably occur in the saturated zone after migration downward through the unsaturated zone. This means that the flow paths of concern will have two parts: an approximately vertically downward portion through the unsaturated zone and a generally horizontal portion through the saturated zone (Figure 8.3.5.12-2).

The site parameters that describe the hydrologic characteristics along these general paths, as well as any other paths that may be identified during site characterization, will be measured during the characterization process. The hydrogeologic test plans that support the resolution of Issue 1.6 are addressed in the geohydrology program (Section 8.3.1.2). An additional requirement for resolving Issue 1.6 is the confirmation and refinement of conceptual models for flow through the saturated and unsaturated zones at the site. Plans for development of these models are also described in the geohydrology program.

Current concepts generally distinguish two general modes of ground-water movement through the unsaturated zone.



Figure 8.3.5.12-2. Conceptual hydrogeologic section from Solitario Canyon to well J-13. Section location shown in Figure 8.3.5.12-1 (modified from [illegible])

1. Flow predominantly through pores in the rock matrix. In this mode, the time of water movement through a given volume of rock is dominated by flow through the small but abundant matrix pores of the tuffaceous rocks. Current data on site characteristics and likely flux values beneath the repository depths suggest that this is the predominant mode of ground-water movement from the disturbed zone to the water table (Section 3.9.4). Although local regions of fracture flow may exist along significant fractions of any flow path, continuous fracture flow probably does not occur along the entire distance of any given flow path from the disturbed zone to the water table.

2. Continuous flow through fractures or faults. In this mode, the flow rate is relatively rapid because flow along one or more entire paths is constrained to the relatively large but sparse openings constituting a fracture network. Continuous fracture flow from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment may be caused by various sequences of events and may occur in only one general location or be distributed throughout the site. This flow may be caused by episodic or continual lateral diversion of water toward a fault; by an average, sustained percolation rate higher than the values of matrix saturated conductivity; by periodic, high intensity infiltration events at the surface; or by other means (Section 3.9.4). The conditions necessary to induce and sustain fracture flow, if such conditions exist at the Yucca Mountain site, are addressed by the geohydrology program, Sections 8.3.1.2.2 and 8.3.1.2.3. Continuous fracture flow beneath the potential repository is not considered likely at Yucca Mountain (Montazer and Wilson, 1984; Peters et al., 1986; Sinnock et al., 1984a, 1986; Wang and Narasimhan, 1986). However, because implications of such flow include short travel times, this mode of flow will be considered in resolution of this issue.

The strategy for determining ground-water travel times is to account for the current uncertainty about flow mechanisms that may occur at the site, as well as uncertainty about the spatial distribution of rock characteristics along flow paths and about boundary conditions. Therefore, site data are needed to reduce the current uncertainty about whether the likely ground-water flow paths include continuous fracture flow. Flow in both the matrix and fractures in the unsaturated zone will be considered on a probabilistic basis, unless site data unambiguously support a position that continuous fracture flow is not likely enough for serious consideration.

In the saturated zone also, the general pathway for water movement probably includes travel through alternating matrix blocks and fractures. For purposes of conservatively evaluating ground-water travel time, the saturated zone will probably be treated solely as an equivalent porous medium where fracture properties characterize the medium.

Approach to resolving the issue

The general approach to resolving this issue, and others, is discussed in Section 8.2.2. Specifically, the strategy for resolving this issue entails the definition, characterization, and assessment of multiple

barriers to ground-water flow. By dividing potential flow paths and flow processes into discrete categories, the DOE conceptually can establish multiple, quasi-independent natural barriers to which goals for ground-water travel time can be assigned. For resolving Issue 1.6, the multiple natural barriers are considered to be distinct hydrogeologic units that occur along potential flow paths. For purposes of developing the strategy for resolving Issue 1.6, the distinct hydrogeologic units are defined using thermal and mechanical characteristics. If the listing shows these units to be insufficient for describing hydrogeologic flow paths, the stratigraphy will be revised accordingly. This approach to resolving Issue 1.6 is valid regardless of the stratigraphy that is used to define the distinct hydrogeologic units. Within each unit different types of general flow processes may be distinguished, including advective flow in rock pores, similar flow in fractures, and diffusion between and within the matrix and fractures.

The strategy is based on current understanding of flow behavior in each of the hydrogeologic units and current assessments of the relative contribution of each process in each unit to flow velocities. The strategy will identify any significant discrete pathways for likely radionuclide travel and investigate the flow behavior in these pathways. Separate goals of 1,000 yr of travel time, with varying degrees of confidence, are assigned to the several hydrogeologic units under flow conditions dominated by the several processes. If any combination of a single unit and set of processes can be shown to meet the goal of 1,000 yr, the issue could be considered resolved. However, all units will be characterized and evaluated. If several units and associated processes meet their goals, confidence is significantly enhanced that the repository site, considered in the whole, will meet the 1,000-yr requirement. This defense-in-depth approach is designed to provide reasonable assurance that the site will comply with the NRC performance objective, even given the uncertainty about flow mechanisms and flow path characteristics that will remain after site characterization.

Specifically, resolution of Issue 1.6 requires several steps as shown schematically in Figure 8.3.5.12-3. The process for resolution (the centerline in Figure 8.3.5.12-3) is designed to account for both conceptual and parameter uncertainties (left and right lines, respectively, Figure 8.3.5.12-3). The first general step is performance allocation where relevant characterization needs are established through a five-part process:

1. Identifying all hydrogeologic units along potential flow paths to the accessible environment and identifying all potentially operating processes within each of these units.

2. Classifying hydrogeologic units and flow processes as primary, secondary, and auxiliary "barriers" to establish a defense-in-depth basis for reasonable assurance that flow time to the accessible environment is at least 1,000 yr.

3. Establishing measures of performance (i.e., travel time) that allow comparisons of the flow behavior in each unit to the 1,000-yr flow time requirement.


CONCEPTUAL UNCERTAINTY
PERFORMANCE ALLOCATION
PARAMETER UNCERTAINTY
ESTABLISH ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUAL MODELS OF FLOW SYSTEM
COLLECT SITE CHARACTERIZATION DATA
IDENTIFY HYDROGEOLOGIC UNITS
ESTIMATE RELATIVE PROBABILITY OF ALTERNATIVE CONCEPTUAL MODELS FOR EACH UNIT
CLASSIFY SYSTEM COMPONENTS FOR RELIANCE AND IDENTIFY ALL POTENTIAL FLOW PROCESSES
UNIT 1 E G TSw (SECONDARY)
UNIT 2 E G CHv (PRIMARY)
UNIT 3 E G CHz (PRIMARY)
ETC E G SZ (SECONDARY)
IS PROBABILITY SUFFICIENT FOR CONSIDERATION ?
NO
DISCARD
YES
ESTABLISH PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND SET GWTT GOALS WITH CONFIDENCE FOR EACH UNIT
CONSTRUCT MATHEMATICAL AND NUMERICAL MODELS OF GROUND WATER FLOW FOR EACH CONCEPTUAL MODEL
SELECT RELEVANT FLOW PROCESSES FOR RELIANCE FOR EACH UNIT
IDENTIFY RELEVANT PARAMETERS FOR EACH UNIT
PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
PARAMETERIZE NUMERICAL MODELS
CONSTRUCT PARAMETER 3-D MODELS OF HYDROGEOLOGIC PROPERTIES AT YUCCA MOUNTAIN SITE
ARE MATHEMATICAL AND NUMERICAL MODELS VERIFIED ?
NO
YES
CALCULATE GWTT PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTION
ARE PARAMETER ALGORITHMS VERIFIED ?
YES
NO
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
EVALUATE CONCEPTUAL AND PARAMETER UNCERTAINTY
ARE MATHEMATICAL AND CONCEPTUAL MODELS VALID ?
ARE PARAMETER MODELS VALID ?
REDUNDANCY
SUFFICIENCY
IS GOAL MET FOR UNIT 1 ?
IS GOAL MET FOR UNIT 2 ?
INCREASE CONFIDENCE
IS GOAL MET FOR UNIT x ?
IS GOAL MET FOR ALL UNITS IN COMBINATION ?
CAN MORE DATA BE COLLECTED ?
OTHER CONCEPTUAL OR PARAMETER MODELS POSSIBLE ?
PARAMETER
CONCEPTUAL
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE MET (POSITIVE FINDING)
ISSUE RESOLVED
PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE NOT MET
SITE DISQUALIFIED OR NRC EXEMPTION REQUIRED (NEGATIVE FINDING)

Figure 8.3.5.12-3. Schematic logic for resolution of Issue 1 6 (current alternative models of flow system acknowledge matrix and fracture dominated flow in unsaturated zone, seepage velocity dispersion and diffusion). (Note: TSw = Topopah Spring welded unit; CHnv = Calico Hills nonwelded vitric unit, CHnz = Calico Hills nonwelded zeolitic unit; SZ=saturated zone; GWTT=ground-water travel time)

4. Assigning goals and associated levels of confidence for each performance measure.

5. Identifying relevant parameters and associated levels of confidence that will be used to predict the travel time and associated uncertainty through each unit.

The second general step is performance assessment, which involves defining, constructing, and applying models to make travel-time predictions. The final step, performance evaluation, entails comparison of predicted travel times to the goals for each unit, then comparing the travel times in all units in combination to the 1,000-yr requirement to assess the likelihood of compliance with the 1,000-yr travel-time performance objective. This final step includes some, as yet ill-defined, process for assessing the validity of the predictive models (Section 8.3.5.19). Each of the parts of performance allocation, the first general step, is discussed in the immediately following pages. Current plans for the second step, performance assessment, are outlined in the succeeding discussion of Information Needs 1.6.2 through 1.6.4 (Sections 8.3.5.12.2 through 8.3.5.12.4). The third step, performance evaluation, is not explicitly addressed because the criteria for evaluating the degree of compliance with performance objectives are not yet known. A summary of the performance allocation process for this issue is provided in Table 8.3.5.12-1.

Both technical and institutional uncertainties affect the approach to resolving Issue 1.6 presented in this section. Technical uncertainties surrounding the determination of the ground-water travel time along the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel arise from (1) the uncertainty about the validity of current conceptual models of hydrologic flow and (2) the uncertainty about the spatial distribution of the parameters that describe the hydrologic flow system. Reducing technical uncertainties associated with pre-emplacement ground-water travel time predictions is the goal of the site characterization activities.

The institutional uncertainty relates to the difficulty in defining the concept of "fastest path of likely radionuclide travel" and the approach to determining the ground-water travel time along that path for licensing purposes.

If an approved approach to evaluation of the pre-emplacement ground-water travel times evolves that differs from that presented below evolves, the site data collected in response to the preliminary plan described in this section should be sufficiently generic to be applicable. Periodic reevaluation of the potential for changes in site data needs caused by changes in regulatory interpretations is recognized to be an important aspect of the overall issue resolution process.

Step 1. Flow system identification

The components of the natural setting that compose a portion of the Yucca Mountain geologic disposal system are shown in Table 3-17

Table 8.3.5.12-1. Summary of performance allocation for Issue 1.6 (ground-water travel time) (page 1 of 2)

Hydrogeologic components available[a]	Allocation of reliance[b]	Process[c]	Performance measure	Performance goal (yr)	Needed confidence[d]	Performance parameters
TSw	Secondary	Darcian flow	GWTT[e]	1,000 10,000	Low Very low	See Table 8.3.5.12-2
CHnv	Primary	Darcian flow	GWTT	1,000 10,000	High Low	See Table 8.3.5.12-2
CHnz	Primary	Darcian flow	GWTT	1,000 10,000	High Low	See Table 8.3.5.12-2
PPw	Auxiliary	Darcian flow	GWTT	1,000 10,000	Medium Very low	See Table 8.3.5.12-2
PPn	Auxiliary	Darcian flow	GWTT	1,000 10,000	Medium Low	See Table 8.3.5.12-2
BFw	Auxiliary	Darcian flow	GWTT	1,000 10,000	Medium Very low	See Table 8.3.5.12-2
BFn	Auxiliary	Darcian flow	GWTT	1,000 10,000	Medium Very low	See Table 8.3.5.12-2
SZ	Secondary	Darcian flow	GWTT	1,000 10,000	Low Very Low	See Table 8.3.5.12-2

Table 8.3.5.12-1. Summary of performance allocation for Issue 1.6 (ground-water travel time) (page 2 of 2)

Hydrogeologic components available[a]	Allocation of reliance[b]	Process[c]	Performance measure	Performance goal (yr)	Needed confidence[d]	Performance parameters
Combination of all units		Darcian flow	GWTT	1,000 10,000	High High	

[a]TSw = Topopah Spring welded; CHnv = Calico Hills nonwelded vitric; CHnz = Calico Hills nonwelded zeolitized; PPn = Prow Pass nonwelded; BFw = Bullfrog welded; BFn = Bullfrog nonwelded; SZ = saturated zone.

[b]If a significant thickness of the unit occurs along the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel.

[c]Darcian flow (advection) with dispersion will be relied upon for matrix dominated flow; Darcian flow with both dispersion and diffusion will be relied upon if substantial continuous fracture flow is identified during characterization.

[d]High, at least two standard deviations below the mean; medium, at least one standard deviation below the mean; low, less than the mean; very low, less than one standard deviation above the mean (see Step 4, performance goals). Goals and confidence levels were established to guide site studies for the hydrology of the entire site to support resolution of Issues 1.1 and 1.6.

[e]GWTT = ground-water travel time along the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel.

(Section 3.9). These components are defined as hydrogeologic units (system components) that occur along potential ground-water travel paths between the disturbed zone and the accessible environment. There are seven units in the unsaturated zone: (1) Topopah Spring welded unit (TSw), (2) Calico Hills nonwelded vitric unit (CHnv), (3) Calico Hills nonwelded zeolitic unit (CHnz), (4) Prow Pass welded unit (PPw), (5) Prow Pass nonwelded unit (PPn), (6) Bullfrog welded unit (BFw), and (7) Bullfrog nonwelded unit (BFn). The saturated zone (SZ) in its entirety is defined as a separate, eighth unit. As site characterization progresses, it may be determined that the hydrologic units need to be subdivided to characterize more adequately the ground-water flow paths to the accessible environment.

Each of these hydrogeologic units can be subdivided into two types of physical elements that may be considered to define distinct pathways: matrix pores and fractures. Fractures, in turn, are considered to exist as two types: (1) distributed networks and (2) fault zones. This classification, though unit specific, is designed to account for thoroughgoing fracture pathways, distributed throughout the rock mass or along fault zones, that may extend uninterrupted from the disturbed zone to the water table and along the saturated pathways to the accessible environment.

The spatial locations of flow paths from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment are generally through the unsaturated zone to the water table and along a 5-km distance in an approximately down-gradient direction along the upper part of the saturated zone. Although a definition of the boundaries of the disturbed zone is not yet firm (Information Need 1.6.5, Section 8.3.5.12.5), this discussion uses a distance of 50 m below the midplane of the repository as the boundary. The hydrogeologic units that may be relied upon depend to a certain extent on where this boundary lies; however, the ability of the site to meet the 1,000-yr ground-water travel-time criterion probably is not affected much by moderate departures from this definition. The thickness of each unsaturated hydrogeologic unit between the assumed boundary of the disturbed zone and water table is shown in Figure 8.3.5.12-4.

Each of the two physical elements (fractures and matrix) of each hydrogeologic unit is considered a potential pathway for water flow. Several processes may be used to describe flow along each pathway. Darcian flow with dispersion in fractured porous media is the process that will be used as a baseline case to describe water movement through the unsaturated and saturated hydrogeologic units. Dispersion is a mixing and spreading process that should be considered to account for the times of first arrivals in a travel-time distribution. Dispersion is believed to be caused by small- to large-scale heterogeneities along a flow path. The dispersive effects of medium- to large-scale heterogeneities will be addressed by accounting for macroscopic property variations along flow paths, and small scale effects may be addressed, if they are shown to accelerate significantly first arrivals, by assigning a dispersivity factor to each unit.

If diffusion of inert tracers between matrix pores and fracture openings is relied upon, the characteristics and limitations of the diffusive process



Figure 8.3.5.12-4. Isopach contour maps of hydrogeologic units used for performance allocation: (A) total thickness from disturbed zone to the water table; (B) thickness of undisturbed Topopah Spring welded unit, TSw; (C) thickness of the Calico Hills nonwelded vitric unit, CHnv; (D) thickness of the Calico Hills nonwelded zeolitic unit, CHnz; (E) thickness of the Prow Pass welded unit, PPw; (F) thickness of the Prow Pass nonwelded unit, PPn; (G) thickness of the Bullfrog welded unit, BFw; and (H) thickness of the Bullfrog nonwelded unit, BFn. Modified from Sinnock et al. (1986).

must be adequately characterized. Because radionuclide travel may occur by particles larger than inert tracers (such as colloids), characterization of colloid formation and behavior is also planned. The diffusive characteristics of radionuclides and colloids will be investigated under the geochemistry program (Section 8.3.1.3). Section 8.3.5.13 (Issue 1.1) provides more discussion on the transfer of particles between the matrix and the fractures by a diffusive process.

Step 2. Selection by hydrogeologic units and flow process

If the current conceptual model for the unsaturated zone is valid, each of the hydrogeologic units listed previously is a barrier that, in and of itself, is likely to have travel times of at least 1,000 yr along some path of likely radionuclide travel (Figure 8.3.5.12-5, top). Current analyses (Sinnock et al., 1986) indicate that the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel from the disturbed zone to the water table will probably occur beneath the east-northeast region of the proposed repository (Figure 8.3.5.12-5, bottom). Only two unsaturated units occur in this area; the Topopah Spring welded and Calico Hills zeolitic units (Figure 8.3.5.12-6). All potential paths of liquid water flow from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment include segments of flow in the saturated and unsaturated zones. Accordingly, a level of performance has been allocated to the Topopah Spring welded, Calico Hills nonwelded zeolitic, and saturated-zone hydrogeologic units (Table 8.3.5.12-1).

Sinnock et al. (1986) assumed one-dimensional steady-state, vertical flow through matrix and fractures of the unsaturated zone and concluded that the Calico Hills nonwelded zeolitic unit has travel times along the fastest paths much greater than 1,000 yr. Based on these analyses, this unit is allocated a high level of performance and is referred to as a primary barrier. The Topopah Spring welded unit and the saturated zone are considered secondary barriers, and are allocated lower levels of performance. The Calico Hills vitric unit, where present, is also thought to provide relatively long travel times, comparable to or greater than those in a similar thickness of the zeolitic facies of the Calico Hills tuffs, though this unit probably is very thin or absent below the northeast portion of the current facility design where the fastest flow paths to the water table are likely to occur.

Because of uncertainty regarding how to determine the fastest path of radionuclide travel, flow from the entire disturbed zone boundary over the entire site will be included in the distribution of travel times from which the fastest path will be identified. For the entire site, the vitric portion of the Calico Hills unit would also serve as a primary barrier, as indicated in Table 8.3.5.12-1. The Calico Hills vitric unit has a higher saturated hydraulic conductivity than the Calico Hills zeolitic unit and is therefore more likely to have drained to lower saturation and higher suction, particularly in view of its greater distance above the water table. Therefore, matrix-dominated flow can be assumed with more confidence in the vitric unit than in the more nearly saturated zeolitic unit. If the regulatory basis for defining the fastest path is, as expected, restricted to geographical regions of least flow time, it might be prudent to modify the





Figure 8.3.5.12-5. Travel-time plots: Top - cumulative frequency plots of current travel-time estimates through each hydrogeologic unit and through the total thickness of the undistrubed unsaturated zone; Bottom - isochron maps of mean total travel times in years. Cross-section A A' is shown in Figure 8.3.5.12-6. Modified from Sinnock et al. (1986)



Figure 8.3.5.12-6. Cross section at Yucca Mountain showing pinch-outs of unsaturated hydrogeologic units. Location of section line shown in Figure 8.3.5.12-5. (2 times vertical exaggeration)

proposed location of the repository to ensure that at least a minimal thickness of vitric Calico Hills tuff occurs along all flow paths from the disturbed zone to the water table.

Other units (e.g., BFw) will also contribute to a longer ground-water travel time; however, the different, sometimes zero, thicknesses of these units (Figure 8.3.5.12-4) for different flow paths requires that their role in resolving the issue be considered somewhat differently. For the purpose of this allocation, these units are termed auxiliary. This allocation strategy may change as additional data and understanding are obtained.

Flow through the unsaturated units of Yucca Mountain includes the possibility of localized sustained flow in fractures (Montazer and Wilson, 1984). Under the current conceptual model, if substantial, continuous fracture flow exists at the site, it probably will not occur throughout broad regions. Sustained flow in fractures is most likely to occur only along a major geologic structural feature such as the Ghost Dance fault or faults bounding the site to the east. This may occur if a sufficient flux of water is diverted laterally to the structural features where the water could then drain quickly through fractures along the fault to the water table (Rulon et al., 1986). Temporary or steady-state ponding of perched water near the structural features is presently considered possible within and above the nonwelded units. Therefore, if water moves as continuous flow in fractures to the water table, it probably occurs in down-dip areas along the eastern portion of the site, where the Calico Hills vitric unit is thin or absent and the zeolitic unit is nearly saturated. Portions of the previously discussed pathways, particularly those at shallow depths, may experience fracture flow following episodic, high infiltration events.

Under the present conceptual model, liquid flow in the unsaturated zone is predominately downward. However, lateral diversion of water at some unit contacts is possible. If such paths are established as likely during site characterization, they would then be used as the basis for determining travel time. There is a credible possibility that, below the repository level, very little liquid water is moving in any direction (e.g., if flux $<<$ 0.5 mm/yr) and that a nearly static condition prevails (Roseboom, 1983). A significant possibility also exists that, in terms of quantities of water, downward flux of liquid water is less than the upward flux of vapor (Montazer and Wilson, 1984). These possibilities will be investigated during further development of the hydrologic model, as described in the geohydrology program. In lieu of more definitive information, the assumption of net, downward movement of liquid flux probably is a conservative basis for calculating ground-water travel times.

An auxiliary facet of the strategy for assessing ground-water travel times involves the estimation of ground-water ages at different points along the flow paths. Geochronology using carbon, chlorine, and hydrogen isotopes in the ground water can provide a basis for estimating ground-water residence times. Results of such studies are generally subject to significant uncertainty regarding the identification of flow paths, mixing of waters of different ages, etc. However, data on residence times (ages) of water along the potential pathways are expected to be very useful for helping to interpret

ground-water travel times calculated with numerical models. Standard hydrochemical data may also be used to help determine whether computed travel times are consistent with the isotopically determined ages (Section 8.3.1.2.2).

Step 3. Performance measure

The probability or frequency distribution of calculated ground-water travel times is the performance measure for each hydrogeologic unit. Ground-water travel time is an obvious choice because of its direct relationship to 10 CFR Part 60.113(a)(2) and because time is a fundamental quantity. The measure of performance for each hydrogeologic unit will be expressed as a cumulative distribution curve.

Uncertainties associated with parameter values will be addressed by randomly sampling the properties from an empirical probability distribution function that describes natural variability within each hydrogeologic unit, as well as uncertainty associated with that variability. The effects of diffusion (between the fractures and the matrix) will be considered. Finally, the uncertainty in the travel time caused by alternative conceptual models will be incorporated in the cumulative distribution curves, perhaps by subjective weighting of the alternatives based on peer review.

The cumulative distribution curve of travel times for each hydrogeologic unit is intended to encompass all relevant sources of uncertainty. This implies neither that all uncertainty will be objectively quantified nor that the cumulative distribution curve will be a measure of the true travel-time distribution. Rather, the curves will represent the uncertainty associated with parameter measurements as well as the uncertainty associated with many professional judgments about the likely effects of the various sources of parameter and conceptual uncertainty on flow mechanisms. Thus, in combination, the cumulative distribution curves will provide a performance measure that allows informed judgments about the likely range and uncertainty in the travel time from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment.

Step 4. Performance goals

The overall performance goal desired for the ground-water travel-time measure for the combination of all hydrogeologic units between the disturbed zone and the accessible environment is 1,000 yr at a high level of confidence (Table 8.3.5.12-1). This goal has been established to guide studies that support the resolution of Issue 1.6 and is considered to be extremely conservative. To achieve the desired confidence in the total site, performance goals of 1,000 yr are set for several individual hydrogeologic units to establish multiple barriers and implement a strategy of defense-in-depth (Table 8.3.5.12-1). Figure 8.3.5.12-7 shows examples of a histogram and an associated cumulative distribution curve for the overall performance measure of ground-water travel time from the disturbed zone through all the units that make up the unsaturated zone. These examples from Sinnock et al., (1986) are based on the net effects of matrix flow, with no diffusion.



Figure 8.3.5.12-7. Examples of ground-water travel-time distributions: top–histogram; bottom–cumulative distribution function showing x percentile of flow having travel times less than some specified value, T*. Modified from Sinnock et al. (1986).

Performance goals of 1,000 yr are set to establish a direct basis for assessing compliance with the performance objective. Goals for 10,000 yr are included to provide a second point on the cumulative distribution curve, thereby lending a degree of assurance that minor shifts in the whole curve (e.g., due to conceptual or parameter uncertainties) will not lead to significant differences in the likelihood of travel times less than 1,000 yr. Also, 10,000 yr goals, if met, provide a basis for a defense-in-depth strategy for resolving Issue 1.1, which addresses releases of radionuclides over a 10,000-yr period. The confidence goals set for each unit for both 1,000-yr and 10,000-yr travel times are based on results of preliminary evaluations by Sinnock et al. (1986), exemplified in Figures 8.3.5.12-5 and 8.3.5.12-7.

The confidences indicated for the two travel-time goals for each individual unit range from very low to very high (Table 8.3.5.12-1). Five levels of confidence are assigned; very high, high, medium, low, and very low. Very high indicates that the goal lies at least three standard deviations below the mean of the ground-water travel time distribution; high indicates that the goal lies at least two standard deviations below the mean; medium, at least one standard deviation below the mean; low, less than the mean; and very low, less than one standard deviation above the mean. The differences in assigned confidences depend on such factors as saturation in each unit, frequency and apertures of fractures, thickness of each unit, and percentage of the repository area underlain by each unit. Confidence for the required travel time to the accessible environment would be high if the goal is met for various individual units, or (because of the redundancy among individual units) very high if goals are met for several of the various individual units.

The confidence desired for travel time through both Calico Hills units, CHnv and CHnz, is highest of all units, consistent with their designation as primary barriers. A confidence level of low was set for the TSw unit because only a short path length may exist below some portions of the disturbed zone and because of the greater likelihood of fracture flow through significant portions of this densely fractured and welded unit than through the CHn units. Confidence levels for the auxiliary Prow Pass and Bullfrog units (PPw, PPn, BFw, and BFn) are lower because they occur only beneath part of the repository area (Figures 8.3.5.12-4 and 8.3.5.12-6). The goal for the saturated zone, a secondary barrier, is assigned relatively low confidence based on current, conservative estimates of saturated zone flow times (DOE, 1986b).

Comparisons of calculated ground-water travel-time distributions (Figure 8.3.5.12-5) with the performance goals (Table 8.3.5.12-1) provide the basis for determining if each hydrogeologic unit meets its goal. This performance evaluation will be done after more data are available and new curves are calculated by determining from the cumulative distribution curves the likelihood that travel time is greater than the performance goal (e.g., 1,000 yr).

Step 5. Parameter needs

The parameters required to satisfy this issue are those that can establish a basis for reasonable assurance that the performance goals are met. This assurance can be achieved, in large part, if it can be demonstrated that water flows predominantly through the matrix rather than the fractures. This would occur if the water flows through a sufficient volume of matrix pores for at least some minimal portion of each unit to which a goal has been assigned. For each unit, the sufficient volume of pore space may be expressed as effective porosity, n_e. The minimum portion of each unit may be expressed for a given flux, q, as distance, d, along a flow path (generally equivalent to thickness of units in the unsaturated zone, assuming vertical flow). The condition of flow through the matrix may be expressed by a ratio of percolation flux to the saturated hydraulic conductivity of the matrix, q/K_s. If this ratio is less than some threshold value, generally taken to be somewhat less than one, a potential (expressed as suction pressure) for additional moisture retention will exist in the matrix materials and the entire flow volume will tend to move through the matrix. This, in effect, means that if flux exceeds matrix saturated conductivity, fracture flow is expected to occur. However, where flux is less than the conductivity, the resulting potential will tend to draw water from adjacent fractures into the matrix pores until pressure equilibrium is established between the matrix and fractures. The water that remains in fractures at this equilibrium pressure will occur in apertures generally equal in diameter to the largest saturated matrix pores or cling to asperities equal in radius to even larger unsaturated matrix pores holding water in menisci. Because an air-gap constrictivity generally occurs along fractures with apertures larger than the radius of partially saturated matrix pores (Wang and Narisimhan, 1985; Montazer, 1982), flow along fractures under suction pressures tends not to occur and flow across fractures may be considered an extension of matrix flow. As the ratio q/K_s decreases, the potential for moisture absorption by the matrix increases, assuming the matrix pores can drain (i.e., assuming they are not bounded downstream by a region where flux exceeds conductivity).

Because local heterogeneities in saturated conductivity can result in a chaotic distribution of regions where some have q/K_s values less than one and others have q/K_s values greater than one, particularly where flux is about equal to the mean of the probability distribution of conductivity, transitions may occur from fracture to matrix flow along any given path. Therefore, a sufficient portion of every flow path in each unit is sought where q/K_s is less than one in freely drained conditions. Given satisfaction of this inequality, seepage velocity can be assumed to equal the flux divided by the effective porosity of matrix materials, and travel time to equal the flow path distance divided by the seepage velocity. By allocating a required travel time (or times) to each unit, a combination of desired flux, effective porosity, and flow distance can be specified that cause the travel-time goal to be met. Further, if current conservatively estimated values for effective porosity and flux are defined as the desired conditions, then a minimum desired thickness of matrix flow can be defined for each unit. This process of quantifying desired parameter values was followed to define the values shown in the performance parameter goal column of Table 8.3.5.12-2, completing the performance allocation process for Issue 1.6.

Table 8.3.5.12-2. Performance parameters for resolving Issue 1.6 (page 1 of 2)

Hydrogeologic unit[a]	Performance parameter[b]	Current estimated range[c]	Performance parameter goal[d,e]	Current confidence	Desired confidence
TSw	q	<0.5 mm/yr	<0.5 mm/yr	Low	Low
	q/K_s	0.005 to 50	<0.85	Low	Low
	n_e	0.01 to 0.2	>0.05	Low	Low
	d	0 to 60 m	>10 m (100%)	Medium	Low
CHnv	q	< 0.5 mm/yr	<0.5 mm/yr	Low	High
	q/K_s	0.00005 to 5	<0.95	Medium	High
	n_e	0.15 to 0.45	>0.2	Medium	High
	d	0 to 160 m	>2.5 m (100%)	Low[f]	High
			>25 m (80%)	Low[f]	Medium
CHnz	q	<0.5 mm/yr	<0.5 mm/yr	Medium	High
	q/K_s	0.005 to 50	<0.9	Medium	High
	n_e	0.2 to 0.4	>0.2	Medium	High
	d	0 to 140 m	>2.5 m (100%)	Low[f]	High
			>25 m (80%)	Low[f]	Medium
PPw	q	<0.5 mm/yr	<0.5 mm/yr	Low	Medium
	q/K_s	0.0005 to 0.5	<0.85	Low	Medium
	n_e	0.015 to 0.35	>0.1	Low	Medium
	d	0 to 40 m	>5 m (80%)	Medium	Medium
PPn	q	< 0.5 mm/yr	<0.5 mm/yr	Low	Medium
	q/K_s	0.005 to 0.5	<0.95	Low	Medium
	n_e	0.1 to 0.45	>0.2	Low	Medium
	d	0 to 140 m	>2.5 m (50%)	Low	Medium
BFw	q	<0.5 mm/yr	<0.5 mm/yr	Low	Medium
	q/K_s	0.0005 to 0.05	<0.85	Low	Medium
	n_e	0.05 to 0.4	>0.1	Low	Medium
	d	0 to 70 m	>5 m (20%)	Low	Medium

Table 8.3.5.12-2. Performance parameters for resolving Issue 1.6 (page 2 of 2)

Hydrogeologic unit[a]	Performance parameter[b]	Current estimated range[c]	Performance parameter goal[d,e]	Current confidence	Desired confidence
BFn	q	<0.5 mm/yr	<0.5 mm/yr	Low	Medium
	q/K_s	0.0005 to 0.5	<0.95	Low	Medium
	n_e	0.1 to 0.4	>0.2	Low	Medium
	d	0 to 50 m	>2.5 m (10%)	Low	Medium
SZ	dh/dl	0.005	<0.001	Low	Low
	K_s	0.1 to 1000 m/yr	<10 m/yr	Low	Low
	n_e	0.0001 to 0.01	>0.01	Low	Low
	d	0 to 5000 m	1000 m	Low	Medium

[a]TSw = Topopah Spring welded unit; CHnv = Calico Hills nonwelded vitric unit; CHnz = Calico Hills nonwelded zeolitized unit; PPw = Prow Pass welded unit; PPn = Prow Pass nonwelded unit; BFw = Bullfrog welded unit; BFn = Bullfrog nonwelded unit; SZ = saturated zone.

[b]q = flux; K_s = hydraulic conductivity of saturated matrix pores; n_e = effective porosity; d = distance along flow paths.

[c]Based on Section 3.9, Figure 8.3.5.12-4., and Sinnock et al. (1986).

[d]Parenthetical values for d indicate the desired percentage of the repository area underlain by the indicated thickness.

[e]A thickness of greater than 10 m for 100 percent of the area below the repository is based on a disturbed zone thickness less than 50 m.

[f]Low current confidence in meeting the goal is based on a moderate to high confidence that the goal will not be met because of the absence of the units below portions of the current repository area (see Figure 8.3.5.12-4); additional site data are unlikely to increase current confidence, relocation of the repository facilities is probably required to achieve the desired confidence, therefore achievement of these goals must be considered in the context of trade offs with goals for design issues (Sections 8.3.2.2 and 8.3.2.5) relating to facility siting.

The values set as goals for the performance parameters, if realized, would establish a bounding basis for concluding with reasonable confidence that travel time in each unit would exceed 1,000 yr. However, knowing these goals were met would not be sufficient to calculate a cumulative distribution of travel time, especially if portions of some paths include fracture flow or if travel time, as expected, is influenced by variability of the parameters within ranges that are only bounded by the goals. Therefore, a set of supporting performance parameters based on the elements of the general flow equations is identified in the next section, which describes Information Need 1.6.1. (Section 8.3.5.12.1). For these supporting parameters, no quantitative goals are set; rather, goals are defined in terms of relative confidence desired in the properties of the probability distributions of the parameters. As a result, the total parameter needs for resolving this issue are separated into two categories: those identified here (Table 8.3.5.12-1) for establishing bounds on the travel time for comparison to goals, and those identified in the following section (Section 8.3.5.12.1) for developing a probabilistic performance measure expressed as a cumulative distribution function of travel time.

Interrelationships of information needs

The question raised by Issue 1.6 addresses whether the regulation for ground-water travel time, 10 CFR 60.113(a)(2), can be satisfied at the Yucca Mountain site. There are several distinct parts to the issue that must be resolved to answer the question. The distinct parts, expressed as questions, are as follows:

1. What site information, design concepts, and auxiliary information are needed to (a) identify the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment, and (b) determine the pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time along this path?

2. What calculational models of the hydrologic system will be used to identify the fastest flow path(s) and predict ground-water travel-time distributions along this path?

3. Based on the selected models, where is the fastest path(s) from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment, and what are the flow characteristics along this path?

4. What is the cumulative distribution of pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel times along this path(s) based upon results of simulations using the calculational models and any other information resulting from answering the preceding questions?

5. Where are the boundaries of the disturbed zone?

Each of these questions has been designated as an information need. Questions 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are Information Needs 1.6.1, 1.6.2, 1.6.3, 1.6.4, and 1.6.5 (Sections 8.3.5.12.1 through 8.3.5.12.5), respectively. Information Need 1.6.1 summarizes the mathematical basis for calculating ground-water travel time and the associated set of site parameters needed to resolve this issue. Included in Information Need 1.6.1 is an indication of the

confidence desired for each parameter. Note that the required parameters and associated confidence levels apply to statistical moments of particular properties and not just to a single value for each property. Such statistical information will allow better quantification of uncertainty for a given conceptual model than will data limited to expressions of confidence in a single, target value for a given property.

Information Need 1.6.2 (Section 8.3.5.12.2) describes the planning basis for selecting calculational models that will help identify flow paths and analyze ground-water travel times along these paths. Direct measurements of ground-water travel time for demonstration of compliance with regulatory rules are not feasible. Therefore, resolution of this issue requires calculational models that can simulate ground-water flow at the site and predict flow paths and travel times from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment. These models also enable sensitivity analyses to be performed; such analyses indicate the relative importance of different parameters to travel-time distributions (values, moments, and spatial location), so that data acquisition plans can be focused in an iterative process on parameters that allow the greatest reductions in quantifiable uncertainty about ground-water travel time. The calculational models will be used to identify likely paths of radionuclide travel (Information Need 1.6.3) and to assess pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time along these paths (Information Need 1.6.4). Thus, the models selected under Information Need 1.6.2 are based on mathematical concepts addressed in Information Need 1.6.1 that establish the parameters needed to predict ground-water travel time. On the other hand, the confidence desired for each parameter is established by interpreting analyses done to satisfy Information Needs 1.6.3 and 1.6.4.

Information Need 1.6.3 (Section 8.3.5.12.3) addresses a basis for determining the fastest paths of likely radionuclide travel for both matrix- and fracture-dominated modes of water movement. As site characterization proceeds, new data will be analyzed to identify the likely flow paths. Ultimate selection of flow processes and paths used for analysis of travel time may be based, in part, on data or theories that are inadequate for unambiguous estimation of a probability or likelihood of occurrence and will require the judicial use of expert judgment and peer review.

Activities under Information Need 1.6.4 (Section 8.3.5.12.4) focus on determining pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel times along the fastest path of radionuclide travel. Sensitivity and uncertainty analyses are also performed under Information Need 1.6.4 to establish the effects of uncertainty in parameter values and conceptual approaches on the ultimate confidence that may be placed in the predictions of travel time. Results of these prelicensing studies will be used to evaluate the sufficiency of the data base on which predictions are made, thereby identifying the proper focus of further site characterization to reduce most effectively the remaining sources of uncertainty in predictions of travel time.

Information Need 1.6.5 (Section 8.3.5.12.5) establishes a planning basis for determining the boundary of the disturbed zone. The current plans are based in part on the general guidance given by the NRC (Gordon et al., 1986). Thermal, mechanical, geochemical, and hydrologic analyses will be used to define the extent of disturbances expected from repository construction and heat generated by the waste. Because Information Need 1.6.5 is fundamentally

different from the previous information needs in this issue (in that the information required for Information Need 1.6.5 will address the postemplacement environment and will not be used directly to assess ground-water travel time), it is treated separately. Information Need 1.6.5 develops its own performance measures and goals, as well as the parameters required to assess the extent of repository-induced disturbances.

The schedule information for Issue 1.6 (ground-water travel time) is presented in Section 8.3.5.12.6.

8.3.5.12.1 Information Need 1.6.1: Site information and design concepts needed to identify the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel and to calculate the ground-water travel time along that path

This information need summarizes the parameter needs required for analyses to be performed for assessing ground-water travel time. The information and data required for Information Needs 1.6.2 through 1.6.4 (Sections 8.3.5.12.2 through 8.3.5.12.4) are described here. Because defining the disturbed zone is distinct from calculating ground-water travel time, the parameters required for the disturbed-zone definition are addressed in Information Need 1.6.5 (Section 8.3.5.12.5). The parameter needs identified here apply only to pre-waste-emplacement conditions.

The specific parameters requested by Issue 1.6 are discussed later in the logic portion of this section and will provide information in the following four categories (Figure 8.3.5.12-8):

1. System geometry.
2. Material property values.
3. Initial and boundary conditions.
4. Model validation.

Information is required from each of these categories to calculate ground-water travel-time values in Information Need 1.6.4.

The specific parameters requested here (inner circle, Figure 8.3.5.12-8) rarely correspond to parameters directly measured in the field or laboratory (outer circle, Figure 8.3.5.12-8). A set of site characterization modeling activities (middle circle, Figure 8.3.5.12-8) is required to reduce the measured data to the parameters amenable for direct use in ground-water travel-time calculations. The logic that establishes how the actual measurements are used to produce the requested parameters is provided in Sections 8.3.1.2 (geohydrology) and 8.3.1.4 (rock characteristics).

Crucial information required by this issue are descriptions of the conceptual models and associated uncertainties for the unsaturated-zone and saturated-zone flow systems at the site. Though no specific parameter needs are delineated here with regard to the validation of flow models, the means by which the flow models will be developed, as well as the plans that described how the requested specific parameter values will be obtained, are described within the geohydrology program (Section 8.3.1.2) and rock characteristics program (Section 8.3.1.4).


MODEL-VALIDATION MEASUREMENTS (SECTION 8.3.1.2)
SITE CHARACTERIZATION
DATA COLLECTION
INITIAL & BOUNDARY CONDITION MEASUREMENTS (SECTIONS 8.3.1.2 & 8.3.1.4)
CONCEPTUAL MODEL DEVELOPMENT (SECTION 8.3.1.2)
MATERIAL PROPERTY MEASUREMENTS (SECTION 8.3.1.2)
SITE CHARACTERIZATION
MODELING
INITIAL & BOUNDARY CONDITION DATA REDUCTION MODELS (SECTION 8.3.1.2)
NUMERICAL MODEL DEVELOPMENT (INFORMATION NEED 1.6.2)
MATERIAL PROPERTY DATA REDUCTION MODELS (SECTION 8.3.1.2)
INITIAL AND BOUNDARY CONDITION PARAMETERS (TABLE 8.3.5.12-2)
MATERIAL PROPERTY PARAMETERS (TABLE 8.3.5.12-2)
GROUND-WATER CALCULATIONS (INFORMATION NEEDS 1.6.3, 1.6.4) MODEL VALIDATION (INFORMATION NEED 1.6.2)
PERFORMANCE
ASSESSMENT
SYSTEM GEOMETRY PARAMETERS (TABLE 8.3.5.12-2)
SYSTEM GEOMETRY DATA REDUCTION MODELS (SECTION 8.3.1.4)
SYSTEM GEOMETRY MEASUREMENTS (SECTION 8.3.1.4)

Figure 8.3.5.12-8. Schematic flow of site information on system geometry, material properties, initial and boundary conditions, and model validation through data reduction modeling (Programs 8.3.1.2 and 8.3.1.4) to definition of performance assessment parameters (Table 8.3.5.12-2) for use in ground-water travel time calculations and model validation (Information Needs 1.6.2, 1.6.3, and 1.6.4).

Detailed plans for the validation of the conceptual and mathematical models that describe the unsaturated-zone flow systems at Yucca Mountain are currently under development. The general approach to validation of these models and the other models to be used for performance assessment is presented in Section 8.3.5.20.2 (plans for verification and validation). Section 8.3.5.12.2.2 (verification and validation) briefly describes the current status of the validation process to be used for the conceptual and mathematical models to be used in the resolution of this issue (1.6) and Issue 1.1 (total system performance).

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

Chapter 3 summarizes the current understanding of conceptual models of ground-water flow addressed by the general equations of flow discussed here. Chapters 1 and 2 provide the current data on the geologic and rock characteristics represented by parameters in the equations. Data on the thicknesses and extents of stratigraphic units also are contained in Chapters 1 and 2. Structural information about fracture and fault characteristics is provided in Chapter 1. Data on porosity are in Chapters 2 and 3, and data on permeability, saturation, pressure, and water table elevations are in Chapter 3.

Parameters

The parameter needs established for this information need are identified in Table 8.3.5.12-3. In general these parameters will be obtained from activities discussed in Section 8.3.1.2.

Logic

Parameter requirements cannot be made without using some conceptual model(s) as the basis. The phenomena relevant to predicting ground-water travel times at the site have been indicated in the issue resolution strategy of this issue and are more fully described in Section 3.9. The general concept for flow in the saturated zone postulates Darcian flow in a saturated, equivalent porous medium. The concept for flow in the unsaturated zone postulates near steady-state Darcian flow, with the possibility of flow in both the matrix and fractures. The mathematical equations that are formulated to describe the conceptual flow models are used to determine what parameter information is required. A significant aspect of site characterization is testing the validity of these models. The models will be periodically reevaluated and modified, if necessary, in light of the results of this testing.

Ground-water models generally are based on one or move governing equations. These equations generally are based on mathematical statements for the conservation of mass and momentum.

Table 8.3.5.12-3. Supporting performance parameters used by Issue 1.6 (ground-water travel time)[a] (page 1 of 6)

Performance parameter	Material type	Spatial location	Stratigraphic unit	Statistical measures desired[b]	Needed confidence[c]	SCP Section where current estimate is discussed	Current confidence[d]
MODEL TYPE: CALCULATION OF GROUND-WATER TRAVEL TIME IN THE UNSATURATED ZONE							
Inital and Boundary Conditions							
Flux, percolation rate	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, TSw2, repository level	Mean	Medium	NA[d]	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, TSw2, repository level	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, TSw2, repository level	SDev	Low	NA	Low
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, TSw2, repository level	Mean	Medium	3.9.3	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, TSw2, repository level	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, TSw2, repository level	SDev	Low	NA	Medium
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, TSw2, repository level	Mean	High	3.9.3	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, TSw2, repository level	SCor	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, TSw2, repository level	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
Moisture content (volumetric)	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	High	3.9.2.1	Low
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	High	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	High	NA	NA
Pressure head (matric potential)	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	3.9.1.2	Low
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
Saturation	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	High	3.9.2.1	Low
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
Temperature, in situ	Rock mass	R-area	UZ, below repository	Mean	Medium	1.6.2.2.4	Medium

Table 8.3.5.12-3. Supporting performance parameters used by Issue 1.6 (ground-water travel time)[a] (page 2 of 6)

Performance parameter	Material type	Spatial location	Stratigraphic unit	Statistical measures desired[b]	Needed confidence[c]	SCP Section where current estimate is discussed	Current confidence[d]
Material Properties							
Density, bulk	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	2.4.2, 1.6.2	Medium
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
Moisture retention curve	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Rock mass	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock mass	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Rock mass	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	3.9.2.1	Low
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
Permeability, relative	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Rock mass	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock mass	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Rock mass	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
Permeability, relative permeatio	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydrologic unit	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydrologic unit	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydrologic unit	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydrologic unit	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydrologic unit	SDev	Low	NA	NA
Permeability, saturated	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Medium	NA	NA

Table 8.3.5.12-3. Supporting performance parameters used by Issue 1.6 (ground-water travel time)[a] (page 3 of 6)

Performance parameter	Material type	Spatial location	Stratigraphic unit	Statistical measures desired[b]	Needed confidence[c]	SCP Section where current estimate is discussed	Current confidence[d]
	Rock mass	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	High	NA	NA
	Rock mass	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Rock mass	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	High	3.9.2.1	Low
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	High	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	High	NA	NA
Porosity, effective	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Rock mass	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	High	NA	NA
	Rock mass	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock mass	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	High	3.9.2.1	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
System Geometry							
Contact altitude, hydrologic units	Rock mass	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	High	8.3.5.12	Medium
	Rock mass	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Rock mass	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
Fault displacement	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	1.3.2.2	Low
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
Fault locations	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	High	1.3.2.2	Low
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
Validation of Model Concepts							
Isotopic ratios, ground-water residence time	Fault zone	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fault zone	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA

Table 8.3.5.12-3. Supporting performance parameters used by Issue 1.6 (ground-water travel time)[a] (page 4 of 6)

Performance parameter	Material type	Spatial location	Stratigraphic unit	Statistical measures desired[b]	Needed confidence[c]	SCP Section where current estimate is discussed	Current confidence[d]
MODEL TYPE: CALCULATION OF GROUND-WATER TRAVEL TIME IN THE SATURATED ZONE							
Inital and Boundary Conditions							
Flux, flow rate	Rock mass	C-area	SZ, upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	3.9.4	Low
Pressure head function of depth	Ground water	C-area	SZ, upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	3.6.3	Low
Temperature, in situ	Rock mass	C-area	SZ, upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	1.6.2	Medium
Material Properties							
Density, bulk	Fault zones	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	2.4.2, 1.6.2	Medium
	Rock matrix	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SCor	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
Permeability, saturated	Fault zones	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fault zones	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	3.6.4, 3.9.2.2	Low
	Fractures	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock mass	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	3.6.4, 3.9.2.2	Low
	Rock mass	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Rock mass	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	3.6.4, 3.9.2.2	Medium
	Rock matrix	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Low	NA	NA
Porosity, effective	Fault zones	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fault zones	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	3.6.4	Low
	Fractures	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock mass	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	3.9.2.2, 3.6.4	Low
	Rock mass	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Rock mass	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Low	3.6.4, 3.9.2.2	Low
	Rock matrix	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Low	NA	NA

Table 8.3.5.12-3. Supporting performance parameters used by Issue 1.6 (ground-water travel time)[a] (page 5 of 6)

Performance parameter	Material type	Spatial location	Stratigraphic unit	Statistical measures desired[b]	Needed confidence[c]	SCP Section where current estimate is discussed	Current confidence[d]
System Geometry							
Aquifer geometry	Rock mass	C-area	SZ, upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	3.6.1, 3.6.2, 3.9.3	Low
Contact altitude, lithologic units	Rock mass	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	3.6.1, 3.6.2, 3.9.3	Low
Fault displacement	Fault zones	C-area	SZ, upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
Fault locations	Fault zones	C-area	SZ, upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
Validation of Model Concepts							
Water table altitude	Ground water	C-area	SZ, water table level	Mean	High	3.9.1.2	Medium
	Ground water	C-area	SZ, water table level	SDev	Low	NA	NA
MODEL TYPE: CALCULATION OF SPATIAL CORRELATION STRUCTURE							
Material Properties							
Porosity, total	Fault zones	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fault zones	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
	Fractures	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fractures	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock mass	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	3.9.2.2	Low
	Rock mass	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Rock mass	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	2.4.2, 2.5	Medium
	Rock matrix	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SCor	Medium	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Medium	3.9.2, 2.4.2, 2.5	Medium
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	High	NA	NA
	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	High	NA	NA
MODEL TYPE: CALCULATION OF FRACTURE HYDROLOGIC CHARACTERISTICS							
Material Properties							
Fracture aperture	Fault zones	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fault zones	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Low	NA	NA

Table 8.3.5.12-3. Supporting performance parameters used by Issue 1.6 (ground-water travel time)[a] (page 6 of 6)

Performance parameter	Material type	Spatial location	Stratigraphic unit	Statistical measures desired[b]	Needed confidence[c]	SCP Section where current estimate is discussed	Current confidence[d]
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fractures	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
Fracture frequency	Fault zones	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Medium	NA	NA
	Fractures	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Medium	3.9.2.1	Low
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
Fracture length	Fault zones	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
System Geometry							
Fracture orientation	Fault zones	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fault zones	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	C-area	SZ, each litho unit in upper 100 m	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	Mean	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below respository	SCor	Low	NA	NA
	Fractures	R-area	UZ, each hydro unit below repository	SDev	Low	NA	NA

[a]SZ = saturated zone; UZ = unsaturated zone; GWTT = ground-water travel time; C-area = controlled area; R-area = repository area; litho = lithological; hydro = hydrological.

[b]Mean = spatially dependent mean value; SDev = spatially dependent standard deviation; SCor = spatial correlation coefficient.

[c]High = high confidence, highest priority; Medium = medium confidence, medium priority; Low = low confidence, low priority.

[d]NA = not available.

The governing equation of three-dimensional flow in saturated porous media is generally expressed as follows:

$$S_s \frac{\partial h}{\partial t} - \nabla \bullet (\bar{\bar{K}} \nabla h) + Q = 0 \qquad (8.3.5.12\text{-}1)$$

where

S_s = specific storage

h = piezometric head

$\bar{\bar{K}}$ = hydraulic conductivity

Q = volumetric discharge

t = time

∇ = differential operator $\left(\frac{\partial}{\partial x}, \frac{\partial}{\partial y}, \frac{\partial}{\partial z}\right)$

For steady or nearly steady flow, the storage term can be neglected.

Flow in unsaturated porous media is generally expressed by variants of Richards' equation. The model for liquid water flow in unsaturated fractured porous media, as described in Section 3.9, can be formulated by an equation derived from a version of Richards' equation written for both the matrix and fracture systems and by assuming that, in a near-equilibrium condition, the pressure head in the fractures and the matrix is locally in equilibrium. This can be written in the form

$$\nabla \bullet [(\bar{\bar{K}}_m(\psi) + \bar{\bar{K}}_f(\psi)) \nabla(\psi + z)] = F\left(\frac{\partial \psi}{\partial t}\right) + Q \qquad (8.3.5.12\text{-}2)$$

where

$\bar{\bar{K}}_m(\psi)$ = the relative hydraulic conductivity for the unsaturated matrix system

$\bar{\bar{K}}_f(\psi)$ = the relative hydraulic conductivity for the unsaturated fracture system

ψ = pressure head

z = elevation head

Q = sink/source term

and F involves the specific moisture capacity of matrix and fractures and the compressibility of water, the bulk rock, and the fracture system (Klavetter and Peters, 1986).

Once the pressure head distribution is established, seepage velocities (v) can be determined by

$$v = -\left(\frac{K(\psi)}{n_e}\right)\left(\frac{\partial h}{\partial l}\right) \qquad (8.3.5.12\text{-}3)$$

and ground-water travel time (GWTT) by

$$\mathrm{GWTT} = \frac{\mathrm{D}}{v} \qquad (8.3.5.12\text{-}4)$$

where h is total head defined by an elevation head component, z, and a pressure head component, ψ, l is length along the head gradient, D is the flowpath length, and n_e is effective porosity.

K or $K(\psi)$, hydraulic conductivity is an empirical parameter that depends on properties of both the moving fluid and transmitting medium (i.e., on both water and rock properties). K may be more fundamentally expressed as

$$K = \frac{\rho g k}{\mu} \qquad (8.3.5.12\text{-}5)$$

where k, permeability, is a property of the rock (and moisture content in unsaturated material); g is the acceleration due to gravity; and μ, viscosity, and ρ, density, are properties of the fluid that depend on temperature and on chemical species present. Assuming little effect of chemistry on ρ and μ, in situ temperatures and intrinsic permeability are the parameters needed to derive K. In unsaturated materials, the value of $K(\psi)$ depends on moisture content and may differ (for transient behavior) depending on whether the material is becoming wetter (ψ increasing) or drier (ψ decreasing). This moisture dependency will be accounted for in modeling of the unsaturated zone (8.3.1.2.2).

Effective porosity is used here as a measure of the volume of space through which flow occurs. In the unsaturated zone, this property is taken to be the in situ moisture content less the residual moisture content. As understanding of unsaturated flow evolves, this definition may need to be modified to account for porous channeling or other phenomena.

Equations 8.3.5.12-1 through 8.3.5.12-5 are judged, based on the current understanding of the conceptual models of flow at the site (as described in Chapter 3), to be a suitable basis for generally describing the flow phenomena present in the saturated and unsaturated zones. These equations define the basic set of material-property parameters that must be available to calculate ground-water travel time and therefore resolve this issue. Additional information required to solve Equations 8.3.5.12-1 through 8.3.5.12-5 include the description of the system geometry (for both the

saturated and unsaturated zones within the controlled area) and initial and boundary conditions for the models.

Parameters requested in Table 8.3.5.12-3 are divided into the four categories previously discussed: (1) system geometry, (2) material property values, (3) initial and boundary conditions, and (4) model validation. As described earlier, information is required from the first three categories to provide specific input for the solution of the general equations for ground-water travel time. To determine if those mathematical equations provide an adequate formulation for the calculation of ground-water travel time, information relevant to the fourth category, model validation, is also required.

Under each of the four categories in Table 8.3.5.12-3, specific parameters are requested for several distinct types of models. The parameters may be used primarily in direct calculations of the ground-water travel times in the unsaturated zone or the saturated zone; they may be used primarily in models to derive hydrologic properties of fractures, or they may be used primarily in models to define the basic spatial correlation structure of the rock mass. Table 8.3.5.12-3 is subdivided to show which parameters are used in each of these broad types of models.

The second column in the table, material type, indicates whether information on the requested parameter is required about their distributions in the rock matrix, in distributed fracture networks, as characteristics of a sufficiently large volume of rock (rock mass), or in fault zones. The third column, spatial location, indicates whether information is needed for the requested parameter in the repository area or the entire controlled area. The fourth column in the table, stratigraphic unit, indicates where in the vertical dimension that information is needed. In the unsaturated zone, because this issue is concerned primarily with downward water movement, most of the information is requested only for those units at the repository level or below. However, it is recognized that similar information may be required for units above the repository level (Investigation 8.3.1.2.2) in order to infer some of the parameters requested in Table 8.3.5.12-3, such as percolation flux.

The fifth and sixth columns indicate, respectively, the statistical measures desired and confidence level set for each requested parameter. The measure desired is either one of the first two statistical moments (mean and standard deviation) for the parameter or the spatial correlation coefficient. The confidence level (low, medium, or high) indicates the relative confidence required in the parameter of interest, with a confidence level of high also indicating that the parameter value is of high priority, medium indicating a medium priority item, and low indicating a low priority item. These confidence levels are based on professional judgments about the relative importance of the various parameters and are not meant to imply any quantitative definition. The confidence levels indicate the desired confidence for the location-dependent mean, standard deviation, and spatial correlation. For example, if the "true" standard deviation is large and the desired confidence in the standard deviation is high, sufficient samples must be measured to show high confidence that the standard deviation of the sample population is a good approximation of the "real" variance of the parameter of interest. Also, the location-dependent requirements indicate a desire to define any

spatial drift in population statistics for each parameter and implies an analysis and removal of drift during data reduction.

Generally, for the unsaturated zone, higher confidence is requested for matrix properties than for properties of fractures, faults, or the rock mass. This reflects current judgments that matrix flow dominates in the unsaturated zone. The relative confidence levels are also based, in part, on the estimated feasibility of obtaining reliable information for each of the parameters.

The seventh and eighth columns in Table 8.3.5.12-3 identify the section in the SCP where current values for each of the identified parameters are discussed and the current confidence that the Yucca Mountain Project has for each parameter.

Table 8.3.5.12-3 lists those site parameters considered necessary to support resolution of this issue. In general, values for parameters listed in the table under the categories of material properties and initial and boundary conditions will provide the direct input necessary to calculate ground-water travel times from the mathematical formulations represented by Equations 8.3.5.12-1 through 8.3.5.12-5. However, some parameters in those equations are not requested by Table 8.3.5.12-3. For example, the viscosity and density of water and the value of the acceleration due to gravity were not requested because they can be readily obtained from scientific handbooks. The specific storage parameter in the first term on the left-hand side of Equation 8.3.5.12-1, which represents responses to transient, stressed conditions, is not requested because pre-waste-emplacement travel times will be calculated under steady or near steady conditions. Also, the parameter in Equation 8.3.5.12-2, representing the specific moisture capacity of the rock and compressibilities of fluid and rock, is not requested because it can be derived from values from a combination of the requested moisture retention curves and from values from literature sources.

The parameters in Table 8.3.5.12-3 related to fracture geometry in the unsaturated zone will be required if evaluation of flow in fractures is required. Values of these parameters for unsaturated units will be used to infer the hydrologic properties of fractures including relative permeability and associated effective porosity, perhaps in the manner of Wang and Narasimhan (1986), only if fracture flow below the disturbed zone is sufficiently widespread or probable to warrant analysis. Similarly, bulk density is listed as a contingency for preserving the option to consider diffusion of nonsorbing tracers in the event of significant fracture flow. The term involving diffusion of tracer particles between the matrix and the fractures is not shown in Equations 8.3.5.12-1 and 8.3.5.12-2 because these equations are ground-water flow rather than transport equations. If diffusion is to be considered then the transport equations developed in Issue 1.1 would apply (Section 8.3.5.13).

For both the unsaturated and saturated zones, the confidence levels set for individual parameters reflect current judgments of their relative importance to ground-water travel time. If the mean values currently available (Chapters 1 through 3) for the parameters listed in Table 8.3.5.12-3 are good estimates of the true values, then those values are probably adequate to show

compliance with the performance goals set for this issue. In no instance is the current level of confidence high for any of the parameters listed.

The actual parameters requested are the first two statistical moments (mean and standard deviation) and the spatial correlation coefficients of each of the properties for each of the hydrogeologic units. Thus, the confidence levels assume nonstationarity and apply to confidence that the three-dimensional location-dependent mean, standard deviation, and spatial correlation within each unit are known to the indicated level of confidence. Generally, more samples are required to obtain higher confidence levels for, respectively, means, standard deviations, and spatial correlations of individual properties. This is particularly true for geologic materials where properties are commonly treated as regionalized variables (Matheron, 1971). Drift or trend surface analysis techniques will be applied to allow the assessment of spatial change in the statistical moments. This strategy of assigning confidence goals to statistical parameters of distinct properties varies somewhat from the general approach for issue resolution discussed in Section 8.2.2 wherein target goals are requested for the value of a property with specified confidence or within specified intervals. Given the nonunique combination of property values that will satisfy the performance goal and the potentially large contribution of spatial and statistical variability of properties to uncertainty in travel-time predictions (Codell, 1986; Sinnock et al., 1986), definition of the statistical characteristics of property distribution will more effectively and efficiently reduce uncertainties, at least for this issue, than specification of target values for the properties. Because spatial variability is a major source of uncertainty in predictions of ground-water travel time, it is prudent to characterize the spatially dependent statistical structure of the variables.

A large number of samples may need to be tested to obtain high confidence in some parameters over the entire repository site, particularly the spatial correlation. This is because the porous tuff formations are probably heterogeneous, with hydrogeologic properties varying in an irregular manner in space both horizontally and vertically. The heterogeneity can be characterized by the autocorrelation of the properties of interest as a function of spatial separation and by analysis in nonstationary populations. The autocorrelation superposed on the drift is referred to in the remainder of this section as spatial correlation. Different scales (sample separation differences) should be sampled reliably to assess the vertical and horizontal spatial structure of parameter statistics within each hydrogeologic unit. The scale over which a measurement averages flow parameters should be evaluated to estimate the proper hydraulic properties of the medium to use in modeling exercises. The laboratory and even field scales of property measurements are usually relatively small compared with the rock mass represented in numerical simulations. Modeling-scale properties of the fractured porous rock mass need to be developed, accounting for the uncertainty in both the fracture and matrix variability, by calibrating the modeling data with the actual measurements obtained from cores, in situ tests, and subsurface observations in the exploratory shaft. The effect of different scales on hydrologic property values will be investigated in Sections 8.3.1.2.2 and 8.3.1.4.3. Definition of the scale-dependency and spatial variability may require systematic, relatively dense sampling of the properties of interest (or their correlated surrogates).

To indicate the level of detail at which the information is required for resolution of this issue, a desired level of confidence, for example high, medium, or low, is indicated in Table 8.3.5.12-3. Because of the paucity of current information on hydrologic properties and characteristics, the requested levels of confidence are only qualitative. These qualitative levels relate to the width of the confidence interval for means and variances, with high indicating that the desired confidence interval for the value is smaller than the interval for a medium level of confidence. For spatial correlation, increasing confidence is taken to mean extending the spatial correlation coefficient (variogram) over a greater distance range, at a given level of confidence. Quantitative levels may be set as the hydrologic models are more completely defined and knowledge is improved about the effects of parameter distributions, interrelationships, and characteristics on uncertainty in ground-water travel time.

Confidence in means, standard deviations, and spatial correlations for less densely sampled parameters can be enhanced by defining the covariance coefficients between them and densely sampled parameters, within and between individual hydrogeologic units, and using the spatial distribution of the more densely sampled parameter to constrain the distribution of the other. To be most effective, this approach should rely on measurements of correlated parameters on a single physical sample. Therefore, design of a sampling and testing program should, to the extent practical, sequence measurements of different parameters on single samples.

Although little specific information is called out within Table 8.3.5.12-3 to define the conceptual hydrologic models, it is evident that definition of alternative conceptual hydrologic models and assessment of their relative likelihood for the unsaturated and saturated zones is an important requirement for evaluating ground-water travel times. Chapter 3 more explicitly addresses some of the sources of uncertainty about unsaturated-zone conceptual models, and these uncertainties are shared by this issue, including questions about coupling processes between matrix and fracture flow and about scaling laboratory and field measurements to a sufficiently large volume of rock for numerical modeling.

Hydrologic concepts and data needed to calculate ground-water travel times are provided by the site characterization programs 8.3.1.2 and 8.3.1.4. Calculation of the ground-water travel-time distribution will probably be made with versions of different calculational models. Calculational models are subject to refinement as conceptual understanding of flow in unsaturated and saturated, fractured porous tuff increases and as additional data are acquired from site characterization. The hydrologic parameters and confidence levels listed in this information need will probably be revised as the current versions of calculational models are refined.

No specific activities are defined for this information need. However, as more information about site data and geostatistical modeling becomes available, the data needs defined in this section will be continually reevaluated (Section 8.3.5.12.4.1.1).

8.3.5.12.1.1 Application of results

The information called for in this information need is a summary of data about site characteristics required to satisfy Issue 1.6. As such, satisfaction of this information need will provide the input parameters for modeling activities described under Information Needs 1.6.2 through 1.6.4.

8.3.5.12.2 Information Need 1.6.2: Calculational models to predict ground-water travel times between the disturbed zone and the accessible environment

Issue 1.6 addresses the performance objective that pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time along the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment shall be at least 1,000 yr. Direct measurements of ground-water travel time are not feasible because the time and distance scales are too great for direct observation. Resolution of the issue will be demonstrated primarily by using numerical models to make quantitative estimates of the distribution of ground-water travel time and by comparing these estimates to the performance goals. Models that describe the appropriate physical processes are needed for estimating the ground-water travel times. Several types of calculational models are required to provide tools for determining the pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time.

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

Currently available calculational models for ground-water travel time are alluded to in Section 3.9, and more comprehensively listed in Section 8.3.5.19. The conceptual basis for the current models and those that may be developed in the future is described in Section 3.9, and the basic mathematical formulations of current models is given in Information Need 1.6.1, Section 8.3.5.12.1.

Parameters

The following information must be available to select a set of calculational models for establishing ground-water travel time:

1. Site parameters described in Information Need 1.6.1 (Section 8.3.5.12.1) and listed in Table 8.3.5.12-3.

2. Conceptual models of water flow through the unsaturated and the saturated zones at the Yucca Mountain site. The conceptual models should consist of a description of the physical processes, including a definition of the limits of the processes, a listing of parameters believed to be relevant to the process, and a statement of the parameters that the model will predict.

3. A three-dimensional geometric model of the site parameters alluded to in item 1. This geometric model should be capable of associating

single values, multiple values, or variations of values for the hydrological and geochemical parameters with specific three-dimensional locations at the Yucca Mountain site.

Logic

The types of calculational models required depend upon the approaches used to resolve the ground-water travel-time performance objective, reflected in the technical basis described for resolving Information Needs 1.6.3 and 1.6.4 (Sections 8.3.5.12.3 and 8.3.5.12.4). A sufficient understanding of the flow behavior at Yucca Mountain, as well as interpretations of the available data, are needed to select an appropriate suite of models for resolving this issue. Once the physical processes of the flow system have been hypothesized (the issue resolution strategy, Section 8.3.5.12 and the geohydrology testing strategy, Section 8.3.1.2) and a proper set of variables (or data) has been identified (Section 8.3.5.12.1), mathematical and numerical models of the flow behavior can be formulated. Many alternative considerations are examined: What dimensionality and scale of modeling should be used? Can simplifying approximations to the physical processes be used? Should a homogeneous-parameter or heterogeneous-parameter model be used to quantify physical properties of discrete hydrogeologic units? What are the proper mathematical forms of the processes embodied by the models? What are the proper geometric and mathematical forms of boundary and initial conditions?

Ground water at the Yucca Mountain site flows through fractured porous tuff in both saturated and unsaturated conditions. Current conceptual models of Yucca Mountain postulate that flow takes place in matrix pores or in matrix pores in combination with fractures. The matrix porosity is made up of interconnected microscopic pores within tuff blocks bounded by fractures. The fracture porosity is made up of joints and fault zones. Indeed, the many fractures can be envisioned as homogeneous within the framework of continuum models at an appropriately large scale. Faults may serve as specific discontinuities, boundaries, zones of high permeability, etc., but they may be too few and too influential to justify a continuum approach. The different types of calculational models that may be used to simulate the flow through fractured, porous systems are discussed in the following paragraphs.

The equivalent porous medium type of model (Bear, 1972) is based on representative elemental volume concepts and on the assumption that any flow through fractures is Darcian. The equation of flow is described by the conservation of mass, including terms for advection, storage, dispersion, diffusion, and sinks and sources. The underlying assumption is that physical quantities such as porosity, conductivity, and pressure can be averaged over large blocks of rock containing a large number of fractures. There is no well-defined method for computing the equivalent porous medium parameters even if the fractures are completely described, although several models are being constructed to generate unsaturated porous-media properties from detailed structural and physical concepts. When available, these methods may be applied to the unsaturated zone. Equivalent porous medium models are generally taken to be the most realistic way of calculating regional scale and local scale (repository area) saturated ground-water flow. Thus, this type of model will be used for saturated flow simulations used to calculate

travel times. The parameters needed for this model are hydraulic conductivity, effective porosity, specific storage, the flux and head at the model boundary, and initial head conditions within the model area.

The double porosity type of model (Barenblatt et al., 1960) lumps all the matrix blocks into one continuum and all the fractures into another continuum and develops a coupling term between the two continua. The rock matrix continuum is commonly characterized by low permeability and high storage, while the fractured continuum is usually characterized by high permeability and low storage. Therefore, the rock matrix often controls the late time response of the system to pressure or stress transients, while the fractured continuum controls the early time response of the system. This system can be described by two mass conservation equations, one for each continuum. If flow is highly dominated by either matrix or fractures, the need for two continua is questionable and reasonable approximations can be obtained by a single equivalent porous medium approach. The parameters needed are the effective porosity, hydraulic conductivity, and the pressure for both matrix and fractured continua; the flux of water; and a coupling function representing the transfer of fluid between rock matrix and fractures, including, as appropriate, hysteric behavior of relative hydraulic conductivity and effects of mineral coatings on fracture-to-matrix conductivity. Physical parameters, such as porosity and permeability, associated with the fracture continuum are obtained from fracture properties such as aperture width, spacing, and orientation. This approach probably will not be used in the studies currently planned because of the current beliefs that flow in the unsaturated zone is predominantly constrained to the matrix pores and in the saturated zone to the fractures.

A special case of the double porosity model, called a composite medium model (Klavetter and Peters, 1986), can be derived by adding the two continuum equations, assuming the potential fields for the two systems (matrix and fractures) are in equilibrium. The validity of this fundamental assumption will be tested by the site characterization program for geohydrology (Program 8.3.1.2). Such superposition is practical in the representative elementary volume approach for saturated flow but has not been demonstrated to be applicable to unsaturated flow. As for the double porosity model, the composite medium model is only applicable under the steady or nonsteady conditions where both matrix pores and fractures are involved in the flow. This model will be provisionally accepted to describe unsaturated flow under transients that cause fracture flow. The parameters required for unsaturated conditions are the relative permeability and saturation as a function of pressure head, effective porosity, and initial conditions; all these parameters are required for both the matrix and fractures (Table 8.3.5.12-3). This type of model will be used primarily to investigate local behavior of fracture and matrix flow within and between units under variable flux conditions to help generate representative concepts, parameters, and flow paths for use in site scale models.

Another approach to investigating the relations between matrix and fracture flow involves discrete fracture models that treat fractures and discontinuities individually rather than as a continuum. The drawback to a discrete fracture model for site scale applications is the amount of detail that is required as input for a large number of fractures and the accompanying difficulties in modeling the discrete fractures throughout a large

volume. For small scales, an efficient approach can be applied by using statistical descriptions of fracture characteristics to generate synthetic fractures sets, then simulating the flow through the fractures and between the matrix blocks and the fractures (Long et al., 1982; Wang and Narasimhan, 1985, 1986). Microfractures, which are too numerous to simulate discretely, may be included within the hydraulic properties of the fracture or matrix continuum, as is true for any modeling approach accounting for dual porosity effects. This type of model will be used to augment a composite medium model to establish proper generalized parameters for use in simpler site-scale models. Of particular interest are the potential for channeling of fracture flow and other complications that may result in generalizing the characterization of the fractures.

The phenomena of flow in fractured porous tuff are complicated, especially in the unsaturated zone. In particular, the mathematically nonlinear description of permeability changes caused by saturation changes (flux transients) in the differential equations of flow become very difficult to solve, especially where material property contrasts occur between matrix blocks and fractures or across unit contacts. If the spatial variability of properties within units is considered, the difficulties of numerical convergence are increased many fold. To attempt to overcome some of these numerical difficulties, development of simplified models that avoid iterative, convergent solutions of the mass-balance differential equations will be pursued. Current ideas point toward direct kinematic or direct simulation models that calculate velocity, simply, as flux divided by moisture content, where flux is treated as an independent boundary condition. For example, the velocity of ground water in unsaturated flow may be approximated in one-dimensional analysis by dividing percolation flux by the moisture content in the matrix pores. If the flux is greater than the saturated hydraulic conductivity, the travel time is calculated from the velocity of flow through fractures (Sinnock et al., 1986). This, or similar simplified models, will be used to the extent it can be demonstrated as reliable or conservative for site-scale calculations of travel-time distributions. Currently, it is believed that there is a possibility of lateral diversion at some unit contacts or within single units. In this case, one-dimensional vertical flow may be an oversimplification and horizontal components might need to be accounted for in defining a set of one-dimensional flow lines. The computing efficiency associated with such one-dimensional kinematic models allows available computing power to be focused on resolution of the effects of spatial heterogeneity.

As currently planned, a stochastic type of model that generalizes flow processes while enhancing spatial resolution of property variations will serve as the primary site-scale model. Using this approach, ground-water travel time can be treated as a random variable rather than as a fixed quantity through any given distance (Codell, 1986). One source of the variability of ground-water travel time is caused by spatial heterogeneity of the parameters. Irreducible uncertainty about site characteristics with regard to spatial and temporal variabilities will always lead to uncertainty in ground-water travel time. To account for the spatial variability and uncertainty of parameters (e.g., hydraulic conductivity and effective porosity for both the matrix and fractures, and for initial and boundary conditions), many random realizations of the parameter sets will be used to estimate a travel-time probability distribution that reflects parameter

uncertainties that are themselves expressed as probability distributions. Such a procedure is known as a Monte Carlo simulation and will be applied to estimate the ground-water travel-time distributions for comparison with the travel-time goals set in Section 8.3.5.12. A preliminary application of this approach was used to generate the cumulative distribution functions for travel time (Sinnock et al., 1986) in Sections 3.9.4 and 8.3.5.12. A more direct stochastic method is to treat numerically the parameters and dependent variables of the governing equations as random processes rather than as deterministic quantities. The partial differential or kinematic equations describing flow are solved in terms of means and variances of the dependent variables. The direct stochastic method of modeling has been rapidly developing in recent years (Mantoglu and Gelhar, 1985; Yeh et al., 1985). A good estimate of input covariances of the hydrogeologic parameters is required for such stochastic modeling. If feasible, this direct stochastic approach may be used to supplement or supplant reliance on Monte Carlo simulations.

The proper application of each type of model is determined by its role in building confidence that the flow time can be adequately simulated and that uncertainty can be adequately accounted for. The level of complexity of the phenomena included in the model depends on the purpose for which the model is intended. A flow-system model will be developed to incorporate spatial variability, temporal variability, and uncertainty. Once a modeling concept has been developed to some level of sophistication, a period of evolution begins, wherein the important features of the model are retained and inconsequential features are eliminated. This occurs by comparing the results of simulations using various approaches, modifying the models to test the assumptions, calibrating and validating the models, performing sensitivity analyses and uncertainty analyses, and incorporating new data into the analyses. The correctness of results predicted by the model will be tested against analytical solutions of a similar model and against laboratory and field data. When discrepancies appear, the models may undergo modification and further modeling tests may be performed until a self-consistent model of the flow system is built.

In summary, the calculational models required to estimate ground-water travel times from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment include (1) local (small-scale) models for both the unsaturated zone and saturated ground-water flow to establish the proper processes to consider in the flow description at the site, (2) a travel-time model to determine ground-water travel time based on simplifications of the flow processes established by the local scale models, and (3) a statistical model to incorporate the uncertainty in the input information into the travel-time model and to provide a probabilistic estimate of ground-water travel time.

8.3.5.12.2.1 Activity 1.6.2.1: Model development

The objective of this activity is to develop calculational models for predicting pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time. Two subactivities are involved in this activity.

8.3.5.12.2.1.1 Subactivity 1.6.2.1.1: Development of a theoretical framework for calculational models

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to assess conceptual and mathematical representations of unsaturated flow phenomena in fractured porous media and adopt a set or sets of equations for use in calculating ground-water travel time.

Description

This subactivity will assess the concepts and hydrologic mechanisms governing fluid flow in partially saturated fractured porous tuff at Yucca Mountain. Section 8.3.1.2.2, under the geohydrology program, will describe the unsaturated zone hydrologic system at Yucca Mountain. This activity will work in conjunction with plans described in Section 8.3.1.2.2 to develop one or more mathematical representations of the hydrology at the site that are suitable for use in the calculation of ground-water travel time.

8.3.5.12.2.1.2 Subactivity 1.6.2.1.2: Development of calculational models

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to develop computer algorithms for calculational (numerical) models to estimate ground-water travel time.

Description

This subactivity will refine existing computer algorithms or develop new ones that embody (1) local flow models for investigating the mechanisms of flow in the unsaturated and saturated zones, (2) travel-time models for estimating ground-water travel time, and (3) statistical models for incorporating the uncertainty in a probabilistic manner. This subactivity will modify present calculational models by comparing them with other models incorporating different levels of sophistication, field test results from the geohydrology program about the conceptual assumptions within the models, and the results of sensitivity analyses. These calculational models will be developed in cooperation with related efforts in Section 8.3.1.2.2.

8.3.5.12.2.2 Activity 1.6.2.2: Verification and validation

The objective of this activity is code verification and model validation. Two subactivities are involved in this activity.

8.3.5.12.2.2.1 Subactivity 1.6.2.2.1: Verification of codes

Objectives

This subactivity will ensure that the computer algorithms making up the codes correctly perform the intended numerical operations.

Description

The numerical accuracy of the calculational models used in analysis of flow will be verified by tests including comparison to analytical solutions and benchmarking against other codes. Currently, the Yucca Mountain Project is participating in HYDROCOIN, an international effort to verify and support validation of computer codes to be used in assessments of environments related to nuclear waste disposal. The Yucca Mountain Project has also instituted a formal code verification activity, COVE, for all performance assessment codes used by the project. For more information, refer to Sections 8.3.5.19 and 8.3.5.20.

8.3.5.12.2.2.2 Subactivity 1.6.2.2.2: Validation of models

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to ensure that the conceptual models and their mathematical and numerical representations correctly account for the physical processes relevant to determining ground-water travel time.

Description

The correctness of theoretical and mathematical models in the simulation of flow phenomena relevant for assessing travel time will be addressed by model validation. The validation tests will involve, to the extent possible, comparisons of model predictions with laboratory experiments and field data or comparisons with other models already validated. The correctness of results predicted by a model will be tested against similar models (verification) and against appropriate laboratory and field data (validation). If discrepancies occur, the models may undergo modification and further verification and validation until the code predicts observed behavior with acceptable accuracy.

This subactivity will perform laboratory experiments that will provide direct observations of flow behavior in unsaturated media that can be compared with code predictions and used to support validation of mathematical models describing unsaturated fluid flow. Integrated sets of laboratory data will be obtained, and the hydrologic properties of the samples used in the validation experiments will be measured. This subactivity is divided into two separate parts. The first is responsible for designing and performing the validation experiments. The second is responsible for ensuring that the hydrologic property values required by the mathematical flow models have been determined for the samples used in the validation experiments.

Under the first part of this subactivity, laboratory hydrologic experiments will be designed and performed to support comparison of unsaturated flow models to laboratory observations. The computer codes in which those models are embodied and the factors involved in the general validation process are summarized in Section 8.3.5.19.

A primary effort within this subactivity will be to design hydrologic experiments that can be sufficiently controlled to produce integrated sets of data such that every relevant component of the model is addressed. Some experiments may address single components of the model, and others may address the composite response of the entire model. Although the time frame of the experiments generally will not be comparable to the time period desired for the application of the model, the loads imposed in the experiments will be as comparable to those expected in situ as possible, perhaps accounting for time and distance scaling factors. In general, the experiments will be designed to monitor water movement (either wetting or drying processes) in laboratory-scale samples under tightly controlled boundary conditions. Materials may range from tuff samples of various kinds to synthetic or natural materials such as sand. The main parameters to be measured will include pressure, saturation, boundary conditions of pressure, saturation, and temperature profiles, and time.

Two experiments have been designed at this time: One is an imbibition (wetting) experiment and the other is a drying experiment. Laboratory scoping experiments of both imbibition and drying processes have already been performed on a welded tuff sample of cylindrical geometry to develop the necessary instrumentation. In the imbibition experiment, a dry sample of cylindrical geometry will be placed within a core holder and pressure vessel. Pressure conditions will be monitored. One-dimensional water movement will be induced by initiating a constant water flux at one end. The transient saturation profile along the sample will be monitored using a (nonintrusive) gamma-beam attenuation technique. The experiment will be terminated after full saturation is reached. The sample will be tested initially under isothermal conditions.

The drying experiment will use the same sample and experimental apparatus used in the imbibition experiment. A dry gas stream will be passed over one or both ends of the saturated sample. The saturation along the sample will be monitored as a function of time as the sample dries out.

The purpose of the second part of this subactivity is to characterize the hydrologic properties of the samples used in the model validation experiments. The parameters determined will be those required by the unsaturated flow model to be validated. The general unsaturated flow model (e.g., Section 8.3.5.12.1, Equation 8.3.5.12-2) requires the following input parameters: hydraulic conductivity as a function of pressure head, saturation as a function of pressure head, and porosity. The first two parameters are often referred to as characteristic curves of the material. The curves should be determined under the same water movement process (either wetting or drying) as took place in the validation experiment.

This subactivity will cooperate with the work performed under Investigation 8.3.1.2.2 to characterize the hydrologic properties of the tested

samples. The results will be documented and supplied to the scientific and engineering property data base for use in the validation process.

Although no validation of models will occur under this subactivity, the experimental efforts will be closely coordinated with work described in Sections 8.3.5.13, 8.3.1.2, and 8.3.5.19 to ensure that appropriate and sufficient laboratory hydrologic experiments are performed to support model validation.

Methods and technical procedures

The methods and technical procedures for Subactivity 1.6.2.2.2. are given in the following table.

Method	Technical procedure		
	Number	Title	Date
Imbibition/drying characterization using gamma-beam attenuation	TBD[a]	Determination of fluid saturation in unsaturated consolidated porous material using gamma-beam attenuation	TBD
Other methods to be determined as required	TBD	The methods and procedures used will be those that are determined by the prototype testing within Activity 8.3.1.2.2.3.1. (matrix hydrologic properties testing) to be the most appropriate to measure property values for the desired parameters	TBD

[a]TBD = to be determined.

8.3.5.12.2.3 Application of results

The information provided by satisfaction of this information need will be used in Information Need 1.6.3 (description of ground-water flow paths) and Information Need 1.6.4 (calculation of pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time).

8.3.5.12.3 Information Need 1.6.3: Identification of the paths of likely radionuclide travel from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment and identification of the fastest path

Descriptions of flow paths in both the unsaturated and saturated zones are required to determine the pathways to be used in compliance with the 10 CFR 60.113(a)(2) requirement for assessing pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time along the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment. This information is used in Information Need 1.6.4 (Section 8.3.5.12.4). In addition, the flow paths, velocities, fluxes, boundary conditions, and initial conditions throughout the site will be developed as input to predict the cumulative curies transported to the accessible environment under normal conditions for Information Needs 1.1.4 and 1.1.5 (Sections 8.3.5.13.4 and 8.3.5.13.5).

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

Current information on flow paths at the Yucca Mountain site is discussed in Chapter 3 and Section 8.3.1.2.

Parameters

The results obtained from Information Need 1.6.2 (calculational models) together with a hydrogeologic model of the Yucca Mountain ground-water flow system are needed to satisfy this information need.

Logic

Compliance with the 10 CFR 60.113(a)(2) ground-water travel-time performance objective requires (1) characterizing the pre-waste-emplacement environment and its potential spatial and short-term temporal variabilities, (2) determining flow paths in the flow domain, and (3) identifying the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel.

Paths of likely radionuclide travel will be identified in two ways. First, the information regarding the site will be evaluated directly. This evaluation will involve examination of what is known about the features of the site. The properties and behavior of these features will be evaluated with regard to the likelihood of radionuclide travel. For example, transport and flow characteristics of the fractures near the Ghost Dance fault will be evaluated. Similarly, the likelihood for lateral diversion of the flow and the transport of radionuclides at contacts of the hydrogeologic units will be evaluated.

Secondly, pathways for likely radionuclide travel will be identified by numerical modeling of the ground-water flow. A distribution of ground-water travel times will be determined for the entire site taking into account the uncertainties in hydrologic properties, the reasonable models of water movement (i.e., matrix versus fracture flow) and ranges of boundary and initial conditions that are plausible. The pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time will be determined for each of the paths of likely radionuclide travel. In each case, the variation and uncertainty in values of hydraulic properties

will be taken into account in evaluating the ground-water travel time. These analyses will result in probability distributions of travel times for each of the various pathways. These distributions, or their means, can be compared to determine which one or ones are the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel.

Currently, travel-time distributions have been estimated only by simplified one-dimensional modeling (Sinnock et al., 1986). The simplifying one-dimensional assumptions will be modified to account for the dependence between outflow locations, travel times, and quantities. Such dependence and interaction are likely to occur in the actual multidimensional flow system. Therefore, analyses that either directly or indirectly account for two-dimensional or three-dimensional flow will be used to incorporate the uncertainty in identifying flow path correlations in the predicted travel times with such features of the site as fault zones, or area of similar thicknesses of hydrogeologic units, or strong spatial correlation of properties in localized regions of the site. For example, the probability distribution for the site may display multimodality that can be identified with geometrically and geographically distinct site features. Even without obvious modality in the probability distribution associated with distinct site features, geometric and geographic characteristics and locations of the most rapid flow time can be identified using standard statistical techniques.

A general conceptual model of flow in the unsaturated zone was presented in Section 3.9. This general conceptual model is flexible enough to accommodate various alternative hypotheses that are based on current understanding of the hydrogeologic characteristics at the site. Each of the alternative hypotheses may produce different likely paths for radionuclide travel.

Data collected under the geohydrology program (Section 8.3.1.2) will be used to quantify ground-water flow characteristics and uncertainties along the possible flow paths. As additional data are collected, the number of alternative conceptual models necessary to consider will decrease. Numerical modeling based on alternative conceptual models will provide quantitative predictions of flow fields and pathways. These models will evolve as new data become available during the characterization process. Using one or more models of the hydrology of the unsaturated and saturated zones at Yucca Mountain, the range of likely flow paths will be determined. Because current concepts include the possibility of lateral diversion of flow in the unsaturated zone, determination of flow paths in the unsaturated zone will entail two-dimensional calculations. The definition of flow paths will be coordinated with activities under the geohydrology program (Section 8.3.1.2).

If the accepted definition of a fastest path of likely radionuclide travel incorporates flow from the entire disturbed zone boundary, then the fastest paths will be identified as those originating at that boundary, and the vitric Calico Hills unit will be a primary barrier. If the geometric location of the fastest path can be defined, the facility location could be changed, if necessary, to ensure adequate thickness of specific hydrogeologic units to provide high confidence of 1,000-yr travel times.

8.3.5.12.3.1 Activity 1.6.3.1: Analysis of unsaturated flow system

The objective of this activity is to determine which flow paths or sets of flow paths of likely radionuclide travel in the unsaturated zone will be used in ground-water travel time calculations.

8.3.5.12.3.1.1 Subactivity 1.6.3.1.1: Unsaturated zone flow analysis

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to determine pre-waste-emplacement unsaturated flow paths from the disturbed zone to the water table. This description of flow paths will be performed in conjunction with Activity 8.3.1.2.2.9.5. The fastest path of likely radionuclide travel through the unsaturated zone will be identified.

Description

Concepts of the behavior of fluid flow in fractured, unsaturated tuff media will be used in conjunction with Study 8.3.1.2.2.9 to develop and apply two-dimensional numerical models of unsaturated flow. Flow paths in the unsaturated zone will be simulated. Likely paths of radionuclide travel will be identified.

8.3.5.12.3.1.2 Subactivity 1.6.3.1.2: Saturated zone flow analysis

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to determine which flow paths or set of paths of likely radionuclide travel in the saturated zone will be used in ground-water travel time calculations.

Description

The local region around Yucca Mountain will be modeled in conjunction with studies described in Section 8.3.1.2.3 by two-dimensional finite-element analysis to support the ground-water travel-time calculations. The two-dimensional models will be evaluated for applicability to the travel-time determination. If necessary to reach the necessary confidence in travel-time predictions, a two-dimensional model of a single layer will be developed. A three-dimensional or quasi-three-dimensional modeling approach would be developed only if two-dimension models are shown to be inadequate. The head field will be predicted based on a set of conductivity values, and boundary head values will be interpreted from the regional model developed under Section 8.3.1.2.3.3. The finite-element mesh will be drawn to follow known or suspected geologic features that may influence fluid flow. Flow paths will be simulated in the saturated zone. This activity will be coordinated with the saturated zone modeling performed in Section 8.3.1.2.3.3.3. Part of this activity will entail defining the boundary of the accessible environment based on the direction of ground-water flow in the saturated zone.

8.3.5.12.3.2 Application of results

The information provided for the satisfaction of this information need will be used in the following areas:

1. Input to Information Need 1.6.4 (Section 8.3.5.12.4) to determine pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time.

2. Input to Information Needs 1.1.4 and 1.1.5 (Sections 8.3.5.13.4 and 8.3.5.13.5) to use in prediction of radionuclide transport to the accessible environment under nominal conditions.

3. Input to Information Need 1.6.5 (Section 8.3.5.12.5) to use in the definition of the disturbed zone.

8.3.5.12.4 Information Need 1.6.4: Determination of the pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time along the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

Chapter 3 provides information on current estimates of ground-water travel time.

Parameters

This information need is a rollup of the previous information needs under this issue. Therefore, the output from these information needs will be used as the basis for determining the pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time.

Logic

The determination of the pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time should account for spatial and temporal variabilities and uncertainties in the data and models. The difficulty of quantifying uncertainty in the performance measure for the ground-water travel-time objective is recognized by the NRC (Codell, 1986). As yet, the NRC has not indicated the specific basis under which a ground-water travel-time modeling approach would be judged adequate in accounting for such uncertainty.

The uncertainty in ground-water travel time is associated with uncertainties in both conceptual models and measurement of hydrologic properties. Ground-water travel time is considered a function of several specially distributed hydrologic properties such as effective porosity and permeability. These properties are spatially distributed in a heterogeneous fashion. The heterogeneity is characterized by a length scale that approximately expresses the spatial correlation of hydrologic properties. Uncertainty will always exist about the representative values for effective

porosities, hydraulic conductivities, and moisture contents of the various rock units at Yucca Mountain, particularly in unsampled regions. Conservative assumptions will be adopted to compensate for the inherent uncertainty in the data and models. Means and variances of the parameter values can be estimated and used with a Monte Carlo approach to account for the uncertainty caused by heterogeneity. If spatially varying parameters (represented by a covariance matrix) can be estimated, then stochastic models or conditional simulations will be applied. Statistical estimates of parameter values from results of well-designed drilling, sampling, and testing programs in conjunction with defensible conceptual models based on appropriate field tests will provide a quantified ground-water travel-time distribution function that incorporates most, if not all, sources of uncertainty.

Ground-water travel-time values are, of course, highly dependent upon the conceptual hydrologic models (to be determined within Section 8.3.1.2) for both the unsaturated and saturated zones. The conceptual hydrologic models are the bases for the formulation of the mathematical models to be used in predicting future hydrologic behavior of the site. In the calculation of the ground-water travel-time distribution function required for resolution of this issue, uncertainties in the conceptual model will be addressed. The uncertainties to be addressed include variations in the possible modes of water movement (i.e., matrix versus fracture flow), the hydrologic initial and boundary conditions, and the hydrologic property values and their intercorrelation. These uncertainties will be investigated within this issue and the geohydrology program (Section 8.3.1.2).

8.3.5.12.4.1 Activity 1.6.4.1: Calculation of pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time

The objective of this activity is to define performance measures and perform related analyses of pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time. This activity includes two subactivities.

8.3.5.12.4.1.1 Subactivity 1.6.4.1.1: Performance allocation for Issue 1.6

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to continually evaluate and, if necessary, update performance allocation for Issue 1.6.

Description

Analyses will be conducted to calculate quantitative estimates of ground-water travel time. The predicted values can be compared directly with the performance goals defined for issue resolution. The strategy for issue resolution outlined in Section 8.3.5.12 will be updated if necessary.

8.3.5.12.4.1.2 Subactivity 1.6.4.1.2: Sensitivity and uncertainty analyses of ground-water travel time

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to determine the sensitivity and uncertainty of ground-water travel time.

Description

Sensitivity analyses will be performed to determine how the ground-water travel time changes as a function of changes in input parameters and conceptual models. Complementary uncertainty analyses will be done to determine how much confidence may be placed in a predicted output parameter based on uncertainties in input parameters.

8.3.5.12.4.1.3 Subactivity 1.6.4.1.3: Determination of the pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to determine pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time at the Yucca Mountain site for comparison with the performance objective in 10 CFR 60.113(a)(2).

Description

Pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time will be calculated along the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel. The present planning basis is to calculate ground-water travel times in accordance with the description given in the logic section for this information need, and within the context of the uncertainties that result from the absence of an approved definition and approach for determining the "fastest path of likely radionuclide travel."

8.3.5.12.4.2 Application of results

The information will be used in determining if the pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time meets the 1,000-yr flow time requirement of 10 CFR 60.113(a)(2) in the environmental impact statement and safety analysis report.

8.3.5.12.5 Information Need 1.6.5: Boundary of the disturbed zone

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

Chapters 6 and 7 provide design data for current estimates of the disturbed zone. Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 4 provide information on site characteristics that might change after repository development.

Logic

This information need deals with determining the boundary of the disturbed zone. Because the location of the boundary of the disturbed zone depends on repository-induced changes in physical or chemical properties that may have a significant effect on the performance of the geologic repository, it is different from the remainder of the information needs under this issue which deal only with pre-waste-emplacement conditions.

In 10 CFR Part 60.2, the NRC defines the disturbed zone as "the portion of the controlled area the physical or chemical properties of which have changed as a result of underground facility construction or as a result of heat generated by the emplaced radioactive wastes such that the resultant change of properties may have a significant effect on the performance of the geologic repository." The definition poses two questions:

1. What physical or chemical changes can have a significant effect on the repository's performance?

2. What constitutes a significant effect on the repository's performance?

The NRC staff addressed these questions in a draft generic technical position (GTP): "Interpretation and Identification of the Disturbed Zone in the High Level Waste Rule; 10 CFR Part 60" (NRC, 1986b). The NRC staff proposed that the disturbed zone be defined "by the zone of significant changes in intrinsic permeability and effective porosity caused by construction of the facility or by the thermal effects of the emplaced waste." This position presumes that permeability and porosity changes are appropriate surrogates for changes in performance. The NRC staff further considers "that the pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time will still be an appropriate measure of the overall geologic setting performance for the purpose of licensing." In an earlier version of the draft GTP (April 1985, page 8), the NRC staff explained what constitutes a significant change in intrinsic permeability and effective porosity; "the meaning of 'significant' in this context is considered to be about a factor of two change in effective porosity, which would generally correspond to about an order of magnitude change in intrinsic permeability." Coupling the NRC definition with the NRC staff's guidance, the Yucca Mountain Project will determine the size of the disturbed zone in the following manner:

1. The likely paths of ground-water travel in the pre-waste-emplacement environment will be identified (Information Need 1.6.3, Section 8.3.5.12.3).

2. Ground-water travel time along these paths will be taken as a primary indicator of performance, as related to the definition of the boundary of the disturbed zone. Because of the general importance of effective porosity and intrinsic permeability in calculating travel times, changes in these two properties along the paths (probably confined to the matrix, not the fractures) will be taken as measures used to define the boundary of the disturbed zone.

3. Repository-induced changes to effective porosity and intrinsic permeability will be determined along the identified likely paths of ground-water travel. Because the likely paths are presently expected to be matrix-dominated and vertically downward in the unsaturated zone, only the matrix properties will be considered at this time. The disturbed zone is presumed to be contained entirely within the unsaturated zone. The point(s) along the paths where effective matrix porosity would decrease more than two times relative to the pre-waste-emplacement conditions or matrix permeability would decrease by a factor of 10 times will mark the outer boundary of the disturbed zone.

As more information becomes available regarding possibilities of fracture flow, lateral ground-water flow and paths of likely ground-water travel (Sections 8.3.1.2.2 and 8.3.1.2.3), the present basis for defining the boundary of the disturbed zone will be reevaluated. If site information indicates that the likely path is one of fracture-dominated flow, changes in intrinsic fracture properties rather than intrinsic matrix hydrologic properties will be used to determine the boundary of the disturbed zone.

Several of the hydrogeologic units within the unsaturated zone may be considered in calculations that investigate how the repository changes the ground-water flow field. Properties and conditions in some of these units, particularly those more than 50 to 100 m from the waste, will probably be needed only to provide accurate boundary conditions for analyses. Only the unsaturated Topopah Spring, the unsaturated Calico Hills vitric, and the unsaturated Calico Hills zeolitic units have performance measures and goals associated with delineation of the disturbed zone boundary. The present concepts of ground-water flow and design of the repository suggest that the boundary of the disturbed zone probably will be contained within the Topopah Spring welded unit. The unsaturated Calico Hills vitric unit and Calico Hills zeolitic unit are assigned goals because future design changes could increase the areal power density of the repository enough to cause significant property changes in them, particularly temperature-induced mineral alterations. In determining an approach to fulfilling this information need, the following guidance from the most recent NRC draft technical position paper (NRC, 1986b) was considered:

> A disturbed zone of five diameters for circular openings, 5 opening heights for noncircular openings, or 50 meters, whichever is largest, from any underground opening, excluding surface shafts and boreholes, may be the minimum appropriate distance for use in

calculations of compliance with the pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel-time criterion.

The reference design for the Yucca Mountain repository calls for underground openings approximately 25 ft (8 m) wide and 22 ft (7 m) high (Chapter 6). Five times the maximum dimension is 40 m and is less than 50 m, therefore, by the NRC staff guidance, the disturbed zone should have a minimum value of 50 m.

Using this guidance and the expectation that significant effects on the performance of the repository will be caused by changes in the hydrologic properties within the Topopah Spring welded unit, site-specific information will determine the extent of the disturbed zone. For convenience in determining what this information should be, the following discussion uses the performance allocation terms (performance measures and goals) developed for the issue resolution strategy (Section 8.2). The performance goals assigned in this discussion, if met, will ensure that the disturbed zone is less than, and perhaps much less than, 50 m in extent.

Some differences exist between the Yucca Mountain Project and the NRC draft GTP in the approach used to define the boundary of the disturbed zone. The GTP states that the disturbed zone is "the zone of significant changes in intrinsic permeability and effective porosity" where "significant changes" was suggested to be about a factor of two change in effective porosity or an order of magnitude change in permeability. 10 CFR 60.2 states that the disturbed zone is "that portion of the controlled area the physical or chemical properties of which have changed...such that the resultant change of properties may have a significant effect on the performance of the geologic repository." The Yucca Mountain Project believes 10 CFR Part 60 offers the opportunity for a more realistic and flexible approach to defining the disturbed zone. The guidance in the GTP infers that changes in the intrinsic permeability of the rock mass are appropriate surrogates for one quantity, ground-water travel time, which itself is an appropriate surrogate for total repository performance. In the unsaturated zone, there will probably not be such a direct correspondence between the intrinsic permeability of the rock mass and ground-water travel time. An order-of-magnitude change in permeability or a factor-of-two change in porosity of either the matrix or fractures will probably cause less than an order-of-magnitude change in the ground-water travel time. The definition for a significant change in intrinsic hydrologic properties may be different for the Yucca Mountain site.

The GTP suggests a minimum distance of 50 m for the disturbed zone boundary based largely upon considerations of stress redistribution around openings. The GTP states that the no-stress-change contour (at which presumably changes in permeability will be eliminated) could be conservatively estimated to be about five times the opening height for noncircular openings or five times the diameter for circular openings. Using 10 m as the appropriate length, a value of 50 m was obtained. However, the Yucca Mountain Project believes that the distance to a contour of minimal changes in permeability is more likely to be two to three diameters (Rautman et al., 1987). This could place the boundary of the disturbed zone at much less than 50 m.

Because the Yucca Mountain Project considers the boundary of the disturbed zone to be at a distance dictated by effects on the performance of the repository, that boundary may be significantly less than the 50-m boundary suggested by the NRC GTP. Ground-water travel time is acknowledged by the DOE as strongly associated with the overall performance of the repository. Effective porosity and permeability are tentatively accepted as reasonable surrogates for ground-water travel time. For this reason, all performance measures for this information need are related to induced changes in matrix permeability and effective porosity. The changes in matrix properties are of primary concern because the movement of water is currently thought to be primarily through the tuff matrix.

Table 8.3.5.12-4 lists the processes of concern in defining the boundary of the disturbed zone; they are processes that could, in principle, change the intrinsic hydrologic properties of the rock. The processes listed in the table are based on the NRC draft technical position paper, which suggested the following processes be considered in determining the boundary of the disturbed zone: (1) stress redistribution, (2) construction and excavation, (3) thermomechanical processes, and (4) thermochemical processes. The first three of these processes could change the permeability of the matrix. Because ground-water flow is expected to be dominantly through the matrix, stress redistribution, which primarily affects fracture hydrologic properties, is not expected to affect the location of the disturbed zone boundary. "Fracture activation caused by mining and heating," is listed in Table 8.3.5.12-4 to represent the first three processes. The fourth process, thermochemical processes, is addressed by the remaining four entries in the table, one for each of the hydrogeological units that are within about 100 m of the repository horizon.

Matrix porosity and permeability are listed explicitly as performance measures only for the Topopah Spring welded unit because it is the only unit along the expected path of ground-water flow from the repository to the water table in which it is thought there could be significant changes in hydrologic properties. Until "significant change" in matrix porosity and permeability is defined for the Yucca Mountain site, the disturbed zone will be approximated by the extent of (1) increases in matrix permeability of more than an order of magnitude and (2) decreases in matrix porosity of more than a factor of 2.

A temperature limit is used as a performance measure for the remainder of the units. The associated performance goal of 115°C was set to limit mineral alteration and dehydration. This goal is indirectly related to changes in intrinsic porosity and permeability. At this time, this goal is also expected to limit the changes in intrinsic hydrologic properties to values no greater than those used as a performance goal for the Topopah Spring welded unit. This assumption will be tested as part of the geochemistry program described in Section 8.3.1.3.

Because the definition of the disturbed zone is not governed by any direct numerical regulatory criteria, and because it is expected that the ability to show compliance with the 1,000-yr ground-water travel-time performance criterion will not be very sensitive to the quantitative definition of the disturbed zone boundary (Issue 1.6), the confidence level for each performance goal in Table 8.3.5.12-4 is set qualitatively as "medium."

Table 8.3.5.12-4. Summary of performance allocation for defining the boundary of the disturbed zone

Hydrologic unit	Process concern	Performance measure	Performance goal	Needed confidence[a]	Approach
Topopah Spring welded unit	Thermomechanical processes: fracture activation caused by mining and heating	Boundary of repository induced changes in effective fracture porosity	Less than a factor of 2 increase in fracture aperture along flow path 50 m from the underground facilities boundary if predominately fracture flow	Medium	Studies are not presently planned because flow is expected to be predominately in the matrix
	Thermochemical processes: alteration within the portion of the Topopah Spring that is considered to be the repository horizon	Boundary of repository induced changes in effective matrix porosity and matrix permeability	Less than a factor of 2 decrease in effective porosity or less than an order of magnitude increase in permeability along the flow path to the accessible environment	Medium	Studies will be completed to determine if mineral alteration can cause factor of 2 decreases in effective porosity or order of magnitudes increases in permeability
Calico Hills nonwelded zeolitic unit	Zeolite alteration below the repository horizon	Temperature	<115°C	Medium	At the temperatures listed as goals, minimal property changes as a result of mineral alteration are expected. Studies will be completed at these temperatures to test the position that there will be minimal changes in rock properties
Calico Hills nonwelded vitric unit	Glass alteration below the repository horizon	Temperature	<115°C	Medium	
Altered vitrophyre below the Topopah Spring welded unit	Clay alteration below the repository horizon	Temperature	<115°C	Medium	

[a]Medium equals a value corresponding to one standard deviation on the most deleterious side of a probability distribution function of the performance measure.

Parameters

The information required to address Information Need 1.6.5 is listed in Table 8.3.5.12-5. These information items are required under the assumption of matrix-dominated flow. If this assumption is shown to be invalid, the current strategy will be modified and additional fracture flow characteristics may be required. However, those additional parameters are already called for by Information Need 1.6.1 (Section 8.3.5.12.1) and it is believed that no testing would be required by this information need.

The following steps will be used to define and provide supporting evidence for the boundary of the disturbed zone:

Step 1. Obtain information on the likely ground-water flow path and mode of travel from the repository to the water table environment before waste emplacement. Determine the values of intrinsic matrix permeability and effective matrix porosity along this path. If continuous fracture flow becomes the likely ground-water flow path, reevaluate the present strategy used to determine the boundary of the disturbed zone. The locations of the likely ground-water flow paths and modes of flow from the repository to the water table are needed to make this decision.

Step 2. Obtain predictions of matrix hydrologic-porosity changes (porosity and permeability) under expected repository conditions. Matrix porosity and permeability changes as a result of geochemical alteration are needed to complete this step.

Step 3. Evaluate the extent and duration of repository-induced changes along the flow path of interest by performing thermohydrologic analyses using data that bound the expected site characteristics (i.e., include the repository-induced changes in site characteristics).

Step 4. Determine quantitatively what would be considered a significant change in the intrinsic hydrologic properties by considering how the ground-water travel time before repository construction and waste emplacement compares with what could be expected after repository construction and waste emplacement in the portion of the rock that has been changed. The original range and mean of the matrix hydrologic properties will also be considered in determining a quantitative value for a significant change in hydrologic properties. The results of step 3 will be needed to complete this step.

Step 5. Review the repository-induced changes in ground-water flow to determine whether there are other repository-induced changes identified in step 3 that could significantly change the ground-water travel time from the repository to the accessible environment. Evaluate whether a new strategy for determining the boundary of the disturbed zone should be initiated.

Table 8.3.5.12-5. Parameter needs for defining the disturbed zone

Item number	Information item description
1	Location of the likely ground-water flow path and mode of flow from the repository to the water table
2	Predicted average travel time and bounds on the travel time along the fastest unperturbed path from the repository location to the accessible environment
3	Reference underground facility designs (including borehole spacing and spacing waste canisters within the emplacement holes)
4	Thermal decay characteristics of the waste package
5	In situ temperature conditions
6	Bulk density
7	Altitude of the hydrogeologic unit contacts
8	Location and displacements of faults within approximately 0.5 km of the outer repository boundary
9	Altitude of the water table
10	Location of any perched-water zones
11	Thermal properties of the rock as a function of saturation (including thermal conductivity and heat capacity) thermal expansion
12	Saturation (and moisture content) values as a function of depth and lateral spatial location
13	Pressure head values as a function of depth and lateral spatial location
14	Thermohydrologic response of test under nonisothermal test conditions
15	Fracture and matrix saturated permeability
16	Relative permeability for the fracture network and matrix as a function of temperature

Table 8.3.5.12-5. Parameter needs for defining the disturbed zone (continued)

Item number	Information item description
17	Gas relative conductivity for the fracture network and matrix as a function of temperature
18	Moisture retention curves for wetting and draining
19	Effective porosity and porosity of the fracture network, fault zones, rock mass, and matrix
20	Changes in porosity and permeability of matrix due to construction and heat from waste emplacement
21	Ground-water percolation flux at the top of TSw2 (portion of Topopah Spring welded unit proposed for repository unit)

Step 6. If necessary, revise the preliminary estimate of the boundary of the disturbed zone using the new predictions of matrix hydrologic property changes and the quantitative definition of significant property changes determined in Step 4.

8.3.5.12.5.1 Activity 1.6.5.1: Ground-water travel time after repository construction and waste emplacement

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to predict the ground-water travel time to the water table using the hydrologic properties changed as a result of repository construction and waste emplacement for comparing pre- and postemplacement travel times to establish the extent of the disturbed zone.

Description

Using a combination of (1) a two-phase, nonisothermal flow code with the region of significant temperature changes and (2) an unsaturated isothermal code outside that region with boundary conditions determined from a thermal-conduction calculation, the movement of gas and liquid along with the temperature distribution in the near-field region as a function of time will be predicted. The following information will be used to help determine the geometry and boundary conditions for the problem: (1) reference underground facility designs, (2) distribution of rock properties, (3) temperature at the water table and the surface, (4) geothermal gradient, (5) location of the

ater table, and (6) initial pressure head and saturation conditions. The ollowing information will be used as input for the calculations: (1) ini- ial pressure head and saturation conditions, (2) hydrologic properties of he rock units before and after repository construction and waste emplacement items 16 through 21 from the parameter list), (3) thermal properties of the ock units (the Topopah Spring as well as surrounding rock units), (4) bulk ensity, (5) hydrologic and thermomechanical unit contacts, and (6) location f perched-water zones.

3.5.12.5.2 Activity 1.6.5.2: Definition of the disturbed zone

bjectives

The objective of the activity is to reevaluate the definition of the sturbed zone.

escription

This activity will reevaluate and, if necessary, refine the boundary of he disturbed zone using the following information: (1) preliminary defini- ion of the boundary of the disturbed zone, (2) the NRC guidance, (3) the verage and fastest likely path of a nonsorbing radionuclide, (4) predicted ounds on the travel time along the average and fastest unperturbed path from he repository location to the accessible environment, and (5) changes in ydrologic rock characteristics that are significant. Although this activity s identified only once, it may be a recurring one. The possibility of ecurrence depends on changes in NRC guidance and the understanding of the anges in properties caused by the repository.

.5.12.5.3 Application of results

The resolution of Issue 1.6 will use the boundary of the disturbed zone.

.5.12.6 Schedule for ground-water travel time (Issue 1.11)

Issue 1.6 (ground-water travel time) includes five information needs, ich contain six performance assessment activities. The schedule infor- tion for these performance assessment activities is summarized in Figure 3.5.12-9. This figure includes the performance assessment activity number ic a brief description, as well as major events associated with each tivity. A major event, for purposes of these schedules, may represent the iiiation or completion of an activity, completion or submittal of a report t he DOE, an important data feed, or a decision point. Solid lines on the sh dule represent activity durations and dashed lines show interfaces among at vities as well as data transferred into or out of this performance as ssment issue. The events shown on the schedule and their planned dates ompletion are provided in Table 8.3.5.12-6.



Figure 8.3.5.12-9. Schedule information for Issue 1.12 (ground- water travel time). See Table 8.3.5.9-6 for description of major events. This network is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE, 1988a) schedule. Revisions will be published in semiannual site characterization progress reports as new information becomes available.

Table 8.3.5.12-6. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 1.6 (ground-water travel time) (page 1 of 4)

Performance assessment activity/ information need number	Brief description of performance assessment activity/ information need	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.6.2.1	Development of calculational models to predict ground-water travel time (GWTT)	A	Information on conceptual and numerical models of flow and transport in unsaturated and partially saturated tuff available for GWTT calculations	10/89
		B	Update of conceptual and numerical models of flow and transport available for updating GWTT calculations	5/91
		C	Complete code development	8/93
1.6.2.2	Verification and validation of calculation models	A	Draft report available to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) on Cove 3 benchmarking	12/88
		B	Draft report available to DOE on the results of preliminary lab studies for validation of the unsaturated zone flow model	2/89
		C	Draft report available to DOE on the specific strategy for validating non-isothermal performance assessment codes	2/89
		D	Information supporting validation of flow and transport models available for GWTT calculations	10/89

Table 8.3.5.12-6. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 1.6 (ground-water travel time) (page 2 of 4)

Performance assessment activity/ information need number	Brief description of performance assessment activity/ information need	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.6.2.2	Verification and validation of calculation models (continued)	E	Updated information from lab studies for validation of flow and transport models available for updating GWTT calculations	5/91
		F	Begin final update/validation of non-isothermal flow models	1/93
		G	Complete certification of computer codes for the calculation of GWTT	7/93
		H	Final information on the validation and verification of models available for final update of GWTT calculations	1/94
1.6.3	Identification of fastest paths of likely radio-nuclide travel	A	Information on initial analysis of flow paths available for GWTT calculations	2/89
		B	Update of flow path analysis available for updating GWTT calculations	5/91
		C	Final results of flow path analysis available for final update of GWTT calculations	1/94
1.6.4.1	Calculation of pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time	A	Draft report available to DOE on the ranges of potential GWTT based on current data	1/90

Table 8.3.5.12-6. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 1.6 (ground-water travel time) (page 3 of 4)

Performance assessment activity/ information need number	Brief description of performance assessment activity/ information need	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.6.4.1	Calculation of pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time	B	Draft report available to DOE on the ranges of GWTT based on interim site characterization data	7/91
		C	Draft report available to DOE on pre-waste-emplacement GWTT to support the draft environmental impact statement (EIS)	7/92
		D	Complete updating calculations of pre-waste-emplacement GWTT for final EIS and license application	9/93
		E	Final report on GWTT calculations available to DOE	7/94
1.6.5.1	Ground-water travel time after repository construction and waste emplacement	A	Complete development of the approach for calculating post-emplacement GWTT	10/88
		B	Complete calculation of post-emplacement GWTT using available site data	2/91
		C	Complete update of post-emplacement GWTT calculations	2/92
		D	Final report on post-emplacement GWTT and definition of the disturbed zone available to DOE	3/94

Table 8.3.5.12-6. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 1.6 (ground-water travel time) (page 4 of 4)

Performance assessment activity/ information need number	Brief description of performance assessment activity/ information need	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.6.5.2	Definition of the disturbed zone	A	Preliminary definition of disturbed zone available for GWTT calculations	11/89
		B	Updated definition of the disturbed zone available for GWTT calculations	5/91
		C	Draft report available to DOE on the effects of near-field changes on the disturbed zone definition	5/92

[a]The letters in this column key major events shwon in Figure 8.3.5.12-9.

The activity-level schedules, in combination with information provided in the logic diagram for this issue (Figure 8.3.5.12-8), are intended to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the relationships between major elements of the site, performance, and design programs. The information provided in Table 8.3.5.12-6 and Figure 8.3.5.12-9, however, should be viewed as a snapshot in time.

The overall program schedule presented here is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE, 1988a). The site characterization program will undergo a series of refinements following issuance of the statutory SCP. Refinements will consider factors both internal and external to the site characterization program, such as changes to the quality assurance program. Such refinements are to be considered in ongoing planning efforts, and changes that are implemented will be reflected in the semiannual progress reports. Summary schedule information for this and other postclosure performance assessment issues can be found in Sections 8.5.2.2 and 8.5.6.

DOE/RW-0199

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.13, Total System Performance

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.13 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.1: Will the mined geologic disposal system meet the system performance objective for limiting radionuclide releases to the accessible environment as required by 10 CFR 60.112 and 40 CFR 191.13?

Regulatory basis for the issue

The regulation that governs this issue is given in Section 60.112 of 10 CFR Part 60. This regulation implements the containment requirements of 40 CFR 191.13(a):

> Disposal systems for spent nuclear fuel or high-level or transuranic wastes shall be designed to provide a reasonable expectation, based upon performance assessments, that the cumulative releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment for 10,000 years after disposal from all significant processes and events that may affect the disposal system shall:
>
> (1) Have a likelihood of less than one chance in 10 of exceeding the quantities calculated according to Table 1 (Appendix A); and
>
> (2) Have a likelihood of less than one chance in 1,000 of exceeding ten times the quantities calculated according to Table 1 (Appendix A).

Appendix A of 40 CFR Part 191 gives, in table form, the radionuclide release limits that will be used to make the calculations referred to above. These limits, expressed as curies (Ci) per 1,000 MTHM, are the release limits for each radionuclide to be used in calculating the normalized release to the accessible environment per Appendix A, 40 CFR Part 191 and are as follows:

Americium-241 or 243	100
Carbon-14	100
Cesium-135 or 137	1,000
Iodine-129	100
Neptunium-237	100
Plutonium-238, 239, 240, or 242	100
Radium-226	100
Strontium-90	1,000
Technetium-99	10,000
Thorium-230 or 232	10
Tin-126	1,000
Uranium-233, 234, 235, 236, or 238	100
Any other alpha-emitting radionuclide with a half-life greater than 20 years	100
Any other radionuclide with a half-life greater than 20 years that does not emit alpha particles	1,000

Note that these limits do not represent the maximum allowable cumulative release of these radionuclides when more than one radionuclide is released

during the performance period. Adjustments for fuel burnups are also needed (see Appendix A, 40 CFR Part 191).

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) understands the term "accessible environment" to mean (1) the atmosphere, (2) land surfaces, (3) surface waters, (4) oceans, and (5) all the lithosphere that is beyond the controlled area. Likewise, the DOE understands the term "controlled area" to mean (1) a surface location, to be identified by passive institutional controls, that encompasses no more than 100 km^2 and extends horizontally no more than 5 km in any direction from the outer boundary of the underground facility, and (2) the subsurface underlying such a surface location.

The phrase "significant processes and events that may affect the geologic repository" is interpreted as meaning likely natural events and such other processes and events that could affect a geologic repository and are sufficiently credible to warrant consideration. Significant processes and events that may affect a geologic repository may either be natural processes and events or processes and events initiated by human activities other than those licensed under 10 CFR Part 60. Processes and events initiated by human activities may only be found to be sufficiently credible to warrant consideration if it is assumed that: (1) the monuments provided for by this part are sufficiently permanent to serve their intended purpose; (2) the value to future generations of potential resources within the site can be assessed adequately under the applicable provisions of this part; (3) an understanding of the nature of radioactivity, and an appreciation of its hazards, has been retained in some functioning institutions; (4) institutions are able to assess risk and to take remedial action sufficient to prevent persistent or systematic releases resulting from human-induced disruptions of a repository; and (5) relevant records are preserved, and remain accessible, for several hundred years after permanent closure.

Overview of the performance assessments for this issue

The DOE plans to demonstrate compliance with the total system performance objective by conducting performance assessments. These performance assessments will (1) identify all significant processes and events that may affect the geologic repository, (2) evaluate the effects of these processes and events on the release of radionuclides to the accessible environment, (3) combine estimates of these effects to the extent practicable into a complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) displaying the likelihood that the amount of radioactive material released to the accessible environment will not exceed the specified values, and (4) compare the numerical predictions with the performance objective, evaluating the importance of any uncertainties on conclusions from this comparison.

The significant processes and events to be taken into account in these performance assessments will be identified by developing scenarios that specify a sequence of processes and events potentially resulting in significant impacts on the variables of the systems important to waste isolation. Scenarios will be developed for undisturbed conditions (those conditions caused by likely natural events) and for disturbed conditions that are sufficiently credible to warrant consideration. In addition to providing an approach to organizing the information regarding significant processes and events for this issue, these scenarios provide a vehicle for the evaluation

of the favorable and potentially adverse conditions of 10 CFR 60.122 for the resolution of Issue 1.8 (Section 8.3.5.17).

The remainder of this section discusses a methodology for the performance assessments and for defining suitable information needs for the resolution of this issue. The methodology that will actually be used in preparing the license application may differ from the methodology proposed here. For example, information developed during the site characterization may suggest a different approach that may be more efficient in conveying the assessment of the repository. However, it is the judgment of the DOE, based upon the available information, that the proposed approach will lead to the information needed for the DOE to present its case for the Yucca Mountain site, whichever methodology is chosen.

The following discussion addresses five topics:

1. Methods for constructing a CCDF.

2. A preliminary selection of events, processes, and scenario classes for the Yucca Mountain repository site.

3. Models for evaluating radionuclide releases in the scenario classes.

4. A preliminary performance allocation for Issue 1.1.

5. Summary of licensing and issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.1.

1. Methods for constructing a complementary consulative distribution function

Definitions

With noted exceptions, the following definitions of terms are used throughout the remainder of this section. The term "period of performance" means the 10,000-yr period that follows closure of the repository. An "event" means a natural or anthropogenic phenomenon that takes place during an interval of time that is very short compared with the period of performance; for all practical purposes, events are regarded as discrete occurrences. Conversely, a "process" means a natural or anthropogenic phenomenon that exhibits continuous change over the entire period of performance. A "feature" (usually modified by the adjectives "undetected" or "undiscovered") means an object, structure, or condition that may exist at the repository site at the time of closure. A "scenario" means a sequence of definite types of events and processes that act or occur during the period of performance with prescribed intensities, at prescribed epochs or for prescribed durations, in a prescribed order of occurrence. A "scenario class" (or class of scenarios) is defined as the collection of all scenarios involving definite types of events or processes, but with intensities, epochs of occurrence or durations, and orders of occurrence allowed to range freely over the physically possible numerical values. The word "consequence" means the magnitude of the normalized, cumulative release of radioactivity that would occur should a given scenario be realized ("normalized release" is defined later). The term "containment" as applied in the EPA standard, is the same as the term "isolation," as applied by the NRC and in this document.

Terms and concepts of probability theory are also frequently used in the following pages e.g., random variable, mean, or expectation, distribution function, and density function. Readers who are unfamiliar with these terms are urged to consult textbooks on the subject for their precise meanings. The texts by Feller (1960, 1966) and Ross (1985) are used as primary references in this section. Other terms are defined as needed throughout the remainder of this section.

Conceptual and mathematical background

Quantitative predictions of the behavior of a geologic waste disposal system over periods of thousand of years are necessarily theoretical and mathematical. Like other mathematical assessments of complex systems, an assessment of the future performance of a geologic waste disposal system must eventually be expressed in terms of a finite number of "performance measures," which are usually numerical. Calculated values of these performance measures can be compared with predetermined numerical criteria that presumably define an acceptable range of system behavior and then judgments concerning the relative worth of the system can be made on the basis of these comparisons.

The performance criterion in this case is specified in the containment requirements of the EPA standard, 40 CFR 191.13, which is to be implemented by the NRC performance objective for overall system performance. This criterion implicitly defines a performance measure of the form

$$M = \sum_i \frac{Q_i}{L_i} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}1)$$

where

M = normalized release from the total system,

Q_i = cumulative radioactivity of the i^{th} radionuclide released to the accessible environment in the 10,000-yr period following closure from significant processes and events that may affect the disposal system (Ci),

L_i = release limit for the i^{th} radionuclide as specified in the regulations (Ci). (See 40 CFR Part 191, Appendix A, for the calculation of these limits.)

The values of the performance measure (M) are not to be simply estimated and compared with a range of acceptable standard values, as might be done for a different kind of system. In the guidance and discussion sections of 40 CFR Part 191 relating to the EPA containment standard, 40 CFR 191.13(a), it is explicitly recognized that considerable uncertainty will attach to estimates of M because of the length of the period of performance and the difficulties inherent in predicting far-future system behavior. Therefore, the regulations imply that M must be treated not as a single number or range of numbers, but as a random variable.

The random variable M may be described by a cumulative distribution function (CDF); the EPA containment standard places conditions on the form taken by the CDF by specifying limits on its complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF). In terms of the CCDF, the containment standard reads

$$\Pr\{M > 1.0\} < 0.1$$

$$\Pr\{M > 10.0\} < 0.001 \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}2)$$

where $\Pr\{e\}$ stands for the probability that the statement "e" is true.

A CCDF is always a nonincreasing function of a variable, say m, which in the problem of present interest ranges from zero to the normalized inventory of the repository closure. (A hypothetical CCDF is shown as the solid curve in Figure 8.3.5.13-1a.) To show this dependence, the CCDF will hereinafter be denoted by

$$G(m) = \Pr\{M > m\}$$

How would one experimentally construct $G(m)$? In principle, one might imagine the following experiment (which will be called a "thought experiment" for convenience in cross referencing): Construct a large number of replicas of the system, begin operation of each replica at some common time, and at the end of the period of performance observe the number of replicas for which M exceeds any one of a set of predetermined values, say 10^{-1}, 1, 10^{1}, 10^{2}, 10^{3}. If the replicas were real systems, there would always be some uncertainty in the initial state of each replica and the physical conditions under which each replica evolved during the period of performance; consequently, the outcomes of the experiment would very likely be different for each replica. Because the replicas are all prepared in the same way, each is equally likely to correspond to the "real" system. By plotting a histogram of the relative frequency of the number of replicas that are observed to exceed each predetermined value (i.e., the number of replicas exceeding that value divided by the number of replicas in the experiment), one would end up with a step-like approximation to a continuous curve very much like the one shown in Figure 8.3.5.13-1b. Such a curve is called an empirical CCDF. By increasing the fineness of the grid of predetermined exceedance values and the number of replicas in the "thought" experiment, the empirical CCDF could be made to approach a continuous curve such as the one shown in Figure 8.3.5.13-1a.

In practice, such an experimental construction of the CCDF for a waste disposal system is impossible. Nevertheless, the experiment may be mimicked with mathematical models of the system which are capable of generating sample values of M when given a numerical specification of the physical states of the system during the period of performance. The mathematical models, invariably implemented by computer code, are used to generate a large number of sample M's; this action replaces the simultaneous observation of the outcomes for the large number of system replicas in the "thought" experiment. To correspond to the identically prepared system replicas, the states of the system during the period of performance must be specified in a way that



Figure 8.3.5.13-1a. Graphic representation of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) containment requirements. Modified from NRC (1968).



Figure 8.3.5.13-1b. Example of an empirical complementary cumulative distribution function. EPA = Environmental Protection Agency. Modified from Figure 18, Hunter et al. (1986).

properly reflects their probabilities. The sample M's so generated may then be plotted as a histogram to give an empirical CCDF. Roughly speaking, this is the way the step-like curve in Figure 8.3.5.13-1b (taken from Hunter et al., 1986) was actually constructed.

Formulating, testing, and validating the mathematical models to be used in mimicking the replicas of the "thought" experiment are by far the major tasks of performance assessment. An extended discussion of mathematical modeling of phenomena relevant to geologic waste disposal is beyond the scope of this section (although there will be some description of systems-level models later in the section entitled "models for evaluating radionuclide releases in the scenario classes." Here, it will simply be assumed that there exists a collection of formulae and algorithms which, when implemented on a high-speed digital computer, are capable of transforming any scenario into a value of the performance measure M.

An idealized geologic repository system must be described ultimately by a finite number if dependent variables (here called performance measures). In turn, the performance measures are functionally dependent upon a finite number of independent variables, which are called state variables. The number and nature of the state variable depend upon the level of detail at which the system is modeled and upon the kinds of scenarios to be included in the modeling efforts. In general, state variables can be arranged in a hierarchy, with certain directly measured physical properties of the system (i.e., the data to be obtained during site characterization) forming the base of the hierarchy. Above the base a graded series of aggregations of quantities, each derived from measured properties and theory or from theory alone form the next lower aggregation in the series.

Some concrete examples of highly aggregated state variables for the Yucca Mountain system are

1. Mass of the i^{th} radionuclide in the repository at closure time.

2. Average percolation flux at repository level.

3. The liquid-phase transport time of the i^{th} radionuclide from the repository level to the accessible environment.

4. The times of occurrence of displacement of the Ghost Dance Fault greater than 1 m.

5. The depth of penetration of a future episode of exploratory drilling.

6. The annual rate of erosion of the washes at Yucca Mountain.

7. The effective weights assigned by professional judgment to alternative conceptual models of some site phenomenon or the response of the system to a known site phenomenon.

In any case, there will exist a level in the hierarchy of state variables at which the aggregations of quantities are judged to be sufficient to describe the occurrence, intensity, and perhaps even the subjective

likelihood of all processes, events, and features making up the scenario classes for release of radioactivity to the accessible environment. In other words, there is a level in the hierarchy of variables that is adequate to describe and model the consequences of all scenarios that have been judged to play a significant role in determining the values of the performance measure.

As described later, the number of state variables necessary in the modeling of sequences is in principle unbounded, but for purposes of discussion, it is assumed that there are N such independent state variables. These variables are conveniently represented as components of a vector

$$\vec{V} = (v_1, v_2, v_3, \ldots, v_N)$$

and the performance measure is seen to be a function of the state variables that will hereinafter be denoted by $M(\vec{V})$. Note that $\vec{V}$ is to be regarded as the logical union of the sets of all state variables required in the modeling of the consequences.

A degree of uncertainty is usually attached to a state variable, owing to various causes such as measurement error in physical quantities, the spatial and temporal inhomogeneities intrinsic to geologic processes and events, and imprecision in the theories relating the variables in different levels of the state-variable hierarchy. That is, most state variables may be regarded as random variables in that they may take on values in ranges of numbers rather than always taking on a single value. Whether any given variable needs to be treated as a random variable depends upon the size of the ratio of the variable's standard deviation to its mean. If that ratio is very small (as is the case for standard physical constants and the dimensions of most engineered features), the variable need not be regarded as a random variable. If the ratio is nearly one or larger, and if the results of a calculation are particularly sensitive to changes in that variable, it may be necessary to treat it as a random variable in order to capture all uncertainty in system behavior.

The previous examples of state variables support this claim. Example 1 cites quantities that in principle could be measured but in practice will probably be known to within at least 20 percent about their estimated mean value. Examples 4, 5, and 7 are scalar random variables with predictable ranges but presently unknown distributions. Examples 2 and 6 are processes that must be described as random functions of time because both processes depend upon climatic variables whose future behavior is presently unknown. Because of hydrodynamic and geochemical dispersion, which arise from unpredictable inhomogeneities in rock properties, the transport time in example 3, under steady-state conditions, must be regarded as a scalar random variable. Finally, all state variables may not be mutually independent: a good example of correlated state variables are examples 2, 3, and 6; all of these quantities ultimately depend on climatic conditions at the site.

Because some of the components of the state-variable vector are random variables, the performance measure, $M(\vec{V})$, taken as a function of the state variables, must also be a random variable whose properties (mean, variance, and distribution) are determined by the joint distribution of the state variables. The joint CDF for the state variables is denoted by $F(\vec{V})$; and the joint density function associated with $F(\vec{V})$ is simply symbolized by $F(d\vec{V})$

using notation from Feller (1966). The mean (or expectation) of the performance measure, $\bar{M}$, can be obtained by applying to $M(\vec{V})$ the expectation operator, an operation formally defined here as

$$E[\bullet] \equiv \int_{v_1}\int_{v_2}\cdots\int_{v_N}[\bullet]F(d\vec{V}) \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}3)$$

that is

$$\bar{M} = E[M(\vec{V})]$$

Other moments of the CDF for the performance measure can be obtained by applying the expectation operator. For instance, the variance of M (denoted by $\mathrm{Var}[M]$) is

$$\mathrm{Var}[M] = E[(M-\bar{M})^2]$$

The CCDF for the performance measure can be formally represented by

$$G(m) = E[u(M-m)] \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}4)$$

where $u(x)$ is the unit step function ($u(x) = 0$ if $x < 0$ and $u(x) = 1$ if $x \geq 0$).

If the joint distribution function $F(\vec{V})$ is continuously differentiable for all the components of $\vec{V}$, then the joint density $F(d\vec{V})$ can be represented in a more familiar form as

$$F(d\vec{V}) = f(v_1, v_2, v_3, \ldots, v_N)dv_1dv_2dv_3\ldots dv_N$$

and the formal expectation operation (Equation 8.3.5.13-3) would be identical with ordinary integration of the quantity $[\bullet]f$ over the ranges of the N state variables. Although $F(\vec{V})$ generally is not differentiable in all variables, the equivalence between evaluation of multiple integrals of large dimension and Monte Carlo simulation (see Hammersley and Handscomb (1954) or Chapter 11 of Ross (1985) suggests that one may evaluate expressions like Equation 8.3.5.13-4 in a manner nearly identical to the scheme for the "thought experiment" outlined earlier. For example, one draws S (>> 1) "samples" from the joint CDF for $\vec{V}$ (say $\vec{V}^1$, $\vec{V}^2$, $\vec{V}^3$, ..., $\vec{V}^S$) and uses each sample value to calculate sample values of the performance measure, for example, $M(\vec{V}^1)$, $M(\vec{V}^2)$, $M(\vec{V}^3)$, ..., $M(\vec{V}^S)$. The sample values of the performance measure may then be arithmetically averaged to give an estimate of $\bar{M}$, or their relative frequency of occurrence may be tabulated and plotted as a histogram to give an empirical distribution function for the performance measure. It follows that the two essential ingredients for construction of an empirical CCDF are (1) a set of consequence models, that is, models that calculate the $M(\vec{V})$ attached to a specific $\vec{V}$s, and (2) a joint distribution function for all uncertain state variables.

In practice, a crude Monte Carlo simulation of the kind just outlined is seldom used, because it is inefficient in the use of random numbers and

therefore, expensive in computing time. Instead, various "modified" Monte Carlo methods such as Latin hypercube sampling (Iman and Conover, 1982) are used to reduce the variance in the estimate for a given sample size (*). But even if variance-reducing schemes are used, the sample size required for adequate resolution of the empirical CCDF may be large, and so, depending upon the time needed to calculate a sample value, the proposed calculation would still be expensive. Iman and Helton (1985) suggest that "good results are obtained" when

$$S \geq (4/3)N$$

This empirical rule illustrates the impracticability of using highly detailed, two- and three-dimensional computer models of the system in attempts to calculate the CCDF by Monte Carlo simulation. Even a modestly detailed, one-dimensional finite-difference model of liquid-phase flow and solute transport at the site, such as the TOSPAC model (Dudley et al., 1988), could involve on the order of 10,000 uncertain state variables and could require at least several minutes to generate its output on even the fastest digital computer. (In addition, note that the output of the code would only be part of the numerical manipulations needed to calculate a sample value of the performance-measure function associated with a scenario involving many kinds of processes and events.) Although such elaborate and detailed models may be necessary for gaining insight into the behavior of site phenomena, their use in simulations of the total system could result in months of continuous computing time being required to construct an empirical CCDF. The DOE realizes these limitations and will attempt to overcome them by developing relatively simple systems-level models of system behavior and system response for use in calculating the empirical CCDF.

As a final background note: The DOE has noticed that there is a single sufficient condition for satisfaction of the inequalities in Equation 8.3.5.13-2. That condition is derived here since it will be used later in developing an approximate criterion for screening events and processes according to the contributions they may make to the CCDF. The condition follows from Markov's Inequality (Loeve, 1960), which states that, for any nonnegative random variable X and any positive number x,

$$\Pr\{X \geq x\} \leq E[X]/x$$

In other words, a CCDF must be bounded above by the positive branch of the hyperbola defined by $y = E[X]/x$. If this result is applied to Equation 8.3.5.13-2, it can be seen that if the inequality

$$E[M] < 0.01 \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}5)$$

is satisfied, then both inequalities in Equation 8.3.5.13-2 are satisfied. As stated, Equation 8.3.5.13-5 is only a sufficient condition; the inequalities in Equation 8.3.5.13-2 may be satisfied even if $E[M] \geq 0.01$, and in such a case, the entire CCDF would have to be constructed to see whether Equation 8.3.5.13-2 is satisfied.

The Cranwell methodology for constructing a complementary cumulative distribution function

Cranwell et al. (1982) and Hunter et al. (1986) present extended summaries and further references to supporting documents for a methodology for constructing a CCDF that shows compliance with 10 CFR 191.3(a). This methodology is hereinafter called the Cranwell methodology.

The methodology represents the CCDF as a weighted sum of conditional CCDFs. Using the mathematical notation developed in the background material, equation (2) of Hunter et al. (1986) reads

$$G(m) = \sum_j G(m|S_j)P(S_j) \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}6)$$

where

S_j = a designator for the j^{th} "scenario"

$P(S_j)$ = probability that S_j is realized

$G(m|S_j)$ = a conditional CCDF: probability that $M > m$, given that only members of the j^{th} "scenario" are realized.

Scenario is placed in quotation marks in the above definitions because the Cranwell methodology definition of the term apparently includes objects that are more general than the objects defined by this section's definition of scenario; the intended meaning of Hunter et al. (1986) appears to be closer to the term "scenario class".

Any CDF or CCDF may be expanded in the manner indicated by Equation 8.3.5.13-6, provided that the S_j are statistically independent entities (i.e., are mutually exclusive events in the probabilistic sense of the term "event") and that the set of all S_j is exhaustive (that is, the S_js represent all possible outcomes of an experiment, again in the probabilistic sense of the term "experiment"). In other words, $P(S_j) > 0$ for all j and $\sum_j P(S_j) = 1$. The conditional CCDFs, $G(m|S_j)$, are to be calculated in the same way as the unconditional CCDF, $G(m)$, (e.g., by Monte Carlo simulation), using the marginal joint distribution function for those state variables, $\vec{V}j$, that appear in the specification of the j^{th} "scenario." These state variables will, in general, be a subset of the components of $\vec{V}$ and will be denoted in vector form by $\vec{V}j$. The reader should note that construction of each conditional CCDF will generally be easier than construction of the unconditional CCDF. This is because some of the events or features that appear in the specification of the j^{th} "scenario" are, by definition, forced to occur during the period of performance, and therefore fewer random numbers are needed.

That the two representations of a CCDF, Equations 8.3.5.13-4 and 8.3.5.13-6, are formed by the same principle. That is, the expansion of a distribution as a sum of conditional distributions, can be seen by making the following correspondences: the integration operation in Equation 8.3.5.13-3

with the summation in Equation 8.3.5.13-6; the $F(d\vec{V})$ in Equation 8.3.5.13-3 with the $P(S_j)$ in Equation 8.3.5.13-6; and the unit step function $u(M-m)$ in Equation 8.3.5.13-4 with the $G(m|S_j)$ in Equation 8.3.5.13-6.

In the first representation (Equation 8.3.5.13-4), the CCDF is expanded in terms of each scenario in the nondenumerably infinite set of scenarios. The "probability" of a scenario is the infinitesimal quantity $F(d\vec{V})$, and the conditional probability that $M > m$ given that the scenario is realized is the unit step function $u(M-m)$. (Note that the unit step function is a perfectly good CCDF for a quantity that takes a single value, say $M = m^*$, with certainty at some point on the line of real numbers.) It is seen that the requirements of mutual independence and exhaustivity are automatically met by Equations 8.3.5.13-3 and 8.3.5.13-4. The function $G(m)$ defined by these equations will always have the properties of a CCDF (that is, $G(0) = 0$ and $G(m) \geq 0$ for $m > 0$, and $G(m)$ nonincreasing for $m > 0$) provided only that $F(\vec{V})$ is a joint CDF for the state variables $\vec{V}$.

In the second representation (Equation 8.3.5.13-6), the CCDF is expanded in terms of a finite number of mutually independent and exhaustive scenario classes; the probability of each scenario class is the finite quantity $P(S_j)$, and the conditional probability that $M > m$, given that only members of scenario class S_j occur, is $G(m|S_j)$.

The remarks in the preceding paragraphs may help in understanding why it has not been clear how the the requirements of mutual exclusivity and exhaustivity could be met for the kinds of "scenarios" proposed in the Cranwell methodology. The Cranwell methodology (Hunter et al., 1986) bypassed certain logical problems by first assigning values to the $P(S_j)$ (usually, on a subjective basis) and then, if the sum of the $P(S_j)$ was not one, renormalizing to obtain new probabilities:

$$\bar{P}(S_j) = P(S_j)/\textstyle\sum_j P(S_j)$$

Although this procedure might be justified on the pragmatic grounds that all $P(S_j)$ are very small numbers whose assignments are ultimately based on subjective judgment, it nevertheless violates the logic of probability theory and provides no definite logical pathway for inferring the $P(S_j)$ from the more-fundamental probabilities of the occurrence of events and processes. The preceding discussion is a preliminary comparison of two approaches represented by Equations 8.3.5.13-4 and 8.3.5.13-6.

The U.S Department of Energy approach to choosing scenario classes

The approach used by the DOE to solve the problem of exclusivity and exhaustivity inherent in Equation 8.3.5.13-6 has been to interpret the S_j as scenario classes instead of "scenarios," and to attempt to partition the set of all scenarios into mutually exclusive classes of scenarios. There are many ways in which such a partition might be accomplished, and each way seems to have its own logical problems. The partitioning scheme adopted by the DOE for the purpose of identifying the significant processes and events for inclusion in the CCDF is illustrated below with the help of some examples.

Consider a waste-disposal system in which any number of processes may be operating, but in which only two independent kinds of disruptive events, E_1

and E_2, may occur. For example, E_1 might be motion along an existing fault, and E_2 might represent exploratory drilling. The probability that event E_k (k = 1, 2) occurs at least once during the period of performance is denoted by p_k. The partitioning into four mutually exclusive scenario classes for this hypothetical example is illustrated in the form of an "event tree" in Figure 8.3.5.13-2. This figure requires further explanation. First, note that the sum of the four probabilities $P(S_j)$, j = 1, 2, 3, 4, is 1. Next, let S_1 denote the class in which no disruptive events have occurred. This class is often and variously called the expected case, the anticipated case, or the nominal case; all these terms may be misleading because there is no reason to believe that $P(S_1)$ will always be larger than the other three probabilities or the probability used in administratively defining the term anticipated process and events. (The DOE will, however, continue the use of these terms because of their significance in the interpretation of other parts of 10 CFR Part 60.) Finally, note that processes are shown to play no explicit role in this kind of expansion of a CCDF in independent scenario classes; a calculation of the conditional CCDFs, $G(m|S_j)$, that appear in Equation 8.3.5.13-6 would have to be accomplished by Monte Carlo simulation and would require that a common set of sample processes be used consistently for the simulation of each of the conditional CCDFs. In other words, all processes are automatically expected or anticipated in this partitioning scheme.

The formalism of Figure 8.3.5.13-2 can be used to show how undetected features may be included in the definition of independent scenario classes. Suppose that, in addition to the possible occurrence of two kinds of events E_1 and E_2, the possibility of the presence of a feature that could influence releases to the accessible environment is admitted. The feature, F_1, is present at the beginning of the period of performance with probability p_3 and absent with probability $(1 - p_3)$. Figure 8.3.5.13-3 illustrates the way the possibility of an undetected feature will lead to a doubling of the number of independent scenario classes. This figure also applies to situations in which there are two alternatives for the conceptual or mathematical model of some process, event, or condition believed to be important in the determination of releases to the accessible environment. A concrete example of this situation is the conceptual model of recharge under Yucca Mountain (Montazer and Wilson, 1984): is recharge concentrated in highly fractured, structural features lying to the southeast of the mountain, or is it nearly uniform throughout the mountain? Such a two-state alternative model is, for all practical purposes, the same as an undetected feature, because it leads to a doubling of the number of independent scenario classes (but note that there may also be n-state alternative models, where $n > 2$, leading to a multiple of n branches). A simple example of a diagram arising from a two-state alternative model can be found in Figure 9 of Hunter et al. (1986).

All the examples just cited involve only a few independent types of events, undetected features, or two-state alternative models. The formalism for expanding the CCDF in independent scenario classes is nevertheless capable of being generalized to any number of such objects, provided that they are statistically independent entities (i.e., having information about the occurrence of one of them does not change the probability that any of the others will occur). If there are K independent types of objects (events or undetected features or two-state alternative models), there will be $J = 2^K$


TIME
ALL PROCESSES ACT
S1: NEITHER E1 NOR E2 HAS OCCURRED; P(S1) = (1 - P1)(1 - P2)
S2: E1 HAS OCCURRED; E2 HAS NOT OCCURRED; P(S2) = P1(1 - P2)
S3: E1 HAS NOT OCCURRED; E2 HAS OCCURRED; P(S3) = (1 - P1)P2
S4: E1 AND E2 HAVE OCCURRED; P(S4) = P1 P2
START PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE
END PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE
8.3.5.13-2P.SCP/10-13-88

Figure 8.3.5.13-2. An illustration of the expansion of a complementary cumulative distribution function in independent scenario classes Two types of events are assumed (See the text for a further explanation of this figure.)


TIME
ALL PROCESSES ACT
F1 NOT PRESENT
F1 PRESENT
F1 NOT PRESENT
F1 PRESENT
F1 NOT PRESENT
F1 PRESENT
F1 NOT PRESENT
F1 PRESENT
S1: NEITHER E1 NOR E2 HAS OCCURRED; P(S1) = (1 - P1)(1 - P2)(1 - P3)
S2: NEITHER E1 NOR E2 HAS OCCURRED; P(S2) = (1 - P1)(1 - P2)P3
S3: E1 HAS OCCURRED; E2 HAS NOT OCCURRED; P(S3) = P1(1 - P2)(1 - P3)
S4: E1 HAS OCCURRED; E2 HAS NOT OCCURRED; P(S4) = P1(1 - P2)P3
S5: E1 HAS NOT OCCURRED; E2 HAS OCCURRED; P(S5) = (1 - P1)P2(1 - P3)
S6: E1 HAS NOT OCCURRED; E2 HAS OCCURRED; P(S6) = (1 - P1)P2P3
S7: E1 AND E2 HAVE OCCURRED; P(S7) = P1P2(1 - P3)
S8: E1 AND E2 HAVE OCCURRED; P(S8) = P1P2P3
START PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE
END PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE
8.3.5.13-3P.SCP/10-13-88

Figure 8.3.5.13-3. An illustration of the expansion of a complementary cumulative distribution function in independent scenario classes Two types of events and one undetected feature are assumed (See the text for a further explanation of this figure)

independent scenario classes denoted, as before, by S_j, $j = 1, 2, 3, \ldots, J$). The probabilities assigned to each class, $P(S_j)$, are then the J terms in the expansion of the product

$$\prod_{k=1}^{K} [(1 - p_k) + p_k]$$

as a sum of terms. (Note that this product is automatically equal to 1 since each of its terms equal 1; hence the representation as a sum of terms also equals 1, thus providing exhaustivity.) The p_k appearing in the product are here called the "elementary probabilities of occurrence" of the K independent types of objects. As shown in the previous examples, the p_ks may have different meanings, depending upon the type of object to which they apply. A discussion of elementary probabilities is provided later in this section.

Incorporation of uncertainties in repository performance related to undetected features in the manner discussed previously is one approach to this problem. Other approaches (e.g., sensitivity analyses and bounding analyses) will be considered before selecting the approach that will be used in the compliance demonstration for licensing.

A generalization of this scheme has been adopted by the DOE for the screening that identifies significant processes and events for inclusion in the CCDF; the next part of this section describes that screening. However, this partitioning scheme is adopted here for the purpose of deriving guidance for the site characterization program. It will not necessarily be the basis adopted in licensing.

Screening for significant events, processes, and features

In the Cranwell methodology, the CCDF for the performance measure M is represented as a weighted sum of 2^K conditional CCDFs (Equation 8.3.5.13-6). The weights are the probabilities of the 2^K exclusive and exhaustive scenario classes, and K is

K = (number of types of independent events) + (number of distinct types of undetected features) + (number of independent, two-state alternative models)

Distinct types of processes are not included in the sum (unless they are the distinguishing features of a two-state alternative model) because, in the Cranwell methodology, the state variables of all processes are included in the specification of every scenario class. In the next few paragraphs, a CCDF depending upon K events, features, or alternative models is denoted by $G_K(m)$.

Thus, the number of scenario classes to be considered in the performance assessments increases exponentially with K; for example, if $K = 10$, there are already 1,024 classes. Calculation of 1,024 empirical CCDFs by Monte Carlo simulation would require an enormous computational effort, even if the increased efficiency inherent in the calculation of conditional CCDFs by simulation is taken into account. Note that Hunter et al. (1986) understandably include only five "scenarios" in their example calculations of an empirical CCDF. Some methods for reducing the number of scenario classes to

be included in a CCDF calculation to a manageable size are needed. At the same time, these methods should preserve exclusivity and exhaustivity, be applicable in advance of a CCDF calculation, and lead to the identification of those scenario classes that play essential roles in determining the shape of an empirical CCDF. Such methods, which might be called screening methods, are mentioned in this descriptions of the Cranwell methodology: "Scenario probabilities offer a means of screening the scenarios to determine which ones should be modeled" and "A preliminary estimate of consequences can also be used to screen scenarios before full-scale consequence modeling" (Hunter et al., 1986). The EPA also mentions the possibility of eliminating events and processes on the basis of their probabilities of occurrence: Guidance for 40 CFR Part 191 states that "performance assessments need not consider categories of events or processes that are estimated to have less than one chance in 10,000 of occurring over 10,000 years." (Appendix B of EPA (1985)).

Certain disruptive events, features, or alternative models (hereinafter collectively called agents) may be eliminated as ingredients of scenarios, provided that their elementary probabilities are sufficiently small. It can be shown that the absolute error in the calculated CCDF caused by dropping those scenario classes in which a single, to-be-eliminated agent occurs is bounded by that agent's elementary probability of occurrence. For example, if event k_1 is to be eliminated, then the absolute error obeys the following inequality:

$$|G_K(m) - G_{K-1}(m)| \leq p_{k_1}$$

If a total of L ($\leq K$) agents is to be eliminated, then

$$|G_K(m) - G_{K-L}(m)| \leq p_{k_1} + p_{k_2} + p_{k_3} + \cdots + p_{k_L}$$

This bound on absolute error incurred by eliminating L out of K agents suggests a way of setting a criterion for screening events, features, or alternative models before constructing a CCDF. If the elementary probability of each agent considered for elimination is such that

$$p_k \leq 0.0001/K \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}7)$$

then up to K of the agents may be eliminated without causing more than 10-percent error in the CCDF at the more restrictive of the two inequalities shown in Equation 8.3.5.13-2, that is, the inequality $G(10) < 0.001$. (Note that other kinds of errors, i.e., those arising from a finite sample size, are inherent in the construction of the empirical CCDF and are not counted in the 10-percent relative error.)

The DOE does not intend to screen scenarios by consequences alone. The methodology will retain an analysis of low-consequence, high-probability events in order to provide a complete estimate of the CCDF and a thorough characterization of repository performance.

A crude but probably adequate measure of the relative importance of the consequences of different disruptive agents can be derived using the CCDF representation in the Cranwell methodology (Equations 8.3.5.13-6 and

8.3.5.13-5). Taking the formal derivative of Equation 8.3.5.13-6 to obtain a probability density function for M, multiplying that probability density function by m, and applying the expectation operator (Equation 8.3.5.13-3) to the resulting product gives

$$E[M] = \sum_{j=1}^{2^K} E[M|S_j]P(S_j) \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}8)$$

The quantities $E[M|S_j]$ are the conditional expectations of the performance measure M, given the occurrence of scenario class S_j. Each term in Equation 8.3.5.13-8 (i.e., the product $E[M|S_j]P(S_j)$) is called the expected partial performance measure (EPPM) for scenario class S_j). Using the inequality in Equation 8.3.5.13-5, a sufficient condition for meeting the regulatory requirements of Equation 8.3.5.13-2 is

$$\sum_j (\text{EPPM for scenario class } S_j) \leq 0.01 \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}9)$$

It intuitively follows from Equation 8.3.5.13-9 that the significant scenario classes are those that have the largest EPPMs. In particular, scenario classes with EPPMs having values near 0.01 are significant, although the occurrence of an EPPM > 0.01 does not automatically imply a violation of the regulatory requirements. The connection between EPPMs and screening of potentially disruptive agents according to their consequences can be made by two observations: First, the EPPM for a scenario class in which a given disruptive agent, say the k^{th} one, is assumed to occur will be bounded above by the product, $p_k\ E[M|S_j]$. Second, an upper bound for the conditional expectation $E[M|S_j]$, say B_j, may often be estimated by simple, deterministic calculations. It follows that the EPPMs for scenario classes involving the k^{th} disruptive agent are bounded above by $p_k B_j$ (or B_j when p_k is unknown), and that the latter quantities can be used as surrogates of the EPPMs in a preliminary screening of potentially disruptive agents. This procedure is particularly useful in the performance allocation process. Several examples of its use are provided later in the section entitled "A preliminary performance allocation for Issue 1.1."

Probabilities of events, processes, and features

The foregoing discussions in this section have established that, in order to calculate an empirical CCDF for the performance measure, various measures of probability (i.e., CDFs for Monte Carlo simulation and elementary probabilities for calculating scenario class probabilities) must be associated with those events, processes, features, and alternative conceptual models that determine the classes of release scenarios. The present discussion briefly addresses two topics regarding probability: (1) the measures of probability needed for each kind of agent or process in order to include their uncertainties in the CCDF and (2) whether and to what extent the DOE believes that those measures of probability can be objectively derived from physical observations and data.

Probability measures for events (and some kinds of undetected features) are usually derived from probability models. A "probability model" is a

mathematical model that is capable of relating measurable quantities associated with past occurrences of the event to CDFs for certain state variables. For example, the state variables of interest for events are usually

1. The number of events that occur in a prescribed interval of time.

2. The times of occurrence of each event.

3. One variable (at least) describing the magnitude or intensity of each event.

For events whose occurrence in time is uncertain, all these variables of interest must be treated as correlated random variables. The elementary probability of the k^{th} kind of event, p_k is the probability that the k^{th} kind of event will occur at least once in the period of performance. The elementary probability for events can always be derived from the CDF (or probability density function) for state variable 1, that is, the number of events that occur in a prescribed interval of time.

Probability models for geologic events can be exemplified by the so-called Poisson process (Ross, 1985). The Poisson process is characterized by the assumption that the waiting times, Δt_k between the occurrence of any two events of type k are independent, exponentially distributed random variables, that is

$$\Pr\{\Delta t_k \leq t\} = 1 - \exp(-\lambda_k t),\ 0 \leq t < \infty$$

where λ_k depends upon the type of event and the associated magnitudes of intensities of the event. The quantity λ_k is sometimes called the probability per unit time since it has units of reciprocal time. The reciprocal of λ_k is the mean time between any two events. The probability that exactly n events of type k will occur in a time interval t is given by the Poisson distribution

$$\frac{(\lambda_k t)^n}{n!} \exp(-\lambda_k t),\ n = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$$

If t is taken to be 10,000 years, it follows that the elementary probability of the occurrence of an event of type k is

$$p_k = 1 - \exp(-\lambda_k t)$$

And when $(\lambda_k t) << 1$, the series expansion of the exponential function is used to justify the approximation, $p_k \approx \lambda_k t$.

In their investigations of the likelihood that the Yucca Mountain repository could be intercepted by extrusive basaltic volcanism, Crowe et al. (1982) combine available data on remnants of volcanic activity with Poisson-process assumptions to arrive at a maximum probability per unit time for volcanic disruption of 4×10^{-8}/yr. Donath and Cranwell (1981) use Poisson-process assumptions combined with geometrical probabilities to estimate the probability that faulting will disrupt a repository.

Poisson-process assumptions are convenient for the treatment of rare, geologic events because there are usually only enough data on past occurrences of the event to fit one parameter (λ_k). The mean time between events, $1/\lambda_k$, can be simply estimated by three steps.

1. Dating physical evidence that marks the past occurrence of an event.

2. Counting the number of events that have occurred in some prescribed time interval.

3. Calculating a mean time between events, by dividing the number of events by the time interval.

This was essentially the method of Crowe et al. (1982). Crowe et al., however, also assumed that episodes of basaltic volcanism in the Yucca Mountain region would be Poisson distributed in space as well as time. In some investigations, there exist sufficient data to conclude that the occurrences of some geologic event actually fit the Poisson distribution. Algermissen and Perkins (1976) assert that "large shocks [from earthquakes] closely approximate a Poisson process, while small shocks may depart significantly from a Poisson process."

Poisson-process assumptions are used to exemplify probability measures for geologic events throughout the remainder of this section. Nevertheless, the DOE recognizes the possibility that data obtained during site characterization may justify the use of different kinds of probability models in performance assessment calculations. For example, if strong evidence is developed that shows that the time intervals between the occurrences of a critical type of geologic event, say during the Quaternary Period, are increasing (or decreasing) instead of remaining approximately constant (as required by Poisson-process assumptions), then a probability model for that type of event based on the so-called nonhomogeneous Poisson process (Ross, 1985) would be used in performance assessment calculations involving that event. The probability per unit time in a nonhomogeneous Poisson process can be any nonnegative function of time, say $\lambda(t)$, that can be fitted with the data.

The DOE also recognizes that the use of a finite data set to fit the parameters of a probability model imposes uncertainty on those parameters themselves. For example, the procedure indicated above for fitting the mean time between events in a homogeneous Poisson-process gives what is called a maximum-likelihood estimate of the true meantime. Such estimates are themselves normally distributed about the true mean with a variance that decreases with increasing sample size (i.e., the number of data points used in calculating the estimator). There is no practical way of minimizing this kind of uncertainty because the number of data points obtainable is always limited by other practical considerations such as limited time, funds, or simply the difficulties in finding and recording the evidence of a past event or process. The only reasonable way to address the fact that the parameters in a probability model may take on a range of values is to first attempt to minimize the spread of those ranges as much as possible and then use those values within the indicated ranges that lead to conservative elementary probabilities (i.e., probabilities that will to some degree overestimate the

likelihood of the occurrence of an event). This scheme is used in interpreting the results of Crowe et al. (1982), and the DOE will apply it generally to arrive at an assignment of the parameters of any probability model that appears in the calculation of an empirical CCDF.

In contrast with geologic events, the assignment of probability measures to anthropogenic events that may occur in the far future must be based entirely on expert judgment. That judgment could be expressed in terms of a probability model or, more likely, by an assignment of a maximum credible rate of occurrence of the event. The EPA has already assigned a maximum credible rate of future exploratory drilling on a waste-disposal site: "...the Agency assumes that the likelihood of such inadvertent and intermittent drilling need not be taken to be greater than 30 boreholes per square kilometer of repository area per 10,000 years for geologic repositories in proximity to sedimentary rock formations, or more than 3 boreholes per square kilometer per 10,000 years for repositories in other geologic formations." (EPA, 1985). Given a maximum credible value on the rate of occurrence of an anthropogenic event, requiring a conservative estimate of the elementary probability forces the use of a Poisson probability model. Placing a maximum credible value on the rate of occurrence of that event automatically forces the use of a Poisson probability model, because such an assignment places a constant upper bound on the failure-rate function (Ross, 1985) uniquely associated with the CDF for the interval of time between occurrences of the event.

The elementary probabilities of the occurrence of natural undetected features, such as fault zones, magmatic intrusions, and perched water, would ideally be derived from probability models similar to the ones used in estimating the occurrence of mineral commodities (see John W. Harbaugh's treatment of this topic in Chapter 2 of Hunter and Mann, 1988). But, because of the quantity and specialized nature of the field measurements required to fit the parameters in these kinds of models (i.e., special boreholes and remote-sensing experiments), it may not be possible to realize the ideal for all but the most credible and potentially important kinds of natural undetected features.

As previously remarked, the numerical specification of a process is the same for all scenario classes unless the process is the distinguishing feature of an alternative model, or unless the process is changed by the occurrence of an event. Hence, processes will generally not play a direct role in the definition of scenario classes in the representation of the CCDF in the Cranwell methodology. Accordingly, processes cannot be screened using the methods associated with the Cranwell methodology and need not be assigned elementary probabilities. There may nevertheless be considerable uncertainty inherent in the description of a process. Important examples are the uncertainty in percolation flux and water-table level because these quantities may be affected by future climatic changes. Such process-related uncertainties can be incorporated into Monte Carlo simulations in at least two ways, whichever way proves to be the most efficient or justifiable in terms of available data:

1. The time-dependent function representing the process may be represented by a piecewise-linear function, as shown in Figure 8.3.5.13-4, or by a piecewise-constant function.



Figure 8.3.5.13-4. Representation of a time-dependent state variable. The hypothetical case shown is of percolation flux in the Topopah Spring welded unit as a function of time. The solid curve is the predicted flux history; the dotted curve is a discrete approximation to solid curve. Subdivisions of the ordinate show possible exceedance intervals for the percolation flux. The cells defined by the subdivisions of the ordinate and abcissa form an M by N matrix for the definition of exceedance probabilities; the notation P(m,n) stands for the probability that percolation flux in the m^{th} interval is exceeded in the n^{th} time interval.

2. The time-dependent function representing the process may be approximated by an analytical expression involving a few deterministic functions of time and a few scalar random variables.

For example, the spatially averaged percolation flux at the level of the repository might be most simply approximated by

$$q(t) = q_o + \delta t,\ 0 \leq t \leq 10,000\ \text{yr}$$

where q_o is a random variable representing the spatially averaged percolation flux at closure time ($t = 0$), and δ is a random variable representing the rate of change of the spatially averaged flux owing to future climatic changes. Other approximations might be justified, depending upon expert judgments in the areas of future climatology and unsaturated-zone hydrology.

The U.S. Department of Energy approach to constructing the complementary cumulative distribution function

In calculating the CCDF, the DOE intends to take into account all those natural processes and events that are sufficiently credible to warrant consideration. Generally, categories of natural processes and events that can be shown to have a likelihood of less than one chance in 10,000 of occurring in the first 10,000 yr after permanent closure would not be taken into account in CCDF. Furthermore, categories of natural processes and events whose contribution to the overall probability distribution can otherwise be shown to be insignificant would not be included in the detailed assessments. Likewise, any particular combinations of categories of natural processes and events that meet either of these two criteria would not be incorporated into the CCDF. That is, particular scenario classes involving a sequence of categories of events or processes that, in combination, can be shown to have a probability of occurrence in the 10,000-yr period following permanent closure of less than one chance in 10,000 or that otherwise can be shown to make a negligible contribution to the overall probability distribution would not be evaluated in detail.

Impacts of processes and events initiated by human activities will also be considered in the system performance assessments with regard to this issue. Repository construction and waste emplacement, as they affect the conditions in the geologic repository, will be taken into account in the evaluating of the CCDF for normalized releases. The treatment of such events and processes will follow an approach similar to that used for the natural processes and events. To address the effects of human activities (such as direct intrusion), the DOE will (1) evaluate the effects of potentially adverse human activities, such as those identified in the examination of the potentially adverse conditions of 10 CFR 60.122; (2) develop scenario classes of categories of processes and events that are initiated by human activities and that result in potentially significant impacts on normalized releases; and (3) estimate relative probabilities and consequences for these scenarios, taking into account the factors and the assumptions given previously in the regulatory basis for this issue. The scenarios and scenario classes associated with human activities are often highly speculative and often do not involve significant impacts on the variables important to waste isolation.

Therefore, the specification of highly speculative, low-impact human-activity-related scenarios and scenario classes, the development of the methods to analyze these classes, and the identification of data to support these analyses will not be allowed to dominate the testing program.

A scenario class will be developed for undisturbed performance of the geologic repository; it will take into account the legitimate, distinguishable alternative conceptual models that are supported by the available information. (As explained previously, this class is called the nominal class; it is associated with anticipated or expected conditions.) By undisturbed performance, the DOE means the predicted behavior of a geologic repository, taking into account the uncertainties in predicted behavior, and considering only likely natural events. In this instance, "natural events" refers to those natural processes and events that are reasonably likely to occur in the 10,000-yr period following permanent closure. The judgments of which natural processes and events are likely to occur during this period will be based on the assumption that those processes operating in the geologic setting during the Quaternary will continue to operate, but that with construction of the repository or the presence of emplaced radioactive waste, some perturbation will occur.

Disruptive scenario classes will also be developed for the analysis. Such scenario classes will be those that involve processes and events that are sufficiently credible to warrant consideration, but which are outside the range of those considered for the nominal case. For example, these scenarios may involve disruptive natural processes such as significant fault displacement, climate change, or volcanic activity that have a low probability of occurrence in the next 10,000 yr. These scenario classes would also include those developed for human interference activities discussed earlier.

As the preceding discussion points out, to describe the system ideally, the set of scenario classes should be exhaustive and the classes should be mutually exclusive. That is, the set of scenario classes should provide a partitioning of all the physically realizable futures for the repository system, and the set should be constructed so that the consequences of some effect are not counted more than once. In practice it will be difficult to provide such an ideal representation of the significant processes and events. For example, it will be difficult to distinguish between the low probability, extreme site characteristics taken into account in the undisturbed-performance scenario classes and the site characteristics resulting from unlikely processes and events that are taken into account in the disturbed-performance scenario classes. Care will be necessary to ensure that the scenario classes are as representative as possible.

It will also be difficult to ensure that every physically realizable future is represented in the set of scenario classes, particularly those that may be associated with unlikely processes and events. One of the undisturbed scenario classes is assumed to account not only for the likely processes and events explicitly specified in the description of the scenarios, but also for all unlikely processes and events that have no impact on repository performance. This scenario class is termed the "nominal" performance scenario class. Again, effort is needed to ensure that the nominal case scenario class provides a reasonable representation for these conditions.

Within each scenario class it will be possible to specify one or more release modes. For example, release of radionuclides may occur by way of water pathways, in which dissolved radionuclides are transported by water; by way of gas pathways, in which the radionuclides are transported in gaseous form and not with the moving water; and by direct pathways, in which the radionuclides are transported directly to the accessible environment by mechanical means, such as by magmatic extrusion or human recovery. In some instances, the scenario class will be defined with a particular release mode in mind; for example, for some scenario classes, such as drilling scenarios, the direct-pathways mode may be considered to dominate.

2. A preliminary selection of events, processes, and scenario classes for the Yucca Mountain repository site

The identification of scenario classes for any system is ultimately a matter of professional judgment. Methods that have been used to identify scenarios were recently reviewed with the following conclusion: "Three different approaches have been proposed to identify scenarios for performance assessments of high-level waste repositories: simulation, event trees, and judgment. Simulation models require large amounts of hard-to-obtain input data. Event trees tend to produce extremely large numbers of scenarios. Most published performance assessments rely on judgmental methods. . ." (Ross, 1986). To this fair appraisal might be added the observation that construction of meaningful simulation models or event trees also requires judgment. Observational and experimental evidence should be used to screen out insignificant effects before attempting to construct simulation models; similarly, efficient construction of event trees can proceed only after there has been a thorough examination and interpretation of the evidence concerning phenomena that might affect the system. The DOE will use professional judgment to guide the program for identifying scenario classes that have significance. At this point, it is appropriate to summarize specific efforts to identify scenarios for a repository system at the Yucca Mountain site.

In addition to the studies summarized below, the DOE has correlated the selection of scenarios with the results of evaluations of alternative conceptual models of site behavior. As Section 8.3.1.1 explains, various alternative models may, on the basis of currently available evidence, be used to describe the behavior of the site. Tables that display these models (called hypothesis-testing tables in Section 8.3.1) have been linked to Issue 1.1 by identifying the performance measures (from the performance allocation tables throughout Section 8.3.5) whose values are sensitive to those processes and then estimating qualitatively the effect that variations on those measures could have on the performance of the repository system.

The list of scenarios derived from the studies summarized below has been expanded as part of the ongoing evaluations of alternative conceptual models described in the tables. The preliminary set of scenario classes derived in this section is intended to incorporate the consequences of all the significant processes that, according to current evidence, could reasonably be expected to affect the performance of the site. The decisions regarding which alternative models will be the bases for the selection of scenarios used in licensing will be reevaluated throughout site characterization as additional information becomes available.

The decision-aiding methodology study

A panel of experts assembled by the DOE (1986a) proposed 15 generic, potentially significant scenarios (Table 8.3.5.13-1) and assessed the significance of these generic scenarios for a repository at Yucca Mountain, Nevada, using professional judgment and information from the Yucca Mountain environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b). The panel judged that scenarios 3, 4, and 12 of Table 8.3.5.13-1 are not sufficiently credible to warrant consideration and that realization of scenarios 5 through 9, 13, and 14 would not entail consequences more severe than the nominal case (scenario 1). Scenario 1 (the nominal case), scenario 2 (unexpected features), and scenarios 10a through 11 were regarded by the panel as being potentially significant at Yucca Mountain.

The unexpected-features scenario (scenario 2) was divided into six categories of features: (1) repository-induced subsidence or uplift, (2) undetected fault zones, (3) undetected significant lateral variations, (4) undetected dikes or sills, (5) undetected vertical heterogeneity (perching of water), and (6) other--a category of unspecified features. The panel stated that "The impacts of extreme conditions that result from unexpected features could lead to releases that could be as much as 10 times greater than those for the nominal case" (DOE, 1986a). After making evaluations, the panel concluded that the most important releases would be by ground water; consequently no scenarios were developed for gas-phase releases (i.e., carbon-14 as carbon dioxide).

The Ross study

Ross (1987) surveyed the events, processes, and features that might play a role in disruptions of the performance of the Yucca Mountain repository site. He examined the 56 processes, events, and features listed in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) list of phenomena potentially relevant to disruptions of a radioactive-waste repository (IAEA, 1983) and, on the basis of information associated with the Yucca Mountain statutory environmental assessment (DOE 1986b), concluded that about 25 distinct events, processes, or features are credible for the Yucca Mountain situation. He also identified 84 sequences formed from the 25 events, processes, and features that, if realized, could influence the performance of one or more of the engineered or natural barriers.

These 84 sequences are summarized in the following series of in-text tables. Each table groups sequences by the event, process, or feature believed to initiate the sequence or substantially guide its progress. The tables identify the sequence number arbitrarily assigned by Ross (1987), as well as an abbreviated description of the sequence.

Following each table is a discussion of the sequences associated with the event, process, or feature that were excluded from consideration. Also given are page numbers from Ross (1987) where the reasons for exclusion can be found.

The sequences associated with climate change identified by Ross (1987) are given in the following table:

Table 8.3.5.13-1. Potentially significant scenarios[a]

Scenario	Description
1	Nominal case (expected conditions)
2	Unexpected features
3	Repository induced dissolution of the host rock
4	Advance of a dissolution front
5	Movement on a large fault inside the controlled area but outside the repository
6	Movement on a large fault within the repository
7	Movement on a small fault inside the controlled area but outside the repository
8	Movement on a small fault within the repository
9	Movement on a large fault outside the controlled area
10a	Extrusive magmatic event that occurs during the first 500 yr after closure
10b	Extrusive magmatic event that occurs 500 to 10,000 yr after closure
11	Intrusive magmatic event
12	Large-scale exploratory drilling
13	Small-scale exploratory drilling
14	Incomplete sealing of the shafts and the repository

[a]Source: Table 3.2 in DOE (1986a).

Ross sequence number	Sequence for climate change
1	An increase in infiltration due to climate change at the repository site increases the unsaturated water flux through the repository.
2	An increase in recharge due to climate change raises the water table beneath the repository above the top of the Calico Hills nonwelded tuff unit.
3	A higher water table short-circuits a flow barrier in the saturated zone, changing the pattern of flow.
4	Regionally higher water tables create discharge points closer to the repository, reducing the distance to the accessible environment. The rise in the regional water table floods the repository.
5	Perched water develops above the repository, diverting downward flow through the repository into localized zones.
6	Perched water develops at the base of the Topopah Spring welded unit. Flow through the Calico Hills unit is diverted into fracture zones draining the perched water table.

The sequences associated with climate change dismissed by Ross (1987) and the pages in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are as follows: increased recharge due to "greenhouse effect" warming that exceeds 50 percent (p. 16), recharge exceeding maximum level attained during the past 100,000 years (p. 16), new points of discharge of ground water from the water-table aquifer closer than 10 km from the repository if the repository does not flood (p. 18), release of radioactivity from discharge of perched water closer than 10 km from the repository (p. 18), and flooding of the repository by perched water (p. 19).

The sequences associated with stream erosion identified by Ross (1987) are given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for stream erosion
7	Entrenchment of the Amargosa River at Alkali Flat lowers base levels and increases regional gradients. Regional hydraulic relations are such that water-table lowering at Yucca Mountain is insignificant, but increases in ground-water velocity are significant.

Ross sequence number	Sequence for stream erosion (continued)
8	Beds of intermittent streams now resting on the Tiva Canyon welded tuff unit erode through to the underlying nonwelded unit. These washes form a barrier to lateral flow in the Tiva Canyon and divert flow downward. Regions of high flux are formed below them.

The sequences associated with stream erosion dismissed by Ross (1987) and the pages in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are as follows: major changes of course of the washes on Yucca Mountain (pp. 22-23), stream erosion rates in Yucca Mountain washes exceeding 50 m over the next 10,000 years (p. 23), stream erosion that exposes the repository (p. 23), and substantial change in saturated-zone hydraulic gradient due to erosion upgradient or near the repository (p. 23).

The sequences associated with flooding identified by Ross (1987) are given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for flooding
9	Flooding of the washes on Yucca Mountain is a major source of infiltration, and zones of higher moisture flux exist permanently or seasonally below washes. One or more of these zones is not detected during the site characterization.
10	Occasional major floods provide sufficient infiltration to overcome the capillary barrier that usually diverts flow laterally, creating temporary wetter zones beneath the washes.
11	Most percolation through the deeper unsaturated portions of Yucca Mountain occurs following the major precipitation events whose recurrence interval is tens, hundreds, or thousands of years. After future events, there are periods of tens to hundreds of years during which percolation through the unsaturated zone is increased over the present relatively dry conditions. Fracture flow then occurs in the Topopah Spring unit and perhaps other hydrogeologic units between the repository and the water table.

The sequences associated with faulting and seismicity identified by Ross (1987) are given in the following table.

Ross sequence number	Sequence for faulting and seismicity
12	Movement of a new or existing fault shears canisters along the line of the fault. The same fault also creates a "trap" for moisture moving laterally through the Tiva Canyon welded unit, and so the sheared canisters are placed in a region of enhanced downward moisture flux.
13	Fracture dilation along a new or existing fault creates zones of enhanced permeability in the Calico Hills and Paintbrush nonwelded units. Erosion of an arroyo at the surface and increased hydraulic conductivity of the Paintbrush unit create a zone of increased percolation along the fault. Moisture moves through fractures along the fault.
14	The downdip side of a new or existing fault moves up. The fault thus forms a "trap" for laterally moving moisture in the Tiva Canyon welded unit. A new region of enhanced flux through the Topopah Spring unit is created.
15	Fracturing along a newly mobilized fault creates a permeable pathway through the flow barrier north of the repository block. The magnitude of the resulting change in the flow system is sufficient to raise the water table under the repository to the top of the Calico Hills nonwelded unit.
16	As in sequence number 15, fault-caused fracturing breaches the flow barrier north of the repository block. Flow is blocked by another barrier, not apparent from the current head distribution, and the resulting rise in water table floods the repository. The water passing through the repository discharges through springs in Fortymile Wash.

The sequences associated with faulting and seismicity dismissed by Ross (1987) and the pages in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are as follows: seismic acceleration due to earthquakes centered outside the site (p. 28); formation of new faults in areas where an existing fault of the same nature might not be discovered during site characterization (p. 29), fault uplift bringing waste canister to the surface (p. 29), and fault movement sufficient to place nonadjacent tuff units in contact (p. 30).

The sequences associated with geochemical changes identified by Ross (1987) are given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for geochemical changes
17	Precipitation of zeolites or other minerals in the saturated zone reduces effective porosity without significantly improving the sorptive properties of the rocks.
18	Fracture flow occurs in the unsaturated zone at current percolation rates. Precipitation or alteration of minerals blocks the small-aperture fractures and diverts the flow into larger fractures, increasing the water velocity.

The sequences associated with undetected faults and shear zones identified by Ross (1987) are given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for undetected faults and shear zones
19	A wet zone below a minor fault through the Tiva Canyon lower contact escapes detection during repository construction, and waste is emplaced in it.
20	An undetected major fault dips below the repository. The fault has greater permeability than surrounding unfaulted rock, and enhanced moisture flow along it passes through the Calico Hills nonwelded unit in fractures.
21	An undetected major fault dips below the repository. Because of the formation of fault gouge, matrix hydraulic conductivity in the fault is less than the moisture flux, and so moisture flows through the Calico Hills nonwelded unit along fractures in or just above the fault.
22	An undetected fault provides a path for water movement from the tuff aquifer beneath the western portion of the repository to an underlying carbonate aquifer.

The sequences associated with undetected faults and shear zones dismissed by Ross (1987) and the pages in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are as follows: existence of undiscovered major through-going faults in tuff at the repository site (p. 34), undiscovered faults in underlying Paleozoic sedimentary or igneous intrusive rocks (p. 35), existence of a major fault that intersects the repository workings but is not discovered during the construction phase (p. 35), fault passing above the repository but not intersecting it (p. 35), water movement from tuff to carbonate aquifers in the eastern portion of the repository site (p. 36), and undetected faults affecting only the saturated tuff aquifer (p. 37).

The sequences associated with undetected dikes identified by Ross (1987) are given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for undetected dikes
23	An undetected dike passing through the Calico Hills nonwelded unit beneath the repository has very low matrix permeability but fairly high fracture permeability. Moisture infiltrating along the dike moves through fractures.

The sequence associated with undetected dikes dismissed by Ross (1987) and the pages in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are undetected intrusive sills (p. 38).

The sequence associated with extrusive magmatic activity identified by Ross (1987) is given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for extrusive magmatic activity
24	A basaltic volcano erupts through the repository. The volcano is fed through a dike; waste canisters within the dike mix with the magma, and their contents are erupted.

The sequences associated with extrusive magmatic activity dismissed by Ross (1987) and the pages in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are as follows: direct release by volcanic eruption of waste that does not lie within a feeder dike or vent (p. 41), and indirect releases due to volcanic eruption (p. 42).

The sequences associated with faulty waste emplacement identified by Ross (1987) are given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for faulty waste emplacement
25	Canisters are placed by mistake in wet zones.
26	Drains installed to divert water around canisters are improperly built or omitted altogether over some canisters.

Ross sequence number	Sequence for faulty waste emplacement (continued)
27	Canisters are left lying on the floor of repository drifts. These canisters have poorer heat removal than those properly emplaced, and their increased horizontal cross-section raises the amount of water they intercept. Water drips on the canisters and corrodes them even while their temperatures are well above 95 degrees centigrade.
28	Canisters are placed closer together than planned. As a result, temperatures inside the packages are higher than anticipated and corrosion of fuel cladding is accelerated.
29	Some waste canisters are manufactured so improperly that they fail early.
30	Some waste canisters are punctured or abraded during emplacement.

The sequence associated with irrigation identified by Ross (1987) is given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for irrigation
31	Irrigation in Midway Valley increases the moisture flux through the repository.

The sequences associated with irrigation dismissed by Ross (1987) and the pages in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are as follows: irrigation directly over the repository (p. 45), significant increase in hydraulic gradient caused by irrigation elsewhere in the ground-water basin (p. 46), and construction of water reservoirs above the repository (p. 47).

The sequences associated with intentional ground-water recharge or withdrawal identified by Ross (1987) are given in the following table.

Ross sequence number	Sequence for ground-water recharge or withdrawal
32	Water is collected in covered cisterns above the repository to enhance ground-water recharge.
33	Irrigation wells are drilled in Midway Valley.
34	Irrigation wells are drilled in Crater Flat or Jackass Flats.

Ross sequence number	Sequence for ground-water recharge or withdrawal (continued)
35	Pumping rates increase in the presently irrigated areas around the town of Amargosa Valley. The water table is significantly drawn down, and the hydraulic gradient increases.
36	Mine dewatering is carried out directly below the repository. The saturated zone is eliminated as a barrier.

The sequence associated with intentional ground-water recharge or withdrawal discussed by Ross (1989) and the page in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are artificial recharge using water imported from outside the vicinity of the repository (p. 47).

The sequence associated with large-scale alterations of hydrology identified by Ross (1987) is given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for large-scale alterations of hydrology
37	An active management scheme is introduced for the Alkali Flat-Furnace Creek Ranch ground-water basin, by which hydraulic gradients in the saturated zone beneath the repository are increased.

The sequence associated with large-scale alterations of hydrology dismissed by Ross (1987) and the page in his report given the reasons for inclusion is damming of the Colorado River (p. 50).

The sequence associated with undiscovered boreholes identified by Ross (1987) is given in the following table.

Ross sequence number	Sequence for undiscovered boreholes
38	A horizontally emplaced waste canister lies in the trace of an old undiscovered borehole. Moisture conditions are wetter than now thought, and water flows in fractures in the old borehole.

The sequences associated with undiscovered boreholes dismissed by Ross (1987) and the page in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are as follows: undiscovered boreholes in which waste canisters are not placed (p. 51), and emplacement of wastes in tunnel floors in the trace of an undiscovered borehole (p. 51).

The sequence associated with undiscovered mine shafts identified by Ross (1987) is given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for undiscovered mine shafts
39	An old prospect in a wash retains water after floods and therefore is a source of enhanced infiltration. The wet zone beneath it is not detected during repository construction, and waste is emplaced in it.

The sequences associated with undiscovered mine shafts dismissed by Ross (1987), and the pages in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are as follows: undiscovered deep mine shafts (p. 52), and undiscovered shallow prospector shafts outside washes (p. 52).

The sequences associated with exploratory drilling identified by Ross (1987) are given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for exploratory drilling
40	Exploratory drillers intercept a waste canister and bring waste up with the cuttings.
41	Water introduced into the unsaturated zone as drilling fluid by exploratory drillers drains downward, through the repository.
42	An exploratory borehole creates a pathway for preferential flow through the upper nonwelded unit, and a wetter zone develops beneath in the Topopah Spring welded unit.
43	Surfactants introduced into unsaturated rock by drilling fluids shift its characteristic curve, draining smaller pores around the borehole. Water introduced by subsequent infiltration events acts as though air were the wetting phase and flows through large pores and fractures.

The sequence associated with exploratory drilling dismissed by Ross (1987) and the page in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are exploratory drilling to prepare for recovery of HLW from the repository (p. 53).

The sequences associated with resource mining identified by Ross (1987) are given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for resource mining
44	Builders of a mine shaft intercept a waste canister and bring radioactive waste up with the mine waste.
45	Water introduced into the unsaturated zone for mining above the repository drains downward through the repository.
46	A mine shaft crates a pathway for preferential flow through the upper nonwelded unit, and a wetter zone develops beneath in the Topopah Spring welded unit.
47	Surfactants introduced into unsaturated rock by drilling fluids shift its characteristic curve, draining smaller pores around the mine. Water introduced by subsequent infiltration events acts as though air were the wetting phase and flows through large pores and fractures.

The sequences associated with resource mining dismissed by Ross (1987) and the pages in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are as follows: lowering of water table due to "mining" of ground water (p. 55); and mining of the repository level for minerals other than the waste itself (p. 56).

The sequences associated with climate control identified by Ross (1987) are given in the following table.

Ross sequence number	Sequence for climate control
48	An increase in recharge at the repository site due to artificial climate change increases the unsaturated water flux through the repository.
49	An increase in recharge due to climate modification raises the water table beneath the repository above the top of the Calico Hills nonwelded tuff unit and induces fracture flow in the welded Topopah Spring unit.
50	Recharge induced by large-scale climate modification raises the regional water table sufficiently to flood the repository.
51	A higher water table due to climate modification short-circuits a flow barrier in the saturated zone, changing the pattern of flow.

Ross sequence number	Sequence for climate control (continued)
52	Perched water develops above the repository because of climate-modification-induced recharge, diverting downward flow through the repository into localized zones.
53	An increase in recharge due to climate control causes perched water to develop at the base of the Topopah Spring welded unit. Flow through the Calico Hills nonwelded unit is diverted into fracture zones draining the perched water table.

The sequences associated with differential elastic response to heating identified by Ross (1987) are given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for differential elastic response to heating
54	Thermal expansion closes most fractures near the repository. Pre-existing fracture percolation is diverted into fractures of larger aperture.
55	Differential thermal expansion of surrounding rocks stresses canisters, leading to stress-corrosion cracking.
56	Differential thermal expansion of surrounding rocks creates stresses that shear canisters.
57	Rock movements driven by thermal expansion of underlying units open fractures through the Paintbrush nonwelded unit. This creates local zones of increased flux through the unsaturated units below.

The sequence associated with differential elastic response to heating dismissed by Ross (1987) and the page in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are opening or closing of fractures due to thermal expansion under natural flux conditions (p. 60).

The sequence associated with nonelastic response to heating identified by Ross (1987) is given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for nonelastic response to heating
58	Thermally induced fracturing of rocks immediately surrounding waste canisters creates capillary barriers to movement of moisture between blocks of the rock matrix. The matrix is locally saturated, forcing flow out into the fractures and resulting in film flow or droplet impact on waste packages. The result is accelerated localized corrosion and waste dissolution.

The sequences associated with nonelastic response to heating dismissed by Ross (1987) and the page in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are as follows: fracturing of rock due to thermal expansion more than 10 cm from waste canisters (p. 62), and changes in ground-water travel time due to fracturing of rock near canisters (p. 62).

The sequences associated with temperature-driven fluid migration identified by Ross (1987) are given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for temperature-driven fluid migration
59	Water accumulates above a repository during the thermal period because of evaporation and condensation. When gravity-driven flow resumes, a large volume of water contacts canisters, and flow goes through fractures.
60	Emplacement of waste in the floor of repository drifts creates a large thermal gradient across the drifts. Moisture condenses on the roof and drips onto canisters, accelerating corrosion.
61	Temperature inhomogeneities in the repository lead to localized accumulation of moisture above it. Wet zones form below the areas of moisture accumulation.
62	A thermal convection cell arises in the saturated zone beneath the repository. The thermally driven outward water flow in the upper portion of the tuff aquifer increases ground-water velocities.

The sequences associated with temperature-driven fluid migration dismissed by Ross (1987) and the pages in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are as follows: temperature dependence of water pressure, density, viscosity and rock relative permeability (p. 63), formation of artificial geysers by steam pressure of repository (p. 65), transport of radioactive aerosols to surface through drained fractures (p. 66), Soret effect (p. 67), and thermal osmosis (p. 67).

The sequence associated with local mechanical fracturing identified by (Ross 1987) is given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for local mechanical fracturing
63	Rock bursts propel rocks into waste packages and puncture the canisters.

The sequences associated with local mechanical fracturing dismissed by Ross (1987) and the pages in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are as follows: subsidence creating open fractures to surface (p. 68), and increases in permeability due to fracturing around repository workings (p. 69).

The sequences associated with corrosion identified by Ross (1982) are given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for corrosion
64	Water drips or wicks onto canisters at specific locations, leading to buildup of brine deposits on small previously stressed areas. These areas are focuses of localized attack.
65	Water drips or wicks onto canisters at specific locations, leading to buildup of brine deposits on small areas that happen to have previously been stressed. Stress-corrosion cracking ensues.
66	The canister material is subject to stress-corrosion cracking, but the initiation time is too long to be detected in tests. Canisters fail by this mechanism a few decades after the repository has been sealed.
67	Canisters are sensitized by long-term storage at moderately hot temperatures in the repository. Stress-corrosion cracking (or perhaps intergranular corrosion) ensues in a stressed zone.
68	Zircaloy cladding is subject to stress-corrosion cracking at repository temperatures, but initiation times are too long for detection in in-reactor service or in the repository testing program.
69	After canister breach, colloids of corrosion products sorb normally highly retarded radionuclides and carry them away unretarded.

The sequences associated with corrosion discussed by Ross (1987) and the pages in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are as follows: erosion corrosion (p. 70), galvanic corrosion (p. 70), selective leaching (p. 70), and hydrogen attack on canisters (p. 71).

The sequences associated with chemical reaction of the waste package with rock identified by Ross (1987) are given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for chemical reaction of waste package with rock
70	Water dripping or running over waste contains ions that precipitate uranium. The precipitation reaction removes uranium from solution and increases the rate of fuel dissolution.
71	Waste and rock are placed in close juxtaposition by mechanical failure of emplacement holes or drifts, or by small movements on faults. Reactions between uranium, rock minerals, and water in contact with both precipitate uranium, leading the spent fuel to dissolve more rapidly than if constrained by the equilibrium solubility of uranium.
72	The high dissolved-silica content of natural waters entering the repository causes rapid corrosion of Zircaloy fuel cladding.
73	Colloids are formed from the rock by alteration under thermal, mechanical, and chemical stresses. Normally well-retarded radioelements such as plutonium and americium sorb to the colloids.
74	Waste-contaminated water reacts with rock, and colloid phases of minerals containing radioelements are formed by coprecipitation. The colloids are transported with little or no retardation.

The sequences associated with geochemical alteration identified by Ross (1987) are given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for geochemical alteration
75	During the period of heating of rocks around the repository, minerals adjacent to the residual water-bearing pores are altered to clays. These clays clog the pores. When the repository cools, water flows through fractures.

Ross sequence number	Sequence for geochemical alteration (continued)
76	During the thermal period, zeolite minerals in fracture fillings are altered to less sorptive phases.
77	Waters moving away from the hot region around the repository precipitate minerals derived from dissolved constituents of tuff and cements used in repository construction. These minerals clog pores and divert subsequent flows into fractures.
78	Evaporation of ground water in the hot zone near the repository horizon leaves precipitates that plug pores. As a result, when gravity-driven flow resumes, water near the repository is diverted into fractures. Initially, there is a pulse of corrosive brine.
79	Evaporation of ground water in the hot zone near the repository horizon leaves precipitate. When gravity-driven flow resumes, the precipitates redissolve, and after a short period of fracture flow, the flow returns to the matrix. There is a considerable period of flow of corrosion brines with elevated dissolved solids.
80	There is fracture flow in the Topopah Spring welded unit even under undisturbed conditions. Chemical reactions induced by repository heat plug smaller-aperture fractures. After the thermal pulse ends, percolation is diverted into larger fractures.
81	Water passing through the warm region around the repository is depleted of calcite by temperature-induced precipitation. Below the repository, the calcite-poor water dissolves out calcite veins in the Calico Hills nonwelded unit.

The sequences associated with chemical alteration dismissed by Ross (1987) and the pages in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are as follows: thermal release of moisture from hydrated zeolites (p. 76), and loss of mechanical strength due to thermal dehydration and rehydration of the Topopah Spring welded unit (p. 77).

The sequences associated with microbial activity identified in Ross (1987) are given in the following table:

Ross sequence number	Sequence for geochemical alteration
82	Microbial activity accelerates canister corrosion.

Ross sequence number	Sequence for geochemical alteration (continued)
83	Microbial activity accelerates cladding corrosion.
84	Radionuclides are incorporated into microorganisms or sorbed on their surfaces. Waste dissolution is accelerated. The nuclides taken up by microorganisms are unaffected by chemical sorption or matrix diffusion.

The sequences associated with microbial activity discussed by Ross (1987) and the pages in his report giving the reasons for exclusion are microbial deterioration of concrete or bentonite (p. 82); transport of radioactivity by motile microorganisms (p. 82); and microbial alteration of ground-water chemistry (p. 83).

Ross (1987) also dismissed, or chose not to identify, any sequences associated with certain events, processes, and features in the IAEA list (IAEA, 1983); a summary of these dismissed events, processes, and features is given in the following table, along with the page numbers of his report where the reasons for dismissing each item are given.

Event, process, or feature	Sequence description and Ross text page
Hydrology change	Change in hydrologic system not caused by some other event or process (p. 20)
Sea-level change	Change of base level due to flooding of Death Valley caused by seal level change (p. 20).
Denudation	Lowering of the land surface to the level of the repository by denudation (p. 21).
	Denudation that exposes the present water table within the ground-water basin (p. 22).
	Change in unsaturated-zone flow, due to removal of the Paintbrush nonwelded unit above the repository by denudation (p. 22).
Glacial erosion	Glaciation (p. 24).
Sedimentation	Sedimentation that affects the repository (p. 27).
Diagenesis	Sedimentary diagenesis (p. 28).
Diapirism	No salt or shale formation (p. 28).
Dissolution	Not a concern at Yucca Mountain (p. 33).

Event, process, or feature	Sequence description and Ross text page (continued)
Brine pockets	Not a concern at Yucca Mountain (p. 33).
Orogeny	Cessation or reversal of current Great Basin orogeny (p. 33).
Epeirogenic uplift and subsidence	Epeirogenic uplift (p. 34).
	Epeirogenic subsidence of repository toward water table (p. 34).
Isostatic uplift and subsidence	No Pleistocene glaciation at Yucca Mountain (p. 34).
Undetected breccia pipes	Not a concern at Yucca Mountain (p. 38).
Undetected lava tubes	Existence of lava tubes unlikely at Yucca Mountain (p. 38).
Undetected gas or brine pockets	Not a concern at Yucca Mountain (p. 39).
Magmatic intrusion	Granitic intrusion (p. 39).
	Intrusion of large bodies of basaltic magma (p. 39).
	Container failure caused by intrusion of dikes or sills (p. 39).
	Intrusion of magma into repository drifts (p. 40).
	Indirect releases of radioactivity due to magmatic intrusion accompanying a volcanic eruption (p. 40).
	Magmatic intrusion below the repository (p. 40).
Meteorite impact	Probability less than 1 in 100 million (p. 42).
Shaft-seal failure	Not a concern in unsaturated zone (p. 43).
Failure of exploration-borehole seals	Not a concern in unsaturated zone (p. 43).

Event, process, or feature	Sequence description and Ross text page (continued)
Chemical liquid waste disposal	Deep-well injection of chemical wastes (p. 49).
	Construction of surface impoundments for chemical wastes (p. 50).
Archaeological exhumation	Not a proper concern of performance assessment (p. 55).
War	Fracturing of rock by nuclear explosion in a war (p. 57); exhumation of waste by nuclear explosion in a war (p. 57).
Sabotage	Unlikely action at Yucca mountain (p. 57).
Waste recovery	Not a proper concern of performance assessment (p. 57).
Canister movement	Significant canister movement not expected (p. 68).
Gas generation	Not a concern in an unsaturated repository (p. 75).
Radiolysis	Radiolytic pressure buildup (p. 79).
Decay-product gas generation	Not an independent failure mode for canister generation (p. 80).
Nuclear criticality	Criticality in a spent-fuel canister (p. 81).
	Criticality due to precipitation of plutonium in a zone of reducing conditions (p. 81).
	Criticality due to accumulation of plutonium on a sorbing zeolite seam (p. 81).

Finally, Ross (1987) did not explicitly consider disruptive sequences that could involve the release and transport of gas-phase radioelements, such as carbon-14 and iodine, to the accessible environment.

Scenario classes defined in the Ross study

The in-text tables that compose most of the preceding subsection on the Ross study list the 25 agents identified in the Ross study. These agents include eleven natural processes, one anthropogenic process (climate control), three natural events (flooding, faulting, and extrusive magmatic activity), five anthropogenic events, and five undetected features. An estimate can be made of the number of independent, mutually exclusive scenario classes contained in the Ross study. (The reader may wish to review Part 1 (methods of constructing a CCDF), for the rationale of these

estimates. The eight events and five undetected features are assumed to be mutually statistically independent entities; that is, information about the occurrence of one such entity gives no information about the future occurrence of any of the others. All hypothetical sequences are also assumed to be somehow resolved, so that there are no two-state alternative models in the picture. The number of independent, mutually exclusive scenario classes is then

$$2^{8+5} = 2^{13} - 8,921.$$

This estimate illustrates why the DOE cannot give a detailed description of all the independent, mutually exclusive scenario classes it will consider within the confines of the present document. The estimate also demonstrates the necessity for screening proposed events, processes, features, and alternative models against consequences, in order to reduce the number of scenario classes that will ultimately be included in a licensing assessment. For each event, feature, or two-state alternative model that can be eliminated by screening (that is, by showing that inclusion of such an agent in the analyses leads to insignificant changes in the CCDF). The number of scenario classes can be reduced by one half.

Favorable and potentially adverse conditions of 10 CFR 60.122

The siting criteria of 10 CFR 60.122 specify certain potentially adverse conditions (PACs). The evaluation of the site with regard to these conditions is taken up in the strategy to resolve Issue 1.8, which directly addresses the siting criteria (Section 8.3.5.17). Because these conditions may be important to waste isolation, they should be taken into account in the strategy for the resolution of this issue in particular, in the development of scenarios for the evaluation of release of radionuclides to the accessible environment.

The set of PACs from the regulation is listed in Table 8.3.5.17-2, which numbers them in the same order as 10 CFR 60.122. The 24 PACs listed in that table do not necessarily define 24 disruptive scenarios. For example, the set of PACs was developed on the basis of generic considerations, and a few do not apply to the Yucca Mountain site at all (e.g., PAC 10). Others may be associated with the expected characteristics of the site (e.g., PAC 24) and therefore need to be taken into account in the nominal, or expected-case, scenario class. Others of these PACs, however, should be explicitly considered in developing the classes of disruptive scenarios for the analysis of repository system performance. The association of each such PAC with one or more scenario classes is explained in the next subsection. The approach used in making this association was simply to compare each of the PACs with the scenario classes developed for the potentially significant, site-specific processes and events. This comparison led to an effort to ensure that each PAC considered applicable to the Yucca Mountain site is addressed by the nominal scenario class or by one or more of the disruptive scenario classes. Further, each of the scenario classes was defined to clarify the association with the relevant PACs. This association is explained in the next subsection and is discussed in some detail in Section 8.3.5.17.

Scenario classes to guide the site-characterization program

The specification of the information needs to resolve this issue is to be framed in terms of a set of scenario classes chosen to address all the processes and events considered potentially significant to release of radionuclides to the accessible environment at the Yucca mountain site. This set includes the nominal class and a sufficient number of additional classes to address all the credible disruptions to this undisturbed class.

As the discussions in the previous subsections suggest, few scenarios have been screened out at this time. In general, the scenarios eliminated by Ross (1987) and those scenarios screened out as part of the DOE decision-aiding methodology (1986a) are assumed to be inapplicable at Yucca Mountain. Such scenarios would include events such as meteorite impact and tornadoes, and processes such as sedimentation and glaciation. The scenarios specified in the compilations of the previous subsections are considered by the DOE to be adequate to guide the testing program.

As explained previously in the discussion entitled "DOE approach to constructing a CCDF, the nominal scenario class is defined by the conditions that the available evidence suggests are expected at the site. These conditions are described in Section 8.3.5.8 and, more generally, in Section 8.0, which discusses the top-level strategy for the site-characterization program. The following three paragraphs are taken from Section 8.0 as a brief summary of the scope of the nominal scenario class.

The currently available information suggests that small amounts of water are available to percolate slowly downward through Yucca mountain. If the Yucca Mountain site is developed for a repository, water that moves through the unsaturated rock above the repository could continue down to the unsaturated rock unit in which underground repository would be constructed. If any of this water could reach penetrate the engineered barrier system and the emplaced waste, it might dissolve radionuclides and carry them in solution through the unsaturated rock below the repository to the saturated rock deep beneath the site. After reaching saturated rock, the water joins the much larger, horizontal flow there; therefore, radionuclides that are carried by the water could be transported by the flow in the saturated zone and move toward the accessible environment.

This sequence of events--downward water movement, water penetration into the engineered-barrier system, and downward transport of radionuclides to saturated rock, and horizontal transport to the accessible environment --defines the expected mode of release in the nominal scenario. According to the available evidence, the percolation flux at and below the repository horizon is very low. Furthermore, it appears that the percolation of water through the unsaturated rock units at this depth is primarily in the rock matrix rather than through fractures. If the water is held tightly within the rock, as it appears to be, it would not be excepted to move from the rock across the air gap to the waste container; the water would therefore not be expected to reach the waste. Furthermore, the results of preliminary studies suggest that the quantity of moving water is so small that any corrosion of the disposal container and the dissolution of radionuclides would be very limited even if the water could cross the air gap. The evidence also suggests that the movement of water in the rock matrix is very slow, and

therefore the transport of any radionuclides dissolved in this water downward through the unsaturated rocks below the repository would be very slow. An additional characteristic of the unsaturated rock is the geochemistry of the water in the rock, which will determine the radionuclide dissolution and the retardation of radionuclide transport.

One further sequence of events might contribute to a release under the conditions expected at Yucca Mountain and is also included in the nominal case. If the waste containers are breached, the radionuclides that exist in the waste in gaseous form might move upward through the air spaces in the unsaturated rock above the repository. They might then reach the accessible environment at the ground surface above the repository. The available information is not complete enough to decide definitively whether this sequence is capable of producing significant releases. It is not clear, for example, that the waste form can release gaseous radionuclides rapidly enough or in sufficient quantities for the release to be important. Nevertheless, in this scenario class it is assumed that this mode could also contribute to release to the accessible environment.

The effects of repository construction and the heat generated by the emplaced waste must be fully taken into account in the nominal scenario class. These effects include changes in the hydrologic properties and in the fluid conditions in the vicinity of the waste packages; they include the effects of temperature increases and thermomechanical stresses on the waste packages themselves. The testing program must provide the information to evaluate these and other effects for the nominal scenario class.

There are clearly large uncertainties in the specification of the nominal scenario class, and the information needs for this issue will have to address the full range of these uncertainties. The investigations of the hydrogeologic, geochemical, and rock characteristics that fully specify this scenario must take into account the full range of tectonic and climatic conditions that are expected at the site. In addition, any expected changes in these conditions that are not sufficient to change the general description that has been given would be taken into account in the nominal class. Therefore, the nominal class can include a wide range of expected tectonic and seismic activity and climatic conditions.

Extreme conditions outside the ranges considered for the nominal class, that is, those that may be possible but have very low probability of occurrence at the site, are considered in the category of disturbed conditions. For example, extreme values of the percolation flux that are sufficiently credible to warrant consideration, but that are not, in fact, expected at the site would be included in this category. The category of disturbed conditions also includes those that would result from disruptive processes or events. For example, tectonic activity that could significantly change ground-water flow conditions would be taken into account in the category of disturbed conditions. Any volcanic activity or extreme climatic changes would also be included in the category of disturbances to the nominal case, as would credible human activities that could interfere with expected repository system performance.

Such disturbances will be explicitly taken into account in the disruptive scenario classes. The three scenario-screening compilations

described above identify a number of disruptive scenarios and provide the basis for selecting the scenario classes used to develop the information needs for this performance issue. The disruptive scenario classes that are used to guide testing and the correlation of these scenario classes with the scenarios of the three compilations are presented in Table 8.3.5.13-2. This table show that this set of scenario classes is strongly correlated with the set of scenarios of the Ross report. Thus, the issue resolution strategy is in general agreement with the screening and conclusions of this study.

The list of candidate scenario classes in Table 8.3.5.13-2, however, differs from the set of scenarios from the Ross study in two ways. First, several of the scenarios described by Ross are enveloped by the nominal scenario class in this issue-resolution strategy; they do not appear in the table. For example, the particular flooding scenarios (scenarios 9, 10, and 11) and geochemical-change scenarios (scenarios 17 and 18) considered by Ross lead to hydrogeologic and geochemical conditions that are taken into account in the nominal class. That is, investigations of the range of hydrogeologic and geochemical characteristics by the site characterization program should be adequate for understanding the effects described in those scenarios.

All the Ross scenarios associated with undetected features (scenarios 19 through 23, 38, and 39) have also been included in the nominal scenario class. At this stage of the site characterization program, it seems appropriate to plan to detect such features and to investigate the full range of conditions associated with heterogeneity at the site. Note that the categorization of scenarios as nominal or disruptive is merely a matter of convenience since the scenarios will be investigated in either instance. It may be determined that for licensing it would be convenient to categorize scenarios that involve undetected features separately from the nominal class. But for the sake of developing the strategy to test for the features of the site, this separation is not important.

Finally, those Ross scenarios associated with the full ranges of conditions to which the waste package is subjected (for example, the full range of temperatures expected from the heat generated by the waste and the full range of local fluid and chemical conditions expected near the waste packages) are all included in the nominal class. In the Ross study, scenarios 25 through 30 and 53 through 84 were developed to ensure that such conditions would receive explicit consideration. All these conditions will be evaluated in the waste-package program (Section 8.3.4) and are included here as part of the nominal class.

The second difference between the scenario classes of Table 8.3.5.13-2 and those of the Ross study is the addition of several scenario classes. They have been added to the set as part of the development of the SCP and the ongoing evaluations of alternative conceptual models. The scenario classes that have been added are briefly described in the following in-text tables in the format used to describe the scenarios of the Ross study in a previous subsection.

The sequences associated with surface flooding or impoundments are given in the following table.

Table 8.3.5.13-2. Disruptive scenario classes for the site characterization program (page 1 of 2)

Scenario initiating event or process	Number of scenario class	Scenario compilation: Decision-aiding methodology[a]	Scenario compilation: Ross study[b]	Scenario compilation: Potentially adverse conditions[c]	Release model[d]	Barriers affected: Seal system	Barriers affected: Waste package	Barriers affected: Unsaturated zone	Barriers affected: Saturated zone	Scenario class category[e]
Extreme climate change	1		1	5,23	I		X	X		C-1
	2		2	5,22	I			X		C-2
	3		3	5	I				X	D-1
	4		4	5,22	I			X	X	C-2,D-1
	5		5	5	I		X	X		C-3
	6		6	5	I		X	X		C-3
Stream erosion	7		7	5,16	I				X	D-2
	8		8	5,16	I		X	X		C-1
Faulting and seismicity	9	6,8	12	5,23	I		X	X		C-1
	10	5,7	13	5,23	I		X	X		C-1
	11	5,7	14	5,23	I		X	X		C-1
	12	9	15	4,5,11,12	I			X	X	C-2
	13	9	16	4,5,7,8, 22	I		X	X	X	C-2,C-3
	14	5,7	89	4,5,7,8, 22	I			X	X	C-2,D-2
					I		X	X		C-1
Intrusive magmatic activity	15	11	90	5	I		X	X		C-1
	16	11	91	5	I		X	X		C-3
	17	11	92	5,7	I		X	X		C-3
	18	11	93	5						
Extrusive magmatic activity	19	10	24	15	D					A-1
Irrigation	20		31	2,5	I		X	X		C-1
Intentional ground-water withdrawal	21		32	2,5	I		X	X		C-1
	22		33	2,5	I		X	X		C-1
	23		34	2,5,22	I			X	X	C-2,D-1
	24		35	2,5	I				X	D-2
	25		36	2,5	I				X	D-1
	26		37	2,5	I				X	D-1

Table 8.3.5.13-2. Disruptive scenario classes for the site characterization program (page 2 of 2)

Scenario initiating event or process	Number of scenario class	Scenario compilation: Decision-aiding methodology[a]	Scenario compilation: Ross study[b]	Scenario compilation: Potentially adverse conditions[c]	Release model[d]	Barriers affected: Seal system	Barriers affected: Waste package	Barriers affected: Unsaturated zone	Barriers affected: Saturated zone	Scenario class category[e]
Exploratory drilling	27	13	40	2,17	D					A-2
	28		41	2,5,17	I		X	X		C-1,C-3
	29		42	2,5,17	I		X	X		C-1,C-3
	30		43	2,5,17	I		X	X		C-3
Resource mining	31		44	2,17	D					A-2
	32		45	2,5,17	I		X	X		C-1
	33		46	2,5,17	I		X	X		C-1,C-3
	34		47	2,5,17	I		X	X		C-3
Climate control	35		48	2,5	I		X	X		C-1
	36		49	2,5,22	I			X		C-2
	37		50	2,5,22	I			X		C-2
	38		51	2,5	I				X	D-1
	39		52	2,5	I		X	X		C-1
Surface flooding or impoundments	40		1,85	3,5	I	X	X	X		C-1
	41		1,86	3,5	I	X	X	X		C-1
	42		1,87	3,5	I	X	X	X		C-1
	43		1,88	2,5	I	X	X	X		C-1
Regional changes in tectonic regime	44		93	5,11,22	I			X		C-2
	45		94	4,5,11,22	I			X	X	C-2,D-1,D-2
Folding, uplift, and subsidence	46		95	5,11	I		X	X		C-1
	47		96	5,11	I		X	X		C-1
	48		97	5,11,22	I			X		C-2
	49		98	5,11	I		X	X		C-1

[a]These numbers represent the potential significant scenarios as listed in Table 3-2 of DOE (1986a).

[b](Sequence numbers from Ross (1987), supplemented by the scenarios (numbers 85 through 99) constructed during SCP development and the evaluations of alternative conceptual models.

[c]These numbers represent the potentially adverse conditions as listed in 10 CFR 60.122 that are associated with one or more scenario classes (see discussion in the text).

[d]I = indirect; D = direct.

[e]Scenario class categories are defined in Table 8.3.5.13-4.

Sequence number	Sequence for surface flooding or impoundments
85	Flooding occurs in Drill Hole Wash, and percolation flux is substantially increased below the wash. Some water seeps to sealed shafts and boreholes where there are unexpectedly large flows down through seal material or down through the disturbed rock around these seals.
86	Faulting at the surface leads to a scarp that produces an impoundment during a period of high precipitation. Percolation flux is substantially increased beneath this impoundment. Some water seeps to sealed shafts and boreholes where there are unexceptedly large flows down through seal materials or down through the disturbed rock around the seals.
87	Volcanic activity in the vicinity of the site leads to damming that produces a large surface-water impoundment. Percolation flux is substantially increased beneath this impoundment. Some water seeps to sealed shafts and boreholes where there are unexpectedly large flows down through seal materials or down through the disturbed rock around the seals.
88	A large surface-water impoundment is constructed near the site. Percolation flux is substantially increased beneath this impoundment. Some water seeps to sealed shafts and boreholes where there are unexpectedly large flows down through the seal material or down through the disturbed rock around the seals.

The sequence associated with faulting and seismicity is given in the following table:

Sequence number	Sequence for faulting and seismicity
89	Fault creep incudes minor restructuring of the in situ strain-energy field. This change causes short-term stress-induced fluctuations in the level of the water table.

The sequences associated with magmatic intrusion are given in the following table:

Sequence number	Sequence for magmatic intrusion
90	Igneous activity leads to a sill that extends over a portion of the underground facility. Water percolating down is diverted at the top surface of the relatively impermeable sill; local percolation flux near the sill is therefore much higher than average flux expected at the site.
91	Igneous intrusion near the underground facility causes extreme changes to rock hydrologic properties.
92	Igneous intrusion near the underground facility causes extreme changes in rock geochemical properties.
93	Igneous intrusion causes a barrier to flow or drastically alters thermal conditions, causing the water table to rise.

The sequences associated with regional changes in the tectonic regime are given in the following table:

Sequence number	Regional changes in the tectonic regime
94	The current tectonic environment at the site is extensional. Fault movement relieves the stresses, causing the fractures in the system to decrease in aperture. The water from the saturated-zone fractures is driven up into the unsaturated-zone fractures, raising the water table.
95	The in situ heat flow at the site changes with time because of large-scale changes in the tectonic environment. The modifications in the temperature gradients at the site lead to convective flow in the saturated zone and modifications to the elevation of the water table.

The sequences associated with folding, uplift, and subsidence are given in the following table:

Sequence number	Sequence for folding, uplift, and subsidence
96	Tectonic folding changes the dip of the tuff beds at the site, thereby changing the local percolation flux to values not currently observed.

Sequence number	Sequence for folding, uplift, and subsidence (continued)
97	Uplift or subsidence changes the drainage at the site, thereby changing the local percolation flux to values not currently observed.
98	Folding, uplift, or subsidence lowers the underground facility with respect to the water table.
99	Subsidence of the mined underground facility creates impoundments or diverts drainage, thereby increasing the local percolation flux to values not currently observed.

Some of the scenario classes result in direct discharge of radionuclides to the surface. Others result in indirect releases; that is they produce movement of radionuclides through the barriers of the repository system to the accessible environment. The table labels the scenario classes according to these modes of release.

Because site investigations will address the scenario classes in Table 8.3.5.13-2, they will produce information needed to determine probabilities of occurrence. However, in order to develop the CCDF, information will also be needed to evaluate releases of radionuclides, and it is convenient to organize these scenarios according to their effects on waste isolation in order to guide the testing program to obtain this information. Table 8.3.5.13-2 also indicates the barriers of the repository system that are important to waste isolation and can be significantly affected in each scenario class. These barriers are (1) the engineered barrier system (2) the unsaturated zone, and (3) the saturated zone.

The engineered barriers include the waste container, the waste form for spent fuel, and the spent-fuel cladding. These components would provide barriers to the release of radionuclides to the host rock under the conditions expected at the site.

The unsaturated zone includes the Topopah Spring host rock, the Calico Hills unit in the unsaturated zone, and other unsaturated units that underlie the underground facility. These units are expected to provide barriers to radionuclide migration down to the water table. In addition, the unsaturated units that overlie the underground facility are expected to limit release of gaseous radionuclides to the surface.

The saturated zone includes all rock units beneath the water table. These units will serve as barriers to the transport of radionuclides that reach the water table.

It is convenient to organize the scenario classes according to the barriers that, in principle, would be significantly affected by them. To do this, a reference scenario class is defined. Ideally, this scenario would be for the expected, undisturbed conditions at the site. Because there is substantial uncertainty in the expected condition in many respects at

present, this scenario class is simply denoted as the nominal scenario class discussed earlier in this section.

Then, scenario categories are defined in which the barriers important to waste isolation are significantly disturbed from the conditions defined in the nominal scenario. These scenario categories are shown in Table 8.3.5.13-3. The first category (A) is for the direct-release scenarios. Two direct-release scenario classes were identified as one listed explicitly in the table.

Category B is for scenario classes in which only the engineered barriers are affected. The classes in this category that are considered relevant to the system performance objective are judged to occur concurrently with the scenarios in categories C or D or to be part of the uncertainty associated with nominal performance of engineered barrier system components (i.e., container and cladding degradation rates or waste-form dissolution rates and solubilities under various likely conditions). Thus, no independent, potentially significant scenario classes associated with category B appear in Table 8.3.5.13-3.

Category C is for the scenario classes in which major aspects of the unsaturated zone are disturbed. In these classes, the engineered barriers may also be affected. These scenario classes appear to be of three types: (1) ones in which the total or local percolation flux through the repository is increased, owing to the appearance of sources above the repository (e.g., those involving climatic change or local flooding from surficial sources); (2) ones in which the thickness of the unsaturated zone is decreased, for example, by a rise in the water-table level under the site; and (3) ones in which there are adverse changes in unsaturated-zone rock hydrologic properties or the geochemistry of the unsaturated zone. The logic of this organization follows from the fact that the appearance of any one of the changes (increased flux, decreased unsaturated-zone thickness, decreased saturated matrix conductivity, or decreased geochemical retardation properties) could lead to an increase in the rate at which dissolved radionuclide-bearing compounds are transported from the repository to the water table. Depending upon the events and processes associated with these changes, each change could appear singly or in combination, i.e., correlated with any or all of the other changes.

Category D is for scenarios in which the saturated zone is affected. The unsaturated zone and the engineered barriers could also be affected. Scenario classes in category D may be organized in a fashion similar to that of category C, but because saturated flow is not dominated by vertical flow like unsaturated-zone flow, the change "increased flux through the saturated zone" would be connected either with rises in the water-table level (considered in C-2) or increased linear water velocity (considered in D-2).

For completeness, the nominal scenario class is also included as category E.

The categories in Table 8.3.5.13-3 serve as the basis for the information needs for this issue. That is scenarios within a category are defined by the category of process or event that initiate the scenario and by the potential effects associated with the category; these factors define the

Table 8.3.5.13-3. Categories of scenarios delineated according to potential impacts on barriers of the geologic repository (scenario classes)

Disturbed performance of barriers.
(A) Direct Releases:
1) direct release in an extrusive magmatic event;
2) direct release associated with human intrusion
(B) Partial failure of engineered barriers[a]
(C) Partial failure of unsaturated zone barriers:
1) accelerated releases to the water table attending increased flux from sources above the repository;
2) accelerated releases to the water table attending a rise in the water table (foreshortening of unsaturated zone);
3) accelerated releases to the water table attending changes in unsaturated zone rock-hydrologic properties or geochemical properties.
(D) Partial failure of saturated zone barriers:
1) accelerated releases to the accessible environment owing to appearance of discharge points within 5 km downgradient of controlled area (foreshortening of the saturated zone flow path), or changes in flow direction in saturated zone.
2) accelerated releases to the accessible environment owing to increased linear water velocity in the saturated zones, changed rock-hydrologic properties, or changed geochemical properties.
Undisturbed and nominal performance of all barriers.
(E) Undisturbed performance of all natural barriers: (matrix flow predominates in unsaturated zone barriers, some carbon-14 released in gas phase)

[a]No independent, potentially significant classes have been associated with this category.

parameters needed to evaluate and take that scenario class into account in the assessment. For example, a scenario class associated with increased flux in the unsaturated zone (category C-1) may be initiated by climate change. Parameters associated with the effect of the climate change on the flux in the unsaturated zone can be developed to address this scenario class.

3. Models for evaluating radionuclide releases in the scenario classes

To perform the preliminary allocations that guide testing for each scenario class, models for the various release and transport mechanisms must be defined. The models for the release from the engineered barrier system are discussed in Chapter 7 of this SCP. In the following, models for transport of radionuclides by water, for transport of gases and for direct release are discussed in order to identify the parameters to be evaluated in the testing program.

Models for water-pathway releases

A representation of the present hydrologic setting at Yucca Mountain is shown in Figure 8.3.5.13-5, which also shows the abbreviations used for the hydrogeologic units. The proposed location of the repository is in the Topopah Spring welded unit (TSw). The TSw unit includes the TSw1 and TSw2 units shown on Figure 8.3.5.13-5. Conceptual models of present hydrologic conditions are described in Chapter 3 and Section 8.3.5.12 of this document. Briefly, it is believed that, within each unsaturated-zone rock unit, water flows downward and mainly in the matrices of the rock units, with spatially averaged percolation flux not exceeding 0.5 mm/yr. Some lateral diversion of flux may occur at the interfaces between distinct hydrologic rock units (e.g., the interface between units TSw2 and CHnv and CHnz below the repository, and the interface between units PTn and TSw1 above the repository). This diverted water may be directed down dip along the interface (as matrix flow, given the present recharge rates) to the water table or to downward drainage points in the highly faulted zone southeast from the edge of the emplacement zone. Water reaching the water table will then flow in a lateral direction to the accessible environment boundary to the southeast of the controlled area.

Those radionuclide-bearing compounds that might be released in the liquid phase as water percolates through the host rock (TSw2) could be transported along these water pathways, and may eventually reach the accessible environment boundary. The subsurface portion of this boundary may be imagined as a vertical, curved sheet that is everywhere located up to 5 km from the edge of the waste emplacement. The amount of radioactivity released to the accessible environment, expressed in curies, in a 10,000-yr period, in the form of the i^{th} radionuclide, for the j^{th} scenario class involving water pathways, is calculated by the following expression:

$$Q_{ij} = \alpha_i \int_0^{10{,}000\,\mathrm{yr}} \left[\int_A \int (\vec{F}_m^i + \vec{F}_f^i) \bullet d\vec{A} \right] dt \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}10)$$



HYDROGEOLOGIC UNITS

TC	TIVA CANYON WELDED
PTn	PAINTBRUSH TUFF NONWELDED
TSw1	TOPOPAH SPRING WELDED (MANY LITHOPHYSAE)
TSw2	TOPOPAH SPRING WELDED (FEW LITHOPHYSAE)
CHnv	CALICO HILLS NONWELDED VITRIC
CHnz	CALICO HILLS NONWELDED ZEOLITIC
PPw	PROW PASS WELDED
PPn	PROW PASS NONWELDED
BFw	BULLFROG WELDED
BFn	BULLFROG NONWELDED
TRw	TRAM WELDED
OT	OLDER TUFFS

REPOSITORY LOCATION

LOWER DISTURBED ZONE BOUNDARY

WATER TABLE

PERCOLATION FLUX THROUGH THE UNSATURATED ZONE

UNSATURATED ZONE BELOW DISTURBED ZONE (MODEL REGION)

SATURATED ZONE

SATURATED ZONE FLOW PATH

Figure 8.3.5.13-5. General hydrogeologic cross section at Yucca Mountain. The wavy arrows show the flow paths, as assumed in this report, from a potential repository through the unsaturated zone to the water table and along the upper portion of the saturated zone toward the accessible environment (5 km away) Modified from Sinnock et al. (1986).

where

Q_{ij} = radionuclide release (Ci)

α_i = specific activity of the i^{th} radionuclide (Ci/kg)

$\vec{F}_m^i$ = local mass flux of the i^{th} radionuclide in the matrix of the saturated zone (kg/m^2[rock]yr)

$\vec{F}_f^i$ = local mass flux of the i^{th} radionuclide in the fracture system of the saturated zone (kg/m^2[rock]yr)

t = time (yr)

$d\vec{A}$ = an outwardly directed area element on the accessible environment boundary.

Note the j-dependence of quantities on the right of Equation 8.3.5.13-10 has been suppressed for simplicity. Each mass flux is assumed to be the sum of an advective flux and a dispersive-diffusive flux:

$$\vec{F}_m^i = C_m^i \vec{q}_m - \theta_m \overline{\overline{D_m^i}} \bullet \nabla C_m^i \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}11A)$$

$$\vec{F}_f^i = C_f^i \vec{q}_f - \theta_f \overline{\overline{D_f^i}} \bullet \nabla C_f^i \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}11B)$$

where

C_m^i = mass concentration of the i^{th} radionuclide-bearing chemical species in matrix pore water (kg/m^3[water])

C_f^i = mass concentration of the i^{th} radionuclide-bearing chemical species in fracture pore water (kg/m^3[water])

$\vec{q}_m$ = specific discharge through the matrix system (m^3[water]/m^2[rock]yr)

$\vec{q}_f$ = specific discharge through the fracture system (m^3[water]/m^2[rock]yr)

θ_m = mobile moisture content in the matrix system (m^3[water]/m^3[rock])

θ_f = mobile moisture content in the fracture system (m^3[water]/m^3[rock])

$\overline{\overline{D_m^i}}$ = effective dispersive-diffusive tensor in the matrix system (m^2[rock]/yr)

$\overline{\overline{D_f^i}}$ = effective dispersive-diffusive tensor in the fracture system (m^2[rock]/yr).

The dispersive-diffusive tensors are the sums of two tensors, one describing molecular diffusion and the other describing hydrodynamic dispersion (Freeze and Cherry, 1979). Note that, in the following development, the contribution of the longitudinal component of molecular diffusion to the dispersive-diffusive fluxes is ignored because the Peclet numbers for the flows that are likely to result in significant releases of radioactivity are about 10 or greater. Furthermore, the dispersive component of mass flux is implicitly included in the specific discharges ($\vec{q}_m$ and $\vec{q}_f$) by assuming the latter are random fields (Sinnock et al., 1986).

To calculate the mass fluxes ($\vec{F}_m^i$ and $\vec{F}_f^i$) one must first solve partial differential equations expressing the transport of dissolved mass from the vicinity of the repository to the accessible environment boundary. A solution of the transport problem gives the mass concentrations (C_m^i and C_f^i) as functions of time and space, and requires the specific discharges ($\vec{q}_m$ and $\vec{q}_f$) and the moisture contents (θ_m and θ_f) as input quantities from a separate calculation of the flow fields in the medium. The mathematical models of flow that have so far been used to predict the hydrologic regime at Yucca Mountain are not reviewed here; Section 8.3.5.12 and Klavetter and Peters (1986) describe the development of a Richards' equation that incorporates composite-porosity concepts for flow through fractured, porous rock. The following partial differential equations for the transport of dissolved mass are consistent with the flow model of Klavetter and Peters and are adopted from Wilson and Dudley (1987):

$$\frac{\partial C_m^i}{\partial t} = -\vec{V}_m^i \bullet \nabla C_m^i - \lambda^i C_m^i + \lambda^{i-1}\left(\frac{R_m^{i-1}}{R_m^i}\right) C_m^i + \frac{1}{\theta_m R_m^i}(\Lambda_1 + \Lambda_2^i)(C_f^i - C_m^i) \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}12A)$$

$$\frac{\partial C_f^i}{\partial t} = -\vec{V}_f^i \bullet \nabla C_f^i - \lambda^i C_f^i + \lambda^{i-1}\left(\frac{R_f^{i-1}}{R_f^i}\right) C_f^i - \frac{1}{\theta_f R_f^i}\Lambda_2^i(C_f^i - C_m^i) \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}12B)$$

where

λ_i = decay rate of the i^{th} nuclide species (yr^{-1})

$\vec{V}_m^i$ = effective transport velocity for the i^{th} species in the matrix system (defined below) (m[rock]/yr)

$\vec{V}_f^i$ = effective transport velocity for the i^{th} species in the fracture system (defined below) (m[rock]/yr)

R_m^i = adsorptive retardation factor for the i^{th} species in the matrix system (defined below)

R_f^i = adsorptive retardation factor for the i^{th} species in the fracture system (defined below)

Λ_1 = advective coupling constant (m^3[water]/m^3[rock]yr)

Λ_2^i = diffusive coupling constant (m^3[water]/m^3[rock]yr).

The numbering of nuclides is such that nuclide $i-1$ decays into nuclide i. The nuclide at the beginning of the chain, nuclide 1, would not have a parent, so λ^0 has a value of zero by definition.

$\vec{V}_m^i$ and $\vec{V}_f^i$, the effective transport velocities for the i^{th} species, are defined by

$$\vec{V}_m^i = \frac{\vec{q}_m}{R_m^i \theta_m} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}13A)$$

$$\vec{V}_f^i = \frac{\vec{q}_f}{R_f^i \theta_f} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}13B)$$

R_m^i and R_f^i, the adsorptive retardation factors for the i^{th} radionuclide species, are defined by

$$R_m^i = 1 + \frac{\rho_b K_d^i}{\theta_m} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}14A)$$

$$R_f^i = 1 + \sigma_f \frac{K_a^i}{\theta_f} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}14B)$$

where

K_d^i = distribution coefficient of the i^{th} species (m^3[water]/kg)

ρ_b = bulk density of rock (kg/m^3[rock])

σ_f = fracture surface area per unit volume of rock (m^{-1}[rock])

K_a^i = distribution coefficient of the i^{th} radionuclide species expressed on a per-unit-surface-area basis (m^3[water]/m^2[rock]).

Some typical values for K_d and estimated values of R_m^i for the various radionuclides in spent fuel are shown in Table 8.3.5.13-4. Because fracture surface areas are usually much smaller than pore surface areas and because chemical equilibrium may not be reached in rapid fracture flows, the adsorptive retardation in fracture flow R_f^i can be regarded as a number of the order of unity (Sinnock et al., 1984b) (i.e., sorption in fractures may be ignored).

Equations 8.3.5.13-12A and 8.3.5.13-12B would be the standard transport equations (Freeze and Cherry, 1979), without dispersive-diffusive terms, except for the presence of the coupling terms proportional to $C_f^i - C_m^i$ on their right-hand sides. In particular, the reciprocal of the quantity Λ_2^i is a measure of the time required for the concentrations in the fracture pore water (C_f^i) to come to equilibrium with its counterpart in the slowly moving matrix pore water (C_m^i). Wilson and Dudley (1987) show that these coupling constants have the forms

Table 8.3.5.13-4. Typical distribution coefficients and approximate retardation factors for welded and nonwelded Yucca Mountain hydrogeologic units

Element	Distribution coefficient, [a] K_d (ml/g)		Retardation factor, [b] R_m	
	Welded	Nonwelded	Welded	Nonwelded
Americium	1,200	4,600	28,000	24,000
Carbon	0[c]	0[c]	1	1
Curium	1,200	4,600	28,000	24,000
Cesium	290	7,800	6,700	41,000
Iodine	0[c]	0[c]	1	1
Neptunium	7	11	160	58
Protactinium	64	140	1,500	740
Lead	5[d]	5[d]	120	27
Plutonium	64	140	1,500	740
Radium	25,000[e]	25,000[e]	580,000	130,000
Tin	100[d]	100[d]	2,300	530
Strontium	53	3,900	1,200	21,000
Technetium	0.3	0[c]	8	1
Thorium	500[d]	500[d]	12,000	2,600
Uranium	1.8	5.3	27	45
Zirconium	500[d]	500[d]	12,000	2,600

[a]Unless otherwise indicated, distribution coefficients were taken from Table 6-25 (DOE, 1986b) or were inferred from the sorption ratios quoted by Daniels et al. (1982).

[b]Calculated using values of moisture content of 10 and 28 percent and bulk densities of 2.33 and 1.48 g/cm^3 for welded and nonwelded tuff.

[c]No data available; assumed to be zero.

[d]Inferred from the midrange retardation factor for tuffs in compilation in Table 7-1 in National Research Council (1983).

[e]Barium used as a chemical analog.

$$\Lambda_1 = \frac{\partial \theta_m}{\partial t} + \nabla \bullet q_m \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}15)$$

$$\Lambda_2^i \cong \frac{\pi^2 \theta_f \, \overline{\overline{D_m^i}} | R_f^i}{R_m^i a^2} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}16)$$

where

a = one-half of the mean spacing between fractures (m[rock])

$|\overline{\overline{D_m^i}}|$ = absolute magnitude of the effective dispersive-diffusive tensor in the matrix (m^2[rock]/yr).

Note that lateral diffusion is accounted for in these coupling terms.

Several of the possible cases of transport of dissolved radionuclides through Yucca Mountain rocks can be qualitatively analyzed by means of Equations 8.3.5.13-12A, 8.3.5.13-12B, and 8.3.5.13-16:

1. Partially saturated flow. In this case, percolation flux does not exceed the saturated matrix hydraulic conductivity so the flow is predominantly through the rock matrix, and only Equation 8.3.5.13-12A applies. This is believed to represent present hydrologic conditions at Yucca Mountain. Under these conditions, the unsaturated-zone rocks act as barriers to the release of liquid-phase contaminants because water flows predominantly in the rock matrix, and matrix flow promotes rather long ground-water travel times (GWTT) to the water table, as shown in Table 8.3.5.13-5. Retardation of many elements is likely to be large under these circumstances (Table 8.3.5.13-4).

2. Fracture flow with weak coupling. In this case, the coupling constants are small compared with the reciprocal of typical transport times in fracture flow ($L/\bar{V}_f^i$ where L is the unit thickness), and Equations 8.3.5.13-12A and 8.3.5.13-12B both apply. The radionuclide concentrations spread out through the matrix and fracture systems separately, with the fracture-system concentrations usually "outracing" the matrix-system concentrations. This situation could arise in a discharge through a saturated structural feature (Class C-3, Table 8.3.5.13-3).

3. Fracture flow with strong coupling. In this case, the coupling constants are larger than or comparable to the reciprocal of typical transport times in fracture flow, and the concentrations of radionuclides in both systems come to equilibrium. Wilson and Dudley (1987) show that in this case a single transport equation for the equilibrium concentration applies, and that the effective transport velocity in the advective term of this equation after equilibrium has been reached has the form

$$V^i = \frac{\vec{q}}{\theta_m + \theta_f + \rho_b K_d^i} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}17)$$

Table 8.3.5.13-5. Estimates[a] of ground-water travel time, predominantly matrix flow[b,c]

Unit	Percentage of total repository area underlain by the unit	Mean (yr)	Standard deviation (yr)
Topopah Spring welded unit	99	4,800	1,900
Calico Hills vitric unit	95	11,000	7,800
Calico Hills zeolitized unit	95	14,000	8,100
Prow Pass welded unit	83	3,900	1,700
Prow Pass unwelded unit	63	15,000	8,000
Bullfrog welded unit	26	6,800	4,100
Bullfrog nonwelded unit	7.5	5,400	3,500
Estimated total[d]		43,000	13,000

[a]Estimates (rounded to 2 significant figures) are for the entire unsaturated zone underlying the disturbed zone. Variability in unit thickness is taken into account.
[b]Percolation flux = 0.5 mm/yr.
[c]Source: Sinnock et al. (1986).
[d]Estimated total is not a sum of the individual columns but represents the quantities for total ground-water travel time through the entire unsaturated zone.

Since θ_m is almost always much greater than θ_f, the effective transport velocity is virtually the same as that for an equivalent porous medium with an effective porosity equal to θ_m and an adsorptive distribution coefficient equal to K_d^i. Thus, models of equivalent-porous-medium transport apply when concentrational equilibrium is reached (or closely approached), and Equation 8.3.5.13-17 approximately applies. Under these circumstances, for percolation flux up to 5 mm/yr, transport times for nonsorbing species through a 50-m section of unsaturated-zone rock would equal or exceed 1,000 yr, and transport times for sorbing species would exceed 10,000 yr.

The third case stated above is likely to apply to those water-pathway scenario classes involving repository-wide failure of the unsaturated-zone barriers: i.e., classes C-1, C-2, and C-3 in Table 8.3.5.13-3. Of most

interest, though, is whether it would apply in the saturated zone. Because the rocks in the saturated zone are known to be highly fractured and it is known that flow through fractures may be orders of magnitude faster than matrix flow, it has previously been assumed that the saturated zone would not be an effective barrier against releases. In Table 6-19 of the EA (DOE, 1986b), the ground-water travel time along a 5-km path to the accessible environment boundary is estimated to be approximately 170 yr, which is brief compared with the times shown in Table 8.3.5.13-5; the effective porosity used in these estimates was 0.0001, a value of fracture porosity attributed to Sinnock et al. (1984b). But if equivalent-porous-medium transport models are applicable to the saturated zone, the transport times for nonsorbing species would be larger than 170 yr by a factor of 100 to 400 (the estimated ratio of matrix porosity to fracture porosity) (i.e., 17,000 to 68,000 yr) and once coupled, sorbing species would be practically immobile in the saturated zone. Thus, whether the saturated zone is an effective barrier against releases to the accessible environment depends on whether equivalent-porous-medium models apply there (i.e., whether advective-dispersive coupling can be achieved along the flow paths between the repository area and the accessible environment boundary).

According to the Wilson-Dudley model, the saturated zone may provide a good barrier to transport of nonsorbing and some weakly sorbing species, but would not reduce by much the releases of strongly sorbing species which, nevertheless, could be strongly retarded in the unsaturated zone. To see this, note that according to Equations 8.3.5.13-12B and 8.3.5.13-16, an estimate of the time constant governing establishment of concentrational equilibrium between fracture and matrix flows is

$$t_c = \frac{R_m^i a^2}{\pi^2 |\overline{\overline{D_m^i}}|} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}18)$$

Assume that the parameters in this expression take the following values in the saturated zone: fracture spacing (2a) equal to 30 cm (CHnv + CHnz from Table 1 of Klavetter and Peters, 1986), an effective diffusivity ($\overline{\overline{D_m^i}}$) equal to 1.0 x 10^{-2} m/yr and adsorptive retardation factors (R_m^i) equal to the values given in Table 8.3.5.13-4 for nonwelded tuff. Then, using these assumptions, the following are the time-constant (t_c) estimates: (1) for nonsorbing species, 0.23 yr; (2) for uranium, 10.4 yr; (3) for plutonium, 170 yr; and (4) for americium, 5,520 yr. In the Wilson-Dudley model (Wilson and Dudley, 1987), the effect of weak coupling on concentrations of strongly sorbing species in fracture flows is seen from Equations 8.3.5.13-12A and 8.3.5.13-12B. Transport of these species is at the fracture-flow velocity, and weak coupling may at best only increase the effective decay rate for concentrations of strongly sorbing species. Thus, using plutonium-239 as an example, one could assign an effective half-life of 0.693 times 170 yr (118 yr) instead of the usual 24,400-yr half-life against radioactive decay. In the saturated zone, where water travel times in fracture flow are also about 170 yr, the effective "decay" of concentration would only reduce cumulative discharge of plutonium-239 by a factor of about $1/e$, or about 37 percent.

The Wilson-Dudley model (Wilson and Dudley, 1987) may prove to be overly conservative in the sense that it overestimates the time required to couple

mass concentrations in fracture flows with mass concentrations in matrix flows, thereby leading to larger discharges of strongly sorbing species at the accessible-environment boundary than would be predicted by equivalent-porous-media transport calculations (i.e., calculations using a single mass concentration that moves with the effective transport velocity in Equation 8.3.5.13-17). Other investigators (Rasmuson and Neretnieks, 1981; Sudicky and Frind, 1982) seem to reach a different conclusion regarding the dependence of the time constant (t_c) governing coupling on the retardation factors (R_m^i). Although it is difficult to see in their analysis, Rasmuson and Neretnieks (1981) appear to predict a time constant of the form

$$t_c = \frac{r^2}{15|\overline{\overline{D_m^i}}|} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}19)$$

where r is the radius of a matrix block (which is assumed to be spherical and is the same order of magnitude as a in the Wilson-Dudley model (Wilson and Dudley, 1987 (see Equation 8.3.5.13-16). Similarly, the work of Sudicky and Frind (1982) suggests that the time constant should be

$$t_c = \frac{a^2}{3|\overline{\overline{D_m^i}}|} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}20)$$

where a is now one-half the uniform spacing between fractures, which are assumed to be planar and parallel. Note that each of the last two forms of time constant is independent of the retardation factor and, apart from factors of 2 or 3, is of the same magnitude as the time constant for coupling nonsorbing species in the Wilson-Dudley model (Equation 8.3.5.13-18).

These different estimates of the time required to couple mass concentrations in fracture and matrix flows illustrate the need for validated conceptual and mathematical models of transport of solutes through the actual (i.e., not idealized) fractured, welded and nonwelded tuffs of Yucca Mountain. Investigations to produce such validated models are described in Chapter 4 and in Section 8.3.1.3 (geochemistry program). The Wilson-Dudley model (Wilson and Dudley, 1987) is undoubtedly conservative relative to the models of Rasmuson and Neretnieks (1981) and Sudicky and Frind (1982); but it is not clear that the first or the third of these models is conservative, because each assumes that the permeabilities and constrictivity-tortuosity factors of the surfaces separating fracture void space from matrix void space are the same as the permeability and constrictivity-tortuosity factor of the matrix. Rasmuson and Neretnieks (1981) do postulate an arbitrary mass-transfer coefficient for the interface between matrix and fracture void spaces, but they then assume it is the same as internal mass transfer coefficients for their calculations. Such an assumption could be wrong if relatively impermeable mineral coatings or mineral-grain occlusions occur over a large fraction of the fracture surfaces. In such circumstances, the effective area for entry into the matrix per unit volume of rock could be reduced by several orders of magnitude, with the effect of reducing the effective diffusivity in the formulas for coupling time given above.

A systems-level mathematical model has been developed for predicting releases for those scenario classes involving releases along water pathways

(e.g., classes in categories E, C, and D in Table 8.3.5.13-3). Discussion of this model serves several purposes in this section:

1. Illustrate the feasibility of and level-of-detail required for the "simplified" models mentioned in the preceding section (Construction of a CCDF) as being necessary for a calculation of the CCDF.

2. Show, in a way that may be clearer than the preceding discussion of radionuclide transport theory, why certain data and information concerning (a) hydrologic and geochemical properties of Yucca Mountain rocks and (b) probabilities and intensities of events or processes initiating a scenario class are needed to resolve this issue.

3. Partially document the basis for the largely nonquantitative reasoning so far used to make preliminary assessments of the relative magnitudes of the EPPMs for scenario classes involving releases along water pathways.

This last purpose should be emphasized: The model to be presented here is preliminary and has at least three serious limitations (the assumptions (1) through (3) given in the next paragraph) that could lead to underestimates of the partial performance measure. These limitations will be remedied by further model development and validation in the future. Most of the detailed development of the following model can be found in Section 3.0 of Sinnock et al. (1986).

Assume that (1) coupling between mass concentrations in matrix and fracture flows is always strong enough to justify the assumption of equivalent-porous-media transport in both the unsaturated and saturated zones, (2) all radionuclides can be treated as single-member decay chains, (3) the process of longitudinal molecular diffusion can be ignored, and (4) mass release rates from the engineered barrier system can be calculated with the formulae given in Section 3.1.1 of Sinnock et al. (1986). Then, making a slight extension of Equation 40 in Sinnock et al. (1986), one can show that the partial performance measure for the j^{th} scenario class involving releases along the water pathway may, in most cases, be approximated by the following expression:

$$M_j = \frac{N}{N_T} \sum_i \frac{a_i}{L_i} \cdot \frac{r_i}{(r_i + \lambda_i)} e^{-\lambda_i t} \cdot e^{\lambda_i \tau_i} \left[1 - e^{-(\lambda_i + r_i)\tau_i}\right] u(\tau_i) \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}21)$$

where

N = number of waste packages involved in the release scenario

N_T = total number of waste packages in the repository at closure

a_i = inventory of the i^{th} radionuclide species at time of closure (Ci/MTHM)

L_i = release limit (per MTHM) for the i^{th} radionuclide as specified in proposed 10 CFR 60.115 and 40 CFR Part 191, Appendix A (Ci)

r_i = fractional mass release rate of the i^{th} radionuclide species from any one of the waste packages involved in the release scenario (yr^{-1})

t = regulatory period of performance (10,000 yr)

λ_i = decay constant for the i^{th} radionuclide species (yr^{-1})

τ_i = a time interval to be described below (yr)

$u(x)$ = unit step function, ($u(x) = 1$ if $x > 0$, and $u(x) = 0$ if $x < 0$).

Table 8.3.5.13-6 provides values for decay constants, radionuclide inventories, release limits, and calculated values for the normalized inventory at risk (a_i/l_i) for the radionuclide species of concern. The following discussion clarifies the meaning of these variables and the equation in general. Note that the subscript j applies to certain variables appearing on the right-hand side, but has been suppressed to simplify the expression. The j-dependence of each variable is noted below.

With the exception of t, N_T, λ_i, and L_i, all the variables appearing on the right-hand side of Equation 8.3.5.13-21 may be regarded as random variables in the sense that uncertainties dictate that they be treated as distributed quantities (examples are mentioned later). Thus, M_j is also a random variable whose statistical properties must usually be evaluated by simulation.

The number of waste packages involved in the release scenario (N) depends on scenario class S_j and on the nature and intensity of the process or event that initiates a realization of the release scenario (e.g., the number of packages intercepted by flow through a fault zone). In every case, $0 < N < N_T$.

The fractional mass release rate (r_i) applies only to release in a liquid phase from bare waste form, and is estimated in Section 3.1.1 of Sinnock et al. (1986) by

$$r_i = \frac{q_u A \bar{S}_i}{M_o} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}22)$$

where

q_u = magnitude of specific discharge of water near a waste package (m^3/m^2 yr)

A = effective water-intercept area of a waste package (m^2)

M_o = mass of waste matrix per package (kg)

$\bar{S}_i$ = effective solubility limit (kg/m^3).

Table 8.3.5.13-6. Reference inventory used in system-level models (page 1 of 2)

Nuclide	Decay constant λ_i (yr^{-1})	Assumed inventory at closure, α_i (Ci/MTHM)[a]	10 CFR 60.115[b] limit, L_i (Ci/MTHM)	Normalized inventory at risk, α_i/L_i
Cm-246	1.26×10^{-4}	3.5×10^{-2}	0.1	3.5×10^{-1}
Cm-245	7.45×10^{-5}	1.8×10^{-1}	0.1	1.8×10^{0}
Am-243	8.72×10^{-5}	1.4×10^{1}	0.1	1.4×10^{2}
Am-242	4.56×10^{-3}	1.0×10^{1}	1.0	1.0×10^{1}
Am-241	1.51×10^{-3}	1.6×10^{3}	0.1	1.6×10^{4}
Pu-242	1.83×10^{-6}	1.6×10^{0}	0.1	1.6×10^{1}
Pu-240	1.05×10^{-4}	4.5×10^{2}	0.1	4.5×10^{3}
Pu-239	2.84×10^{-5}	2.9×10^{2}	0.1	2.9×10^{3}
Pu-238	8.06×10^{-3}	2.0×10^{3}	0.1	2.0×10^{4}
Np-237	3.24×10^{-7}	3.1×10^{-1}	0.1	3.1×10^{0}
U-238	1.54×10^{-10}	3.2×10^{-1}	0.1	3.2×10^{0}
U-236	2.90×10^{-8}	2.2×10^{-1}	0.1	2.2×10^{0}
U-235	9.76×10^{-10}	1.6×10^{-2}	0.1	1.6×10^{-1}
U-234	2.81×10^{-6}	7.4×10^{-2}	0.1	7.4×10^{-1}
U-233	4.28×10^{-6}	3.8×10^{-5}	0.1	3.8×10^{-4}
Pa-231	2.13×10^{-5}	5.3×10^{-6}	0.1	5.3×10^{-5}
Th-232	4.95×10^{-11}	1.1×10^{-10}	0.1	1.1×10^{-9}
Th-230	8.66×10^{-6}	4.1×10^{-6}	0.1	4.1×10^{-5}
Th-229	9.44×10^{-5}	2.8×10^{-8}	0.1	2.8×10^{-7}
Ra-226	4.33×10^{-4}	7.4×10^{-9}	0.1	7.4×10^{-8}
Pb-210	3.11×10^{-2}	7.0×10^{-10}	1.0	7.0×10^{-10}

Table 8.3.5.13-6. Reference inventory used in system-level models (page 2 of 2)

Nuclide	Decay constant λ_i (yr^{-1})	Assumed inventory at closure, α_i (Ci/MTHM)[a]	10 CFR 60.115[b] limit, L_i (Ci/MTHM)	Normalized inventory at risk, α_i/L_i
Cs-137	2.31×10^{-2}	7.5×10^{4}	1.0	7.5×10^{4}
Cs-135	2.31×10^{-7}	2.7×10^{-1}	1.0	2.7×10^{-1}
I-129	4.36×10^{-8}	3.3×10^{-2}	1.0	3.3×10^{-2}
Sn-126	6.93×10^{-6}	4.8×10^{-1}	1.0	4.8×10^{-1}
Tc-99	3.22×10^{-6}	1.3×10^{1}	10.0	1.3×10^{0}
Zr-93	7.29×10^{-7}	1.7×10^{0}	1.0	1.7×10^{0}
Sr-90	2.39×10^{-2}	5.2×10^{4}	1.0	5.2×10^{4}
Ni-59	8.66×10^{-6}	3.0×1.0	1.0	3.0×10^{-2}
C-14	1.21×10^{-4}	1.5×10^{0}	0.1	1.5×10^{1}
			SUM =	1.7×10^{5}

[a]MTHM = metric tons of heavy metal.
[b]From the proposed amendments to 10 CFR Part 60.

$\bar{S}_i$ is expressed mathematically as

$$\bar{S}_i = \min(S_i , S_m)$$

where

S_i = solubility limit for the chemical species carrying the i^{th} radionuclide (kg/m^3)

S_m = solubility limit for the bulk waste form (kg/m^3).

The fractional mass release rate (r_i) depends on the scenario class and the nature and intensity of initiating events or processes through its dependence on q_u and $\bar{S}_i$ (which are also dependent on the nature and intensity of initiating events and processes). In future formulations of Equation 8.3.5.13-21, r_i may be replaced with empirically determined fractional release rates as a function of time and specific discharge (q_u) near a waste package. Determination of actual release rates from waste packages under different repository hydrologic conditions is part of the investigations associated with Issues 1.4 and 1.5.

The quantity τ_i appearing in Equation 8.3.5.13-21 is defined by

$$\tau_i = t - [\max(T_c , T_d) + T_u^i + T_s^i] \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}23)$$

where

t = regulatory period of performance (10,000 yr)

T_c = waste package containment time (yr)

T_d = total delay time (yr)

T_u^i = the unsaturated zone transport time for the i^{th} radionuclide species (yr)

T_s^i = the saturated zone transport time for the i^{th} radionuclide species (yr).

The waste-package containment time (T_c) is actually either the waste-package containment time or the time during which waste package temperature exceeds 95°C, whichever is greater. T_d, the total delay time, measured after closure and before the onset of a release, is defined by

$$T_d = T_e + t_p \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}24)$$

where

T_e = waiting time, after closure, before the first occurrence of an initiating event or process that may lead to a release (yr)

t_p = time interval representing the delay between the occurrence of the initiating event or process and the epoch when releases begin (yr).

Examples of T_e are (1) the epoch at which motion occurs along a fault zone that is sufficient to divert substantial amounts of downdip flow through the repository (t_p would then be the delay between the event, "fault motion," and the event "flow in fault reaches the repository level") and (2) the epoch at which a large surface-water impoundment is formed near the controlled area (t_p would then be the delay between the event, "formation of impoundment," and the event "wetting front from impoundment reaches repository level"). Thus, T_e and t_p depend on the scenario class (j) and the nature and intensity of the initiating events or processes.

The unsaturated zone (UZ) transport time for the i^{th} radionuclide species (T_u^i) is the time required for a molecule of a chemical species carrying the i^{th} radionuclide, which is released from the repository in the liquid phase, to reach the water table. If it is assumed that coupling between mass concentrations in matrix and fracture flows is strong in the UZ, then the effective transport velocity is given by Equation 8.3.5.13-17 and

$$T_u^i = \int_x^y \frac{ds}{|\vec{V}_u^i|} = \int_x^y \frac{1}{q_u}(\theta_m + \theta_f + \rho_b K_d^i)\, ds \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}25)$$

where

x = any point in that part of the repository affected by flows associated with the j^{th} scenario class and the event or process initiating the flow

y = a point on the water table connected to x by a flow pathway through the UZ

ds = an element of length along the pathway from x to y

The saturated zone (SZ) transport time for the i^{th} radionuclide species (T_s^i) is defined in a manner similar to the UZ transport time. Again, if strong coupling in the SZ is assumed, then

$$T_s^i = \int_y^z \frac{ds}{\vec{V}_s^i} = \int_y^z \frac{1}{q_s}(n_m + n_f + \rho_b K_d^i)\, ds \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}26)$$

where

q_s = specific discharge in the saturated zone (m^3/m^2 yr)

n_m = effective matrix porosity in the saturated zone

n_f = effective fracture porosity in the saturated zone

z = a point on the accessible environment boundary connected to (defined above) by a flow pathway through the saturated zone.

Finally, the quantity $u(\tau_i)$ appearing in Equation 8.3.5.13-21 is the unit step function: $u(\tau_i) = 1$ if $\tau_i > 0$, and $u(\tau_i) = 0$ if $\tau_i < 0$. Since this function appears as a multiplicative factor in each term of the sum in Equation 8.3.5.13-21, then if any one of the Ts in Equation 8.3.5.13-23 exceeds 10,000 yr, or if the sum of the Ts exceeds 10,000 yr, that term will make no contribution to the sum in Equation 8.3.5.13-21. Thus, the various Ts (T_e, T_c, T_u and T_s), are sensitive quantities in the determination of the magnitude of the partial performance measure (M_j) and warrant special discussion. It is appropriate to reiterate the claim made earlier that, with few exceptions, the variables in Equation 8.3.5.13-21 are distributed variables; it is therefore appropriate to refer to the distribution of the Ts, rather than specific values that the Ts may take.

The distribution of waste-package containment time (T_c) is not known. Estimates in the Yucca Mountain site environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b) suggest that 3,000 yr < T_c < 30,000 yr, but no distribution was attached to this range. Current studies proposed for determining the distribution of T_c are outlined in Section 8.3.5.9.

The waiting times after closure until first occurrence of the process or event that initiates a release (T_e) is distributed differently according to the process or event and scenario class to which it pertains (in this nominal case, $T_e = 0$). In most cases, and particularly for events, waiting times are assumed to be exponentially distributed with a given annual probability of occurrence. For example, consider the scenario class C-1 (Table 8.3.5.13-3) and the initiating event, "episodic offset on faults creates new pathways for drainage of water through the repository"; in this instance T_e may be exponentially distributed with an annual probability less than 10^{-5}/yr (an expected recurrence time of 100,000 yr).

If the waiting time to first occurrence of an event is exponentially distributed with mean annual probability less than 10^{-8}/yr, then the probability that T_e is less than 10,000 yr would be less than one chance in ten thousand. In other words, the event would be expected to occur at most once during a simulation of many tens of thousands of runs and, even on occurrence, the consequences might be zero if other time delays were finite. To make a significant contribution to the CCDF, the consequences (the sample value of M_j) attending the occurrence of such a low-probability event would have to exceed 10,000, with little delay between the event and a release to the accessible environment. Events or processes associated with releases along water pathways fulfilling these conditions are inconceivable, although some events attending direct releases (e.g., scenario class A-1) may come near to fulfilling them.

The time delay (t_p) between the occurrence of an initiating event or process and the epoch when releases from the engineered barrier system attending that event or process begins may in certain contexts be highly sensitive in the determination of the magnitude of the partial performance measure. Generally speaking, $t_p > 0$ for those scenario classes involving hydrologic response to changed boundary conditions on the flows through

either the UZ or SZ (scenario classes in categories C and D). Though few calculations of the dynamic response of flows to changed boundary conditions have yet been made, the preliminary studies that have been documented indicate that t_p for events affecting flows in the UZ tends to be long (1,000 to 10,000 yr), while t_p for events affecting flows in the SZ tends to be relatively short (tens to hundreds of years). Current tools for investigating hydrodynamic response times are the hydrodynamics module of the Total System Performance Assessment Code (TOSPAC) for the UZ (under development, but refer to Peters et al. (1986) or Klavetter and Peters (1986) for the physical basis of TOSPAC's hydrodynamics), and the ISOQUAD code (Barr and Miller, 1987) for the SZ. The calculation of t_p for different scenario classes and different initiating events or processes will in general require the use of these or similar, phenomenological codes. In those cases where the calculation proves difficult or time consuming, t_p may conservatively be set to zero.

The transport times (T_u^i and T_s^i) are probably the most sensitive quantities determining the performance measure, Equation 8.3.5.13-21. From Equations 8.3.5.13-25 and 8.3.5.13-26, it is seen that the distributions of T_u^i and T_s^i apparently must be inferred by calculating the distributions of space integrals whose arguments contain quantities that are themselves distributed in space (e.g., the product $\rho_b K_d^i$ is expected to be spatially distributed with different mean values, variances and autocovariances pertaining to each rock unit). Such a calculation would be time-consuming in a systems-level model. However, considerable simplification is possible using extensions of the analytic methods proposed in Appendix A of Sinnock et al. (1986). Sinnock et al. (1986) show that distributions of ground-water travel time can be conservatively represented by a normal distribution, and analytic methods are developed therein for calculating the mean and variance of the GWTT distributions; these analytic methods can be applied to the calculation of the mean and variance of the transport times (T_u^i and T_s^i). For example, the mean of the UZ transport times can be estimated by

$$\bar{T}_u^i = \sum_k [\bar{\theta}_m + \bar{\theta}_f + \bar{\rho}_b \bar{K}_d^i]_k \cdot \bar{l}_k \overline{[q_u^{-1}]} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}27)$$

where

$\bar{\theta}_m$ = mean mobile moisture content in the matrix system (m^3[water]/m^3[rock])

$\bar{\theta}_f$ = mean mobile moisture content in the fracture system (m^3[water]/m^3[rock])

k = index labeling rock geohydrologic units in the UZ below the repository horizon

$\bar{l}_k$ = thickness of the k^{th} geohydrologic unit that intervenes between the repository floor and the water table in the repository area (m).

A bar over a quantity denotes the mean value or spatial average for a spatially varying quantity.

Note that $\bar{l}_k = 0$ if a water-table rise completely submerges the k^{th} unit.

Similarly, the mean of the SZ transport times can be estimated by

$$\bar{T}_s^i = \sum_s (\bar{n}_m + \bar{n}_f + \bar{\rho}_b \bar{K}_{d,s}^i) \cdot \bar{d}_s \overline{[q_s^{-1}]} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}28)$$

where

$\bar{n}_m$ = mean effective porosity in matrix

$\bar{n}_f$ = mean effective porosity in fractures

s = index labeling rock geohydrologic units in the SZ

$\bar{d}_s$ = flow-path length through the s^{th} unit (m).

The sum of the individual $\bar{d}_s$ is a total flow-path length from a given point on the water table under the repository to any point on the accessible-environment boundary. The formulae for estimating the variances of the transport times (T_u^i and T_s^i) are not quoted here; the evaluation of these formulae requires the same mean values of the quantities that appear on the right-hand sides of Equations 8.3.5.1.3-27 and 8.3.5.13-28, and in addition, the spatial variances and autocovariance lengths for, and correlation coefficients among, all these quantities. In short, given estimates of the statistical parameters associated with the natural distributions of rock hydrologic and geochemical parameters associated with each geohydrologic unit, one can estimate the distribution of the transport times (T_u^i and T_s^i). Estimates of each statistical parameter are intrinsically uncertain because of practical limitations on both the analytical methods used to ascertain values of those parameters, and on the number of the data units (field samples or measurements) that can be obtained for use in those analytical methods. Data that could be used to infer these statistical parameters are presently sparse or nonexistent.

Considerable insight into the sensitivity of the transport times for the determination of the releases can be gained by study of the expressions for the mean value of those times (i.e., Equations 8.3.5.13-27 and 8.3.5.1.3-28). Because fracture porosities are almost always much less than matrix porosities, order-of-magnitude estimates of the mean transport times can be made from

$$\bar{T}_u^i \cong \frac{\bar{n}_m}{\bar{q}_u} \bar{R}_m^i \cdot \bar{l} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}29A)$$

$$\bar{T}_s^i \cong \frac{\bar{n}_m}{\bar{q}_s} \bar{R}_m^i \cdot \bar{d} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}29B)$$

where all barred quantities on the right-hand sides now denote spatial averages over the entire UZ or SZ as appropriate. Again, it is emphasized that these estimates apply only if the assumption of strong coupling between mass concentrations in matrix and fracture flows is valid.

For the UZ, one may take $\bar{n}_m$ equal to 0.2 (Figure B-1 in Sinnock et al., 1986), values for $\bar{R}^i_m$ from column 5 of Table 8.3.5.13-4, and l equal to 250 m (Figure 4(A) in Sinnock et al. (1986)). Using these values, one finds that at $\bar{q}_u$ = 5 mm/yr, the mean UZ transport time for nonsorbing species (where $\bar{R}^i_m$ = 1) is just about 10,000 yr, and much longer for sorbing species (e.g., uranium's mean transport time through the UZ would be 270,000 to 450,000 yr). The SZ mean transport times can be estimated by taking $\bar{n}_m$ and $\bar{R}^i_m$ as in the UZ case, but $\bar{q}_s$ = 3.2 x 10^{-2} m/yr and $\bar{d}$ = 5000 m (Table 6-19 in DOE, 1986b). The mean transport time in the SZ for nonsorbing species is about 30,000 yr, and for sorbing species, a term longer by the factor $\bar{R}^i_m$.

Estimates such as these show (1) why it may be possible to ignore the contributions of sorbing species to the sum in Equation 8.3.5.13-21, provided that the standard deviations (i.e., the square root of the variances) of the transport times are small compared with the mean and (2) why the variances of the transport times are important in determining the relative contributions of all species to the sum in Equation 8.3.5.13-21. These estimates also show why a solution to the problem of coupling times for the transfer of mass concentrations between fracture and matrix flows is seriously needed, particularly for flows in the SZ. If coupling times are short then, as indicated, transport times for all species in the SZ may exceed 30,000 yr and the SZ becomes the primary barrier to releases through the water pathways (indeed, those scenario classes involving water-pathway releases would make little if any contribution to the complementary cumulative distribution functions in this alternative). On the other hand, if coupling times are long compared with the estimated 170-year ground-water travel time in the SZ, the SZ barrier could only modestly reduce the magnitude of 10,000-yr cumulative releases, and the UZ barrier would become the primary barrier to releases.

Models for gas-phase releases

Release of radionuclides by gas pathways appears in both undisturbed-case and disturbed-case scenario classes. A few of the radionuclides in spent-fuel waste forms, namely tritium, carbon-14, krypton-85, and iodine-129, could be released from waste packages as gases or in compounds that form gases. Of these, the only important one appears to be carbon-14, in the form of carbon dioxide. The half-lives of tritium and krypton-85 (12.3 yr and 10.7 yr, respectively) are short. Current evidence and the extremely reactive nature of elemental iodine suggest that it is likely to be released or quickly transforms in a liquid or solid phase. The source of gas-phase carbon-14 "is thought to be removal of carbon from the oxidized skin of the Zircaloy cladding by reaction of the oxygen in the atmosphere with carbon in the cladding oxidation layer to release carbon dioxide" (Oversby and McCright, 1985). Oversby and McCright believe that as much as 1 percent of the carbon-14 inventory in spent fuel may be available for rapid release from the breached waste packages in the form of carbon dioxide during the first 100 to 1,000 yr following closure (Section 8.3.5.9). After the 1,000-yr containment period, the amount of carbon-14 available for rapid release from the breached waste packages would be very small because of slow oxidation rate of carbon-14 to carbon dioxide due to low temperatures and gamma fluxes (Section 8.3.5.10). Carbon-14 in nongaseous forms will be released slowly, probably in a liquid phase.

Rapid release of 1 percent of the carbon-14 inventory to the accessible environment would not alone violate the proposed rule (10 CFR 60.115). An upper-bound estimate of the normalized cumulative release under expected conditions is 0.15, assuming a normalized inventory of 15 for carbon-14 (Table 8.3.5.13-6) at closure time and prompt transfer of 1 percent of the carbon-14 to the atmosphere above the repository. Carbon-14 dioxide originating in the waste form would, of course, not be promptly transferred to the atmosphere, but would have finite and possibly long residence times in partially saturated pore spaces of the repository's overburden during which times the carbon-14 could decay. In addition, some of the released carbon-14 dioxide would diffuse downward and presumably become dissolved in water in pore spaces of rock below the repository horizon. The effect of long residence times and downward diffusion would be to reduce the time-integrated flux of carbon-14 to the atmosphere above the repository.

The time-dependent surface flux of carbon-14 originating in the waste form may, in principle, be estimated by first constructing a conceptual model of transport of carbon-14 dioxide through the partially saturated overburden units at Yucca Mountain and, second, solving the system of transport equations rising from the conceptual model. The remainder of this discussion is devoted to a description of one possible conceptual model of transport of carbon-14 dioxide and the site-specific data needed to verify that conceptual model and implement a solution of the associated transport equations.

The conceptual model for the transport of carbon-14 dioxide through the partially saturated overburden has three principal features:

1. Gas-phase carbon-14 dioxide moves upward through air-filled pores and fractures of the unsaturated tuffs by molecular diffusion and by advection in a thermally driven air-convection cell. Analyses to date do not permit either of these processes to be neglected.

2. An isotopic equilibrium exists between carbon dioxide in the gas phase, which is mobile, and dissolved bicarbonate, which is immobile. Advection of dissolved bicarbonate almost certainly may be neglected.

3. Precipitation of calcite, if it occurs, irreversibly removes carbon-14 from the system. The chemical controls on calcite precipitation are not yet understood.

To describe this system, three sets of equations are required:

1. Equations for the movement of carbon-14 and its transfer among phases.

2. Equations that determine the chemical environment, insofar as it is not directly observable.

3. Equations for the velocity of air flow.

The following discussion describes the preliminary model for releases along gas pathways. Thorstenson et al. (1983) point out that each isotopic

species of CO_2 within unsaturated-zone gas diffuses according to its own concentration gradient. Advective transfer also will depend on the local concentration of any given species, independent of the presence of other isotopes. Mass transfer among phases can, however, depend on the concentrations of other isotopic species.

With these considerations in mind, a governing equation for the concentration of any gas in the unsaturated zone is needed. This is obtained by adding advection terms to Equation 12 of Thorstenson et al. (1983). The one dimensional equation is as follows:

$$-q_g \frac{\partial C_A}{\partial x} - q_L \frac{\partial C_A^*}{\partial x} + \tau \Theta_D D_A \frac{\partial^2 C_A}{\partial x^2} = \Theta_D \frac{\partial C_A}{\partial t} + (\Theta_T - \Theta_D) \frac{\partial C_A^*}{\partial t} + \frac{\partial \bar{C}_A}{\partial t} + \alpha_A \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}30)$$

where

q_g = Darcy velocity of mass flow of the pore gas (cm/s)

q_L = Darcy velocity of liquid water flow (cm/s)

C_A = concentration of gas A (mole/cm^3)

C_A^* = concentration of gas A and its reaction products in the soil water (mole/cm^3 of water) (Thorstenson et al. define this variable as a concentration per unit mass)

$\bar{C}_A$ = concentration of substance A and its reaction products in the solid phase (mole/[cm^3 of medium], where [cm^3 of medium] refers to the space occupied by solids + liquids + gases)

x = dimension increasing with depth; 0 at land surface (cm)

τ = a tortuosity factor accounting for the added resistance to diffusion imposed by the structure of the porous medium (dimensionless)

Θ_D = drained or gas-filled porosity (dimensionless)

D_A = molecular diffusion constant for diffusion of gas A into the pore gas (cm^2/s)

t = time (s)

Θ_T = total porosity (dimensionless)

α_A = a production term for substance A [(mole/cm^3 of medium)/s].

In addition to the measurable parameters τ, Θ_D, D_A, and Θ_T, Equation 8.3.5.13-30 contains five quantities that must be calculated from other models: q_L, q_g, $\partial C_A^*/\partial t$, $\partial \bar{C}_A/\partial t$, and α_A. The production term α_A will, for carbon-14 originating from a repository, be obtained from waste-package models that will not be discussed here. The interphase transfer terms ($\partial C_A^*/\partial t$ and $\partial \bar{C}_A/\partial t$) depend on C_A, and if species A is total carbon dioxide

the relationship is nonlinear. The chemical models describing this relationship must therefore be incorporated into the transport model.

Since liquid-phase advection is almost certainly negligible for carbon species at Yucca Mountain, the second term on the left-hand side of the equation, involving q_L, can be dropped.

The gas advection velocity q_g at any point depends on the gas density throughout the mountain; the gas density depends on temperature and on the partial pressures of water vapor (which, in turn, depends on temperature because the relative humidity of pore gas is always close to 100 percent) and carbon dioxide. Both of these gases are more concentrated in unsaturated-zone gases than in the atmosphere; water vapor is lighter than air and carbon dioxide is heavier. Temperature differences between the mountain interior and the outside arise from the damping out of daily and annual temperature variations in the subsurface, the geothermal gradient, and the heat source in the repository. The first two of these factors, combined with the topographic relief of the mountain, induce a nonnegligible air flow under existing conditions (Weeks, 1986; Kipp, 1986). Another, steadier component of air flow will be induced by repository heating and continue until the rock temperature throughout the mountain has returned to its initial temperature. The relative magnitude of these flows is unknown.

Steady air flows, such as those due to repository heating or mean humidity differences between pore gas and atmosphere, are incorporated into Equation 8.3.5.13-30 through the q_g term. The best manner of treating oscillating flows due to daily and annual temperature variations is uncertain; rather than calculating a varying q_g, it may be easier to treat these flows as a mixing process and replace the effective molecular diffusion constant (τD_A) with a mixing constant (D^*), which varies from place to place.

Fortunately, it is possible at Yucca Mountain to decouple air-flow and carbon-dioxide-transport models and solve the air-flow problems without reference to CO_2. The advection velocity q_g is essentially independent of CO_2 concentration because humidity and temperature effects are much greater than the density changes associated with variations in CO_2 partial pressures.

Equation 8.3.5.13-30 requires two boundary conditions, one at the water table and the other at or near the surface. Because the production of CO_2 by plant roots is large and difficult to quantify and because seasonal temperature variations result in changes in CO_2 flux that extend for some distance below the surface, it will probably be more convenient to locate the upper boundary at a depth of about 10 m rather than the surface. As for the lower boundary, Thorstenson et al. (1983) found that an assumption of chemical equilibrium between pore gas just above the water table and water just below it frequently is not borne out. Very likely, it will not be possible to develop mechanistic models of CO_2 fluxes at the boundaries, and concentrations there will simply have to be set to measured values.

The quantity that must be calculated to determine regulatory compliance is not the concentration C_A, but the integral of the net flux to the accessible environment over the area of the repository and over a 10,000 yr

period following closure. The mass flux of species A, which is denoted q_A, can be computed from solutions to Equation 8.3.5.13-30 as

$$q_A = q_g C_A + q_L C_A^* - \tau \Theta_D \frac{\partial C_A}{\partial x} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}31)$$

In the sign convention used here, the fluxes (q) are positive downward.

Solution of Equation 8.3.5.13-30 requires that formulae be derived for the time derivatives of the quantities C^* and C_A, representing the concentrations of species A in the liquid and solid phases. Because the species of interest are total carbon dioxide and carbon-14, these derivatives will be equal to the rates of carbon-dioxide dissolution and carbonate mineral precipitation. The rates of these reactions will be determined by the carbonate chemistry of the system. Unfortunately, existing data are not adequate to identify a unique chemical model. The model needed for resolving Issue 1.1 will be developed as part of an investigation in the Yucca Mountain Project geochemistry program (Section 8.3.1.3.8).

A model for concentrations of total carbon dioxide is a prerequisite for predicting transport of carbon-14 for two reasons:

1. The equation for carbon-14 transport will contain parameters depending on concentrations of total carbon dioxide and bicarbonate.

2. The success of a model in explaining currently observed carbon dioxide concentrations is a valuable test of its validity.

To apply the transport Equation 8.3.5.13-30 to total carbon dioxide, one needs formulae for the rates of change in the dissolved bicarbonate concentration C^* and the solid calcite concentration $\bar{C}$. These two quantities will be addressed in an investigation in the Yucca Mountain Project geochemistry program (Section 8.3.1.3.8).

Two equations are needed to describe the aqueous and solid carbon-14 concentrations. Here, the concentrations and partial pressures of total carbon dioxide are denoted as C_T and P_T, respectively, and the concentration and partial pressures of carbon-14 dioxide are denoted as C_{14} and P_{14}.

The liquid and gas phases are intimately mixed, and both gas molecules and dissolved ions are very mobile. The chemical reactions are rapid, and isotopic fractionation factors between gas and aqueous-phase species and among aqueous-phase species in the carbonate system are all very close to unity. Consequently, isotopic equilibrium can be expected between gas-phase carbon dioxide and dissolved bicarbonate. This gives the equation

$$\frac{C_{14}^*}{C_T^*} = \frac{P_{14}}{P_T} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}32A)$$

Carbon atoms in solid calcite are much less mobile. At least as a first approximation, they may be thought of as a reservoir of "dead" carbon with no carbon-14 content. In this case, we can write equations not for the solid

concentration C, but for its time derivative. Different equations are obtained for the cases of net precipitation and net dissolution:

$$\frac{\frac{\partial \bar{C}_{14}}{\partial t}}{\frac{\partial \bar{C}_T}{\partial t}} = \frac{P_{14}}{P_T} \quad , \text{ for } \frac{\partial \bar{C}_T}{\partial t} > 0 \qquad \text{(8.3.5.13-32B)}$$

$$\frac{\partial \bar{C}_{14}}{\partial t} = 0 \quad , \text{ for } \frac{\partial \bar{C}_T}{\partial t} < 0 \qquad \text{(8.3.5.13-32C)}$$

Equation 8.3.5.13-32C for net dissolution rests on the assumption that there has been no precipitation in the relatively recent past (intervals of a few times the half-life of 5,730 yr). If a period of precipitation followed by dissolution within the next 10,000 yr is predicted, some carbon-14 would be released from the dissolving calcite and a different equation would have to be used instead of Equation 8.3.5.13-32C.

If Equation 8.3.5.13-30 for transport of total carbon can be solved without regard for carbon-14, substitution of that solution along with Equations 8.3.5.13-32 and 8.3.5.13-30 for carbon-14 will yield a linear equation for carbon-14 transport. This will indeed be the case. Natural carbon-14 abundances are on the order of one part in 10^{14}. The carbon-14 in the repository will be considerably more abundant, but still negligible compared with the carbon in impinging water and soil gas. Even a relatively high estimate of the repository carbon-14 inventory at 10^5 Ci (van Konynenburg et al., 1984) only places about 22 kg of carbon-14 in the repository. It should be noted that less than 1 percent of the 22-kg inventory of carbon-14 may become available for gaseous release. By comparison, if the disturbed zone around the repository has a thickness of 100 m, an area of 6 km, a drained porosity of 0.1, and a CO_2 partial pressure of 0.1 percent by volume, it will contain approximately 33,000 kg of carbon in the gas phase, and even more carbon will be present as dissolved bicarbonate.

Discussion of some preliminary scenario classes

Disturbed case (A-1): direct release in basaltic volcanism. The consequences of basaltic volcanism on a waste-disposal site at Yucca Mountain were thoroughly studied (Link et al., 1982) before reference repository host rock and inventories for the presently proposed site at Yucca Mountain were conceived. Many of the insights from this study are still relevant, however, and can be used as background for the discussion of this scenario class.

"The formation of the basic Basin and Range topography of the (Yucca Mountain site) has been punctuated throughout Tertiary and Quaternary time by volcanism. In fact, (the site) is an up-faulted block made up of at least 6,000 feet of tuff, a volcanic rock. Only basaltic volcanism (dike-fed cinder cones) is known to have occurred during Quaternary time in the region surrounding the (site)." (Link et al., 1982)

During eruption, cinder cones like the ones near the Yucca Mountain site are usually characterized by a pulsating columnar eruption of jets of gas and lava fragments. At repository depths, cones are fed by vertical, tabular magma bodies called dikes.

"Geometric arguments suggest that if a tabular dike intersects the repository, it would most likely intercept about seven spent fuel canisters....Other positions or lengths of penetration of the dike in the repository could result in the interception of as few as zero canisters or as many as 448 spent fuel canisters.... Because there is no information available on the possible interaction between a waste canister and a basaltic dike, all waste in each canister was assumed to be released into the magma.... If waste were entrained by magma, some of it would be released by the eruption column in the form of fine particles." (Link et al., 1982)

Using these insights about basaltic volcanism, an estimate of the normalized cumulative release can be made for this scenario class. It is assumed that (1) the surface projection of the area bounded by the perimeter drift, and extensions, is 5.1 km^2; (2) a tabular feeder dike passes through the center of the area bounded by the perimeter drift, and extensions, and has dimensions 1 m by 3 km (i.e., 3 x 10^{-3} km^2 area); (3) 18,000 waste packages are uniformly distributed over the area bounded by the perimeter drift, and extensions, with radionuclide inventory given in columns 1 and 3 of Table 8.3.5.13-6; and (4) any waste packages intercepted by the feeder dike are immediately ejected through the cinder cone. The perimeter drift is the boundary of the primary repository area and extensions; the surface projection is the vertical projection of the primary repository area and extensions onto the ground surface.

Geometric argument shows that 11 waste packages are intercepted in this case. One can estimate a bound on the consequences for release to the accessible environment for this case using Equation 8.3.5.13-21, that is,

$$M \leq \frac{N}{N_T} \sum_i \frac{a_i}{L_i} = 104 \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}33)$$

where $N = 11$, $N_T = 18{,}000$, and the sum over the index i of a_i/L_i is computed at the bottom of column 5 of Table 8.3.5.13-6. If 4 x 10^{-8}/yr (Crowe et al, 1982) is taken as the upper-bound estimate of the annual probability of occurrence of basaltic volcanism in the area bounded by the perimeter drift, and extensions, then the probability of such an event occurring once in a 10,000-yr period is 4 x 10^{-4} and the probability of more than one occurrence is negligible. According to these estimates, the normalized release is less than

$$104 \times 4 \times 10^{-4} = 4.16 \times 10^{-2}.$$

This estimate is not necessarily an upper bound, because the size of the feeder dike was arbitrarily assumed. A more realistic calculation that takes into account the decay of the waste inventory, the distribution in sizes of feeder dikes, and the distribution of waiting times until occurrence of basaltic volcanism can easily be made once the values of performance parameters for the scenario are known.

Disturbed case (A-2): direct release via human intrusion. Many scenarios involving human intrusion at Yucca Mountain can be imagined, but for this document consideration is restricted to the events cited in the list of potentially adverse conditions (PACs) (10 CFR 60.122(c)(2)). This list mentions some of the human activities that could adversely affect ground-water flow systems, namely (1) ground-water withdrawal, (2) extensive irrigation, (3) subsurface injection of fluids, (4) underground pumped storage, (5) military activity, and (6) construction of large-scale surface water impoundments. In considering the potential effects of future activities of these kinds, the DOE has assumed that none could credibly occur within the boundaries of the controlled area (the area to be delimited by long-lasting markers); however, the possibility of some circumspect exploratory drilling within the controlled area is allowed.

Scenarios involving activities (2) and (6) are incorporated in the discussions of scenario classes C and D, which involve local or repository-wide flooding from sources above the repository (C) and effects on the saturated zone (D); neither of these activities could logically lead to direct releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment in the context of Yucca Mountain.

Activity 1, ground-water withdrawal, could lead to either direct or indirect releases. Direct releases would occur through the pumping to the surface of saturated-zone ground water that has become contaminated with radionuclides from the repository. This situation is of concern for the ground-water protection rule addressed by Issue 1.3 (Section 8.3.5.15). Indirect releases could be linked to changes in ground-water velocities in the saturated zone through changes in head gradients caused by water withdrawal. Given the long transport times through the unsaturated zone that are predicted for the nominal case (less than 1 percent of calculated ground-water travel times are less than 10,000 yr (Sinnock et al., 1986)), the consequences of direct release through ground-water withdrawal appear to be minuscule and probably can be ignored. The consequences of indirect release through alterations in the head gradients of the saturated zone probably can also be ignored, but in any case are amenable to quantification using models for failure of the saturated-zone barriers (category D in Table 8.3.5.13-3).

This leaves the essentially underground activities (3, 4, and 5), which, along with other underground activities in the controlled area not mentioned in the potentially adverse condition (PAC) list (e.g., underground exploration for economic and scientific purposes), would logically be preceded by some kind of investigations from the surface. Consistent with the PAC list's context of late 20th-century socioeconomic needs and technology, the most likely method of exploration from the surface would be the drilling of boreholes. It is recognized that, in principle, other human activities could be important. However, the DOE's judgment is that the assumptions specified with regard to human activities in the definition of significant events and processes in the proposed amendments to 10 CFR 60.2 (and given in the regulatory background for this discussion) limit those that should, in fact, be considered. In the remainder of this discussion, an upper-bound estimate of the scenario probability and the normalized cumulative release for such inadvertent exploratory drilling is made. The scenario assumptions are given in the following paragraphs.

It is assumed that Yucca Mountain could become the site of many episodes of exploratory drilling during the 10,000-yr period following closure. Each episode is presumed to follow a period in which markers for the controlled area (as defined by the NRC in 10 CFR 60.2) have either disappeared or become unreadable, and records and knowledge of previous exploratory efforts are lost. During each episode, there is the possibility that deep drilling on the site will accidentally graze or penetrate a waste package, resulting in radioactive material being brought to the surface along with core. The activity of this material would thus contribute to the cumulative release to the accessible environment. Depending on the time of an episode after closure and the depth of drilling in the unsaturated zone, some radioactivity could be brought to the surface in the pore water of cores from those boreholes that do not graze a waste package. This contribution is not considered in the present analysis, but it could be considered in future analyses, given the same kinds of data as will be required for a complete analysis of the present scenario class (A-1) and the nominal class (E).

It is assumed that 18,000 waste packages, each containing 3.89 MTHM of spent fuel, are uniformly distributed throughout the area bounded by the perimeter drift, and extensions, in the Topopah Spring (TS) unit (Figure 8.3.5.13-5). The bounded area is 1,260 acres (510 ha, or 5.1 km^2). The waste packages are cylindrical with an internal diameter of 68 cm and internal length of 4.3 m; the analysis below treats both vertical and horizontal placement of waste packages. Waste composition of each package is given in Table 6-47 of DOE (1986b). To bound the estimate, it is assumed that a 100-yr-old waste inventory prevails during every exploratory episode and that the rate of penetration over the 10,000-yr period is constant and equal to 0.0003 boreholes per square kilometer per year (this rate of drilling is specified by the EPA in 40 CFR Part 191, Appendix B as a maximum rate of penetration at sites containing nonsedimentary rock). It is also assumed that each penetration passes vertically through the TS unit and that the drill-bit diameter is constant and equal to 6 cm.

Given that the entire thickness of the TS unit under the surface projection of the perimeter drift and extensions is vertically penetrated by the drill-bit, the probability that a waste package is at least grazed by any one drill-bit is

$$p = \begin{cases} .0125 & \text{(horizontal emplacement)} \\ .00152 & \text{(vertical emplacement)} \end{cases}$$

This probability is equal to the ratio of the total effective intercept area of the 18,000 packages to the area bounded by the perimeter drift and extensions. The effective intercept area/package is just the projected area per package plus the area of a 3-cm-thick border around the projected area. At the given upper limit on the rate of penetration of the site 0.0003 boreholes per square kilometers per year, one expects about 15 penetrations in 10,000 yr. Given $N = 15$ tries, the expected value of curies brought to the surface on the n^{th} try ($n = 1, 2, 3, \ldots N$) is $C_i(n)p$, where $C_i(n)$ is the expected curies, in the form of the i^{th} nuclide species, intercepted by the drill bit on the n^{th} try. Note that this quantity would have to be estimated by simulation, taking into account the change in waste-package nuclide

inventory with time. For purposes of this bounding calculation, we introduce $C_i(\mathbf{max})$, the maximum curies that could be intercepted by a drill bit in any try; thus, the expected value of curies brought to the surface in N tries is

$$\bar{Q}_i = \sum_{n=1}^{N} C_i(n)p \leq NpC_i(\mathbf{max}) \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}34)$$

and the expectation of the performance measure for this scenario class is

$$\bar{M} = \sum_{i} \frac{\bar{Q}_i}{L_i} \leq Np \sum_{i} \frac{C_i(\mathbf{max})}{L_i} \qquad (8.3.5.13\text{-}35)$$

The quantity on the right side of the above inequality is an upper-bound estimate of the expected partial performance measure (EPPM) for this scenario class. The sum on the right side is calculated in Table 8.3.5.13-7. Using the values of N and p given above

$$\bar{M} < \begin{cases} 7.66 \times 10^{-4} & (\mathbf{vertical}) \\ 9.92 \times 10^{-4} & (\mathbf{horizontal}) \end{cases}$$

This upper-bound estimate should be compared with the estimate of the EPPM for nominal-case releases along water pathways, about 2×10^{-7} (Table 4 in Sinnock et al., 1986).

Disturbed case (C-1): increased flux through the unsaturated zone. Some of the initiating events or processes causing an increased percolation flux through the unsaturated zone (UZ) and a consequent decrease in radionuclide transport times through the UZ are the following:

1. Climate change causes increase in infiltration over controlled area (C-area).

2. Offset on faults creates surface-water impoundments, alters drainage, creates perched aquifers, or changes dip of tuff beds.

3. Volcanic eruption causes flows or other changes in topography that result in surface-water impoundments or diversion of drainage.

4. Igneous intrusions, such as a sill, that could result in a change in flux.

5. Tectonic folding changes the dip of tuff beds in C-area, thereby changing flux.

6. Uplift or subsidence changes drainage, thereby changing flux.

7. Subsidence of the mined repository creates surface-water impound ments or diverts drainage.

8. Natural surface-water impoundments are formed over access shafts connecting surface and repository.

Table 8.3.5.13-7. Maximum radioactivity (in curies) released in a single exploratory drilling at the Yucca Mountain site

Species[a]	Inventory[b] (Ci/MTHM)	Maximum radioactivity in 6-cm-diameter core, C_i (max) (Ci)		Limit, L_i[c] (Ci)	C_i (max)/L_i	
		Horizontal emplacement	Vertical emplacement		Horizontal emplacement	Vertical emplacement
Am-241	3.5×10^3	16.7	106	7,000	2.39×10^{-3}	1.51×10^{-2}
Pu-241	1.0×10^3	4.78	30.4	7,000	6.83×10^{-4}	4.34×10^{-3}
Pu-240	4.5×10^2	2.15	13.7	7,000	3.07×10^{-4}	1.96×10^{-3}
Pu-239	2.9×10^2	1.39	8.84	7,000	1.99×10^{-4}	1.26×10^{-3}
Pu-238	1.0×10^3	4.78	30.4	7,000	6.83×10^{-4}	4.34×10^{-3}
Cs-137	9.4×10^3	44.9	286	70,000	6.41×10^{-4}	4.09×10^{-3}
Sr-90	5.7×10^3	27.2	173	70,000	3.89×10^{-4}	2.47×10^{-3}
	Subtotal	102	648			
	Contributions from other species	0.42	3			
	Totals	102	651		5.29×10^{-3}	3.36×10^{-2}

[a]The seven radionuclides listed contribute more than 99 percent of maximum radioactivity in core; refer to column 3.

[b]100-yr-old spent fuel. Source: Tables 3.3.8, 3.3.9, and 3.3.10 in DOE (1979). MTHM = metric tons of heavy metal.

[c]EPA limit on 10,000-yr releases for 70,000 MTHM of spent fuel (40 CFR Part 191).

9. Extensive irrigation is conducted near the C-area.

10. Large-scale surface-water impoundments are constructed near the C-area.

Of these events and processes, climatic change is probably the agent with the most potential for increasing local and repository-wide flux levels. The diversion of drainage from down-dip flow attending an episodic offset along a fault passing through the repository could also substantially increase local flux and, as a consequence, place a limited number of waste packages in pathways to the water table along which the UZ transport times are short relative to the mean transport times of the nominal case. The other initiating events or processes appearing in the above list will probably prove to have consequences that are indistinguishable from nominal-case consequences. In particular, those events or processes leading to floods over the C-area will probably have very long hydraulic-response times, and thus near-zero consequences. This belief stems from preliminary calculations of flooding that show response times of thousands of years. There is also a small number of waste packages that would be intercepted by the "plume" of a flooding event, and a negligible reduction in UZ transport time would be caused by the slight increase in flux that attends a flooding event.

Disturbed case (C-2): foreshortening of the unsaturated zone. Some initiating events and processes that could lead to a decrease in the effective thickness of the unsaturated zone (UZ) and a consequent decrease in radionuclide transport times through the UZ are the following:

1. Climate change causes an increase in altitude of water table.

2. Igneous intrusion causes a flow barrier or thermal effects that alter water-table level.

3. Offset on fault juxtaposes transmissive and nontransmissive units, resulting in either the creation of a perched aquifer or a rise in water table.

4. Episodic changes in strain in the rock mass due to faulting cause changes in water-table level.

5. Folding, uplift, or subsidence lowers repository with respect to water table.

6. Extensive irrigation is conducted near the C-area.

7. Large-scale surface-water impoundments are constructed near the C-area.

8. Extensive surface or subsurface mining occurs near C-area.

9. Extensive ground-water withdrawal occurs near C-area.

Of these events and processes, climate change probably is the agent with the most potential for increasing the elevation of the water table under the C-area; Czarnecki (1985) used a regional hydrologic model (Czarnecki and

Waddell, 1984) and extremely conservative assumptions about the effects of climatic change on ground-water systems to show that water-table elevations might rise by as much as 130 m in the future. The effect of changed offset along faults on saturated-zone (SZ) transmissivity may also be important in determining water-table elevations. Barr and Miller (1987) have used the ISOQUAD code (Pinder, 1976) to explore the effects of abrupt alterations of (SZ) features presumed to control the distribution of hydraulic heads. For example, they assumed a fault-controlled model with sudden leakage across the Solitario Canyon fault and predicted rises in the water-table altitude under the C-area of 30 m with hydrodynamic response times of about 115 yr. A connection between fault motion and changes in leakage across that fault has not been firmly established. Hence, the calculations of Barr and Miller (1987) should be viewed as a worst-case calculation.

The other initiating events or processes appearing in the list will probably prove to have consequences indistinguishable from nominal-case consequences, or even have positive effects such as the lowering of the water-table level through ground-water withdrawals or mine dewatering. In any case, these beliefs need to be confirmed by quantitatively screening the consequences of realization of each of the initiating events or processes shown in the list.

Disturbed case (C-3): altered unsaturated-zone rock-properties and geochemistry. Some initiating events and processes that could alter rock-hydrologic properties and geochemical conditions in the unsaturated zone (UZ) in such a way as to decrease radionuclide transport times through the UZ are the following:

1. Igneous intrusions cause changes in rock hydrologic properties.

2. Igneous intrusions cause changes in rock geochemical properties.

3. Episodic offset on faults causes local changes in rock hydrologic. properties, thereby destroying existing barriers to flow or creating new conduits for drainage.

4. Offset on a fault causes changes in movement of ground water, resulting in mineralogical changes along the fault zone.

5. Offset on a fault changes radionuclide travel pathway to one with different geochemical properties.

6. Changes in stress or strain in the C-area resulting from episodic faulting, folding, or uplift cause changes in the hydrologic properties of the rock mass.

7. Tectonic processes cause changes in ground-water table or movement that results in mineralogic changes in the C-area.

8. Extensive irrigation is conducted near the C-area.

9. Large-scale surface-water impoundments are constructed near the C-area.

10. Extensive surface or subsurface mining occurs near the C-area.

Acting alone, none of these events or processes are currently believed to be capable of leading to consequences distinguishable from undisturbed-case consequences; nevertheless, this belief needs to be confirmed by a quantitative screening of consequences.

Disturbed case (D-1): foreshortening of flow paths in the saturated zone. Some initiating events and processes that could lead to the appearance of surficial discharge points within the C-area, thereby shortening radionuclide travel times through the saturated zone (SZ) to the accessible environment, are the following:

1. Climate change causes appearance of surficial discharge points within the C-area.

2. Igneous intrusions cause flow barrier or thermal effects that alter water-table level.

3. Offset on fault juxtaposes transmissive and nontransmissive units, resulting in either the creation of a perched aquifer or a rise in the water table.

4. Episodic changes in strain in the rock mass due to faulting causes changes in water-table level.

5. Folding, uplift, or subsidence lowers repository with respect to water table.

Climate change probably is the only credible cause of a water-table rise sufficient to create long-term surficial discharge points. Even so, a consideration of the minimum distances between the current water table and the surface levels apparent within recently proposed boundaries for the C-area (Rautman et al., 1987) shows that water-table rises greater than 160 m would be required to create new discharge points. The appearance of surficial discharge points within the C-area is not the only way by which the SZ could be foreshortened. Changes in the horizontal component of the gradient of the SZ head contours could also lead to decreases in the means and increases in the variances of the radionuclide transport times (changes in the vertical components of the SZ head contours, i.e., changes in the magnitude of the linear water velocity through the SZ, are included in scenario class D-2). This latter effect depends upon the definition of the boundaries of the C-area that is ultimately adopted. The effect has not been considered in the choice of initiating events and processes in the preceding list.

Disturbed case (D-2): altered saturated zone head gradients, rock hydrologic properties, and geochemistry. Some initiating events and processes that could lead to adverse alterations of the saturated zone (SZ) vertical head-gradients, or SZ rock hydrologic properties, or SZ geochemistry are the following:

1. Climate change causes an increase in the hydraulic gradients of the water table within the C-area.

2. Igneous intrusion causes flow barriers or thermal effects that alter water table (or hydraulic gradients).

3. Offset on faults juxtaposes transmissive and nontransmissive units, resulting in either the creation of a perched aquifer or a rise in the water table (or a change in hydraulic gradients).

4. Extensive irrigation is conducted near the C-area.

5. Large scale surface-water impoundments are constructed near the C-area.

6. Extensive surface or subsurface mining occurs near the C-area.

7. Extensive ground-water withdrawal occurs near the C-area.

"Adverse" alterations means changes that could decrease radionuclide transport times in the SZ. Again, the only potentially important cause of adverse alteration in the vertical head gradient probably is climatic change. In his most recent calculations, Czarnecki (1985) predicts that a four-fold increase in specific discharge in the SZ could accompany the 130-m water-table rise associated with a model of future climatic conditions. Changes in SZ transmissivity associated with fault motion might also have some small effects on radionuclide transport times in the SZ, as shown by Barr and Miller (1987); however, the model effects on transport time of an uncoupled contaminant particle through the SZ observed by Barr and Miller (1987) are probably related more to changes in the horizontal components of the head gradients than in the vertical components. In any case, both climatic change and faulting need to be seriously considered as agents of change in the SZ transport times.

4. A preliminary performance allocation for Issue 1.1

A preliminary performance allocation for this issue is summarized in Table 8.3.5.13-8. Because this allocation deals with the total system and performance measures for the total system, it is appropriate to allocate performance against those perceived events and processes to which the total system must respond. Column 1 of Table 8.3.5.13-8 lists the eight potentially significant categories of scenario classes identified in Table 8.3.5.13-3. Column 2 indicates the mode(s) of the release (or release pathway) corresponding to each scenario class. For reasons mentioned in the background material on gas-phase releases, the gas pathway is considered important only for the nominal case (E). Column 3 shows a preliminary assessment of the barriers on which primary reliance may be placed in meeting the performance goal listed in column 6; possible backup barriers are also indicated. Column 4 shows the component(s) of the primary barrier that are believed to contribute most to the achievement of the performance goal; column 5 gives the reason for the assignment of a primary barrier in the form of the processes or conditions that may ensure the achievement of the performance goal.

Column 6 shows the performance measure for each scenario class, the expected partial performance measure (EPPM). The EPPM is defined earlier in this section, in the discussion entitled "Screening for significant events,

Table 8.3.5.13-8. Preliminary performance allocation for Issue 1.1 (page 1 of 2)

Release scenario class	Pathway	System elements: Primary barriers	System elements: Primary barrier components	Primary processes or conditions	Performance measure (EPPM)[a]	Tentative goal	Needed confidence
			NOMINAL CASE				
E	Water	Unsaturated zone; saturated zone, EBS[b] as backup	Combined facies of Calico Hills; other units as backup	Equivalent-porous-media transport through matrix with adsorptive retardation	EPPM	< 0.01	High
	Gas	EBS; overburden as backup	Container and structural components	Limited rapid release of carbon-14 as carbon dioxide	EPPM	< 0.2	Medium
			DIRECT RELEASES				
A-1	Direct	(No allocation: see text for explanation)			EPPM	< 0.1	High
A-2					EPPM	< 0.1	Medium
			FAILURE OF UNSATURATED ZONE BARRIERS				
C-1	Water	Repository overburden	Paintbrush Tuff unit and Topopah Spring	Flooding-pulse delay times > 10,000 yr	EPPM	< 0.01	High
	Gas	None	None	None			High
C-2	Water	Saturated zone; EBS and residual unsaturated zone as backup	Saturated zone to boundary of AE[c] (or discharge points)	Equivalent-porous-media transport with adsorptive retardation	EPPM	< 0.1	Medium
	Gas	None	None	None			High

Table 8.3.5.13-8. Preliminary performance allocation for Issue 1.1 (page 2 of 2)

Release scenario class	Pathway	System elements: Primary barriers	System elements: Primary barrier components	Primary processes or conditions	Performance measure (EPPM)[a]	Tentative goal	Needed confidence
			FAILURE OF UNSATURATED ZONE BARRIERS (continued)				
C-3	Water	Saturated zone; EBS and residual unsaturated zone as backup	Saturated zone to boundary of AE (or discharge points)	Equivalent-porous-media transport with adsorptive retardation	EPPM	< 0.01	High
	Gas	None	None	None			High
			FAILURE OF SATURATED ZONE BARRIERS (does not affect gas-phase releases)				
D-1	Water	Residual saturated zone + residual unsaturated zone, EBS as backup		Equivalent-porous-media transport with adsorptive retardation	EPPM	< 0.1	Medium
D-2	Water	Residual saturated zone + residual unsaturated zone, EBS as backup		Equivalent-porous-media transport with adsorptive retardation	EPPM	< 0.1	High

[a]Maximum EPPM for each event/process associated with scenario/class (see subsection on discussion of issue-resolution strategy for Issue 1.1).
[b]EBS = engineered barrier system.
[c]AE = accessible environment.

processes, and features"; it appears formally in Equation 8.3.5.13-8. Ideally, the value of the entire CCDF could be used as the performance measure. To obtain such a value would, however, require that information for all the scenario classes be available at the same time; for that reason, such a measure would not be useful or practical in guiding the site characterization program toward acquiring the information needed for evaluating a single scenario class. The EPPM is therefore used in the preliminary performance allocation as a surrogate measure suitable for individual scenario classes. The final resolution of this issue will be made in terms of the full CCDF and not the EPPMs.

Column 7 shows a tentative goal for each expected partial performance measure; column 8 gives an indication of the confidence that the DOE expects to need in licensing when it demonstrates that this goal has been met. These measures of confidence are subjective, since models to calculate the EPPMs for all scenario classes are not yet available, and considerable judgment has been used in making assignments in columns 7 and 8. The use of tentative goals and indications of confidence is explained in Section 8.1.2.2.

Except for the gas pathway in the first scenario class of Table 8.3.5.13-8, all entries in column 7 were made using the assumption that fractional release rates of radionuclides from the engineered barrier system (EBS) would not exceed the 10 CFR Part 60 limit of 0.00001 parts per year of the 1,000-yr inventory. This may be an unrealistic assumption for the highly soluble compounds associated with carbon, technetium, and iodine.

It is not possible to allocate performance of the total system for the direct-release scenario classes (A-1 and A-2 in Table 8.3.5.13-3). However, the estimates of the EPPMs for these scenarios that are in column 7 of Table 8.3.5.13-8 are conservative, particularly if the improbability of short delay times before the occurrence of the initiating events is taken into account. The delay-time probabilities have also been factored into the assignments in columns 7 and 8 for some of the water-pathway scenario classes (C-1, C-2, D-1, and D-2).

Tables 8.3.5.13-9 through 8.3.5.13-16 (performance-parameter tables) list the parameters needed to evaluate the EPPM for the scenario classes and the goals associated with these parameters. Table 8.3.5.13-17 lists parameters that support the performance parameters in these tables and are needed to evaluate the overall CCDF. The eight performance-parameter tables give, for each initiating event or process, the associated performance measure, performance parameters, tentative goals, and confidence (current and needed). These phrases are explained in general terms in Section 8.1.2.2. In these tables, the performance measure is the EPPM specified in Table 8.3.5.13-8. The performance parameters are data and information that are required to calculate or assess values of the EPPM for each scenario class. The tentative goals state quantitative or qualitative conditions on the value of a performance parameter. These goals are <u>not</u> criteria that the site repository or other parts of the system must meet; they are merely values which, if met, are likely to lead to achieving the quantitative goal for the EPPM. In the confidence columns, current confidence is a measure of the confidence on a scale of high (H), medium (M), and low (L), that currently available data and information would suffice to show that the goal for the performance parameter could be met; the needed confidence column indicates,

Table 8.3.5.13-9. Performance parameters for scenario class E (the nominal case) (page 1 of 3)

Performance measure[a]	Performance parameter[b]	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Current confidence	Needed confidence
EPPM for liquid pathway, unsaturated zone (UZ) barrier only	$\bar{q}_u$ - average flux through R-area UZ	< 0.5 mm/yr	None	Medium	High
	$\bar{n}_e$ - average effective matrix porosity, R-area UZ	> 0.1	3.9.2.1	Low	High
	$\bar{R}_i$ - average chemical retardation factor for i^{th} species	≥ 1	4.1.3.3, 8.3.1.3	High	High
	$\bar{d}_u$ - average thickness of R-area UZ between repository and water table	> 100 m	8.3.5.12, 3.9.1.2	Medium	High
	r_i - fractional mass release rate from engineered barrier system (EBS) for i^{th} species	< 10^{-4}/yr, all species[c]	8.3.5.10	Low	Medium
EPPM for liquid pathway, saturated zone (SZ) barrier only[d]	$\bar{q}_s$ - average discharge in SZ under C-area	< 32 mm/yr	None	Low	Medium

Table 8.3.5.13-9. Performance parameters for scenario class E (the nominal case) (page 2 of 3)

Performance measure[a]	Performance parameter[b]	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Current confidence	Needed confidence
EPPM for liquid pathway, saturated zone (SZ) barrier only[d] (continued)	$\bar{n}_f$ - average effective matrix porosity, C-area, SZ	> 0.1	3.9.2.1	Low	Medium
	$\bar{R}_i$ - average chemical retardation factor for i^{th} species, C-area, SZ	≥ 1	4.1.3.3, 8.3.1.3	High	Medium
	$\bar{d}_s$ - average length of flow paths through SZ from C-area to accessible environment boundary	> 5,000 m	3.6.4	Low	Medium
	r_i - fractional mass release rate from EBS for i^{th} species	< 10^{-4}/yr, all species[c]	8.3.5.10	Low	Medium
EPPM for gas pathway	Fraction of total carbon-14 inventory that could be released as carbon-14 dioxide	Fraction < 1% of inventory at closure	8.3.5.10	Low	High

Table 8.3.5.13-9. Performance parameters for scenario class E (the nominal case) (page 3 of 3)

Performance measure[a]	Performance parameter[b]	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Current confidence	Needed confidence
EPPM for gas pathway (continued)	Mean residence time of released carbon-14 dioxide in UZ units	Show residence time > 10,000 yr	None	Low	High

[a]EPPM = expected partial performance measure; see subsection on discussion of complementary cumulative distribution functions and significant processes and events.

[b]R-area = the projection of primary area and extensions onto the surface; C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.

[c]The performance allocation for Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates, Section 8.3.5.10) sets a goal for the fractional mass release rate from the EBS at 10-5 per yr to comply with the performance objective in 10 CFR 60.113.

[d]Performance parameters and goals apply only if equivalent-porous-media transport is valid in the SZ; otherwise, the SZ cannot act as a backup barrier to water-pathway releases.

Table 8.3.5.13-10. Performance parameters for scenario class A-1 (extrusive magmatic events)

Performance measure	Initiating event or process	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Current confidence	Needed confidence	SCP section
EPPM[a]	Volcanic eruption penetrates repository and causes direct releases to the accessible environment	Annual probability of volcanic eruption that penetrates the repository	$<10^{-6}$/yr	1.5.1	Low	High	8.3.1.8.1
		Effects of volcanic eruption penetrating repository, including area of repository disrupted	Given occurrence, show <0.1% of repository area is disrupted with a conditional probability of <0.1 of being exceeded in 10,000 yr	1.5.1	Low	Medium	8.3.1.8.1

[a]EPPM = expected partial performance measure; see subsection on discussion of complementary cumulative distribution function and significant processes and events.

Table 8.3.5.13-11. Performance parameters for scenario class A-2 (exploratory drilling)

Performance measure	Initiating event or process	Performance parameter[a]	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Current confidence	Needed confidence	SCP section
EPPM[b]	Exploratory drilling intercepts a waste package and brings waste up with core or cuttings.	Presence and readability of C-area markers over next 10,000 yr.	>50% chance that markers are readable over next 10,000 yr.	None	Low	Medium	8.3.1.9.1
		Expected drilling rate (no. of boreholes per square kilometer per year) R-area over the next 10,000 yr.	Expected drilling rate $\leq 3 \times 10^{-4}$ boreholes per square kilometer per year	None	Low	Low	None
		Distribution of depths of exploratory drillings.	No goal	None	Low	Low	None
		Distribution of diameters of exploratory drill holes.	No goal	None	Low	Low	None

[a]R-area = the projection of primary area and extensions onto the surface; C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.

[b]EPPM = expected partial performance measure; see subsection on discussion of complementary cumulative distribution function and significant processes and events.

Table 8.3.5.13-12. Performance parameters for scenario class C-1 (local or extensive increases in percolation flux through unsaturated zone) (page 1 of 2)

Performance measure	Initiating event or process	Intermediate performance measure	Performance parameter[a]	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Current confidence	Needed confidence	SCP section
EPPM[b]	Climatic change causes increase in infiltration over C-area[d]	Radionuclide transport time through unsaturated zone (UZ), given fixed UZ thickness, rock hydrologic properties, and geochemical properties	Expected magnitude of flux change due to climatic changes over next 10,000 yr; quantitative confidence bounds on expected magnitude of change	Flux change will be < 0.5 mm/yr with 67% confidence or more	3.9.3.3	Low	High	8.3.1.5.2
	Offset on faults creates surface impoundments, alters drainage, creates perched aquifers, or changes dip of tuff beds	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ thickness, rock hydrologic properties, and geochemical properties	Probability of offset >2 m on a fault in the C-area in 10,000 yr	$<10^{-1}$	1.3.2.2	Low	Medium	8.3.1.8
			Probability of changing dip by >2° in 10,000 yr by faulting	$<10^{-4}$ per 10,000 yr	None	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
			Effect of faulting on flux	Faulting will not affect flux because of low slip rate	None	Low	Medium	8.3.1.8
	Volcanic eruption causes flows or other changes in topography that result in impoundment or diversion of drainage	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ thickness, rock hydrologic properties and geochemical properties	Annual probability of volcanic events within C-area	$<10^{-5}$/yr	1.5.1	Low	Medium	8.3.1.8
			Effects of a volcanic event on topography and flow rates	Topographic changes are not enough to affect flux	None	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
	Igneous intrusions, such as a sill, that could result in a change in flux	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ thickness, rock hydrologic properties and geochemical properties	Annual probability of significant igneous intrusions in the C-area	$<10^{-5}$/yr	1.5.1	Low	High	8.3.1.8
			Effects of an igneous intrusion on flux	Igneous intrusion will not affect flux because of depth, location, and extent of intrusion	None	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
	Tectonic folding changes dip of tuff beds in C-area, thereby changing flux	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ thickness, rock hydrologic properties and geochemical properties	Probability of changing dip by >2° in 10,000 yr by folding	$<10^{-4}$ per 10,000 yr	1.3.2	Low	Low	8.3.1.8

Table 8.3.5.13-12. Performance parameters for scenario class C-1 (local or extensive increases in percolation flux through unsaturated zone) (page 2 of 2)

Performance measure	Initiating event or process	Intermediate performance measure	Performance parameter[a]	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Current confidence	Needed confidence	SCP section
EPPM (continued)	Uplift or subsidence changes drainage, thereby changing flux	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ thickness, rock hydrologic properties and geochemical properties	Probability of exceeding 30 m elevation change in 10,000 yr	$<10^{-4}$ per 10,000 yr	1.1.3.3	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
	Subsidence of mined repository creates impoundments or diverts drainage	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ thickness, rock hydrologic properties, and geochemical properties	Probability that continuously displaced surfaces from subsidence originating at repository will intersect interface of TSw and PTn units in 10,000 yr	$<10^{-4}$	None	Low	Medium	None
	Natural surface-water impoundments are formed over access shafts connecting surface and repository	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ thickness, rock hydrologic properties, and geochemical properties	Expected magnitude of local flux change, and quantitative bounds on magnitude of flux change, due to flooding through access shafts	Show <25,000 m^3/yr would pass through access shafts	None	Low	Medium	None
			Expected fraction of waste containers which are subject to changed flux	Show less than 0.01% of containers would be subject to more than a 100% flux change caused by flooding through access shafts.	None	Low	Medium	None
	Extensive irrigation is conducted near the C-area	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ thickness, rock hydrologic properties, and geochemical properties	Expected magnitude of flux change due to extensive irrigation near C-area over next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	None	Not applicable	Not applicable	8.3.1.9.3
	Large scale surface-water impoundments are constructed near the C-area	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ thickness, rock hydrologic properties, and geochemical properties	Expected magnitude of flux change due to presence of an artificial lake near the C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	None	Not applicable	Not applicable	8.3.1.9.3

[a] TSw = Tiva Canyon welded unit; PTn = Paintbrush nonwelded unit; C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.
EPPM = expected partial performance measure; see subsection on discussion of complementary cumulative distribution functions and significant processes and events.

Table 8.3.5.13-13. Performance parameters for scenario class C-2 (foreshortening of the unsaturated zone) (page 1 of 2)

Performance measure	Initiating event or process	Intermediate performance measure	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Current confidence	Needed confidence	SCP section
EPPM[a]	Climatic change causes an increase in altitude of water table	Radionuclide transport time through unsaturated zone (UZ), given fixed UZ rock hydrologic and geochemical properties	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level due to climatic changes over the next 10,000 yr	Expected magnitude of change in water-table altitude will not bring water table to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	3.7.4, 3.9.8	Low	High	8.3.1.5.2
	Igneous intrusion causes barrier to flow or thermal effects that alter water-table level	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ rock hydrologic and geochemical properties	Annual probability of significant igneous intrusion within 0.5 km of C-area[b] boundary	$<10^{-5}$/yr	1.5.1	Low	Medium	8.3.1.8
			Barrier-to-flow effects of igneous intrusions on water-table levels	Expected magnitude of change in water-table altitude will not bring water table to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	None	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
			Thermal effects of igneous intrusions on water-table levels	Expected magnitude of change in water-table altitude will not bring water table to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	None	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
	Offset on fault juxtaposes transmissive and nontransmissive units, resulting in either the creation of a perched aquifer or a rise in water table	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ rock hydrologic and geochemical properties	Probability of total offsets >2.0 m in 10,000 yr on faults within C-area boundary	$<10^{-1}$	1.3.2.2	Low	Medium	8.3.1.8
			Effects of fault offsets on water-table levels	Expected magnitude of change in water-table altitude will not bring water table to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	None	Low	Low	8.3.1.8

Table 8.3.5.13-13. Performance parameters for scenario class C-2 (foreshortening of the unsaturated zone) (page 2 of 2)

Performance measure	Initiating event or process	Intermediate performance measure	Performance parameter[a]	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Current confidence	Needed confidence	SCP section
EPPM (continued)	Episodic changes in strain in the rock mass due to faulting causes changes in water-table level	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ rock hydrologic and geochemical properties	Probability that strain-induced changes increase potentiometric level to >850 m mean sea level	$<10^{-5}$/yr	1.3.2.3	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
	Folding, uplift or subsidence lowers repository with respect to water table	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ rock hydrologic and geochemical properties	Probability that repository will be lowered by 100 m through action of folding, uplift, or subsidence in 10,000 yr	$<10^{-4}$ per 10,000 yr	1.1.3	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
	Extensive irrigation is conducted near the C-area	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ rock hydrologic and geochemical properties	Expected magnitude of change in altitude of water table under C-area due to extensive irrigation near C-area over next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	None	Not applicable	Not applicable	8.3.1.9.3
	Large-scale surface-water impoundments are constructed near the C-area	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ rock hydrologic and geochemical properties	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level under C-area due to placement of artificial lake near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	None	Not applicable	Not applicable	8.3.1.9.3
	Extensive surface or subsurface mining occurs near C-area	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ rock hydrologic and geochemical properties	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level under C-area due to mine water usage or mine dewatering near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	None	Not applicable	Not applicable	8.3.1.9.3
	Extensive ground-water withdrawal occurs near C-area	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed UZ rock hydrologic and geochemical properties	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level under C-area due to extensive ground-water withdrawal near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	3.8.1	Not applicable	Not applicable	8.3.1.9.3

[a]EPPM = expected partial performance measure; see subsection on discussion of complementary cumulative distribution function and significant processes and events.
[b]C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.

Table 8.3.5.13-14. Performance parameters for scenario class C-3 (changes in rock, hydrologic, and geochemical properties in the unsaturated zone) (page 1 of 2)

Performance measure	Initiating event or process	Intermediate performance measure	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Current confidence	Needed confidence	SCP section
EPPM[a]	Igneous intrusion causes changes in rock hydrologic properties	Radionuclide transport time through unsaturated zone (UZ), given fixed thickness of UZ	Annual probability of significant igneous intrusion within 0.5 km of C-area[b] boundary	$<10^{-5}$/yr	1.5.1	Low	Medium	8.3.1.8
			Effects of igneous intrusion on local permeabilities and effective porosities	No significant changes in rock hydrologic properties	None	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
	Igneous intrusion causes changes in rock geochemical properties	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed thickness of UZ	Annual probability of significant igneous intrusion within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-5}$/yr	1.5.1	Low	Medium	8.3.1.8
			Effects of igneous intrusions on local rock geochemical properties	Potential changes in mineralogy will not be extensive	None	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
	Episodic offset on faults causes local changes in rock hydrologic properties, thereby destroying existing barriers to flow, or creating new conduits for drainage	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed thickness of UZ	Annual probability of faulting events on Quaternary faults within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-4}$/yr	1.3.2.2	Low	Medium	8.3.1.8
			Effects of fault motion on local permeabilities and effective porosities	Change in fracture permeability is less than a fac- of 2 and fracture porosity decreases	None	Low	Medium	8.3.1.8
	Offset on a fault causes changes in movement of ground water that result in mineralogical changes along the fault zone	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed thickness of UZ	Probability of movement within 2 km of surface and location of Quaternary faults in C-area	$<10^{-4}$/yr per fault	1.3.2.2	Low	Medium	8.3.1.8
			Degree of mineralogic change in fault zone in 10,000 yr	Adverse changes in mineralogy will not occur	None	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
	Offset on a fault changes potential radionuclide travel pathway to one with different geochemical properties	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed thickness of UZ	Probability of total offsets >2.0 m in 10,000 yr on faults within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-1}$	1.3.2.2	Low	Medium	8.3.1.8
			Effects of fault offsets on travel pathway	Significant changes will not occur	None	Low	Low	8.3.1.8

Table 8.3.5.13-14. Performance parameters for scenario class C-3 (changes in rock, hydrologic, and geochemical properties in the unsaturated zone) (page 2 of 2)

Performance measure	Initiating event or process	Intermediate performance measure	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Current confidence	Needed confidence	SCP section
EPPM[a] (continued)	Changes in stress or strain in C-area resulting from episodic faulting, folding or uplift causes changes in the hydrologic properties of the rock mass	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed thickness of UZ	Effects of changes of stress or strain on hydrologic properties of the rock mass	Changes in conductivity and porosity of rock mass are less than a factor of 2	1.3.2.3	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
	Tectonic processes cause changes in ground water table or movement that results in mineralogic changes in C-area	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed thickness of UZ	Degree of mineralogic change in the controlled area resulting from changes in water-table level or flow paths in 10,000 yr	Adverse changes in mineralogy will not occur	None	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
	Extensive irrigation is conducted near C-area	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed thickness of UZ	Expected magnitude of changes in distribution coefficients, solubilities and chemical reactivity of the engineered barrier system and UZ units due to extensive irrigation near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	None	Not applicable	Not applicable	8.3.1.9.3, 8.3.1.3.7
	Large-scale surface water impoundments are constructed near the C-area	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed thickness of UZ	Expected magnitude of changes in distribution coefficients, solubilities and chemical reactivity of the engineered barrier system and UZ units due to presence of an artifical lake near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	None	Not applicable	Not applicable	8.3.1.9.3, 8.3.1.3.7
	Extensive surface or subsurface mining occurs near C-area	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed thickness of UZ	Expected magnitude of changes in distribution coefficients, solubilities and chemical reactivity of the engineered barrier system and UZ units due to mining activities near the C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	None	Not applicable	Not applicable	8.3.1.9.3, 8.3.1.3.7

[a]EPPM = expected partial performance measure; see subsection on discussion of complementary cumulative distribution functions and significant processes and events.
C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.

Table 8.3.5.13-15. Performance parameters for scenario class D-1 (appearance of surficial discharge points within the C-area[a]; foreshortening of the saturated zone) (page 1 of 2)

Performance measure	Initiating event or process	Intermediate performance measure	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Current confidence	Needed confidence	SCP section
EPPM[b]	Climate change causes appearance of surficial discharge points within C-area	Radionuclide transport time through UZ, given fixed SZ rock hydrologic and geochemical properties	Expected locations of surficial discharge points within C-area over next 10,000 yr	That no surficial discharge points could appear within C-area given a water table rise <160 m	None	Low	Medium	8.3.1.5.2
	Igneous intrusion causes barrier to flow or thermal effects that alter water-table level	Radionuclide transport time through saturated zone (SZ), given fixed SZ rock hydrologic and geochemical properties	Annual probability of significant igneous intrusion within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-5}$/yr	1.5.1	Low	Medium	8.3.1.8
			Barrier-to-flow effects of igneous intrusions on water-table levels	Show water table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	None	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
			Thermal effects of igneous intrusions on water-table levels	Show water table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	None	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
	Offset on fault juxtaposes transmissive and nontransmissive units, resulting in either the creation of a perched aquifer or a rise in the water table	Radionuclide transport time through SZ, given fixed SZ rock hydrologic and geochemical properties	Probability of total offsets >1.0 m in 10,000 yr on faults within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-1}$	1.3.2.2	Low	High	8.3.1.8
			Effects of fault offset on water-table levels	Show water table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	None	Low	High	8.3.1.8
	Episodic changes in strain in the rock mass due to faulting cause changes in water-table level	Radionuclide transport time through SZ, given fixed SZ rock hydrologic and geochemical properties	Probability that strain-induced changes increase potentiometric level to greater than 850 m mean sea level	$<10^{-5}$/yr	1.3.2.3	Low	Low	8.3.1.8

Table 8.3.5.13-15. Performance parameters for scenario class D-1 (appearance of surficial discharge points within the C-area[a]; foreshortening of the saturated zone) (page 2 of 2)

Performance measure	Initiating event or process	Intermediate performance measure	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Current confidence	Needed confidence	SCP section
EPPM (continued)	Folding, uplift, or subsidence lowers repository with respect to water table	Radionuclide transport time through SZ, given fixed SZ rock hydrologic and geochemical properties	Probability that repository will be lowered by 100 m through action of folding, uplift, or subsidence in 10,000 yr	$<10^{-4}$	1.1.3.3	Low	Low	8.3.1.8

[a]C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.
[b]EPPM = expected partial performance measure; see subsection on discussion of complementary cumulative distribution functions and significant processes and events.

Table 8.3.5.13-16. Performance parameters for scenario class D-2 (increased head gradients or changed rock, hydrologic, or geochemical properties in the saturated zone) (page 1 of 2)

Performance measure	Initiating event or process	Intermediate performance measure	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Current confidence	Needed confidence	SCP section
EPPM[a]	Climatic change causes an increase in the gradient of the water table within the C-area[b]	Radionuclide transport time through saturated zone (SZ), given fixed distances to accessible environment boundary	Expected magnitude of change in water-table gradient due to climatic change over the next 10,000 yr	Gradients change less than a factor of 4	3.7.1	Low	Medium	8.3.1.5.2
	Igneous intrusion causes barriers to flow or thermal effects that alter water-table (or hydraulic gradients)	Radionuclide transport time through SZ, given fixed distances to accessible environment boundary	Annual probability of a significant igneous intrusion within 0.5 km C-area boundary	$<10^{-5}$/yr	1.5.1	Low	Medium	8.3.1.8
			Barrier-to-flow effects of igneous intrusions on water table level	Show water table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	None	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
			Thermal effects of igneous intrusions on hydraulic gradients	Gradients change less than a factor of 4	None	Low	Low	8.3.1.8
	Offset on faults juxtaposes transmissive and nontransmissive units, resulting in either the creation of a perched aquifer or a rise in the water table (or a change in hydraulic gradients)	Radionuclide transport time through SZ, given fixed distances to accessible environment boundary	Probability of total offset > 2.0 m in 10,000 yr on faults within 0.5 km of C-area	$<10^{-1}$	1.3.2.2	Low	Medium	8.3.1.8.3
			Effects of fault offsets on water-table levels	Show water table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr;	None	Low	Medium	8.3.1.8.3
			Effects of fault offsets on hydraulic gradients	Show gradients change less than a factor of 4				
	Extensive irrigation is conducted near C-area	Radionuclide transport time through SZ, given fixed distances to accessible environment boundary	Expected magnitude of changes in head gradients of SZ in C-area due to extensive irrigation near C-area over next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	None	Not applicable	Not applicable	8.3.1.9.3

Table 8.3.5.13-16. Performance parameters for scenario class D-2 (increased head gradients or changed rock, hydrologic, or geochemical properties in the saturated zone) (page 2 of 2)

Performance measure	Initiating event or process	Intermediate performance measure	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Current confidence	Needed confidence	SCP section
EPPM (continued)	Extensive irrigation is conducted near C-area (continued)		Expected magnitude of changes in distribution coefficients of SZ due to extensive irrigation near C-area over the next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	None	Not applicable	Not applicable	8.3.1.9.3, 8.3.1.3.7
	Large-scale surface-water impoundments are constructed near the C-area	Radionuclide transport time through SZ, given fixed distances to accessible environment boundary	Expected magnitude of changes in head gradients of SZ in C-area due to presence of an artificial lake near C-area over the next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	None	Not applicable	Not applicable	8.3.1.9.3
			Expected magnitude of changes in distribution coefficients of SZ units due to presence of an an artificial lake near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	None	Not applicable	Not applicable	8.3.1.9.3, 8.3.1.3.7
	Extensive surface or subsurface mining occurs near C-area	Radionuclide transport time through SZ, given fixed distances to accessible environment boundary	Expected magnitude of changes in gradients of water table under C-area due to extensive surface or subsurface mining near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	None	Not applicable	Not applicable	8.3.1.9.3
			Expected magnitude of changes in distribution coefficients of SZ units due to extensive surface or subsurface mining near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	None	Not applicable	Not applicable	8.3.1.9.3, 8.3.1.3.7
	Extensive ground-water withdrawal occurs near C-area	Radionuclide transport time through SZ, given fixed distances to accessible environment boundary	Expected magnitude of changes in gradients of water table under C-area due to ground-water withdrawal near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	None	Not applicable	Not applicable	8.3.1.9.3

[a]EPPM = expected partial performance measure; see subsection on discussion of complementary cumulative distribution functions and significant processes and events.
[b]C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.

Table 8.3.5.13-17. Supporting parameters needed to evaluate the nominal case and as baseline data for the disturbed cases (page 1 of 6)

Issue 1.1 calculation using supporting parameter[a]	Supporting parameter: Description	Supporting parameter: Modifier	Lateral spatial location where needed[b]	Unit where needed[c]	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Characterization goal[d]	Current confidence[e]	Needed confidence[e]	SCP section
Specific-discharge field in UZ (Klavetter and Peters, 1986); moisture contents of UZ units; hydrodynamic response times in overburden	Saturated permeability	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ-units, Ovb	3.9.2.1	m,v,a	NA	H,M,L	8.3.1.2.2
		Fracture network	R-area	UZ-units, Ovb	3.9.2.1	m,v,a	NA	H,M,L	8.3.1.2.2
	Relative liquid permeability (wetting and draining)	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ-units, Ovb	None	m,v	NA	M,L	8.3.1.2.2
		Fracture network	R-area	UZ-units, Ovb	None	m,v	NA	L,L	8.3.1.2.2
	Effective porosity[f]	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ-units, Ovb	3.9.2.1	m,v,a	NA	H,M,L	8.3.1.2.2
		Fracture network	R-area	UZ-units, Ovb	None	m,v,a	NA	L,L,L	NA
	Moisture retention curve (wetting and draining)	Rock matrix	R-area	UZ-units, Ovb	3.9.2.1	m,v	M,M	L,L	3.9.2.1
		Fracture network	R-area	UZ-units, Ovb	None	m,v	NA	L,L	NA
	Altitudes of hydrogeologic unit contacts	As a function of lateral spatial location	C-area	UZ-units, Ovb	8.3.5.12	m,v	M,M	H,M	8.3.1.4.2, 8.3.1.4.3, 8.3.1.2.2
	Altitude of water table	Ambient, as a function of lateral spatial location	C-area	NA	3.9.1.2	m,v	M,M	H,M	8.3.1.3.1
Specific-discharge field in fault zones in UZ; moisture content in fault zones; hydrodynamic response times of fault zones	Location, width, and offset of fault zones	As a function of lateral spatial location	C-area	UZ-units, Ovb	1.3.2.2.2	m,v	L	H	8.3.1.4.2, 8.3.1.8.5
	Saturated permeability	Fault-zone rock-mass	C-area	UZ-units, Ovb	None	m,v	NA	M,L	8.3.1.2.2
	Effective porosity	Fault-zone rock-mass	C-area	UZ-units, Ovb	None	m,v	NA	L,L	8.3.1.2.2

Table 8.3.5.13-17. Supporting parameters needed to evaluate the nominal case and as baseline data for the disturbed cases (page 2 of 6)

Issue 1.1 calculation using supporting parameter[a]	Supporting parameter: Description	Supporting parameter: Modifier	Lateral spatial location where needed[b]	Unit where needed[c]	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Characterization goal[d]	Current confidence[e]	Needed confidence[e]	SCP section
Coupling factors and radionuclide retardation factors in UZ and SZ (Wilson and Dudley, 1987)	Bulk density	Rock matrix	C-area	All units	1.6.2.2 & Chapter 2	m,v	M,L	M,M	8.3.1.15.1, 8.3.1.2.2
	Fracture frequency	Fracture networks	C-area	All units	3.9.2.1, 1.3.2.2.2	m,v,a	L,L,L	M,L,L	8.3.1.2.2
	Fracture frequency	Fault-zone rock-mass	C-area	All units	1.3.2.2.2	m,v,a	L,L,L	M,L,L	8.3.1.4.2
	Liquid constrictivity/tortuosity factor	Rock matrix	C-area	All units	None	m,v	L,L	M,L	8.3.1.2.2, 8.3.1.3
		Fracture networks	C-area	All units	None	m,v	L,L	L,L	8.3.1.2.2, 8.3.1.3
		Fault-zone rock-mass	C-area	All units	None	m,v	L,L	L,L	8.3.1.2.2, 8.3.1.3
	Distribution coefficients (K_ds)	Rock matrix, for the following chemical species: Sr, Cs, Pu, Am, C, U, Np, Tc, Zr, I, Cm	C-area	All units	4.1.3.3, 8.3.1.3	m,v,a	M,L,L	M,M,L	8.3.1.3.4
Specific-discharge field in SZ (ISOQUAD code, Pinder, 1976); also hydrodynamic dispersion in SZ; hydrodynamic response times of SZ times of SZ	Effective thickness of saturated zone	As a function of lateral spatial location	C-area	SZ-units	3.6.4	m	L	L	8.3.1.3.3
	Hydraulic conductivity	Rock matrix	C-area	SZ-units	3.6.4, 3.9.2.2	m,v,a	M	H,L,L	8.3.1.3.3
		Fracture networks	C-area	SZ-units	3.9.2.2, 3.6.4	m,v,a	L	H,L,L	8.3.1.3.3
	Effective porosity	Rock matrix	C-area	SZ-units	3.9.2.2, 3.6.4	m,v,a	L,L,L	M,M,L	8.3.1.3.3
		Fracture networks	C-area	SZ-units	3.6.4	m,v,a	L,L,L	M,M,L	8.3.1.3.3
	Fracture compressibility	Fracture networks	C-area	All units	3.9.2.1	m	L	L	8.3.1.3.3

Table 8.3.5.13-17. Supporting parameters needed to evaluate the nominal case and as baseline data for the disturbed cases (page 3 of 6)

Issue 1.1 calculation using supporting parameter[a]	Supporting parameter		Lateral spatial location where needed[b]	Unit where needed[c]	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Characterization goal[d]	Current confidence[e]	Needed confidence[e]	SCP section
	Description	Modifier							
Model validation-coupling factors in UZ and SZ	Matrix-fracture interface permeabilities	NA	C-area	All units	4.1.3.5	Not significantly different from matrix values	L	H	8.3.1.3.6
	Matrix-fracture interface constrictivity (MF-CT factors)	NA	C-area	All units	None	Not significantly different from matrix factors	L	H	8.3.1.3.6
Gas-phase carbon-14 transport in overburden of UZ units	Relative pneumatic permeability (wetting and draining)	Rock matrix	R-area	Ovb	None	m,v	L,L	M,L	8.3.1.3.2
		Fracture network	R-area	Ovb	None	m,v	L,L	M,L	8.3.1.3.2
	Effective pneumatic porosity	Rock matrix	R-area	Ovb	None	m,v,a	L,L,L	L,L,L	8.3.1.3.2
		Fracture network	R-area	Ovb	None	m,v,a	L,L,L	H,L,L	8.3.1.3.2
	Profile of partial pressure of CO_2	Ambient, rock mass	R-area	UZ-units, Ovb	None	No goal	L	M	8.3.1.3.2
	Profiles of bicarbonate concentration, calcium ion concentration, pH, in liquid phase	Ambient, rock mass	R-area	UZ-units, Ovb	None	No goal	L	M	8.3.1.3.1, 8.3.1.2.2
	Profile of temperature	As a function of time, including effects of heat from repository	R-area	UZ-units, Ovb	1.6.2.2.4, Chapter 6	Predict profiles where temperature change exceeds 10% of ambient (°C)	L	M	8.3.1.4.2
	Profile of near-field saturation	As a function of time, including effects of heat from repository	R-area	UZ-units, Ovb	2.7.2	Prediction consistent with temperature profile (above)	L	M	8.3.1.2.2

Table 8.3.5.13-17. Supporting parameters needed to evaluate the nominal case and as baseline data for the disturbed cases (page 4 of 6)

Issue 1.1 calculation using supporting parameter[a]	Supporting parameter		Lateral spatial location where needed[b]	Unit where needed[c]	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Characterization goal[d]	Current confidence[e]	Needed confidence[e]	SCP section
	Description	Modifier							
Model calibration and validation, gas-phase carbon-14 transport in overburden of UZ	Profile of carbon-14 concentration	Ambient, rock mass pore spaces	R-area	UZ-units, Ovb	None	TBD	L	M	8.3.1.2.2, 8.3.1.3.8
	Major-ion water chemistry (i.e. composition, Eh, pH)	Ambient, rock mass pore fluids	R-area	UZ-units, Ovb	None	TBD	L	M	8.3.1.3.1, 8.3.1.2.2
	Profiles of abundances of secondary calcite, carbon-14 in calcite	Ambient, rock mass	R-area	UZ-units, Ovb	None	TBD	L	L	8.3.1.3.2
	Profile of Darcy velocity of air flow	Ambient, rock mass pore spaces	R-area	UZ-units, Ovb	None	TBD	L	H	8.3.1.2.2
Source term - liquid and gas-phase releases from waste packages	Geometry of waste package	Diameter, length and proposed orientation with respect to vertical direction	NA	NA	6.2.3	No goal (design parameter)	NA	NA	8.3.2.2.3, 8.3.4.2.2, 8.3.4.2.3
	Radionuclide inventory at closure in waste package	Expressed as kilograms (or curies) per package for radionuclides listed in Table 8.3.5.13-7	NA	NA	7.4.3.2.1, 7.4.3.1.1	m,v	L,L	H,H	8.3.4.2.2
	Areal density of k^{th} kind of waste package in repository	As a function of lateral spatial location, and, if more than one level, altitude above mean sea level	NA	NA	None	No goal (design parameter)	NA	NA	8.3.2.2.6, 8.3.4.2.2

Table 8.3.5.13-17. Supporting parameters needed to evaluate the nominal case and as baseline data for the disturbed cases (page 5 of 6)

Issue 1.1 calculation using supporting parameter[a]	Supporting parameter		Lateral spatial location where needed[b]	Unit where needed[c]	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Characterization goal[d]	Current confidence[e]	Needed confidence[e]	SCP section
	Description	Modifier							
Source term - liquid and gas-phase releases from waste packages (continued)	Containment time of k^{th} kind of waste package i.e., time after closure at which liquids would have free access to waste form	As a function of position in repository, if necessary	R-area	Host rock	None	m,v	L,L	M,M	8.3.5.9.4
	Post-containment mass release rate from k^{th} kind of waste package	Waste form to liquid phase; expected conditions; if necessary, as a function of: time since closure, position in repository, percolation flux at repository level	R-area	Host rock	7.4.3.1.1, 7.4.3.2.1	m,v Also show mean release rates for C, Tc, and I are less than 10^{-5} of 1000-yr inventory	L,L	M,M	8.3.5.10.4
	Mass release rate of carbon-14 in a gas phase from the k^{th} kind of waste package	Waste form to a gas phase; pre- and post-containment periods; if necessary, as a function of: time since closure, position in the repository	R-area	Host rock	7.4.3.1	m,v Also show that fraction of C-14 inventory that could be released in gas phase is less than 1%	L,L	H,M	8.3.5.10.4
	Degradation rates of waste form in the k^{th} kind of waste package	Ambient conditions (i.e., natural water chemistry associated with repository host rock)	R-area	Host rock	7.4.3.1.1, 7.4.3.2.1	m,v	L,L	M,M	8.3.5.10.3

Table 8.3.5.13-17. Supporting parameters needed to evaluate the nominal case and as baseline data for the disturbed cases (page 6 of 6)

Issue 1.1 calculation using supporting parameter[a]	Supporting parameter: Description	Supporting parameter: Modifier	Lateral spatial location where needed[b]	Unit where needed[c]	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Characterization goal[d]	Current confidence[e]	Needed confidence[e]	SCP section
Source term - liquid and gas-phase releases from waste packages (continued)	Maximum concentration of chemical species associated with the i^{th} radionuclide (i.e., solubility limits)	In general, for the radionuclides listed in Table 8.3.5.13-4, ambient conditions	R-area	Host rock	None	m,v	L,L	M,M	8.3.5.10.3

[a]UZ = unsaturated or partially saturated zone; SZ = saturated zone.

[b]Notation for indicating the various areas or zones around the repository: R-area = the vertical projection of primary repository area and extensions; C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area which is chosen according to the 10 CFR Part 60 definition of controlled area.

[c]Ovb = overburden; i.e., all hydrogeologic units above repository floor; UZ-units = all hydrogeologic units below repository floor but above water table; SZ-units = all hydrogeologic units below water table which are included in the effective thickness of the saturated zone.

[d]Notation for statistical descriptors: m = mean value; v = variance; a = autocorrelation length. In general, these descriptors are used for spatially varying quantities, but m and v will also be used to indicate mean and variance of a scalar random variable; the supporting parameter being described should make clear which usage is intended.

[e]L = low, M = medium, H = high, and NA = not applicable.

[f]Effective porosity, sometimes called the kinematic porosity (see pp. 24-25 of DeMarsily, 1986).

on the same scale, an assessment of the confidence needed to establish in a formal licensing action that the goal for the performance parameter has been met.

5. Summary of licensing and issue-resolution strategy for Issue 1.1

A nine-step program for providing the documented analyses and calculations for resolving Issue 1.1 is outlined in Table 8.3.5.13-18.

Table 8.3.5.13-18. Licensing strategy for resolving Issue 1.1 (total system performance)

Step	Description
1. Identify relevant phenomena leading to releases	Generic lists of phenomena potentially leading to releases from a geologic repository (IAEA, 1983a) are used together with site-specific information to single out those phenomena that are relevant to the waste-disposal system being considered.
2. Identify potentially significant events and processes	Relevant phenomena are examined in the light of being possible initiators or promoters of release scenarios. The implications of the site-specific frequencies and magnitudes, insofar as these are known for the integrity of each of the system's barriers, are explored.
3. Identify release scenarios	Events, processes, and conditions identified in step 2 are chained together to form scenarios. The construction of chains is constrained by physical causality and evidence concerning the likelihood of occurrence of events and processes that form the chain (in other words, screening against probability may occur in this step). The result of this step is usually a large number of potential release scenarios.
4. Identify scenario classes	All release scenarios identified in step 3 are examined and, by judgment, assembled in classes, each class being amenable to formulation as a single mathematical model. The result of this step is usually a moderate number of scenario classes that, after being put in mathematical form in step 5, can be screened against consequences in step 6.

Table 8.3.5.13-18. Licensing strategy for resolving Issue 1.1 (total system performance) (continued)

Step	Description
5. Construct scenario class models	Mathematical models of the scenario classes identified in step 4 are constructed. The independent variables of each model are those state variables needed to determine initial conditions, boundary conditions, and any time-dependent forcing functions that appear in the scenario class; the dependent variable (the output) of each model is the partial performance measure for the scenario class associated with a particular choice of the class's independent variables.
6. Eliminate inconsequential scenarios	Release scenarios or even whole scenario classes may be eliminated from set of exceptional scenarios by screening against relative or absolute consequences. If necessary, the models that survive screening against consequences may be simplified in this step by elimination of insensitive independent variables (sensitivity analyses).
7. Construct total system	Simplified mathematical models resulting from step 6 are implemented by efficient computer codes that can be combined in a single calculational model under the control of a driver routine. The driver routine must provide independent variables for each submodel, direct a simultaneous calculation of the partial performance measure for each submodel, and sum the resulting partial performance measures to obtain a value of the total performance measure, M, for a system; the driver routine must also select independent variables for the submodels by Monte Carlo sampling from the joint probability distribution of state variables for all submodels. The form of the joint probability distribution of state variables, and the ranges of those state variables, will inevitably be determined by judgment. Wherever possible, judgment will be enhanced and supplemented with site specific actuarial data concerning magnitudes and frequencies of the phenomenon that determine the state variables.

Table 8.3.5.13-18. Licensing strategy for resolving Issue 1.1 (total system performance) (continued)

Step	Description
8. Construct an empirical complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF)	The computer-implemented simulator assembled in step 7 is used to generate sample values of the total performance measure M. By repeated sampling, a large number of samples can be generated and used to construct an empirical CCDF or as a data set to which standard statistical methods for estimating likelihoods with given confidence bounds may be applied.
9. Document results	The logic and data bases supporting the analyses for steps 1 to 4, the rationales for the models developed in steps 5 to 7, and the results of the CCDF calculations in step 8 are all documented and presented as evidence that the proposed waste disposal system will meet the proposed 10 CFR 60.112 and 60.115 requirements, thereby resolving Issue 1.1 (8.3.5.13).

The logic of issue resolution is diagrammed in considerable detail in Figures 8.3.5.13-6A through 8.3.5.13-6G. The list and logic diagrams complement one another and both are shown in enough detail to be self-explanatory. Most of the elements, processes, and factors that appear in the list and logic diagrams are defined and explained in Part 1 (Methods for constructing a CCDF) and Part 2 (A preliminary selection of events, processes, and scenario classes for the Yucca Mountain repository site) of this overview.

Interrelationships of information needs

Sections 8.3.5.13.2 through 8.3.5.13.5 address the information and tasks needed to complete the nine-step program. Section 8.3.5.13.2 (Information Need 1.1.2) covers the required information and activities for step 5, the construction of scenario-class models. Section 8.3.5.13.4 (Information Need 1.1.4) covers required information and activities for step 6, the screening of scenario classes on the basis of consequences, and for the process of constructing the simplified scenario-class models to be used in completing steps 7 and 8. Finally, Section 8.3.5.13.5 (Information Need 1.1.5) addresses construction of the total-system simulator (step 7) and the empirical CCDF (step 8). The activities and schedules necessary for the preparation of licensing material (step 9) are also addressed in Section 8.3.5.13.5. Section 8.3.5.13.1 (Information Need 1.1.1) is a summary of all data and information called for in Information Needs 1.1.2 (8.3.5.13.2) through 1.1.5 (8.3.5.13.5).


START
IDENTIFY A SET OF RELEASE SCENARIOS BASED ON EXISTING INFO & REQUIREMENTS
ROSS SCENARIOS (ROSS, 1986)
PACs (FROM ISSUE 1.8)
YUCCA MOUNTAIN EA (DOE, 1986b) AND SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
PRELIMINARY PERFORMANCE ALLOCATION
(SEE SUBTREE 1, FIGURE 8.3.5.13-6B)
ADD NEW RELEASE SCENARIOS
STATES/TRIBES
INTERVENORS
REGULATORY AGENCIES
SITE CHARACTERIZATION
HAVE ALL SCENARIOS BEEN ANALYZED ?
YES
A
(PROBABILISTIC CALCULATIONS & EVALUATIONS FIGURE 8.3.5.13-6C)
NO
ANALYZE NEXT RELEASE SCENARIO
(SEE SUBTREE 2, FIGURE 8.3.5.13-6D)
(SEE SUBTREE 3, FIGURE 8.3.5.13-6E)
CONSTRUCT MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF SCENARIO ADEQUATE FOR SCREENING
NO
ARE MATHEMATICAL MODELS ADEQUATE FOR SCREENING ?
YES
SCREEN NEXT RELEASE SCENARIO
(SEE SUBTREE 4 FIGURE 8.3.5.13-6F)
ELIMINATE SCENARIO FROM SET OF SCENARIOS
NO
IS NEXT RELEASE SCENARIO SIGNIFICANT ?
YES
REVISE PERFORMANCE ALLOCATION
ASSIGN NEXT RELEASE SCENARIO TO SETS
1 INCLUDE IN CCDF
2 NOT INCLUDED IN CCDF
(SEE SUBTREE 5 FIGURE 8.3.5.13-6G)
CCDF - COMPLEMENTARY CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION
EA - ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT
PAC - POTENTIALLY ADVERSE CONDITION
INFO - INFORMATION
TBA RELEASE SCENARIOS - THOSE SCENARIOS THAT ARE TO BE ASSIGNED SIGNIFICANCE AND A DETERMINATION MADE AS TO WHETHER THEY COULD BE INCORPORATED IN THE CCDF

Figure 8.3.5.13-6A. Idealized scenario classification and screening (logic diagram for Issue 1.1, total system performance).


IN
SELECT NEXT RELEASE SCENARIO FROM PRELIMINARY SET
DETERMINE MODES OF RELEASE:
1. DIRECT
2. WATER-PATHWAY
3. GAS-PATHWAY
DETERMINE INITIATING EVENTS OR PROCESSES ASSOCIATED WITH RELEASE SCENARIO
DETERMINE WHICH INTERMEDIATE PERFORMANCE MEASURES WOULD BE AFFECTED
ASSIGN RELEASE SCENARIO TO SCENARIO CLASS OR CREATE NEW CLASS IF NECESSARY
IDENTIFY PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS ASSOCIATED WITH SCENARIO
DETERMINE WHETHER NEW CONCEPTUAL OR THEORETICAL INFORMATION IS NEEDED
SET GOALS AND NEEDED CONFIDENCE
CONSTRUCT PRELIMINARY QUANTITATIVE MODELS OF SCENARIO CLASS (IF NONE EXIST)
NOTIFY APPROPRIATE DESIGN AND CHARACTERIZATION PROGRAMS OF NEEDS FOR CONCEPTS AND PARAMETERS
IS SET OF PRELIMINARY SCENARIOS EMPTY ?
NO
YES
OUT

Figure 8.3.5.13-6B. Subtree 1--Idealized preliminary performance allocation (logic diagram for Issue 1.1, total system performance)


A
CONSTRUCT CCDF INCLUDING ALL SCENARIOS FOR WHICH CONSTRUCTION IS SHOWN TO BE PRACTICABLE
EVALUATE RISKS OF OF ALL SCENARIOS NOT INCLUDED IN THE CCDF
DOES CCDF MEET REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 60.112 AND 60.115 ?
YES
YES
ARE RISKS OF THOSE SCENARIOS NOT INCLUDED IN CCDF ACCEPTABLE ?
NO
NO
ISSUE 1.1 RESOLVED POSITIVELY
STOP
ISSUE 1.1 RESOLVED NEGATIVELY
CCDF - COMPLEMENTARY CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION

Figure 8.3.5.13-6C. Idealized probabilistic calculations and evaluations (logic diagram for Issue 1.1 total system performance)


IN
DETERMINE MODE OF RELEASE:
1. DIRECT
2. WATER-PATHWAY
3. GAS-PATHWAY
DETERMINE INITIATING EVENTS OR PROCESSES ASSOCIATED WITH RELEASE SCENARIO
DETERMINE WHICH INTERMEDIATE PERFORMANCE MEASURES WOULD BE AFFECTED
IDENTIFY PERFORM-ANCE PARAMETERS ASSOCIATED WITH RELEASE SCENARIO
IS SCENARIO CAPABLE OF BEING QUANTIFIED WITH EXISTING MODELS ?
YES
YES
DOES SITE CHARACTER-IZATION OR DESIGN PROVIDE PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS FOR SCENARIO ?
NO
NO
REQUEST ADDITIONAL PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS FROM CHARACTERIZATION AND DESIGN PROGRAMS
OUT - NO
OUT - YES

Figure 8.3.5.13-6D. Subtree 2--Idealized scenario classification (logic diagram for Issue 1.1, total system performance).


IDENTIFY
1. MODES OF RELEASE
2. INITIATING EVENT
3. PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS
{FROM SUBTREE 2, FIGURE 8.3.5.13-6D
FROM:
• CHARACTERIZATION/DESIGN EXPERIENCE
• LITERATURE
• OUTSIDE EXPERTISE
REQUEST UNKNOWN PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS FROM CHARACTERIZATION OR DESIGN PROGRAMS
IDENTIFY MEANS (IF ANY) FOR VALIDATING A MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THIS SCENARIO CLASS
IDENTIFY PHENOMENOLOGY AND THEORY ASSOCIATED WITH THIS SCENARIO'S CLASS
CONSTRUCT MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THIS SCENARIO CLASS THAT IS ADEQUATE FOR SCREENING
VERIFY ANALYTIC PROCEDURES AND CODES ASSOCIATED WITH MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THIS SCENARIO CLASS
VALIDATE MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THIS SCENARIO CLASS USING AVAILABLE MEANS (IF ANY)
DOCUMENT MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THIS SCENARIO CLASS, INCLUDING VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION
OUT

Figure 8.3.5.13-6E. Subtree 3--Idealized sequence for constructing a mathematical model of a scenario class logic diagram for Issue 1.1, total system performance).


IN
ESTIMATE EPPM FOR THIS SCENARIO
OBTAIN OR ESTIMATE ANNUAL PROBABILITIES OF INITIATING EVENTS OR PROCESSES
IS EPPM >> NOMINAL-CLASS EPPM ?
NO
YES
ARE ALL 10,000 YR PROBABILITIES < 10^{-8}/YR. ?
YES
NO
DOCUMENT SCREENING ANALYSIS FOR THIS SCENARIO
IS THIS SCENARIO ASSOCIATED WITH A PAC ?
NO
YES
OUT - NO
NOTIFY ISSUE 1.8 INVESTIGATORS (8.3.5.17)
EPPM - EXPECTED PARTIAL PERFORMANCE MEASURE
PAC - POTENTIALLY ADVERSE CONDITION
OUT - YES

Figure 8.3.5.13-6F. Subtree 4– –Idealized scenario screening (logic diagram for Issue 1.1, total system performance).


IN
ARE ALL DATA AND CONCEPTS ABOUT THIS SCENARIO SUFFICIENT TO CONSTRUCT A CCDF ?
YES
NO
CAN SITE CHARACTER-IZATION OR DESIGN PROVIDE SUFFICIENT INFORMATION ?
YES
REQUEST NEEDED INFORMATION FROM CHARACTERIZATION OR DESIGN PROGRAMS
NO
ASSIGN THIS SCENARIO TO SET OF SCENARIO NOT TO BE INCLUDED IN THE CCDF
ASSIGN THIS SCENARIO TO SET OF SCENARIOS TO BE INCLUDED IN THE CCDF
IS THIS SCENARIO ASSOCIATED WITH A PAC ?
YES
NOTIFY ISSUE 1.8 INVESTIGATORS OF ASSIGNMENT MADE TO SCENARIO (8.3.5.17)
NO
CCDF - COMPLEMENTARY CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION
PAC - POTENTIALLY ADVERSE CONDITION
OUT

Figure 8.3.5.13-6G. Subtree 5 – – Decision to include scenario in complementary cumulative distribution function calculation (logic diagram for Issue 1.1, total system performance).

The schedule information for Issue 1.1 (total system performance) is presented in Section 8.3.5.13.6.

8.3.5.13.1 Information Need 1.1.1: Site information needed to calculate releases to the accessible environment

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

Section 8.3.5.13 discusses the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) and significant processes and events, summarizes the issue resolution strategy, and discusses the performance allocation for Issue 1.1. Applicable support documents include Ross (1986) (scenario selection), Klavetter and Peters (1986), and Wilson and Dudley (1987) (flow and transport through porous, fractured rock).

Parameters

All information and data requested in this information need are specified in Tables 8.3.5.13-8 through 8.3.5.13-17 and discussed in the text of the preliminary performance allocation.

Planned performance assessment activities

No performance assessment activities are planned.

8.3.5.13.1.1 Application of results

Site information needed to calculate releases to the accessible environment will be used in Information Needs 1.1.2 through 1.1.5.

8.3.5.13.2 Information Need 1.1.2: A set of potentially significant release scenario classes that address all events and processes that may affect the geologic repository

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

Section 8.3.5.13 discusses the interpretation of significant processes and events and disruptive scenarios for the Yucca Mountain repository site. In Table 8.3.5.13-18, Step 3 describes the identification of potentially disruptive scenarios and Step 4 describes the identification of scenario classes. Applicable supporting documents include DOE (1986a,b) and Ross (1987) (preliminary identification of release scenarios).

Parameters

The parameters for this information need are

1. Information and data on, and interpretations of, site-specific phenomena from the Yucca Mountain Project environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b) and its supporting references and documents.

2. Data and interpretive information to be supplied through the fulfillment of other performance and characterization issues. See Tables 8.3.5.13-9 through 8.3.5.13-17 for performance and supporting parameters.

Logic

All data and interpretive information arising from the resolution of the Yucca Mountain Project site characterization program are potentially relevant to the identification of release-scenario classes at the Yucca Mountain repository site. But in advance of obtaining these data, and for the purpose of guiding site characterization activities, one must proceed with scenario identification using the data and knowledge bases established during the preparation of the Yucca Mountain Project environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b). On the other hand, once site characterization work is well advanced, the interpretations and decisions originally considered for the purpose of initially guiding site characterization activities must be reexamined in the light of new data and information. Accordingly, there are two phases of work toward fulfilling this information need: (1) a preliminary phase, in which current data and interpretive information are used to construct potentially significant release scenario classes, and (2) a final phase, during which the preliminary scenario classes are modified, supplemented, dropped from consideration, or reconsidered if they had been previously dropped but warrant a second examination on the basis of new evidence. The logic of phase 1 is described in the following paragraph.

In the preliminary phase, the phenomena identified in the environmental assessment as being significant at the Yucca Mountain site are compared with generic lists of world-wide natural processes, events, or conditions that have been thought to influence the long-term performance of geologic waste disposal systems (for examples of such lists see Table 2.3.1 in Campbell et al. (1978); or IAEA (1983a)). Those natural processes or events in the generic lists that are either manifestly irrelevant to the context of the Yucca Mountain site (e.g., sea-level rise and glaciation) or have had demonstrably minor effects on site characteristics during the Quaternary (e.g., meteorites, hurricanes, and root penetration) are eliminated as potential ingredients of disruptive scenarios. In a similar fashion, features of the site and the repository design, and available estimates of the effects of repository excavation and waste emplacement on site characteristics are compared with anthropogenic processes and events in the generic lists and eliminated as being either irrelevant (e.g., brine-bubble migration) or insignificant. This elimination process leaves a set of natural and anthropogenic processes and events that, in the absence of further information, may be considered to play roles in changing the nominal performance of the total system (e.g., climatic change, seismic events, volcanic activity, erosion, dissolution of the host rock, undetected geologic features such as mineral

resources near the site, subsidence, and permanent thermal changes in rock hydrologic and geochemical properties).

The processes and events that are determined to play potential roles in release scenarios are then subjectively arranged in series, and an attempt is made to discover the effects of realization of each series on the performance of one or more of the isolation barriers for the total system. This part of the analysis is necessarily subjective because the number of series formed in this way could be astronomical if the intuition and knowledge of the analyst is not applied to reduce the number of possibilities to a manageable size. Two nonsubjective principles may, however, be used at this point to guide the formation of the series: (1) the principle of causality (i.e., certain chains of events and processes are not possible because one or more event or process upstream in the chain is logically antecedent to others downstream in the chain) and (2) the fact that long series of events or processes are unlikely to be realized in the 10,000-yr period being considered (e.g., events with even a modest probability--chances of 0.1 or less in a 10,000-yr period--will compose an unlikely series if there are more than four of them in a serial chain). In addition, certain short series of events may be eliminated on the basis of probability at this point if there is sufficient evidence that the initiating event or guiding process is improbable (in the sense of not exceeding the 0.0001 cutoff probability threshold in 10,000 yr). Using the kinds of reasoning and analyses indicated previously, Ross (1987) has identified 84 series of events and processes that could cause or influence releases of radioactivity to the accessible environment that have the potential of adding to nominal-case releases.

As seen from Ross (1987), the results of the kinds of analyses previously indicated is a large but finite number of sequences of events and processes that must be further organized into scenario classes to efficiently begin construction of the mathematical models of those classes. In turn, the mathematical representations of the scenario classes are necessary to determine each class's consequences and also to enable screening of each class against relative consequences. A preliminary organization of scenario classes is shown in Table 8.3.5.13-3.

8.3.5.13.2.1 Performance Assessment Activity 1.1.2.1: Preliminary identification of potentially significant release scenario classes

The objective of this performance assessment activity is to preliminarily identify significant release scenario classes for the purpose of determining data and informational needs that must be supplied by the Yucca Mountain Project site characterization program. This activity includes two subactivities.

8.3.5.13.2.1.1 Subactivity 1.1.2.1.1: Preliminary identification of potentially significant sequences of events and processes at the Yucca Mountain repository site

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to identify a set of causally related, apparently probable sequences of events and processes, any member of which, if realized, could cause or influence releases of radioactivity to the accessible environment at the Yucca Mountain site in excess of nominal-case releases.

Parameters

See the general parameters listed previously for Information Need 1.1.2.

Description

See the general logic discussion given previously for Information Need 1.1.2.

8.3.5.13.2.1.2 Subactivity 1.1.2.1.2: Preliminary identification of potentially significant release scenario classes

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to preliminarily identify a set of significant release scenario classes for the purpose of determining data and informational needs that must be supplied by the Yucca Mountain Project site characterization program.

Parameters

The parameters for this subactivity are the sequences of events and processes identified in Subactivity 1.1.2.1.1 plus the information, data, interpretations, and calculational models related to site-specific phenomena from the Yucca Mountain Project EA (DOE, 1986b) and its supporting documents.

Description

This subactivity has been completed, and the results are summarized in the section on approach to resolving this issue.

8.3.5.13.2.2 Performance Assessment Activity 1.1.2.2: Final selection of significant release scenario classes to be used in licensing assessments

Objectives

The objective of this performance assessment activity is to use data and information obtained in the Yucca Mountain Project site characterization program to modify, if necessary, the set of significant release scenario classes developed in Activity 1.1.2.1 and in the preliminary phases of work

fulfilling Information Needs 1.1.3 and 1.1.4 (Sections 8.3.5.13.3 and 8.3.5.13.4).

Parameters

All data and information that could arise during the site characterization program are potential parameters. The tables in the introductory material of this section give the requested data and information.

Description

Only examples of possible study topics can be given. Work in fulfillment of Information Need 1.5.4 (Section 8.3.5.10.4) may show that release rates of radionuclides from the engineered barrier system are orders of magnitude less than the regulatory rate under unanticipated conditions in the repository. In such a case, certain scenario classes in Table 8.3.5.13-3 would be screened again and possibly eliminated. Work in fulfillment of Information Need 1.1.3 (Section 8.3.5.13.3) and Investigation 8.3.1.5.2 may indirectly indicate that delay times for climatic infiltration pulses are long compared with 10,000 yr. In such a case, certain scenarios in class C-1 in Table 8.3.5.13-3 could be dropped from consideration. Similarly, two-dimensional calculations of transient flow in faulted zones, when combined with predictions of the effects of tectonic activity on hydrologic characteristics (from Investigation 8.3.1.8.3), may indicate that certain scenarios in class C-3 in Table 8.3.5.13-3 can be dropped. On the other hand, the development of evidence that colloids play a significant role in radionuclide transport (in fulfillment of Investigation 8.3.1.3.5) could force a modification of the transport equations used to screen scenario classes in Information Need 1.1.3 (Section 8.3.5.13.3), and a reassessment of all scenario classes involving releases along the water pathways. Finally, the development of evidence for future, inadvertent human activity on or near the site may lead to the reconsideration or augmentation of the direct-release scenario classes such as Class A-2 in Table 8.3.5.13-3.

8.3.5.13.2.3 Application of results

The preliminary phase of work addressing this information need will be used to guide the construction of the mathematical models of scenario classes during the partial fulfillment of Information Need 1.1.3 (Section 8.3.5.13.3). The tasks of showing that certain conditions mentioned in 10 CFR 60.122 and 10 CFR 960.4 (i.e., erosion and rock dissolution) are neither favorable or unfavorable at the Yucca Mountain site are also regarded as part of the preliminary phase of work in conjunction with the preliminary phase of work addressing Information Need 1.1.3.

The final phase of work addressing this information need will be used in conjunction with the final phase of Information Need 1.1.3 to modify the set of scenario-class models (if necessary) that must be simplified and made numerically efficient in work toward fulfillment of Information Need 1.1.4 (Section 8.3.5.13.4).

8.3.5.13.3 Information Need 1.1.3: Calculational models for predicting releases to the accessible environment attending realizations of the potentially significant release-scenario classes

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

The introductory discussion of Section 8.3.5.13 develops disruptive scenarios for the Yucca Mountain repository site and addresses the topics of gas-phase releases and calculation of releases through the water pathways. In Table 8.3.5.13-18, Step 5 discusses the construction of scenario-class models. The supporting documents are DOE (1986b), Sinnock et al. (1986) (calculational models used in Section 6.4.2 of the Yucca Mountain Project environmental assessment), and Wilson and Dudley (1987).

Parameters

The parameters of this information need are

1. The release-scenario classes identified in the preliminary phase of work fulfilling Information Need 1.1.2 (Section 8.3.5.13.2).

2. The same rock hydrologic properties that are needed to resolve the ground-water travel time issue (Information Need 1.6.1, Section 8.3.5.12.1), but extended to include rock hydrologic properties for overburden units. See Tables 8.3.5.13-9 and 8.3.5.13-17 and parameters for Information Need 1.6.1 and Investigations 8.3.1.2.2 and 8.3.1.2.3.

3. Data and interpretive information concerning rock and ground-water geochemical properties, with emphasis on the properties of rock units and ground water below the repository horizon; also, the effective retardation of carbon dioxide by isotopic exchange with ground water in the overburden units of the unsaturated zone. See Tables 8.3.5.13-9 and 8.3.5.13-17 and parameters from Investigations 8.3.1.3.4, 8.3.1.3.5, 8.3.1.3.7, and 8.3.1.3.8.

4. Definition of the boundary of the engineered barrier system, and release rates of radionuclides from the engineered barrier system for nominal and disturbed conditions in the repository. See Tables 8.3.5.13-9 and 8.3.5.13-17 and parameters from Information Need 1.5.4 (Section 8.3.5.10).

5. Preliminary estimates of the kind and nature of human-intrusion and magmatic-intrusion events. See Tables 8.3.5.13-10 and 8.3.5.13-11 and parameters from Investigations 8.3.1.8.3 through 8.3.1.8.5 and 8.3.1.9.3.

6. Calculational models of transient flow in the unsaturated and saturated zones capable of predicting time-dependent specific discharge in at least two dimensions. See the introductory material to this section and parameters from Information Need 1.6.2 (Section 8.3.5.12.2).

7. Calculational models of transport of dissolved species in the unsaturated and saturated zones capable of predicting time-dependent mass-flux fields in at least two dimensions. See the introductory material to this section and parameters from Investigation 8.3.1.3.7.

8. Final conceptual models of the unsaturated and saturated zone hydrologic systems. See the introductory material to this section and parameters from Investigations 8.3.1.2.1, 8.3.1.2.2, and 8.3.1.2.3.

9. Final conceptual models of the unsaturated and saturated zone geochemical systems, including geochemical effects on gas-phase transport. See the introductory material to this section and parameters from Investigations 8.3.1.3.7 and 8.3.1.3.8.

Logic

The release-scenario classes identified in the preliminary phase of work fulfilling Information Need 1.1.2 (item 1 in parameter list) are listed in Table 8.3.5.13-3. Mathematical models of these release-scenario classes are the product of this information need. The models are needed (1) to screen the scenario classes against consequences, and (2) provided that the scenario class survives screening against consequences, to serve as a basis for constructing the simplified mathematical models required for the construction of the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) in fulfillment of Information Need 1.1.5 (Section 8.3.5.13.5). The screening of scenario-class models against relative consequences, and the construction of simplified scenario-class models based on the preliminary models developed in this information need, are studies to be conducted in Information Need 1.1.4 (Section 8.3.5.13.4). There are two phases of work toward the construction of scenario-class models: (1) a preliminary phase in which current data and interpretive information are used to build and test the models, and (2) a final phase in which data and interpretive information arising out of the site characterization program are used to justify modifications or replacements of existing models, or the construction of entirely new models. The logic of phase 1 is emphasized in the discussion that follows.

As shown by the grouping of release-scenario classes in Table 8.3.5.13-3, at least four distinct kinds of models are needed to calculate releases to the accessible environment: (1) those that predict radionuclide releases along water pathways, (2) those that predict gas-phase radionuclide releases, (3) those that predict releases associated with intrusive or extrusive magmatic events, and (4) those that predict direct releases associated with inadvertent human intrusion (here, inadvertent exploratory drilling on the site).

Water-pathway models. The Total System Performance Assessment Code (TOSPAC), which is under development (Klavetter and Peters, 1986), is currently the major "workbench" for the development of the phenomenology of water-pathway models that apply to Yucca Mountain conditions. As implied by its name, the TOSPAC is capable of simulating the static and dynamic response of a one-dimensional conceptual model of the total waste-disposal system at Yucca Mountain. This is done by the coupling of three submodels (or modules): (1) a flow module, that can predict time-dependent, specific-discharge fields in the unsaturated zone given surficial infiltration rates; (2) a source term module, that supplies mass flux or concentrations of liquid-phase radionuclides in the host rock near the repository given radionuclide release rates from the engineered barrier system (EBS); and (3) a transport module that solves the transport equations for coupled matrix-fracture flow (see Equations 8.3.5.13-12 to 8.3.5.13-17 in the introductory material to this section) in the unsaturated zone and computes cumulative releases to the water table, given the flow field from the flow module and the boundary concentrations from the source-term module. The TOSPAC currently has no modules for flow or transport through the saturated zone; these phenomena are being investigated with the ISOQUAD code (Pinder, 1976).

In spite of its limitation to one dimension, the TOSPAC can still be used to screen some of the water-pathway release scenarios in Table 8.3.5.13-3 against consequences. The code has already been used to show (1) that transient flooding from surficial sources may have little effect on repository performance and (2) that increases in fracture density will have no effect on repository performance in the absence of extreme climatic changes. Items 1 through 4 in the parameter list will be needed to provide a rock-property data set for these TOSPAC calculations. The screening of some other water-pathway release scenario classes in Table 8.3.5.13-3, namely in C-1, D-1, and D-2, will definitely require two-dimensional models of flow and transport of the kind mentioned in items 6 and 7 of the parameter list. These two-dimensional models will also be used to validate the phenomenology incorporated in TOSPAC's flow and transport modules (i.e., the neglect of horizontal flow paths and transport along those paths).

It is very likely that the TOSPAC and the phenomenology that it contains will require substantial modification after the "ground truth" of the site characterization program is established. Items 8 and 9 in the parameter list will be required to assess the changes that must be made in the systems-level models.

Models of gas-phase releases. The significance of gas-phase release of carbon-14 has only recently become apparent, and no models for transport of carbon-14 dioxide from the repository through overburden units have so far been developed within the Yucca Mountain Project. An adequate general theory of carbon-14 transport is presented in the introductory material to this section; however, application of that theory to the Yucca Mountain setting would seem to require considerable study of hydrologic, gas-phase hydraulic, and geochemical properties of the overburden units. For that reason, thought should be given to balancing complexity and cost factors associated with site characterization studies with complexity and cost factors associated with engineered barrier system performance and design, because these factors relate to models of gas-phase, carbon-14 releases. The parameters required

by systems-level models for gas-phase transport would include both the effective diffusivity of carbon dioxide and the effective retardation factor for carbon-14 dioxide because of isotopic exchange, each as a function of depth within the overburden units. The latter quantity is requested in item 3 of the parameter list. The effective diffusivity of carbon dioxide might be inferred from final results of experiments being conducted in partial fulfillment of Investigation 8.3.1.2.2.

While the general model of carbon-14 transport may predict travel times shorter than might be expected on the basis of experimental measurements, it is judged to be useful for present purposes of identifying parameter needs because it tends to produce conservative results. As an alternative to a full transport calculation, a simpler systems-level model of gas-phase releases might be devised; use of this model would require estimates of the mean and standard deviation of residence time of carbon-14 nuclei in the repository overburden. Either modeling technique requires specification of the release rate of carbon-14 dioxide from the engineered barrier system, a quantity that is called for in item 4 of the parameter list. However, that release of C-14 is limited at the waste container and at the engineered barrier system boundary to satisfy the requirements in 10 CFR 60.113. Depending on the containment strategies, including alternatives adapted for the waste package, the C-14 source term for the total system may be significantly changed. For example, if all the fast fraction of C-14 were released before waste emplacement, no consideration of C-14 transport would be necessary for the total system performance assessment in Issue 1.1.

Models of releases through basaltic volcanism. The mathematical model for predicting the consequences of basaltic volcanism developed by Link et al. (1982) can be modified and used to estimate cumulative releases to the accessible environment attending the realization of such events at Yucca Mountain. The work by Link et al. (1982) was specifically applied to Yucca Mountain, but the conceptual and data bases may be outdated, and a request is made for the most current concepts and data in item 5 of the parameter list.

Models of releases through human intrusion. A calculation of an upper bound to the consequences of inadvertent exploratory drilling on the Yucca Mountain site during the next 10,000 yr is described in the introductory material to this section, along with a brief discussion of other types of human-intrusion scenarios that might be realized at that location. The model implicit in the calculation is easily put into mathematical terms. The state variables for the model include (1) the mean recurrence time between penetrations (current guidance in Appendix B of 40 CFR Part 191 sets a limit on the penetration rate of 0.0003 penetrations/km^2 per yr), (2) the depth of penetration (and the attending probability distribution), and (3) the diameter of the exploratory drill bit (and its probability distribution). Data required to implement the model, and models of other potential human-intrusion scenario classes, are requested through item 5 in the parameter list.

8.3.5.13.3.1 Performance Assessment Activity 1.1.3.1: Development of mathematical models of the scenario classes

The objective of this performance assessment activity is to construct mathematical models of the scenario classes developed in Information Need 1.1.3 (Section 8.3.5.13.3). Four subactivities are included in this activity. These subactivities describe the models to be developed for this activity.

8.3.5.13.3.1.1 Subactivity 1.1.3.1.1: Development of models for releases along the water pathways

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to produce mathematical models whose phenomenology is sufficient (1) to effect a screening of the release scenarios associated with the water pathways with respect to consequences and (2) to form an adequate basis for the simplified models needed to fulfill Information Need 1.1.5 (Section 8.3.5.13.5).

Parameters

The parameters for this subactivity are items 1 to 4 in the general parameter list for Information Need 1.1.3 and preliminary versions of the conceptual models referred to in items 8 and 9 of the same general parameter list.

Description

Several systems-level models of releases along the water pathways have already been constructed: the TOSPAC (see Klavetter and Peters, 1986), RELEASE (Sinnock et al., 1986), and SPARTAN (Lin, 1985). The two- and three-dimensional models of flow and transport that could be used to screen scenario classes on the basis of long delays for certain effects are listed in Section 8.3.5.19. The TOSPAC probably will be sufficient to screen scenario classes E and C-2 through C-3 (Table 8.3.5.13-3) if calculations with the multi-dimensional models show that lateral flow paths can be ignored. The screening of scenario class C-1 will require at least a two-dimensional model of transient flow through a faulted zone. Scenario classes D-1 and D-2 can probably be screened with the simple RELEASE code (or modifications of it) if saturated-zone flow fields are provided by the two-dimensional ISOQUAD model. Effective use of any of these models in the screening of water-pathway scenario classes will definitely require better, site-specific conceptual and data bases. Thus, items 2 and 3 are in the general parameter list.

8.3.5.13.3.1.2 Subactivity 1.1.3.1.2: Development of a model for gas-phase releases

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to produce a mathematical model whose phenomenology is sufficient (1) to effect a screening of the release scenario associated with the anticipated gas-phase releases and (2) to form a basis for the simplified model needed to fulfill Information Need 1.1.5.

Parameters

The parameters for this subactivity are items 3 and 4 in the general parameter list for Information Need 1.1.3.

Description

A systems-level model similar to the one described for water-pathway releases in the introductory material to this section may be sufficient to determine the expected partial performance measure (EPPM) for anticipated gas-phase releases, and at the same time be simple enough to use as a scenario-class model in the construction of the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) (Information Need 1.1.5, Section 8.3.5.13.5). This subactivity will thus involve the calibration of one of the parameters of a system-level model (the reciprocal of the mean residence time) with estimates of the actual time for carbon-14 dioxide to diffuse from the repository level to the surface (from item 4). Other parameters required by the model are supplied through item 3.

8.3.5.13.3.1.3 Subactivity 1.1.3.1.3: Development of a model of releases through basaltic volcanism

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to produce a mathematical model whose phenomenology is sufficient (1) to effect a screening of the release scenarios associated with basaltic volcanism and (2) to form an adequate basis for the simplified models needed to fulfill Information Need 1.1.5 (Section 8.3.5.13.5).

Parameters

The parameters for this subactivity are the model of basaltic volcanism proposed by Link et al. (1982) and the updated estimates of the kind and nature of magmatic-intrusion events at Yucca Mountain (item 5 in the general parameter list).

Description

The model proposed by Link et al. (1982) will, if necessary, be modified to reflect most recent estimates of the kind and nature of basaltic volcanism to be expected at Yucca Mountain.

8.3.5.13.3.1.4 Subactivity 1.1.3.1.4: Development of a model of releases through human intrusion

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to produce mathematical models whose phenomenology is sufficient (1) to effect a screening of the release scenarios associated with inadvertent human intrusion and (2) to form an adequate basis for the simplified models needed to fulfill Information Need 1.1.5 (Section 8.3.5.13.5).

Parameters

The parameters of this subactivity are the model of releases through inadvertent exploratory drilling presented in Section 8.3.5.13 and the preliminary and final assessments of the nature of future human intrusion events at the Yucca Mountain repository site (item 5 in general parameter list).

Description

The model of releases through exploratory drilling presented in the introductory material to this section will be put into mathematical terms. Depending upon the outcome of the preliminary assessments of potential human-intrusion events, new conceptual models may have to be developed and put into mathematical terms.

8.3.5.13.3.2 Application of results

The mathematical models developed in Activity 1.1.3.1 and their supporting data bases will be used in a study associated with Information Need 1.1.4 (Section 8.3.5.13.4) to screen the release-scenario classes in Table 8.3.5.13-3 against relative consequences. They must also form the basis for activities directed toward model simplification in Information Need 1.1.4, provided that the scenario class is to be included in calculations of the complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF).

8.3.5.13.4 Information Need 1.1.4: Determination of the radionuclide releases to the accessible environment associated with realizations of potentially significant release scenario classes

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

The introductory material to this section addresses the interpretation of "significant processes and events." In Table 8.3.5.13-18, Step 6 discusses the screening of scenario classes on the basis of relative consequences. The supporting documents are DOE (1986b), Sinnock et al. (1986), and Barr and Miller (1987).

Parameters

The parameters of this information need are the mathematical models of the release scenario classes that were developed in Activity 1.1.3.1 (Section 8.3.5.13.3.1) under Information Need 1.1.3 and their supporting data bases.

Logic

The goals of the work fulfilling this information need are twofold: (1) a screening of the release scenario classes in Table 8.3.5.13-3 (and other classes that may be proposed during the site characterization program) against the criterion of relative consequences, and (2) a set of simplified mathematical models of those release-scenario classes that survive the screening process. In simple terms, the release-scenario classes that survive the screening process will be those release-scenario classes that will provide the major contribution to the empirical complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) to be constructed during activities fulfilling Information Need 1.1.5 (Section 8.3.5.13.5). As is explained in the logic section of Information Need 1.1.3 (Section 8.3.5.13.3), there are necessarily two phases of work fulfilling the need: a preliminary and a final. There are also at least four distinct kinds of models that need to be considered in the preliminary phase of work.

To meet goal 1 in the preliminary phase, computer-implemented versions of the models developed in fulfillment of Information Need 1.1.3 (Section 8.3.5.13.3) will be used to simulate the general consequences of realizations of members of the scenario classes in Table 8.3.5.13-3, and the results of these simulations will be compared. The comparisons will show which (if any) of the scenario-class members may temporarily be dropped from consideration. The work toward meeting goal 2 in the preliminary phase will then focus upon the models of the scenario classes that survive these comparative studies. Work toward meeting goal 1 in the final phase will proceed in a similar fashion, except that the modified or entirely new models produced in the final phase of work fulfilling Information Need 1.1.3 (if any) and final data bases developed in site characterization work will be used in making the comparisons.

The procedures that may be used to turn a complex mathematical model into a simple one representing the same phenomenology (i.e., one that meets goal 2) are best described in a model-specific context. All such procedures could probably be lumped under the title of "sensitivity studies"; but the reader should recognize that there are at least two kinds of model sensitivity: (1) sensitivity of model output to the kinds and manner of representation of physical phenomena incorporated in the model and (2) the sensitivity of model output to variations in the model's input variables. Model simplification is primarily concerned with the first kind of sensitivity. A mathematical model may initially include kinds and representations of physical phenomenon that later prove inessential. These phenomena can be deleted from the model, thereby effecting a simplification and increasing computational efficiency. In the studies fulfilling this information need, sensitivity of the second kind will generally not be investigated; uncertainties in the model input variables will be taken into account by including them in the construction of the joint probability distribution of the model's state

variables (i.e., input parameters) an activity conducted in fulfillment of Information Need 1.1.5 (Section 8.3.5.13.5).

8.3.5.13.4.1 Performance Assessment Activity 1.1.4.1: The screening of potentially significant scenario classes against the criterion of relative consequences

The objective of this performance assessment activity is to identify the set of scenario classes representing the significant events and processes mentioned in proposed 10 CFR 60.112 and 60.115. Two subactivities are included in this activity.

8.3.5.13.4.1.1 Subactivity 1.1.4.1.1: The screening of the preliminary scenario classes

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to identify those scenario classes among the members of the preliminary set (Table 8.3.5.13-3) whose consequences of realization are not significantly different from nominal-class consequences, and therefore may be temporarily dropped from consideration.

Parameters

See the general parameter list for Information Need 1.1.4.

Description

See the general logic and descriptions of Subactivities 1.1.3.1.1 through 1.1.3.1.4 listed in Section 8.3.5.13.3.1.

8.3.5.13.4.1.2 Subactivity 1.1.4.1.2: A final screening of scenario classes

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to identify the final scenario classes to be used in constructing the empirical complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) during fulfillment of Information Need 1.1.5 (Section 8.3.5.13.5).

Parameters

The parameters for this subactivity are a modified and an amended set of mathematical models produced in the final phase of Subactivities 1.1.3.1.1 to 1.1.3.1.4, plus amended data bases from site characterization work.

Description

See the remarks on the final phase in the general logic section for this information need.

8.3.5.13.4.2 Performance Assessment Activity 1.1.4.2: The provision of simplified, computationally efficient models of the final scenario classes representing the significant processes and events mentioned in proposed 10 CFR 60.112 and 60.115

The objective of this performance assessment activity is to provide the simplified, computationally efficient models of the final scenario classes representing the significant processes and events mentioned in proposed 10 CFR 60.112 and 60.115. Two subactivities are included in this activity.

8.3.5.13.4.2.1 Subactivity 1.1.4.2.1: Preliminary development of simplified, computationally efficient scenario-class models

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to construct, as necessary, simple computationally efficient versions of the scenario-class models developed during the Subactivities 1.1.3.1.1 to 1.1.3.1.4 listed in Section 8.3.5.13.3.1.

Parameters

The parameters for this subactivity are the mathematical models developed in Activity 1.1.3.1 of Information Need 1.1.3.

Description

The activities to be conducted depend upon which of the scenario classes survive screening in Subactivity 1.1.4.1.1. If classes E, C-2, or C-3 in Table 8.3.5.13-3 survive, the phenomenology of the existing TOSPAC (in development, but see Klavetter and Peters, 1986) may be amenable to simplifications that preserve the code's ability to represent the essential events and processes of any one of these classes that survive. Simplified, exploratory versions of the TOSPAC have already been tried. See, for instance, the RELEASE model in Sinnock et al. (1986) or the systems-level model proposed in Section 8.3.5.13. These exploratory versions of TOSPAC may also be used to represent classes C-2 or C-3 in Table 8.3.5.13-3 if these classes survive a preliminary screening. The models currently proposed for the screening of the expected-case, gas-phase releases (part of scenario class E) and the direct releases (scenario classes A-1 and A-2), are being developed.

8.3.5.13.4.2.2 Subactivity 1.1.4.2.2: Development of the final, computationally efficient models of the scenario classes that will be used to represent all significant processes and events in the simulation of the total system

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to develop the final, computationally efficient models of the scenario classes that will be used to represent the simulation of the total system.

Parameters

The parameters for this subactivity are the scenario classes that survive the final screening of Subactivity 1.1.4.1.1 and the techniques and insight established in Subactivity 1.1.4.2.1.

Description

See the remarks on final phase of work in the general logic section of this information need.

8.3.5.13.4.3 Application of results

The set of final, computationally efficient models developed in Activity 1.1.4.2 and their supporting data bases will be used in the construction of the total-system simulator, and calculations of an empirical complementary cumulative distribution function (CCDF) with that simulator, as described in activities of Information Need 1.1.5 (Section 8.3.5.13.5).

8.3.5.13.5 Information Need 1.1.5: Probabilistic estimates of the radionuclide releases to the accessible environment considering all significant release scenarios

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

Section 8.3.5.13 discusses the regulatory basis for the issue and the construction of the complementary cumulative distribution functions (CCDFs). In Table 8.3.5.13-18, Step 7 discusses the construction of a total system simulator and Step 8 discusses the construction of an empirical CCDF.

Parameters

The parameters for this information need are

1. Simplified versions of the mathematical models of the significant scenario classes (from Information Need 1.1.4, Section 8.3.5.13.4).

2. Statistical data and interpretive information sufficient to construct the joint probability distribution for the set of state variables that describes all necessary state variables in the simplified mathematical models of the significant scenario classes. See the introductory material to this section and parameters from Tables 8.3.5.13-9 through 8.3.5.13-17.

Logic

The simplified mathematical models provided through fulfillment of Information Need 1.1.4 (Section 8.3.5.13.4) will be implemented by efficient computer codes that are then combined in a single calculational model under the control of a driver routine. The driver routine will (1) provide values for state variables for all submodels through Monte Carlo sampling from the joint distribution of the state variables, (2) direct a calculation of the partial performance measure for each submodel, and (3) sum the resulting partial performance measures for each submodel to obtain a sample value of the total system performance measure. By repeatedly sampling in this way, a large number of samples can be generated and used to construct an empirical complementary cumulative distribution function or as a data set to which standard statistical methods for estimating likelihoods with given confidence bounds may be applied.

The joint distribution of state variables will be constructed using judgment guided by the site-specific statistical data and interpretive information mentioned in the foregoing parameter list.

8.3.5.13.5.1 Performance Assessment Activity 1.1.5.1: Calculation of an empirical complementary cumulative distribution function

Objectives

The objective of this performance assessment activity is to construct an efficient, total-system simulator that is capable of providing probabilistic estimates of radionuclide releases to the accessible environment, under both nominal and disturbed conditions, for 10,000 yr after closure. Three subactivities are included in this activity.

8.3.5.13.5.1.1 Subactivity 1.1.5.1.1: Construction of the total-system simulator

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to construct an efficient, total-system simulator.

Parameters

The parameters for this subactivity are efficient, computer-implemented mathematical models of significant scenario classes (see Information Need 1.1.4, Section 8.3.5.13.4) and a synthetic joint probability distribution for the state variables in all submodels sufficient for testing the operation of the total-system simulator.

Description

A driver routine will be constructed and tested, using submodels and synthetic joint probability distribution. Available variance-reduction techniques will be applied, and the technique most efficient for total-system simulation will be determined.

8.3.5.13.5.1.2 Subactivity 1.1.5.1.2: Construction of the joint probability distribution to be used in the licensing-assessment calculations

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to construct a joint probability distribution that incorporates data and interpretive information from the site characterization program.

Parameters

The parameters for this subactivity are given in the parameters list for this information need.

Description

The state variables will be grouped into statistically independent subsets. For each subset of state variables, a multivariate analytical distribution will be chosen, and its parameters fitted by techniques such as maximum-likelihood, using available, site-specific data for the mean annual probabilities and the intensities of the processes and events that determine the state variables.

8.3.5.13.5.1.3 Subactivity 1.1.5.1.3: Construction of an empirical complementary cumulative distribution function for the licensing action

Objectives

The objective of this subactivity is to construct an empirical complementary cumulative distribution function for the licensing application.

Parameters

The parameters for this subactivity are the total-system simulator from Subactivity 1.1.5.1.1 and the joint distribution function from Subactivity 1.1.5.1.2 (Sections 8.3.5.13.5.1.1 and 8.3.5.13.5.1.2).

Description

By repeated simulation, sample statistics on the total system performance measure, M, will be obtained with a sample size large enough to ensure that proposed 10 CFR 60.112 and 60.115 are (or are not) met with high confidence.

8.3.5.13.5.2 Application of results

The results of fulfilling this information need will be used by the DOE in a licensing application as evidence of compliance with proposed 10 CFR 60.112 and 60.115. Fulfillment of this information need resolves Performance Issue 1.1. There are no other issues or information needs that require the fulfillment of this information need.

8.3.5.13.6 Schedule for total system performance

Issue 1.1 (total system performance) includes five information needs, which contain six performance assessment activities. The schedule information for these performance assessment activities is summarized in Figure 8.3.5.13-7. This figure includes the performance assessment activity number and a brief description, as well as major events associated with each activity. A major event, for purposes of these schedules, may represent the initiation or completion of an activity, completion or submittal of a report to the DOE, an important data feed, or a decision point. Solid lines on the schedule represent activity durations and dashed lines show interfaces among activities as well as data transferred into or out of this performance assessment issue. The events shown on the schedule and their planned dates of completion are provided in Table 8.3.5.13-19.

The activity-level schedules, in combination with information provided in the logic diagrams for this issue (Figures 8.3.5.13-6A through 8.3.5.13-6G), are intended to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the relationships between major elements of the site, performance, and design programs. The information provided in Table 8.3.5.13-19 and Figure 8.3.5.13-7, however, should be viewed as a snapshot in time.

The overall program schedule presented here is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE, 1988a). The site characterization program will undergo a series of refinements following issuance of the statutory SCP. Refinements will consider factors both internal and external to the site characterization program, such as changes to the quality assurance program. Such refinements are to be considered in ongoing planning efforts, and


1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
DEIS
LA
PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT ACTIVITY
data on Far-Field Thermomechanical Effects (Activity 1.11.6.3)
1.1.2.1 PRELIMINARY IDENTIFICATION OF POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT RELEASE SCENARIO CLASSES
1.1.2.2 FINAL SELECTION OF SIGNIFICANT RELEASE-SCENARIO CLASSES TO BE USED IN LICENSING ASSESSMENTS
data on Unanticipated Events (Activity 1.5.3.1)
data on Anticipated Events (Activity 1.5.3.1)
data on Gas-Phase Flow through UZ (8.3.1.2.2.7)
1.1.3.1 DEVELOPMENT OF MATHMETICAL MODELS OF THE SCENARIO CLASSES
1.1.4.1 SCREENING OF POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT SCENARIO CLASSES AGAINST THE CRITERION OF RELATIVE CONSEQUENCES
Input from Waste Package Performance Assessment of Conceptual Design (Activity 1.4.4.1)
Input from Waste Package Performance (Activity 1.5.4.2)
1.1.4.2 PROVISION OF SIMPLIFIED, COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT MODELS OF THE FINAL SCENARIO CLASSES REPRESENTING SIGNIFICANT PROCESSES AND EVENTS
1.1.5.1 CALCULATION OF EMPIRICAL COMPLEMENTARY CUMULATIVE DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION
Input from Seal System Performance Assessment (Activity 1.12.4.2)
LEGEND
FLOW OF WORK
INTERFACE OF TRANSFER OF INFORMATION
MAJOR EVENT
DEIS - DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
LA - LICENSE APPLICATION
UZ - UNSATURATED ZONE

Figure 8.3.5.13-7. Schedule information for activities in Issue 1.1 (total system performance) See Table 8.3.5.13-19 for description of major events This network is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE, 1988a) schedule Revisions will be published in semiannual site characterization progress reports as new information becomes available

Table 8.3.5.13-19. Major events and completion dates for activities in Issue 1.1 (total system performance) (page 1 of 4)

Performance assessment activity number	Brief description of performance assessment activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.1.2.1	Preliminary identification of potentially significant release-scenario classes	A	Description of preliminary scenario classes to be screened against consequences	10/88
1.1.2.2	Final selection of significant release-scenario classess to be used in licensing assessments	B	Complete refinement of potential release-scenario classes based on screening against models; begin refinement based on available site data	3/89
		C	Information on refined release-scenario classes based on site data available	8/90
		D	Complete refinement of release-scenario classes	11/91
		E	Draft report available to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) on final release-scenario classes for input to the draft environmental impact statement (DEIS)	12/92
1.1.3.1	Development of mathematical models of the scenario classes	A	Draft report available to DOE on preliminary system models of volcanism and human interference	1/89

Table 8.3.5.13-19. Major events and completion dates for activities in Issue 1.1 (total system performance) (page 2 of 4)

Performance assessment activity number	Brief description of performance assessment activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.1.3.1	Development of mathematical models of the scenario classes (continued)	B	Draft report available to DOE on preliminary system models of gas-phase releases	6/89
		C	Complete update/preliminary validation of gas-phase release models	12/89
		D	Draft report available to DOE on preliminary system models of release through water	7/90
		E	Updated water- and gas-release models available	12/91
		F	Complete final water-release model relecting site characterization input	3/93
1.1.4.1	Screening of potentially significant scenario classes against the criterion of relative consequences	A	Begin screening scenario classes using available site data and the models developed in the activities of Information Need 1.1.3	10/88
		B	Draft report available to DOE on interim screening of release scenario classes	1/91

Table 8.3.5.13-19. Major events and completion dates for activities in Issue 1.1 (total system performance) (page 3 of 4)

Performance assessment activity number	Brief description of performance assessment activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.1.4.1	Screening of potentially significant scenario classes against the criterion of relative consequences (continued)	C	Complete screening to identify final release scenario classes	1/92
1.1.4.2	Provision of simplified, computationally efficient models of the final scenario classes representing significant processes and events	A	Begin development of simplified, computationally efficient models of the final scenario classes	1/91
		B	Draft report available to DOE on efficient models to be used in the total system simulations	3/92
		C	Complete development/validation of performance assessment codes	12/93
1.1.5.1	Calculation of empirical complementary cumulative distribution function	A	Draft report available to DOE on the source term model for total system studies	12/88
		B	Draft report available to DOE on the refined source term model	6/92
		C	Draft report available to DOE on joint probability distribution used in the total system simulator	12/92

Table 8.3.5.13-19. Major events and completion dates for activities in Issue 1.1 (total system performance) (page 4 of 4)

Performance assessment activity number	Brief description of performance assessment activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.1.5.1	Calculation of emperical complementary cumulative distribution function (continued)	D	Draft report available to DOE on the structure of the total system simulator	3/93
		E	Complete interim probabilistic analysis of performance of the total system	7/93
		F	Total system performance assessment calculations available for the DEIS	8/93
		G	Updated total system performance assessment calculations available	5/94

[a]The letters in this column key major events shown in Figure 8.3.5.13-7.

changes that are implemented will be reflected in the semiannual progress reports. Summary schedule information for each information need of this issue can be found in Section 8.5.2.2.

DOE/RW-0199

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.14, Individual Protection

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.14 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.2: Will the mined geologic disposal system meet the requirements for limiting individual doses in the accessible environment as required by 40 CFR 191.15?

Regulatory basis for the issue

The regulatory basis for limiting individual does from ground water as stated in 40 CFR 191.15 has been vacated by the first district court of appeals (NRDC et al. vs. EPA, 1987) and the EPA has been asked by the court to reevaluate the rule in light of other rules protecting individuals. If and when EPA modifies 40 CFR 191.15, the DOE will reevaluate the plans for resolving Issue 1.2. Until that time, the DOE will proceed with plans to address individual dose limitations as currently covered by the rule now under reevaluation by the EPA.

The relevant parts of 40 CFR 191.15 are quoted in the following:

191.15 Individual protection requirements.

> Disposal systems for spent nuclear fuel or high-level or transuranic radioactive wastes shall be designed to provide a reasonable expectation that, for 1,000 yr after disposal, undisturbed performance of the disposal system shall not cause the annual dose equivalent from the disposal system to any member of the public in the accessible environment to exceed 25 millirems to the whole body or 75 millirems to any critical organ. All potential pathways (associated with undisturbed performance) from the disposal system to people shall be considered, including the assumption that individuals consume 2 L per day of drinking water from any significant source of ground water outside of the controlled area.

In the regulation just given, undisturbed performance means the predicted behavior of a disposal system, including consideration of the uncertainties in predicted behavior, if the disposal system is not disrupted by human intrusion or the occurrence of unlikely natural events. The term accessible environment means (1) the atmosphere, (2) land surfaces, (3) surface waters, (4) oceans, and (5) all the lithosphere that is beyond the controlled area, a surface location that encompasses no more than 100 km^2 and extends horizontally no more than 5 km in any direction from the outer boundary of the original location of the radioactive wastes in a disposal system.

In addition, the regulation (40 CFR 191.12) defines the significant source of ground water to mean:

> (1) An aquifer that: (i) Is saturated with water having less than 10,000 milligrams per liter of total dissolved solids; (ii) is within 2,500 feet of the land surface; (iii) has a transmissivity greater than 200 gallons per day per foot, provided that any formation or part of a formation included within the source of ground water has a hydraulic conductivity greater than 2 gallons per day per square foot; and (iv) is capable of continuously yielding at least 10,000 gallons per day to a pumped or flowing well for a period of at least a year; or (2) an aquifer that provides the

primary source of water for a community water system as of the effective date of this Subpart.

The expected condition of the repository environment is such that no significant amounts of liquid water will be present in and adjacent to the borehole for at least 300 yr after repository closure. For 300 to 1,000 yr after closure, a limited amount of water (i.e., less than 5 liters per package per year for 90 percent of the packages and less than 20 liters per package per year for 10 percent of the packages) may be available to contact some waste containers, although most of the containers are expected to remain in a dry environment for well over 1,000 yr (Section 8.3.4). A limited amount of radionuclides, therefore, may be released from breached containers and transported by ground water to the accessible environment.

Three radionuclides might be able to escape from the breached container as gaseous species under the conditions at Yucca Mountain: carbon-14, tritium, and krypton-85. Of these, only carbon-14 is readily available for rapid release from a breached waste container. The other radionuclides, both of which have short half-lives, are contained within the waste form (Sections 8.3.5.9 and 8.3.5.10). Carbon-14 release is expected to be in the form of carbon-14 dioxide that will percolate up through the pore space in the unsaturated overburden to the accessible environment.

Approach to resolving the issue

There are only two significant pathways for the radionuclides from the waste package to reach humans in the accessible environment (i.e., ground-water transport and gaseous phase transport). These probable flow paths for each transport mechanism lead to quite different and separate exposure sources for any released radionuclides. Therefore, they will be treated separately.

The approach to resolving Issue 1.2 for the ground-water pathway is to determine whether any exposure to the public will result during the 1,000-yr period after disposal (40 CFR 191.15). Because a significant source of ground water might exist at the boundary of the controlled area, the dose calculation will assume that individuals consume 2 liters per day of drinking water at the outside boundary of the controlled area, where the concentration of radionuclides in ground water could be expected to be the highest. For the gaseous pathway, the reference case will examine whether the upper bounding value of the exposure to the public will be less than 25- and 75-mrem/yr dose limits based on the amount of the carbon-14 inventory that can be released in gaseous form. Alternatively, it may be possible to show that the gaseous carbon-14 dioxide may never reach the accessible environment during the 1,000-yr period. The total dose to the individuals will be the sum of the doses through both pathways and it will be compared against the required dose limits. Figure 8.3.5.14-1 illustrates the objective and logic to resolve Issue 1.2.

Under the undisturbed conditions of the repository, it is expected that most of the waste packages will remain dry and that the radionuclides will be substantially completely contained in the waste package. Under very conservative assumptions, however (described in Section 8.3.5.9), up to 20 percent of the waste containers may be breached and radionuclides may be released and


ISSUE 1.2: WILL THE MINED GEOLOGIC DISPOSAL SYSTEM MEET THE REQUIREMENTS FOR LIMITING INDIVIDUAL DOSES IN THE ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT AS REQUIRED BY 40 CFR 191.15?
OBJECTIVE: DETERMINE WHETHER, FOR 1,000 yr AFTER DISPOSAL, THE UNDISTURBED PERFORMANCE OF THE DISPOSAL SYSTEM WILL CAUSE AN ANNUAL DOSE EQUIVALENT FROM THE DISPOSAL SYSTEM TO ANY MEMBER OF THE PUBLIC IN THE ACCESSIBLE ENVIRONMENT TO EXCEED 25 MREM TO THE WHOLE BODY OR 75 MREM TO ANY CRITICAL ORGAN BY EITHER THE GROUND-WATER OR GASEOUS PATHWAYS
GROUND-WATER PATHWAY
GASEOUS PATHWAY
CALCULATE THE RADIONUCLIDE TRAVEL TIME
CALCULATE THE GASEOUS CARBON-14 RESIDENCE TIME IN OVERBURDEN
IS THE SHORTEST RADIO-NUCLIDE TRAVEL TIME TO THE BOUNDARY OF THE CONTROLLED AREA >1,000 yr ?
YES
IS THE GASEOUS CARBON-14 RESIDENCE TIME IN THE OVERBURDEN >1,000 yr ?
YES
AND
NO
NO
IS THERE A SIGNIFICANT SOURCE OF GROUND WATER AT THE YUCCA MOUNTAIN SITE ?
NO
CALCULATE THE CARBON-14 RELEASE RATE TO THE GROUND SURFACE AND THE RESULTING DOSE
YES
CALCULATE THE DOSE USING 2L PER DAY CONSUMPTION
IS THE COMBINED DOSE LESS THAN THE 25 AND 75 MREM PER YEAR DOSE LIMIT ?
NO
USE MORE REALISTIC MODELS AND PARA-METERS OR GO TO ISSUE 1.4 FOR SOURCE TERM REDUCTION
YES
RESOLUTION OF ISSUE 1.2

Figure 8.3.5.14-1. Logic diagram for Issue 1.2 (individual protection)

transported in the ground water through the unsaturated and saturated zones before they reach the accessible environment (Section 8.3.5.13). Sorbing species of the radionuclides would travel slower than the ground-water movement because of retardation, and even the nonsorbing species cannot travel faster than the ground-water movement itself along the path of likely radionuclide travel. For the ground-water pathways, this issue will be resolved if reasonable expectations are established that contaminant transport to the water table exceeds 1,000 yr with high confidence. Current estimates of the ground-water travel time show a mean value of 43,265 yr with a standard deviation of 12,765 yr (Sinnock et al., 1986), thus providing an initial level of confidence that the radionuclide travel time will be longer than 1,000 yr (Section 8.3.5.12).

If the radionuclide transport time is less than 1,000 yr, then the concentration of radionuclides in ground water and its change with time will be calculated using the total system performance model (see Section 8.3.5.13) at the boundary of the controlled area. There may be no significant source of ground water at the outside boundary of the controlled area. However, using the concentration of radionuclides at the boundary of the controlled area and the assumption that individuals consume 2 liters per day of drinking water, the dose to a maximally exposed individual can be calculated. Alternatively, it could be determined that there is no significant source of ground water outside the controlled area but that a source exists within the 1,000-yr radionuclide travel time boundary. If, however, any such source is identified, the same calculation as above can be made for that location. It should be noted that there is another requirement for the site (10 CFR 60.113(a)(2)) that the pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time must be at least 1,000 yr. The pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time and the radionuclide travel time (post-emplacement) are related but not the same; therefore, a radionuclide travel time that is less than 1,000 yr, although very unlikely, would not necessarily violate the 10 CFR 60.113 requirement (see Section 8.3.5.12).

Both spent fuel and glass waste forms contain carbon-14. The total amount of carbon-14 in the spent fuel is conservatively estimated to be 1.5 Ci/MTHM (metric tons of heavy metal) by actual measurements and analyses (Van Konynenburg et al., 1986). A smaller inventory of carbon-14 is expected for glass waste forms because of the potential for release and transfer to other waste streams during reprocessing. Most of the carbon-14 in the spent fuel is locked inside UO_2 fuel, Zircaloy cladding, and fuel assemblies and will be released slowly after the containment is breached. Only a small fraction of the total carbon-14 inventory in the spent fuel could be rapidly released from the oxidized skin of the Zircaloy cladding by reaction of the oxygen in the atmosphere with the carbon in the cladding oxidation layer (Oversby and McCright, 1985). Oversby and McCright believe that as much as 1 percent of the carbon-14 inventory in spent fuel could be rapidly released in this way during the first 100 to 1,000 yr following closure when high temperature and gamma radiation are expected (Section 8.3.5.9). No rapid release of carbon-14 is known from glass waste forms.

A bounding-case calculation for carbon-14 release can be made as follows: when the repository is completely filled with 70,000 MTHM, the total inventory of carbon-14 will be less than 105,000 Ci; considering that some of the wastes are in glass waste forms, the rapid release fraction of

carbon-14 from the entire repository is not likely to exceed 1,000 Ci even if every waste container were breached within 1,000 yr. The goal of the waste-container design limits the container failure to less than 5 percent for the first 300 yr and to less than 20 percent for 1,000 yr after closure. Under a conservative assumption of 20 percent container failure, the total inventory of available carbon-14 for rapid release in gaseous form, therefore, would be less than 200 Ci. The 200 Ci would most likely be released gradually as the containers fail in a time-distributed manner. Even with a total failure of the entire 20 percent of the containers in 1 yr, the maximum release will not exceed 200 Ci in 1 yr, with no further release during the subsequent years, because there will be no more carbon-14 available for rapid release. Evaluation of the inventory and release of carbon-14 from Zircaloy cladding is being investigated in Section 8.3.5.10.

The carbon-14 released from the spent fuel during the initial breach of the container is expected to be in the form of carbon dioxide. Gas-phase carbon-14 dioxide moves upward through air-filled pores in the unsaturated tuffs by molecular diffusion and by advection in a thermally driven air-convection cell. In the course of the upward movement of carbon-14 dioxide, isotopic exchange of carbon-14 with the normal carbon of the carbon dioxide gas in the pore space will occur, thus retarding the movement of the carbon-14 to the atmosphere above the repository. The carbon dioxide gas in the pore space is probably in equilibrium with dissolved bicarbonate in the pore water. Therefore, a large reservoir of normal carbon exists in the unsaturated tuffs and is available for carbon-14 isotopic exchange. In addition, precipitation of calcite, if it occurs, will irreversibly remove carbon-14 from the system. Actual residence times of carbon-14 in the pore spaces of the repository overburden could, in principle, be estimated by solving a transport equation that takes the isotope exchange and chemical models into account. However, site-specific data that would permit realistic estimates of the carbon-14 residence time are lacking.

If the residence time of the carbon-14 in the overburden (the time needed for carbon-14 to travel through the overburden) is established with high confidence to exceed 1,000 yr, this part of Issue 1.2 will be resolved. The mean and standard deviation of the residence time in the overburden of a carbon-14 nucleus that is released at the repository level will be estimated in Section 8.3.1.3.8, and a model for gas-phase releases will be developed in Information Need 1.1.3 (Section 8.3.5.13.3).

A realistic estimate of doses from the gaseous pathway to the public in the accessible environment will have to be based on the gas-phase release estimated from Information Need 1.1.3 (Section 8.3.5.13.3). For the resolution of Issue 1.2, however, a bounding-value calculation will be used. The inventory of carbon-14 available for rapid release, a total of 200 Ci for 1,000 yr, is small compared with (1) an average release of 5 to 10 Ci from each operating nuclear power plant (boiling water and pressurized water reactors) into the atmosphere every year and (2) the design-basis release of approximately 800 Ci/yr from a 1,500-MTHM/yr fuel-reprocessing plant. Because of the very small dose consequences expected from the assumed release of carbon-14 through the repository overburden, bounding calculations will be done for a hypothetical maximally exposed individual on the ground surface above the repository assuming a ground-level release of the total 200 Ci in one year. Internal dose from ingestion has not been calculated because of

the lack of site-specific data. This dose is, however, expected to be significantly smaller than the inhalation dose because of the lack of vegetation at the Yucca Mountain site.

Unless this issue has been resolved by having both the radionuclide travel time (liquid pathway) and residence time of carbon-14 in the overburden greater than 1,000 yr, doses from the individual pathways will be summed to see if the goal is met. At present, there is a high confidence that the goal can be met with the current design of the waste package and the site geohydrologic conditions. If, however, the goal has not been met, the source term for the radionuclide release can be reduced by a more realistic (less conservative) assessment of the dose pathways to the individuals or by alternative designs of the waste package (Section 8.3.5.9).

A preliminary performance allocation for this issue is summarized in Table 8.3.5.14-1. Because Issue 1.2 concerns only the undisturbed performance of the disposal system with respect to individual protection from radiation, it is appropriate to allocate performance against the expected pathways. A goal is set for the liquid pathways for near-zero release; it calls for the radionuclide travel time to exceed 1,000 yr. More detailed performance measures and their goals are set for the gaseous pathway. No significant external dose is expected from the weak beta radiation from carbon-14 through the skin. The only significant pathways for internal dose are through inhalation of carbon-14 dioxide in breathing air and ingestion of carbon-14-containing food items grown in the area. Specific goals based on the preliminary analysis are established with a high confidence for the internal doses by inhalation and ingestion. A goal is also set for the residence time of gaseous carbon-14 in the overburden.

Table 8.3.5.14-1 also illustrates the relationship between the performance measures and the parameters. Table 8.3.5.14-2 identifies the characterization parameters needed to determine the transport of carbon-14 dioxide on the surface above the repository.

Interrelationships of information needs

Two information needs have been identified for Issue 1.2: Information Need 1.2.1 determines the doses through the ground-water pathway, using the same methodology as that used for Issue 1.1, total system releases. The second information need (1.2.2) determines the internal and external doses to the public in the accessible environment through the gaseous pathway of carbon-14.

The schedule information for Issue 1.2 (individual protection) is presented in Section 8.3.5.14.3.

8.3.5.14-1. Performance allocation for Issue 1.2 (individual protection)

Release scenario class	Pathway	Primary barriers	Performance measure	Tentative goal	Needed confidence
Nominal (expected)	Significant groundwater source	Unsaturated zone and saturated zone	Individual dose (whole body)	Near zero (dose much less than standards)	High
	Gaseous phase	Waste container and overburden	Individual dose (whole body)		High
			External	Near zero	High
			Internal		
			Inhalation	<5 mrem/yr	High
			Ingestion	<5 mrem/yr	High

8.3.5.14-2. Performance parameters for Issue 1.2 (individual protection)

System element relied on	Function	Process or conditions	Performance measure	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	Needed confidence	SCP section providing expected parameter values	Current confidence	Investigations supplying parameter
Unsaturated zone and saturated zone below the repository (ground-water transport)	Retardation of radionuclide movement in ground water	Porous-media transport through matrix and adsorptive retardation	Individual dose	Ground-water[a] travel time	>1,000 yr	High	3.9.4	Low	8.3.5.12.4
				Retardation	>1	High	4.1.3.3	Medium	8.3.1.3.4
Overburden (gaseous phase transport)	Retardation of movement of gaseous nuclides	Isotope exchange, chemical equilibrium and precipitation	Individual dose	Residence time of carbon-14 in overburden	>1,000 yr	High	None	Low	8.3.1.3.4
Waste form (gaseous phase transport)	Containment and controlled release of gaseous nuclides	Distribution of radionuclides and containment	Individual dose	Inventory of rapid release fraction of carbon-14	<1,000 Ci	High	7.4.3.1	Low	8.3.5.10.2

[a]Ground-water travel time is used as a measure of the radionuclide transport time to the boundary of the accessible environment.

8.3.5.14.1 Information Need 1.2.1: Determination of doses to the public in the accessible environment through ground-water transport

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

The information needed to satisfy this information need and the methodology to be used are basically the same as that used for Section 8.3.5.13, total system performance.

Parameters

The parameters needed to satisfy this information need are the same as those required for Information Need 1.1.4, Section 8.3.5.13.4. Specifically, these parameters include:

1. Flux through the unsaturated zone (also from Section 8.3.5.12.4).

2. Retardation through the unsaturated zone (also from Section 8.3.1.3.4).

3. Dose conversion factors (standard values).

4. Determination of whether a significant source of ground water is present or absent (information from Section 8.3.5.15.1.1.2 will be used).

Logic

This information need addresses the movement of radionuclides through the ground water to the accessible environment. The parameters needed and the methodology to be used to satisfy this information need are similar to those used to determine the total releases to the accessible environment under expected conditions. The difference between this issue and Issue 1.1 is that the parameters and scenarios to be considered for this issue will cover only the first 1,000 yr after closure under expected conditions, whereas Issue 1.1 (Section 8.3.5.13) will cover releases over 10,000 yr under expected and unexpected conditions. Radionuclide releases will be determined from the engineered barrier system, and contaminant transport will be considered through the unsaturated zone to the water table. Because the ground-water travel time through the unsaturated zone is expected to be much greater than 1,000 yr, this issue will initially examine the transport to the water table. If the ground-water travel time to the water table through the unsaturated zone is less than 1,000 yr, then the ground-water travel time to the boundary of the controlled area and the change in radionuclide concentration in a significant source of ground water at the boundary will be calculated for the dose evaluation.

8.3.5.14.1.1 Activity 1.2.1.1: Calculation of doses through the ground-water pathway

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to use the methodology applied in Section 8.3.5.13 to calculate the radionuclide transport to the boundary of the controlled area.

Parameters

See the general parameters list for this information need.

Description

This activity will obtain from Information Need 1.1.4 the distribution of radionuclides transported to the boundary of the controlled area during the first 1,000 yr after closure. Only expected conditions will be considered for this analysis. The radionuclide transport model used to make this evaluation will be verified and validated under Issue 1.1. The concentration of radionuclides in the ground water at the boundary of the controlled area and the assumption that individuals consume 2 liters per day of drinking water from a significant source of ground water at the controlled area boundary will be used to calculate the individual dose. The results of this evaluation will be presented in a report.

8.3.5.14.1.2 Application of results

This information will be used to resolve the doses through the ground-water pathway section of this Issue (1.2).

8.3.5.14.2 Information Need 1.2.2: Determination of doses to the public in the accessible environment through the gaseous pathway

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

The following sections of Chapter 8 summarize the information relevant to this information need.

Chapter 8 section	Short title
8.3.1.12	Meteorology
8.3.5.3	Public radiological exposures--normal conditions

Chapter 8 section	Short title
8.3.5.13	Total system performance

Sections 8.3.5.9 and 8.3.5.10 will establish that carbon-14 is the only important gaseous radionuclide that can be transported to the accessible environment through the gaseous pathway and also will establish the maximum inventory of carbon-14 for rapid release. Since a bounding-value calculation is believed to be sufficient to resolve this issue, time distribution of container failure from Information Need 1.4.4 (Section 8.3.5.9.4) will not be used here.

Parameters

Most of the parameters needed to satisfy this information need are obtained from other information needs as noted in the following list:

1. Important gaseous radionuclides (Section 8.3.5.10.1).
2. Inventory and release of gaseous radionuclides (Section 8.3.5.10.2).
3. Retardation of gaseous flow through the overburden (Section 8.3.5.13.3).
4. Site meteorological data (Section 8.3.1.12.2).
5. Offsite activities for ingestion and inhalation scenarios (Section 8.3.1.13).
6. Dose conversion factors (standard published values).

Logic

Releases of gaseous radionuclides will be determined by using a two-step process. The first step involves examining the retardation of gaseous flow of carbon-14 dioxide through the overburden. This step will use the same parameters and methodology as used to address Issue 1.1, total system performance, with the exception that this issue considers only expected conditions over the first 1,000 yr following disposal. The second step involves examining inhalation and ingestion rates when the carbon-14 dioxide reaches the surface. This step will be performed only if it is determined that the goal for gaseous retardation through the overburden cannot be achieved with a high level of confidence.

For a given radionuclide, when the release rate, wind speed, and dispersion coefficients are known, it is a straightforward calculation to obtain the external and internal inhalation doses with standard dose-conversion factors. Inhalation dose is expected to be the overwhelming component of the potential dose from carbon-14 releases. Uptake by ingestion, however, greatly depends upon local vegetation and agricultural activities and can vary significantly from area to area even for the same amount of release. No significant agricultural activities are currently present at the Yucca

Mountain area, and the expected conditions for 1,000 yr in the area can be assumed in order to estimate the ingestion dose. Since the dose rate will be highest at the land surface, only one calculation for a hypothetical maximally exposed person will be required to resolve this information need.

Two activities are planned to calculate doses to the public in the accessible environment through the gaseous pathway. The second activity will be performed only if it is determined that the goal for gaseous retardation through the overburden cannot be achieved with a high level of confidence.

8.3.5.14.2.1 Activity 1.2.2.1: Calculation of transport of gaseous carbon-14 dioxide through the overburden

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to estimate the transport time for gaseous carbon-14 dioxide from the repository to the land surface during the first 1,000 yr after disposal.

Parameters

Parameters 1, 2, and 3 identified under Information Need 1.2.2 are required for this activity.

Description

This activity will obtain from Information Need 1.1.4 the distribution of gaseous radionuclides transported through the overburden to the land surface during the first 1,000 yr after disposal. Only expected conditions will be considered for this analysis. The results of this evaluation will be presented in a final report on doses to the public in the accessible environment through gaseous phase transport.

8.3.5.14.2.2 Activity 1.2.2.2: Calculation of land-surface dose and dose to the public in the accessible environment through the gaseous pathway of carbon-14

Objectives

The objectives of this activity are to collect the necessary data on carbon-14 inventory and meteorology and to calculate upper bound values for external and internal doses. The latter objective includes doses from both inhalation and ingestion.

Parameters

See the general parameter list for this information need.

escription

This activity will extract the carbon-14 inventory data from Information eed 1.5.2 (Section 8.3.5.10.2) and calculate the dispersion coefficients and ind speed from meteorological data from Section 8.3.1.12.1. This activity ill also calculate the expected and upper bound internal and external doses o a hypothetical maximally exposed person on the land surface above the epository. The AIRDOS-EPA program or other appropriate programs will be sed for the dose calculation. Model verification and validation are dis- ussed in the Project Radiological Monitoring Plan (Section 8.3.5.3). The esults will be presented in a report.

.3.5.14.2.3 Application of results

This information will be used to resolve the doses through the gaseous athway section of this issue.

.3.5.14.3 Schedule for Issue 1.2 (individual protection)

Issue 1.2 (individual protection) includes two information needs, which ontain three performance assessment activities. The schedule information r these performance assessment activities is summarized in Fig- e 8.3.5.14-2. This figure includes the performance assessment activity mber and a brief description, as well as major events associated with each tivity. A major event, for purposes of these schedules, may represent the itiation or completion of an activity, completion or submittal of a report the DOE, an important data feed, or a decision point. Solid lines on the hedule represent activity durations and dashed lines show interfaces among tivities as well as data transferred into or out of this performance sessment issue. The events shown on the schedule and their planned dates completion are provided in Table 8.3.5.14-3.

The activity-level schedules, in combination with information provided the logic diagram for this issue (Figure 8.3.5.14-1), are intended to ovide the reader with a basic understanding of the relationships between ajor elements of the site, performance, and design programs. The informa- ion provided in Table 8.3.5.14-3 and Figure 8.3.5.14-2, however, should be iewed as a snapshot in time.

The overall program schedule presented here is consistent with the ft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE, 1988a). The site characterization program i l undergo a series of refinements following issuance of the statutory SCP. efinements will consider factors both internal and external to the site haracterization program, such as changes to the quality assurance program. h refinements are to be considered in ongoing planning efforts, and nges that are implemented will be reflected in the semiannual progress orts. Summary schedule information for each information need of this ue can be found in Section 8.5.2.2.



Figure 8.3.5.14-2. Schedule information for activities in Issue 1 2 (individual protection) See Table 8 3 5 14-3 for description of major events. This network is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE 1988a) schedule Revisions will be published in semiannual site characterization progress reports as new information becomes available

Table 8.3.5.14-3. Major events and planned completion dates for activities in Issue 1.2 (individual protection)

Activity number	Brief description of activity	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.2.1.1	Calculation of doses to the public in the accessible environment through groundwater transport	A	Draft of preliminary report on the evaluation of radionuclide releases and public doses via water and gas pathways available to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)	8/90
1.2.2.1	Calculation of gaseous carbon-14 dioxide through the overburden	B	Update available to DOE on the evaluation of radionuclide releases and public doses via water and gas pathways	1/93
1.2.2.2	Calculation of land-surface dose and dose to the public in the accessible environment through the gaseous pathway of carbon-14	C	Draft of final report on the evaluation of radionuclide releases and public doses via water and gas pathways available to DOE	10/93
		D	Report available to DOE on the evaluation of doses to the public through water releases	7/94
		E	Report available to DOE on the evaluation of doses to the public through gas-phase releases	7/94

[a]The letters in this column key major events shown in Figure 8.3.5.14-2.

DOE/RW-0199

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)



Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.15, Ground-water Protection

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.15 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.3: Will the mined geologic disposal system meet the requirements for the protection of special sources of ground water as required by 40 CFR 191.16?

Regulatory basis for the issue

The regulatory basis for protection of special sources of ground water as stated in 40 CFR 191.16 has been vacated by the first district court of appeals (NRDC et al. vs. EPA 1987), and the EPA has been asked by the court to reevaluate the rule in light of other rules protecting ground water. If and when the EPA modifies 40 CFR 191.16, the DOE will reevaluate the plans for resolving Issue 1.3. Until that time, the DOE will proceed with plans to address ground-water protection as currently covered by the rule now under reevaluation by EPA.

The parts of 40 CFR 191.16 relevant to Issue 1.3 are quoted in the following:

191.16 Ground water protection requirements

(a) Disposal systems for spent nuclear fuel or high-level or transuranic radioactive wastes shall be designed to provide a reasonable expectation that, for 1,000 yr after disposal, undisturbed performance of the disposal system shall not cause the radionuclide concentrations averaged over any year in water withdrawn from any portion of a special source of ground water to exceed:

(1) 5 picocuries per liter of radium-226 and radium-228;

(2) 15 picocuries per liter of alpha-emitting radionuclides (including radium-226 and radium-228 but excluding radon); or

(3) The combined concentrations of radionuclides that emit either beta or gamma radiation that would produce an annual dose equivalent to the total body or any internal organ greater than 4 millirems per year if an individual consumed 2 liters per day of drinking water from such a source of ground water.

(b) If any of the average annual radionuclide concentrations existing in a special source of ground water before construction of the disposal system already exceed the limits in 191.16(a), the disposal system shall be designed to provide a reasonable expectation that, for 1,000 years after disposal, undisturbed performance of the disposal system shall not increase the existing average annual radionuclide concentrations in water withdrawn from that special source of ground water by more than the limits established in 191.16(a).

In the previous regulations, undisturbed performance means the predicted behavior of a disposal system, including consideration of the uncertainties

in predicted behavior, if the disposal system is not disrupted by human intrusion or the occurrence of unlikely natural events.

An aquifer must meet several criteria to be designated as a special source. The first step in the evaluation is to establish whether the aquifer is a Class I source as defined by the EPA Ground Water Protection Strategy of 1984 (EPA, 1984). The conditions that must be met for designation as a Class I source are (1) that the source is highly vulnerable to contamination because of the hydrologic characteristics and (2) that the source is irreplaceable in that no reasonable alternative is available to substantial populations or that the source is ecologically vital in that it provides baseflow to a sensitive ecological system.

If an aquifer meets the criteria for a Class I source, the next step is to determine whether it qualifies as a special source of ground water. 40 CFR 191.12 defines a special source of ground water as

> those Class I ground waters identified in accordance with the agency's Ground-Water Protection Strategy . . . that: (1) are within the controlled area encompassing a disposal system or less than 5 km beyond the controlled area [the controlled area is the actual area chosen according to the 40 CFR 191.12 definition of the controlled area]; (2) are supplying drinking water for thousands of persons as of the date that the [DOE] chooses a location within that area for detailed characterization as a potential site for a disposal system (e.g., in accordance with Section 112(b)(1)(B) of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act); and (3) are irreplaceable in that no reasonable alternative source of drinking water is available to that population.

Approach to resolving the issue

The approach to resolving this issue consists of a series of determinations and decision points, any one of which could result in an affirmative resolution. As shown in the logic diagram for this issue (Figure 8.3.5.15-1), the first decision is whether Class I or special sources of ground water exist in the vicinity of Yucca Mountain as determined by comparing the criteria with the hydrogeologic, demographic, and ecologic characteristics of the site and its contiguous vicinity. If Class I or special sources are found not to exist, the issue is resolved affirmatively.

If a Class I source exists, the Yucca Mountain Project will proceed to evaluate whether the Class I ground water is also a special source of ground water. If so, the concentration of waste in special-source ground water must remain below the limits specified in 40 CFR 191.16. The approach is first to determine whether slow ground-water movement alone can ensure meeting the limits. If neither path can provide this assurance, the Yucca Mountain Project will conduct transport modeling to test whether concentrations in special-source ground water will remain below the established limits.

These two fundamental questions (i.e., whether special sources exist, and whether contamination of a special source will be below the 40 CFR 191.16 limits) are the basis for defining two information needs:


ISSUE 1.3: EPA SPECIAL SOURCE GROUND-WATER PROTECTION
OBJECTIVE: DETERMINE WHETHER CLASS I OR SPECIAL SOURCES EXIST IN VICINITY OF YUCCA MOUNTAIN
COMPARE CLASS I SOURCE CRITERIA WITH SITE CHARACTERISTICS
DO CLASS I SOURCES EXIST ?
NO
YES
COMPARE SPECIAL-SOURCE CRITERIA WITH SITE CHARACTERISTICS
DO SPECIAL SOURCES EXIST ?
NO
YES
IS THE GROUND-WATER MOVEMENT TO THE SPECIAL SOURCE OF GROUND WATER LONGER THAN 1,000 yr ?
YES
NO
CALCULATE CONCENTRATION OF HIGH-LEVEL OR TRANSURANIC WASTES IN SPECIAL-SOURCE AQUIFERS
IS CONCENTRATION WITHIN LIMIT 40 CFR 191.16 ?
NO
REEVALUATE ISSUE 1.3 STRATEGY
YES
AFFIRMATIVE RESOLUTION OF ISSUE 1.3
CALCULATE TRANSPORT OF RADIONUCLIDES THROUGH UNSATURATED ZONE TO THE NEAREST GROUND-WATER SOURCE FOR THE FIRST 1,000 yr OF REPOSITORY PERFORMANCE
CALCULATE CONCENTRATIONS IN NEAREST WATER SOURCE IN 1,000 yr
IS CONCENTRATION WITHIN LIMITS OF 40 CFR 191.16 ?
NO
YES
WILL CHANGES IN STRATEGY IMPROVE PERFORMANCE ?
YES
TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION
8.3.5.15-1D.SCP/10-4-88

Figure 8.3.5.15-1. Logic diagram for Issue 1.3 (ground-water protection)

1.3.1 Determine whether any Class I or special sources of ground water exist at Yucca Mountain, within the controlled area, or within 5 km of the controlled area boundary.

1.3.2 Determine for all special sources whether concentrations of waste products in the ground water during the first 1,000 yr after disposal will not exceed the limits established in 40 CFR 191.16.

Performance allocation for Issue 1.3

A preliminary performance allocation for this issue (1.3) is summarized in Table 8.3.5.15-1. Because this issue is concerned with the protection of special ground-water sources from contamination, it is appropriate to first establish whether a Class I or special ground-water source exists. If no special sources exist, then the issue is resolved. If a special source is identified at or near the site, this issue could be resolved by establishing that the concentrations of waste products in the special source are likely to be much less than allowed by EPA limits. The relationship between the performance measures and the required parameters is illustrated in Table 8.3.5.15-1.

Interrelationships of information needs

Two information needs have been identified for this issue; the first is the determination whether a Class I or special source of ground water exists at or in the vicinity of the Yucca Mountain site. If a special source aquifer is identified during site characterization, a second information need will be addressed to determine whether concentrations of waste in the ground water could exceed the limits established by 40 CFR 191.16.

The schedule information provided for information needs in this section includes the sequencing, interrelationships, and relative durations of the analyses in the information need. Specific durations and start/finish dates for the analyses are being developed as part of ongoing planning efforts and will be provided in the SCP at the time of issuance and revised as appropriate in subsequent semiannual progress reports.

8.3.5.15.1 Information Need 1.3.1: Determination whether any Class I or special sources of ground water exist at Yucca Mountain, within the controlled area, or within 5 km of the controlled area boundary

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

The following sections of Chapter 3 (Hydrology) summarize the data relevant to this information need:

Table 8.3.5.15-1. Performance allocation for Issue 1.3 (ground-water protection)

Performance measure	Goal	Needed confidence	Performance parameters	Goal	Modifier	Current estimate	Current confidence	Needed confidence
Existence of special source of ground water	No special source	High	Existence of aquifers within 5 km of controlled area[b]	NA[a]	Valley fill (VF) Tuff (T) Lower carbonate (LC)	Exists Exists Exists	High High High	High High High
			Aquifer vulnerability to contamination	Not vulnerable within 10,000 yr	VF, T, LC	Not vulnerable within 20,000 yr	Low	Medium
			a. Population served or b. Baseflow to sensitive ecological system	<substantial None	VF T LC VF T LC	>3,000, < 5,000 <1,000 ≈500 None None Exists	High Medium Medium Medium Medium Medium	High High High High High High
			Population served	<thousands	VF T LC	>3,000, <5,000 <1,000 ≈500	High Medium Medium	High High High
			Existence of reasonable alternative source	Exists	VF T LC	Does not exist Exists Does not exist	Low Medium Low	High High Medium
Waste concentration in special source aquifer within 1,000-yr after disposal	<limits of 40 CFR 191.16 for 1,000 yr	High	Concentration of specified constituents as function of time	<limits specified in 40 CFR 191.16 for 1,000 yr	VF, T, LC	Meets goal	Low	High

[a]NA = not applicable.
[b]Controlled area is the actual area chosen according to the 40 CFR 191.12 definition of controlled area.

SCP section	Subject
3.6	Regional hydrogeologic reconnaissance of candidate area and site
3.7	Regional ground-water flow system
3.8	Ground-water uses
3.9	Site hydrogeologic system

The information contained in these sections supports a preliminary determination that no potential special sources of ground water are present at the site, below the site, within the boundaries of the controlled area, or within 5 km of the controlled area boundary. The following discussion is a brief compilation of this information from Chapter 3.

All the aquifers meet the criterion for location. The tuff aquifer and the lower carbonate aquifer both underlie the proposed repository location. The valley-fill aquifer is located within 5 km of the controlled area (Chapter 3) and was the only aquifer in the Yucca Mountain area serving a population of thousands of persons at the time that the site was chosen for characterization (Section 3.8). Within the Amargosa Desert where the valley-fill aquifer is used, it is underlain by the Paleozoic rocks of the lower carbonate aquifer.

The lower carbonate aquifer is considered an irreplaceable source because it supplies baseflow to the Ash Meadows region in southern Nye County (Dudley and Larson, 1976), which has been designated a critical habitat for several species of endangered fish. The Ash Meadows area, however, is part of a different ground-water subbasin (Ash Meadows) from the Alkali Flat-Furnace Creek Ranch ground-water subbasin, which contains Yucca Mountain (Section 3.6). Evaluations of the hydrologic feasibility of developing the lower carbonate aquifer must consider the possibility of interbasin diversion of this baseflow (Section 8.3.1.9.2).

It is presently considered, with a medium level of confidence, that none of the three aquifers is vulnerable to contamination within 1,000 yr after emplacing waste at Yucca Mountain, based on the hydraulic and geochemical characteristics of the thick unsaturated zone that would contain the repository. In addition to its protection by the thick unsaturated zone, the lower carbonate aquifer has a higher potentiometric head than does the tuff aquifer in the vicinity of the site, according to data obtained from drillhole UE-25p#1 (Craig and Robison, 1984). Therefore, the potential or tendency for flow is upward from the lower carbonate aquifer rather than downward into it. Both the lower carbonate and tuff aquifers crop out in limited areas of rugged terrain, indicating the potential for contamination directly into these aquifers from future human activities is slight. However, a low level of confidence is assigned (Table 8.3.5.15-1) to this determination for the valley-fill aquifer because (1) the valley-fill materials occur at the surface over broad areas and (2) the designation of a Class I source is not restricted to its vulnerability to contamination from the proposed repository (EPA, 1984).

Parameters

Most of the cultural parameters (i.e., demographic and water-use data) needed to complete this information need relative to potential special sources have already been obtained from preliminary investigations. Further investigations being carried out as part of the geohydrology test program will provide confirmatory hydrologic data needed to raise the confidence level of the preliminary finding. The main parameters to be confirmed are

1. The degree and location(s) of hydraulic communication between the aquifers of the flow system (Investigation 8.3.1.2.3).

2. The potential for contamination of the aquifers from the mined geologic disposal system (Investigation 8.3.1.2.1).

3. Refined demographic information on local ground-water users (Investigation 8.3.1.9.2).

Logic

There are four criteria that must be met in order to classify an aquifer as a special source. One of the criteria (that the aquifers are located within the controlled area or within 5 km of the controlled area boundary) has been established with a high level of confidence. The three remaining parameters will need to be known with greater certainty to resolve this issue.

One analysis, which consists of two activities, is planned to evaluate the data that will be obtained from the geohydrology and human interference programs. This analysis will be a synthesis of the required information and will present the final evaluation of the three subject aquifers against the regulatory criteria.

8.3.5.15.1.1 Analysis 1.3.1.1: Determine whether any aquifers near the site meet the Class I or special source criteria

This analysis consists of two synthesis activities that will obtain required parameter values from Investigations 8.3.1.2.1 and 8.3.1.2.3, which are part of the postclosure geohydrologic programs. Additional information will be taken from Investigation 8.3.1.9.2, which is a part of the human activities program.

8.3.5.15.1.1.1 Activity 1.3.1.1.1: Synthesis and evaluation of hydrologic and environmental information needed to determine whether aquifers at the site meet the special source criteria

Objectives

The objectives of this activity are (1) to raise the confidence levels of the previously obtained hydrologic and environmental data and (2) to

analyze these data in order to evaluate whether any aquifers at or near Yucca Mountain meet the criteria for designation as a Class I or special source of ground water.

Parameters

The parameters that will be obtained and evaluated are the location(s) and degree of hydraulic communication between the aquifers and the expected susceptibility of the aquifers to contamination from the mined geologic disposal system.

Description

This activity will extract its parameters from Investigations 8.3.1.2.1, 8.3.1.2.3, and 8.3.1.9.2, which are needed to raise the confidence on the determination whether any special source of ground water exists at or near the Yucca Mountain site. The results of the synthesis will be evaluated in conjunction with data obtained from Activity 1.3.1.1.2 (Section 8.3.5.15.1.1.2) and will be presented in a report.

8.3.5.15.1.1.2 Activity 1.3.1.1.2: Synthesis and evaluation of demographic and economic data needed to determine whether Class I or special sources of ground water exist

Objectives

The objectives of this activity are (1) to obtain refined demographic data on water use needed to establish the number of users from each aquifer at the time Yucca Mountain was selected for site characterization and (2) to examine the economic feasibility of development of the lower carbonate aquifer for alternative water supply to local populations.

Parameters

The parameters that will be obtained and evaluated are population data and locations, depths, and completion dates for all wells within the boundaries of the hydrogeologic study area (Chapter 3 introduction). Information on short-term water demand, water supply, and projected socioeconomic conditions will be obtained (Section 8.3.1.9.2.2.1) and evaluated to determine the economic feasibility of developing the lower carbonate aquifer.

Description

This synthesis activity will obtain data from Section 8.3.1.9.2.2.1 (human interference program) in order to evaluate the site aquifers against the criteria for special source status. These criteria are (1) population served at the time Yucca Mountain was selected for site characterization and (2) presence of alternative water supplies.

8.3.5.15.1.2 Application of results

The information obtained from this analysis will be used to satisfy the regulatory requirements of 40 CFR 191.16. To confirm that there have been no designations of the subject aquifers as special sources, the Yucca Mountain Project will request on a regular basis, information from the EPA on the status of each of the three aquifers.

8.3.5.15.2 Information Need 1.3.2: Determine for all special sources whether concentrations of waste products in the ground water during the first 1,000 yr after disposal could exceed the limits established in 40 CFR 191.16

Technical basis for addressing the information need

Link to the technical data chapters and applicable support documents

Section 8.3.5.13 (Issue 1.1, total system performance) presents the data and methods relevant to this information need. The information contained in this section supports the preliminary determination that concentrations of contaminants in the ground water during the first 1,000 yr after disposal will not exceed the limits established in 40 CFR 191.16.

Parameters

The parameters needed to satisfy this information need will be obtained from other studies, in particular from the geohydrology program (Section 8.3.1.2) and the total system performance issue (Section 8.3.5.13). The main parameters are (1) concentration of existing contaminants in all potential special source aquifers identified by Analysis 1.3.1.1 and (2) total system performance over the next 1,000 yr.

Logic

This information need will be investigated only if it is determined that a special source of ground water exists within 5 km of the controlled area at Yucca Mountain (Figure 8.3.5.15-1).

8.3.5.15.2.1 Analysis 1.3.2.1: Determine the concentrations of waste products in any special source of ground water during the first 1,000 yr after disposal

This analysis consists of one activity that will calculate the concentration of waste products in any special-source aquifers during the first 1,000 yr after disposal.

8.3.5.15.2.2 Activity 1.3.2.1.1: Synthesis and evaluation of releases of waste products to special sources of ground water during the first 1,000 yr after disposal

Objectives

The objective of this activity is to determine the quantity of waste products that could be released and transported to a special source of ground water during the first 1,000 yr after disposal.

Parameters

The parameters that will be obtained are the releases to the accessible environment under expected conditions over the first 1,000 yr after disposal.

Description

This study will obtain information directly from studies associated with Issue 1.1 (total system performance, Section 8.3.5.13). The difference between this issue and Issue 1.1 is that the parameters and scenarios to be considered in this issue will only cover the first 1,000 yr after disposal under expected conditions, whereas Issue 1.1 examines releases over 10,000 yr under expected and unexpected conditions. No additional information is requested under this activity.

8.3.5.15.2.3 Application of results

The information obtained from this analysis will be used to satisfy the regulatory requirements of 40 CFR 191.16.

8.3.5.15.3 Schedule for Issue 1.3 (ground-water protection)

Issue 1.3 (ground-water protection) includes two information needs, which contain two analyses. The schedule information for these performance assessment activities is summarized in Figure 8.3.5.15-2. This figure includes the performance assessment activity number and a brief description, as well as major events associated with each activity. A major event, for purposes of these schedules, may represent the initiation or completion of an activity, completion or submittal of a report to the DOE, an important data feed, or a decision point. Solid lines on the schedule represent activity durations and dashed lines show interfaces among activities as well as data transferred into or out of this performance assessment issue. The events shown on the schedule and their planned dates of completion are provided in Table 8.3.5.15-2.

The analysis-level schedules, in combination with information provided in the logic diagram for this issue (Figure 8.3.5.15-1), are intended to provide the reader with a basic understanding of the relationships between major elements of the site, performance, and design programs. The information provided in Table 8.3.5.15-2 and Figure 8.3.5.15-2, however, should be



Figure 8.3.5.15-2. Schedule information for analyses in Issue 1.3 (ground-water protection). See Table 8.3.5.15-2 for description of major events. This network is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE, 1988a) schedule. Revisions will be published in semiannual site characterization progress reports as new information becomes available.

Table 8.3.5.15-2. Major events and completion dates for analyses in Issue 1.3 (ground-water protection)

Analysis number	Brief description of analysis	Major event[a]	Event description	Date
1.3.1.1	Determine whether any aquifers near the site meet the Class I or special source criteria	A	Draft report available to the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) on evaluation of the potential for special sources of ground water at Yucca Mountain	1/91
		B	Complete evaluation of the potential forspecial sources of ground water at Yucca Mountain	6/91
1.3.2.1[b]	Determine the concentration of waste products in any special source of ground-water during the first 1,000 yr after disposal	A	Interim report available to DOE on the concentrations of waste products in special sources of ground water at Yucca Mountain	4/93
		B	Final report on the concentration of waste products in special sources of ground water at Yucca Mountain available to DOE	3/94

[a]The letters in this column key major events shown in Figure 8.3.5.15-2.
[b]Note: This analysis will not be performed if a determination is made that no Class I or special sources of ground-water exists at Yucca Mountain.

viewed as a snapshot in time. The overall program schedule presented here is consistent with the Draft Mission Plan Amendment (DOE, 1988a). The site characterization program will undergo a series of refinements following issuance of the statutory SCP. Refinements will consider factors both internal and external to the site characterization program, such as changes to the quality assurance program. Such refinements are to be considered in ongoing planning efforts, and changes that are implemented will be reflected in the semiannual progress reports. Summary schedule information for each information need of this issue can be found in Section 8.5.2.2.

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.16, Performance Confirmation

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.16 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.7: Will the performance-confirmation program meet the requirements of 10 CFR 60.137?

Regulatory basis for the issue

Issue 1.7 addresses the NRC requirements for performance confirmation. 10 CFR 60.137 requires that the repository be designed to permit implementation of a performance confirmation program in accordance with the requirements of Subpart F of 10 CFR Part 60. Subpart F gives both general and specific requirements for a program directed toward confirming that the actual subsurface conditions and changes in those conditions during construction and operations are within the limits specified in the license application (10 CFR 60.140(a)(1)), and that the natural and engineered systems are functioning as intended and anticipated (10 CFR 60.140(a)(2)). The program is to be started during site characterization and continued until permanent closure (10 CFR 60.140(b)). Specific data collection activities are required, and subsurface conditions are to be evaluated and compared with the original (license application) design bases and assumptions to determine if changes are needed in design to accommodate actual field conditions encountered (10 CFR 60.141). Differences and changes must be reported to the NRC (10 CFR 60.141(a)). The program must also test the effectiveness of engineered portions of the repository (10 CFR 60.142), and the waste packages (10 CFR 60.143). The construction authorization from the NRC will incorporate provisions requiring that the DOE provide additional information during construction with respect to (1) differences between actual conditions and the repository design basis (provided in the license application), (2) any deficiencies in the design and construction that could adversely affect safety, and (3) research and development results intended to resolve safety issues (10 CFR 60.32(b)). The performance confirmation program will be designed to address appropriate portions of these information requirements.

As defined in 10 CFR Part 60.2,

> performance confirmation means the program of tests, experiments, and analyses which is conducted to evaluate the accuracy and adequacy of the information used to determine with reasonable assurance that the performance objectives for the period after permanent closure will be met.

The repository must be designed so as to permit the performance confirmation program to be implemented (10 CFR 60.137), and the program must include tests that the NRC deems appropriate (10 CFR 60.74(b)). A performance confirmation plan will be available in the same time frame as the license application to guide the development and implementation of the program.

The DOE considers that the repository conditions and design assumptions integral to demonstrating compliance with the postclosure performance objectives should be the primary subject of the performance confirmation program. In addition, the validity of models and the assumptions and uncertainties associated with their application to demonstrate compliance with these objectives are crucial aspects to be addressed by the performance confirmation program. These aspects are also discussed in Section 8.3.1.1 (overview of the site program) and Section 8.3.5.20 (analytical techniques requiring significant development). The DOE has specified that collection of data and

performance of analyses to support the license application be adequate to quantify site performance and demonstrate that conceptual model(s) adequately represent relevant processes. This requirement was used to determine which data collection and analysis activities must be completed prior to submittal of the license application and which should be continued, as part of the performance confirmation program, to confirm the assumptions presented in the license application. The portion of the performance confirmation program that succeeds the license application will be designed to confirm that the models chosen from the suite of alternatives continue to be the alternatives most consistent with site data. This is consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 60.140(a)(1) and (2). The confirmation program implemented following submittal of the license application will be based on tests begun during site characterization and continuing in various forms through permanent closure.

For purposes of implementing 10 CFR 60 Subpart F, the DOE has established a performance confirmation program consisting of two phases (shown schematically in Figure 8.3.5.16-1): (1) a baseline phase ending with the submittal of the license application for construction authorization (10 CFR 60.140(d)(2)), and (2) a confirmation phase that begins with the submittal of the license application and ends with the approval of the license amendment for permanent closure (10 CFR 60.51). The confirmation phase is subdivided into three periods: (1) an interim period, ending with the issuance of the construction authorization, during which performance confirmation activities will be consistent with the requirements of 10 CFR 60.140(d)(2); (2) the construction period, ending with the issuance of the license to accept waste, during which the appropriate requirements of 10 CFR 60.141 and 60.142 will be addressed; and (3) the operation period, ending with the license amendment for permanent closure, during which the confirmation activities under 10 CFR 60.141 and 60.142 will be continued and additional testing and monitoring will be initiated to meet the intent of 10 CFR 60.143. The performance confirmation program ends with the issuance of the license amendments for closure (10 CFR 60.51) and license termination (10 CFR 60.52).

Technical background and licensing strategy

The performance confirmation program is the program of testing, analysis, and monitoring activities required to confirm assumptions regarding the subsurface conditions at the site and the functioning of the engineered and natural systems as predicted by the performance assessment calculations presented in the license application. At the time of license application submittal, sufficient information must be provided to allow the commission to determine, with reasonable assurance, that the geologic repository will not pose unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public. Understanding of the site and confidence in the ability to predict the performance of the site and engineered barriers will increase as the project progresses. The purpose of the performance confirmation program (which will be continued until permanent closure) is to supply added confidence, beyond that supplied in the license application, that the actual subsurface conditions are within the limits assumed for the geotechnical and design parameters in the license application and that the engineered and natural systems of the repository are functioning as anticipated to meet the long-term performance objectives for containment and isolation.



Figure 8.3.5.16-1. Correlation between the phases and objectives of the DOE's performance confirmation program, phases of the repository program, and NRC requirements driving the objectives.

The DOE's performance confirmation program, as discussed later in more detail, consists of a baseline phase that includes collection of data that is a subset of the data collected during site characterization and a subsequent confirmation phase that involves the testing and monitoring needed to add additional confidence to the assumptions and performance assessments provided in the license application. The DOE's position is that the subset of the

site characterization activities presently planned to obtain and evaluate baseline information on conditions at the site, and to monitor and analyze changes from these conditions as a result of site characterization, meets the requirements of 10 CFR 60.140(d)(2) and (3) for that part of the performance confirmation program that could reasonably be expected to begin during site characterization. Therefore, no performance confirmation activities for the baseline phase have been specified in addition to the site characterization activities already planned. The information and data needs identified through the performance allocation process represent the baseline information on site parameters and natural processes that will be obtained during site characterization.

During site characterization, information is gathered (1) to evaluate the suitability of the site, (2) to develop a suitable design, and (3) to make defensible performance assessments to establish with reasonable assurance that the performance objectives will be met. Most of the postclosure performance issues have been designed to address the NRC's performance objectives. Through the activities undertaken to support resolution of these issues (Issue 1.1 through 1.6), information will be made available to demonstrate compliance with the related performance objectives. The DOE's issue resolution strategy, as described in Section 8.1, involves an iterative process of testing and analyses. When sufficient information is gathered to prepare defensible performance assessments for the license application, the DOE's issue resolution process for the license application can be considered complete and the results documented. Information supporting the resolution of performance issues (that is, demonstrating compliance with the performance objectives) will be included in the license application. This information will be supplemented, as necessary during the licensing proceedings and at each stage of repository development, by testing and monitoring to be conducted under the confirmation phase of the performance confirmation program designed to satisfy the applicable and appropriate requirements of 10 CFR 60.140-143.

The details of the testing and monitoring activities of the performance confirmation program to be conducted following the submittal of the license application are expected to be developed and the baseline phase conducted in conjunction with the issue resolution process during site characterization. The resolution of Issue 1.7 is linked to the resolution of Issues 1.1 through 1.6 in that the performance assessments, issue resolution strategies, and baseline data developed during site characterization to support issue resolution in the license application will, in large measure, determine the nature of the information to be obtained under the confirmation phase of the performance confirmation program. At the beginning of site characterization, only very general plans for the program can be defined. The plans will mature in parallel with the development of the assessments needed for the license application as the parameters and measurements most significant to the confirmation program are identified. Preliminary design provisions for

accommodating performance confirmation testing and monitoring in the repository are given in the SCP Conceptual Design Report (SNL, 1987). As issues are resolved to support the license application, the testing and monitoring activities to be conducted under the performance confirmation program will become better defined. Development of the details for each phase of the performance confirmation program will proceed in accordance with the general schedule indicated in Figure 8.3.5.16-1.

As stated previously, Issue 1.7 focuses on the performance confirmation program responding to Subpart F of 10 CFR Part 60. Based on the content of Subpart F, the objectives to be met by the DOE's performance confirmation program can be described as follows:

1. Develop baseline information: Develop information on subsurface conditions and natural systems important to the performance assessments to be provided in the license application and those aspects of design integral to the assessments (10 CFR 60.140(d)(2)); monitor and analyze changes in this baseline information as a result of site characterization, and predict changes resulting from construction and operation (10 CFR 60.140(d)(3)); begin collection of such information during site characterization (10 CFR 60.140(b)).

2. Confirm baseline information: Confirm, to the extent practicable, that actual subsurface conditions and the changes in those conditions resulting from construction and operation are within the limits assumed in the license application (10 CFR 60.140(a)(1) and (d)(3); 10 CFR 60.141).

3. Confirm barrier and seal performance: Confirm, to the extent practicable, that natural and engineered systems and components that are designated or assumed to operate as barriers after permanent closure are functioning as intended and anticipated within the limits described in the license application (10 CFR 60.140(a)(2); 10 CFR 60.142-143)).

These objectives will be pursued in a manner that does not adversely affect the ability of the natural and engineered barriers to meet the performance objectives, as required by 10 CFR 60.140(d)(1). This concern is addressed specifically in Section 8.4.3, which is applicable to the baseline phase of performance confirmation that will be conducted during site characterization. If, at any time, the monitoring or testing being conducted as part of site characterization (for example, the multipurpose borehole tests) indicates that changes being brought about by characterization activities (e.g., shaft sinking) may adversely affect repository performance, appropriate analyses and mitigation actions will be implemented as required by 10 CFR 60.140(d)(4).

Figure 8.3.5.16-1 shows the phases of the DOE's performance confirmation program relative to the stages of the overall repository program. The DOE's performance confirmation program, as discussed earlier, is divided into baseline and confirmation phases, with the submittal of the license application serving as a convenient demarcation between phases. Before the license application, site characterization testing provides for baseline data on site conditions important to repository design and performance, monitoring of

changes in those conditions as a result of site characterization, predictions of changes in those conditions as a result of construction and operation, and predictions of repository performance after closure.

With the submittal of the license application, the DOE begins the formal licensing process with the NRC. The license application will present the performance assessments intended to show that repository performance will satisfy the regulatory postclosure performance objectives and will also present the data on site conditions upon which the repository design and performance assessments are based. Further data gathering activities after the application is submitted are intended to be confirmatory or for other purposes, such as design optimization.

A subset of the testing conducted during site characterization to support the resolution of the performance and design issues in the license application will provide the baseline data needed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 60.140(d)(2),(3). This includes baseline data on the parameters important to design and performance, as well as data on natural processes that may be changed by site characterization, construction, and operational activities. All the activities presently required to obtain this baseline information are included in the site characterization program, and the information needed is identified in the performance allocation tables. If, based on data and other information gathered during site characterization, the need for additional baseline information is identified, the baseline phase of the performance confirmation program will be appropriately expanded or otherwise modified.

Some of the site characterization activities that also meet requirements of 10 CFR 60.140(d)(2) and (3) for performance confirmation during the baseline phase will be continued past the license application submittal date, if continuation of these activities would produce useful data of a confirmatory nature. Such activities fall into two general categories: (1) long-term monitoring of natural processes, events, or site conditions (e.g., seismic monitoring and monitoring of unsaturated zone hydrologic parameters) and (2) long-duration in situ testing to characterize processes and evaluate conceptual models (e.g., in situ testing of flow processes in the unsaturated zone). These activities are also consistent with and would support the requirements of 10 CFR 60.141 for confirmation of geotechnical and design parameters during construction and operation. Data collected from such activities during characterization would be used in licensing assessments.

Tables 8.3.5.16-1 and -2 list the testing and monitoring activities in each of the above categories that have been tentatively identified. Included in the tables are the test titles, locations, purposes, value for performance or design confirmation, approximate dates, and the SCP section that provides the information. The column describing the value of the activity to performance or design confirmation provides a link between the performance confirmation program and the appropriate regulatory requirements or technical concerns relating to repository performance. In addition to these long-duration monitoring and testing activities to be conducted as part of site characterization and continued into the confirmation phase, certain tests may be identified as being necessary for confirmation only. If the time scales for such testing are long, they may be initiated during site characterization. A test currently identified in this category is the heated room test shown in

Table 8.3.5.16-1. Monitoring activities initiated during site characterization and planned to be continued as performance confirmation.

Test title	Location[a]	Purpose	Principal value for performance or design confirmation	Approximate dates	SCP section providing information
MONITORING ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING PERFORMANCE ISSUE RESOLUTION STRATEGIES IN THE LICENSE APPLICATION					
Precipitation and meteorological monitoring	At and around the site	Continue data collection for precipitation, wind speed, direction, etc.	Improve estimates for recharge and infiltration for ground-water travel time and total system performance	Ongoing, continuing beyond 1/95	8.3.1.12.2.1.1 8.3.1.2.1.1.1
Seismic network monitoring	Regional monitoring	Continue expansion of earthquake catalog	Improve estimates of earthquake probabilities and magnitudes for total system performance	Ongoing, continuing beyond 1/95	8.3.1.17.4.1.2
Geodetic leveling - Yucca Mountain base station network) monitoring	Across the site	Measure station elevations over time	Confirm and evaluate rates of tectonic deformation	Ongoing through preclosure period	8.3.1.17.4.10.1
Surface water runoff monitoring	In and around the site	Continue data collection on runoff	Improve calculations for seal performance and ground-water travel time	Ongoing, continuing beyond 1/95	8.3.1.2.1.2.1
Site vertical boreholes' unsaturated zone boreholes monitoring	Overlying and adjacent to the primary repository boundary	Expand data base for site hydrologic conditions	Increase confidence in calculation of ground-water travel time	Ongoing, continuing beyond 1/95	8.3.1.2.2.3.2
Natural infiltration monitoring	In and around the site	Continue infiltration monitoring	Increase confidence in infiltration values used in developing ground-water flow models	Ongoing, continuing beyond 1/95	8.3.1.2.2.1.2
Site potentiometric-level monitoring	Around the site	Measure water table levels over time	Improve site hydrologic model for total system performance	Ongoing, continuing beyond 1/95	8.3.1.2.3.1.2
MONITORING ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING DESIGN PARAMETERS IN THE LICENSE APPLICATION					
Drift stability monitoring	Exploratory shaft facility (ESF) and underground facility	Expand data base on shaft and drift convergence	Confirm design assumptions on stability	11/90, continuing beyond 1/95	8.3.1.15.1.8.3
Seismic network monitoring	Regional monitoring (a 150 km radius of Yucca Mountain)	Extend earthquake catalog	Increase confidence in earthquake probabilities and magnitudes	Ongoing, continuing beyond 1/95	8.3.1.17.4.1.2

[a]For more specific details on locations of tests to the conducted, see Section 8.4.2.2.3.

Table 8.3.5.16-2. Testing activities initiated during site characterization planned to be continued as performance confirmation

Test title	Location[a]	Purpose	Performance assessment analysis	Approximate dates	SCP section providing information
		TESTING ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING PERFORMANCE ISSUE RESOLUTION STRATEGIES IN THE LICENSE APPLICATION			
Intact fracture test	Laboratory exploratory shaft (ES) samples	Continue measurements of dispersivity, diffusion, and flow rates in response to changes in stress	Evaluation of discrete fracture flow models for total system calculations	5/92, continuing beyond 1/95	8.3.1.2.2.4.1
Percolation test	ES breakout room	Validation of dual porosity and discrete fracture models	Improve confidence in ground-water travel time and radionuclide transport calculations	5/92, continuing beyond 1/95	8.3.1.2.2.4.2
Bulk permeability test	ES lower breakout zone alcove	Continue measurements of large scale hydrologic parameters, gas permeability	Addresses scale effects important to flow models used for calculations of ground-water travel time and radionuclide transport	5/92, continuing beyond 1/95	8.3.1.2.2.4.3
Near-field thermally perturbed hydrologic properties	Underground facility - repository level and laboratory testing	Improve data base for fluid flow paths and rates in near-field environment	Improve confidence in performance assessments for engineered barrier system (EBS) and waste package	6/92, continuing beyond 1/95	8.3.4.2.4.4.1
Rock/water interaction tests	Underground facility - repository level and laboratory testing	Continue to measure dispersivity, diffusion, perturbation of rock/water chemistry by thermal effects	Improve confidence in EBS and waste package performance assessments	6/92, continuing beyond 1/95	8.3.4.2.4.4.2
		TESTING ACTIVITIES SUPPORTING DESIGN ISSUE RESOLUTION IN THE LICENSE APPLICATION			
Heated room experiment	Repository level ESF drift	Obtain data base on rock mass deformation and stress changes as a function of temperature, rock thermal conductivity, and heat capacity on the drift scale	Confirm behavior of underground openings - design assumptions for drift size, ground support requirements	12/91, continuing beyond 1/95	8.3.1.15.1.6.5
Near-field thermally perturbed hydrologic properties	Underground facility - repository level and laboratory testing	Determine near-field hydrologic properties	Confirm design assumptions about water inflow to waste packages	6/92, continuing beyond 1/95	8.3.1.2.2.4.3
In situ testing of scale components	Repository level of ESF	Verify behavior of sealing components under in situ conditions	Improve confidence in seal performance	1/93 through repository construction	8.3.3.2.3

[a]For more specific details on locations of tests to be conducted, see Section 8.4.2.2.3.

Table 8.3.5.16-2. These lists are not intended to be complete, but rather to indicate the tests that have been tentatively identified at this time as being useful for performance confirmation. As issue resolution proceeds during site characterization, confirmation phase testing and monitoring activities may be added or deleted.

The performance confirmation program draws upon baseline data collected during site characterization. The manner in which these baseline data are used in performance assessment determines the extent of the testing and monitoring activities needed. During the baseline phase, details of the performance confirmation program will evolve in parallel with the development of the performance assessments. In the license application, the assessments of site performance will be presented, accompanied by information that describes the testing and monitoring needed to evaluate the accuracy and adequacy of the information and models used in those assessments. The repository design presented in the license application will also contain any features (test rooms, monitoring stations, etc.) determined to be necessary for the testing and monitoring activities to be conducted as part of the performance confirmation program.

As shown in Figure 8.3.5.16-1, the confirmation phase follows the baseline phase. During the confirmation phase, predictions of baseline conditions and the changes caused by repository construction and operation are to be confirmed (objective 2), to the extent practicable, along with barrier and seal performance (objective 3). The confirmation phase consists of three divisions: the interim confirmation period (the period after the license application submittal until issuance of the construction authorization) and the construction and operation period (beginning with repository construction and ending with the receipt of the license to accept waste), and the operations period (ending with the approval of the license amendment for permanent closure). During license application review (the interim confirmation period), the DOE will continue to conduct testing and monitoring activities, such as those indicated in Tables 8.3.5.16-1 and -2, both at the site and in the exploratory shaft facility. This testing will serve to confirm baseline conditions and support the predictions of changes to these conditions. Once the construction phase begins, predicted changes in site conditions (10 CFR 60.141), as well as the assumed performance of the natural and engineered systems (10 CFR 60.142), can be confirmed by the testing and monitoring programs conducted during this phase. During the operation period, the performance confirmation program designed to meet the requirements in 10 CFR 60.141 and 60.142 will be continued and additional confirmation activities will be initiated to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 60.143.

As mentioned previously, results of postclosure performance assessments are based on the site characterization and involve predictions of performance into the postclosure time frame. These long-term predictions are made on the basis of conceptual models that are evaluated using data acquired over shorter time frames, and possibly through the use of natural analogs. To confirm these performance assessments, surrogates for the barrier performance that can be measured by field and laboratory testing must be defined. These surrogates are appropriately referred to as confirmation measures. These measures are not substitutes for performance but rather testable measures that, if they achieve target values or goals, will give confidence that the performance objectives will be met. These measures are then the focus of the

testing, monitoring, and analysis efforts designed to confirm their predicted behavior. For example, corrosion rates for container materials could be used as a confirmation measure for the waste-package containment performance objective.

The confirmation measures eventually identified will probably be closely related to some of the performance measures or parameters developed through the performance allocation process. Confirmation measures will be derived that relate to waste package containment, engineered barrier release, and backfill and seal behavior. Based on site-specific needs, additional measures may be identified. Testing to confirm the predicted values of confirmation measures may be initiated as early as site characterization, but will most likely take place during the construction/operation phase.

Postclosure performance predictions are largely based on numerical modeling, and therefore, a program for the evaluation of the numerical models to be be used is an important part of the confirmation program. The models of concern to the performance confirmation program are those used in the license application to predict long-term performance and from which the values of the confirmation measures may be identified. Evaluations of these models will have been begun during the site characterization period and will continue as needed until permanent closure and the models are considered to be consistent with site data and to adequately represent the conditions and processes at the site. Parameters critical to the evaluation of models will be identified during the baseline phase (site characterization). Any confirmation phase testing judged necessary to supply added confidence to model evaluation efforts will be identified and may be initiated during the license application review period, consistent with the development of the detailed plans for confirmation phase testing and monitoring. Section 8.3.1.1 discusses alternate model evaluations and hypothesis testing, while Section 8.3.5.20 discusses numerical model validation and the specific testing currently planned.

DOE/RW-0199

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.17, NRC Siting Criteria

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.17 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.8: Can the demonstrations for favorable and potentially adverse conditions be made as required by 10 CFR 60.122?

Regulatory basis for the issue

Postclosure Performance Issue 1.8 addresses the NRC siting criteria. These criteria, set forth in 10 CFR 60.122, consist of two sets of conditions that describe human activities and natural conditions, processes, and events. The first set (10 CFR 60.122(b)) encompasses eight favorable conditions (FCs) that could enhance the ability of a site to meet the performance objectives relating to the isolation of waste if they were present at the site. These favorable conditions are shown in Table 8.3.5.17-1. The second set (10 CFR 60.122(c)) encompasses 24 conditions (potentially adverse conditions, or PACs) that could adversely affect the ability of a site to meet the performance objectives relating to the isolation of waste if they were present at the site. These potentially adverse conditions are shown in Table 8.3.5.17-2.

The siting criteria also include requirements for the demonstrations that must be made regarding these conditions. For each potentially adverse condition determined to be present, the NRC requires that the following be demonstrated:

(i) The potentially adverse human activity or natural condition has been adequately investigated, including the extent to which the condition may be present and still be undetected, taking into account the degree of resolution achieved by the investigations; and

(ii) The effect of the potentially adverse human activity or natural-condition on the site has been adequately evaluated using analyses which are sensitive to the potentially adverse human activity or natural condition and assumptions which are not likely to underestimate its effect; and

(iii) (A) The potentially adverse human activity or natural condition is shown by analysis pursuant to paragraph (a)(2)(ii) of this section not to affect significantly the ability of the geologic repository to meet the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste, or

(B) The effect of the potentially adverse human activity or natural condition is compensated by the presence of a combination of the favorable characteristics so that the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste are met, or

(C) The potentially adverse human activity or natural condition can be remedied.

Table 8.3.5.17-1. Favorable conditions, Performance Issue 1.8 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission siting criteria)[a]

Favorable condition	Text of the condition
1	The nature and rates of tectonic, hydrogeologic, geochemical, and geomorphic processes (or any of such processes) operating within the geologic setting during the Quaternary Period, when projected, would not affect or would favorably affect the ability of the geologic repository to isolate the waste.
2	For disposal in the saturated zone, hydrogeologic conditions that provide - (i) A host rock with low horizontal and vertical permeability; (ii) Downward or dominantly horizontal hydraulic gradient in the host rock and immediately surrounding hydrogeologic units; and (iii) Low vertical permeability and low hydraulic gradient between the host rock and the surrounding hydrogeologic units.
3	Geochemical conditions that - (i) Promote precipitation or sorption of radionuclides; (ii) Inhibit the formation of particulates, colloids, and inorganic and organic complexes that increase the mobility of radionuclides; or (iii) Inhibit the transport of radionuclides by particulates, colloids, and complexes.
4	Mineral assemblages that, when subjected to anticipated thermal loading, will remain unaltered or alter to mineral assemblages having equal or increased capacity to inhibit radionuclide migration.
5	Conditions that permit the emplacement of waste at a minimum depth of 300 meters from the ground surface. (The ground surface shall be deemed to be the elevation of the lowest point on the surface above the disturbed zone.)
6	A low population density within the geologic setting and a controlled area that is remote from population centers.

Table 8.3.5.17-1. Favorable conditions, Performance Issue 1.8 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission siting criteria)[a] (continued)

Favorable condition	Text of the condition
7	Pre-waste-emplacement travel time along the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment that substantially exceeds 1,000 yr.
8	For disposal in the unsaturated zone, hydrogeologic conditions that provide- (i) Low moisture flux in the host rock and in the overlying and underlying hydrogeologic units; (ii) A water table sufficiently below the underground facility such that fully saturated voids contiguous with the water table do not encounter the underground facility; (iii) A laterally extensive low-permeability hydrogeologic unit above the host rock that would inhibit the downward movement of water or divert downward moving water to a location beyond the limits of the underground facility; (iv) A host rock that provides for free drainage; or (v) A climatic regime in which the average annual historic precipitation is a small percentage of the average annual potential evapotranspiration.

[a]Quoted from 10 CFR 60.122(b).

Table 8.3.5.17-2. Potentially adverse conditions, Performance Issue 1.8 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission siting criteria)[a]

Potentially adverse condition	Text of the condition
1	Potential for flooding of the underground facility, whether resulting from the occupancy and modification of floodplains or from the failure of existing or planned man-made surface water impoundments.
2	Potential for forseeable human activity to adversely affect the ground-water flow system, such as ground-water withdrawal, extensive irrigation, subsurface injection of fluids, underground pumped storage, military activity or construction of large scale surface water impoundments.
3	Potential for natural phenomena such as landslides, subsidence, or volcanic activity of such magnitude that large-scale surface water impoundments could be created that could change the regional ground-water flow system and thereby adversely affect the performance of the geologic repository.
4	Structural deformation, such as uplift, subsidence, folding or faulting, that may adversely affect the regional ground-water flow system.
5	Potential for changes in hydrologic conditions that would affect the migration of radionuclides to the accessible environment, such as changes in hydraulic gradient, average interstitial velocity, storage coefficient, hydraulic conductivity, natural recharge, potentiometric levels, and discharge points.
6	Potential for changes in hydrologic conditions resulting from reasonably forseeable climatic changes.

Table 8.3.5.17-2. Potentially adverse conditions, Performance Issue 1.8 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission siting criteria)[a] (continued)

Potentially adverse condition	Text of the condition
7	Ground-water conditions in the host rock, including chemical composition, high ionic strength, or ranges of Eh-pH, that could increase the solubility or chemical reactivity of the engineered barrier system.
8	Geochemical processes that would reduce sorption of radionuclides, result in degradation of the rock strength, or adversely affect the performance of the engineered barrier system.
9	Ground-water conditions in the host rock that are not reducing.
10	Evidence of dissolutioning such as breccia pipes, dissolution cavities or brine pockets.
11	Structural deformation, such as uplift, subsidence, folding, and faulting, during the Quaternary Period.
12	Earthquakes that have occurred historically that if they were to be repeated could affect the site significantly.
13	Indications, based on correlations of earthquakes with tectonic processes and features, that either the frequency of occurrence or magnitude of earthquakes may increase.
14	More frequent occurrence of earthquakes or earthquakes of higher magnitude than is typical of the area in which the geologic setting is located.
15	Evidence of igneous activity since the start of the Quaternary Period.
16	Evidence of extreme erosion during the Quaternary Period.

Table 8.3.5.17-2. Potentially adverse conditions, Performance Issue 1.8 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission siting criteria)[a] (continued)

Potentially adverse condition	Text of the condition
17	The presence of naturally occurring materials, whether identified or undiscovered, within the site, in such a form that: (i) Economic extraction is currently feasible or potentially feasible during the forseeable future; or (ii) Such materials have a greater gross value or net value than the average for areas of similar size that are representative of and located within the geologic setting.
18	Evidence of subsurface mining for resources within the site.
19	Evidence of drilling for any purpose within the site.
20	Rock or ground-water conditions that would require complex engineering measures in the design and construction of the underground facility or in the sealing of boreholes and shafts.
21	Geomechanical properties that do not permit design of underground openings that will remain stable through permanent closure.
22	Potential for the water table to rise sufficiently so as to cause saturation of an underground facility located in the unsaturated zone.
23	Potential for existing or future perched water bodies that may saturate portions of the underground facility or provide a faster flow path from an underground facility located in the unsaturated zone to the accessible environment.

Table 8.3.5.17-2. Potentially adverse conditions, Performance Issue 1.8 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission siting criteria)[a] (continued)

Potentially adverse condition	Text of the condition
24	Potential for the movement of radionuclides in a gaseous state through air-filled pore spaces of an unsaturated geologic medium to the accessible environment.

[a]Quoted from 10 CFR 60.122(c).

The demonstration requirements for the favorable conditions are not as explicit as the requirements for the potentially adverse conditions. The NRC, in 10 CFR 60.122(a)(1), requires that

> A geologic setting shall exhibit an appropriate combination of the... [favorable conditions]...so that, together with the engineered barrier system, the favorable conditions present are sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste will be met.

This requirement from 10 CFR Part 60 indicates that a site judged suitable for a repository does not necessarily have all favorable conditions. To demonstrate that the combination of conditions is appropriate, the safety analysis report in the license application to the NRC is required to contain "analyses to determine the degree to which each of the favorable and potentially adverse conditions, if present, has been characterized, and the extent to which it contributes to or detracts from isolation" (60.21(c)(1)(ii)(B)). For those potentially adverse conditions that could detract from isolation, the NRC allows a site to rely on the favorable conditions present at the site to compensate for the potentially adverse conditions (60.122(a)(2)(iii)(B)). Thus, the presence of favorable conditions is expected to contribute substantially to the demonstration of reasonable assurance, and their functions in enhancing isolation will be included explicitly, whenever it is feasible to do so, in calculations demonstrating compliance with the performance objectives.

Approach to resolving the issue

Because 10 CFR 60.122 addresses two kinds of conditions, two strategies for resolving this issue have been developed and are described in the following section. The first addresses the demonstrations required for the potentially adverse conditions, and the second addresses the demonstrations required for the favorable conditions. There is a strong tie between these strategies and the strategy for resolving Issue 1.1 (Section 8.3.5.13). Issue 1.1 addresses the NRC's overall system performance objective (10 CFR 60.112).

Significant processes and events will be investigated through the assessments of compliance with the performance objective. These significant processes and events, including natural features existing at the site and various alternative conceptual models, will be taken into account by developing scenarios that specify a sequence of processes and events potentially resulting in significant impacts on the repository system elements important to waste isolation.

The DOE intends to evaluate in the overall system performance assessment only those natural processes and events and human activities that are sufficiently credible to warrant consideration. Generally, categories of natural processes and events and human activities that can be shown to have a likelihood of less then one chance in 10,000 of occurring in the first 10,000 yr after permanent closure will be excluded from the postclosure performance assessment. These processes, events and activities however, will be investigated, as necessary, during site characterization to validate such a determination of credibility of occurrence.

Scenarios will be developed for undisturbed conditions (those conditions that are caused by likely natural events) and for disturbed conditions (those conditions that are caused by unlikely yet sufficient credible events). The term "scenario class" is used in the resolution strategy of Issue 1.1 to group those scenarios involving similar types of events and processes. The scenarios for undisturbed conditions are grouped into the normal-scenario class (sometimes referred to as the "expected case", anticipated case", and "undisturbed case"). The scenarios for undisturbed conditions are grouped into a number of distruptive-scenario classes. The screening of future events and processes and the development of scenarios and scenario classes is described in detail in the resolution strategy of Issue 1.1 (Section 8.3.5.13).

The strategies for Issue 1.8 (Section 8.3.5.17) ensure that the scenarios and scenario classes overall system performance assessment conducted through the resolution of Issue 1.1 consider the site characteristics with which the NRC is concerned, specifically the favorable and potentially adverse conditions of 10 CFR 60.122. To conduct a realistic performance assessment, Issue 1.1 will rely upon input from Issue 1.5 (engineered barrier system release rates), which must in turn consider the site conditions specified in 10 CFR 60.122. The strategy for resolving Issue 1.1 is discussed in detail in Section 8.3.5.13.

Issue 1.8 has many similarities to Issue 1.1; the two issues take many of the same site conditions into account, and both deal with the effects of site conditions on the isolation of the waste. They do not, however, have to be structured identically. Although each of the two issues will require both quantitative and qualitative arguments for resolution, the DOE expects that the resolution of Issue 1.8 will rely more heavily on expert geotechnical judgment. The resolution of Issue 1.1 will result in a definitive quantitative demonstration of compliance by the construction of the cumulative complementary distribution function. This resolution will rely on qualitative reasoning primarily for the justification of the conceptual models it uses and for showing the reasonable assurance required by 10 CFR 60.101. Because 10 CFR 60.122 makes explicit reference to meeting the waste-isolation

performance objectives, the resolution of Issue 1.8 cannot be wholly qualitative. It can, however, be a forum for full expression of sound qualitative technical judgment on the site's ability to isolate waste. The DOE expects that such judgments can frequently be made without recourse to complex calculations of releases to the accessible environment; for example, modeling of ground-water flow may be used to address increases in water-table elevations and in infiltration. Such simpler calculations and the use of expert geotechnical judgment will play important roles in the resolution of Issue 1.8.

Strategy for addressing the potentially adverse conditions

In 10 CFR 60.122 the NRC states that these conditions are potentially adverse if they are characteristic of the controlled area or may affect isolation within the controlled area. If present, these conditions could significantly affect the ability of a site to meet the performance objectives relating to isolation of waste. Therefore, each PAC must be investigated to determine whether the condition is present at the Yucca Mountain site, what effects the PAC could have on the site's ability to isolate waste, and whether the effects, if any, are significant.

Figure 8.3.5.17-1 shows the major steps that the DOE intends to take in resolving Issue 1.8 for each potentially adverse condition (PAC) listed in 10 CFR 60.122. The figure, which is an expansion of the general issue resolution strategy shown in Section 8.1, outlines the licensing strategy and the subsequent steps that will lead to the final resolution of Issue 1.8 for each PAC. As explained in detail below, certain steps in the licensing strategy--i.e., the steps up to the collection of site characterization data--were carried out in preparing this section and have been used in the development of the site characterization program presented in other parts of Section 8.3.

The following detailed explanation of Figure 8.3.5.17-1 describes the steps and the reasoning behind them. The explanation is intended to guide the reader's understanding of the detailed discussions presented later in Section 8.3.5.17 that explain how the licensing-strategy decisions were made for each PAC. To keep the section as concise as possible, those detailed discussions omit many of the general principles that underlie the strategy. The following explanation supplies those principles. The steps in the figure are numbered to aid the reader in following the explanation.

The first step in the licensing strategy for dealing with each PAC is to adopt a tentative strategy on whether the license application will show that the PAC is present at the Yucca Mountain site (step 1). This decision has been based on the evidence currently available to the DOE. As Section 8.1 explains in detail, the tentative decisions adopted in the development of licensing strategies will be changed if evidence acquired in the future shows them to be technically unsound. For now they are simply a basis for planning site characterization.

Strategy for addressing PACs with preliminary findings not present at the site--The major branch on the right side of Figure 8.3.5.17-1 shows the steps to be followed to test the hypothesis that a PAC is not present at the site. If the available data show conclusively that the condition is not


DECIDE STRATEGY: PAC PRESENT (PI) OR NOT PRESENT (NPI)? 1
P
NP
ARE CONCLUSIVE DATA AVAILABLE FOR SHOWING NP? 2
Yes
RESOLUTION: PAC IS NOT PRESENT 3
No
DO THE NOMINAL AND DISRUPTIVE SCENARIOS OF ISSUE 1.1 ADDRESS PAC? 12
No
DO OTHER ISSUES ADDRESS PAC? 13
No
Yes
Yes
DO THE NOMINAL AND DISRUPTIVE SCENARIOS OF ISSUE 1.1 CALL FOR SITE CHARACTERIZATION DATA THAT ADDRESS THE PAC? 4
No
Yes
DO OTHER ISSUES CALL FOR SUCH DATA? 5
Yes
No
DO SITE CHARACTERIZATION DATA CALLED FOR IN ISSUE 1.1 OR OTHER ISSUES APPEAR ADEQUATE TO SHOW PAC PRESENT AND NOT SIGNIFICANT? 15
No
DEVELOP SCENARIOS AND DATA NEEDS FOR SHOWING PAC PRESENT BUT NOT SIGNIFICANT 14
DO THE SITE CHARACTERIZATION DATA CALLED FOR IN ISSUE 1.1 APPEAR ADEQUATE TO SHOW NP? 7
No
DEVELOP DATA NEEDS FOR SHOWING NP 6
Yes
Yes
No
HAS PAC BEEN SHOWN PRESENT? 17
No
Yes
COLLECT DATA 8
COLLECT DATA 16
ARE DATA GOOD ENOUGH TO SHOW NP (i.e., IS INVESTIGATION ADEQUATE)? 9
No
SHOULD DECISION ON P OR NP BE CHANGED? 11
No
PERFORM ANALYSES TO EXAMINE SIGNIFICANCE 18
RESOLUTION: PAC IS PRESENT AND COMPROMISES PERFORMANCE 22
Yes
RESOLUTION: PAC IS NOT PRESENT 10
CAN PAC BE COMPENSATED FOR OR REMEDIED? 21
HAS PAC BEEN SHOWN TO BE NOT SIGNIFICANT? 19
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
DEVELOP NEW STRATEGY FOR SHOWING COMPENSATION OR REMEDY 23
ARE THE ANALYSES REALISTIC AND THE INVESTIGATION ADEQUATE? 20
HAS THE INVESTIGATION BEEN ADEQUATE? 27
Yes
No
No
DEVELOP DATA NEEDS FOR ADEQUATE INVESTIGATION 28
REFORMULATE ANALYSIS METHODS OR SCOPE OF INVESTIGATION 24
No
WERE THE ANALYSIS METHODS 'SENSITIVE' AND NOT UNDER-ESTIMATORS? 29
Yes
RESOLUTION: PAC IS PRESENT BUT NOT SIGNIFICANT 30
DEVELOP DATA NEEDS 26
Yes
ARE MORE DATA NEEDED? 25
No

Figure 8.3.5.17-1. Logic diagram for resolving Issue 1.8 for potentially adverse conditions (PACs). The text discussion is keyed to the numbers in this logic diagram.

present (step 2), the issue will be resolved simply by reporting those data (step 3). If the available data are not conclusive, the strategy will follow the remainder of the major branch.

Step 4 shown in Figure 8.3.5.17-1 is an examination of the performance allocation in Issue 1.1. The reason for this step and for two other steps near it in the diagram (5, 6) is the following: a major premise of the licensing strategy for Issue 1.8 is that most of the data needed for resolution are already called for by other issues. Issue 1.1 (total-system performance) is the principal issue that calls for data needed in resolving Issue 1.8 because it is the issue that must consider all the credible scenarios for future events and processes at the site. The list of PACs in 10 CFR 60.122 includes many conditions that might serve as initiating events for credible disruptive scenarios, and for that reason Issue 1.1 has used the list in allocating performance for the assessment of such scenarios. Furthermore, the allocation of performance for the scenarios has relied on the technical judgment of both performance-assessment and geoscience personnel; this effort has been intended to make the allocations in Issue 1.1 responsive to the data needs of Issue 1.8, as well as to the need to address the overall system performance objective adequately.

Thus, Step 4 in Figure 8.3.5.17-1 is a decision on whether the performance allocation for the nominal and disruptive scenarios in Issue 1.1 calls for the data needed for testing the hypothesis that the PAC is not present. If such data are not called for in Issue 1.1, other issues are examined to see whether they address the PAC by calling for the needed data (step 5). If no issue that addresses the PAC is found, the strategy calls for a separate development of data needs for testing the hypothesis that the PAC is not present (step 6).

If Issue 1.1 or some other issue addresses the PAC, the licensing strategy for Issue 1.8 proceeds by examining the allocation made in that issue (step 7). If the site characterization information called for there is judged to be adequate for testing the hypothesis that the PAC is not present, the allocation is adopted as the licensing strategy for collecting the data needed for resolving the PAC (step 8). As the detailed descriptions of the licensing strategy for each PAC show, Issue 1.1 usually contains an adequate allocation because the PACs were specifically used in constructing the strategy for its resolution. If the allocation is judged inadequate, the strategy requires a separate development of the data needed for resolution (step 6). (The DOE has carried out the work described in the steps leading to this point, and the results are described in the detailed discussion of the strategy for each PAC.) Data called for by the licensing strategy will be collected through the site characterization program (described in other sections of the SCP); the diagram shows this collection in a single box (step 8).

Beginning with step 9, Figure 8.3.5.17-1 describes additional actions that may need to be taken for any given PAC. The DOE will decide whether the data are adequate for testing the hypothesis that the PAC is not present (step 9). In other words, the DOE will decide whether the investigation that provided the data is likely to be judged adequate in the licensing proceedings. If the investigation is found adequate, the DOE will consider the issue resolved (step 10). If the investigation is not found adequate,

the DOE must decide (step 11) whether the information suggests a change in the overall strategy for the PAC: should the strategy be to test the hypothesis that the PAC is present? If the answer is yes, the steps to be followed appear in the left branch of Figure 8.3.5.17-1, beginning with step 12. If the answer is no, the DOE will develop new data needs that will provide an adequate investigation of the PAC (step 6), and the collection of additional data (step 8) will begin.

Demonstration strategy for PACs present at the site--For PACs known or suspected to be present at the site, 10 CFR 60.122 offers three options for demonstrating that they do not compromise the ability of the site to isolate the waste. Currently, however, the DOE feels that all the PACs that might be present can be shown to meet the particular option allowing for the PACs to be shown "not to affect significantly the ability of the geologic repository to meet the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste." The strategy shown as the major branch on the left side of Figure 8.3.5.17-1 assumes that those PACs will be treated in the license application according to that option. Figure 8.3.5.17-1 uses the word "significant" as a short form to refer to the option. The possible use of the other two choices appears in the strategy much later--to be used if evidence suggests that the site characterization data will not demonstrate insignificance.

The first steps in the left branch of Figure 8.3.5.17-1 are similar to the first steps in the right branch. The strategy calls first for an examination of Issue 1.1 to see whether the PAC is addressed in the nominal and disruptive scenarios there (step 12); for the reasons explained above, Issue 1.1 is a likely issue in which to find considerations of PACs because it uses the PACs in identifying the scenarios that are credible at the site. If the PAC is not addressed there, other issues are examined to see whether they address the PAC (step 13). If no issue addresses it, the DOE will develop a new performance allocation--i.e., a scenario and the set of data needed for showing the presence and significance of the PAC (step 14).

If an issue is found to address the PAC, the performance allocation in the issue is examined to see whether the data it calls for appear adequate for determining the presence and significance of the PAC (step 15). If the data appear adequate, they are adopted for resolving Issue 1.8. If they do not, the DOE constructs a new performance allocation based on the strategy for showing the presence of the PAC and determining its significance (step 14). (The work described in the steps leading to this point has been done, and the results are described in the explanation of the strategy for each PAC). The data called for by the licensing strategy will be collected as part of the site characterization program described in other sections of the SCP (step 16).

The remainder of the left branch of Figure 8.3.5.17-1 describes the issue-resolution steps that the DOE expects to take after site characterization has provided the needed information. The collected data may show that, contrary to the expectation embodied in the licensing strategy, the PAC is not present at the site (step 17). If it is not present, the DOE will change the strategy for dealing with the PAC, and the figure therefore shows a decision that leads to the major right branch of the diagram (step 2).

The statements of some PACs in 10 CFR 60.122 do not refer simply to the presence of a condition; for such a PAC to be shown present, the condition must be shown to adversely affect the performance of a repository. For example, PAC 5 refers not simply to the presence of a potential for changes in hydrologic conditions but to the presence of a potential for changes "that would affect the migration of radionuclides to the accessible environment." Such PACs cannot be shown to be present in step 17 alone. Their presence can be shown only after subsequent steps in the strategy have examined their effect on performance, which, as explained above, Figure 8.3.5.17-1 refers to as their "significance."

If step 17 has failed to show that the PAC is not present at the site, the DOE will use the site characterization information in analyses intended to determine whether the PAC is significant in the sense of 10 CFR 60.122 (step 18). These analyses will not necessarily trace the contribution of the PAC to the full cumulative complementary distribution function (CCDF) required for resolving Issue 1.1 (Section 8.3.5.13). An elaborate model of the total system will be used in deriving the CCDF, but it will often be possible to use simpler models of the system or its subsystems to see whether the presence of a PAC changes the characteristics (e.g., the performance parameters) of the site enough to affect waste isolation. The analyses of significance will include sensitivity and uncertainty studies in order to provide confidence that the conclusions derived from the system or subsystem analyses are justified by the data they use and the assumptions they make. Step 18 in Figure 8.3.5.17-1 represents the performance of these analyses.

All these analyses--(calculations using total-system models or simpler subsystem models, sensitivity studies, uncertainty studies)--will contribute to the decision on whether the PAC is significant. That decision, shown as step 19 in the figure, will rely on both the results of the analyses and expert professional judgment in the technical fields appropriate to studies of the PAC. Whether the decision is that the PAC is or is not significant, several steps remain in the strategy before the issue can be resolved, and Figure 8.3.5.17-1 shows a separate branch for each of the two outcomes.

If the analyses fail to show that the PAC is not significant, the analyses themselves must be examined to make sure that the methods they use are realistic representations of the effects of the PAC (step 20). The reason such an examination is necessary is that many analyses of repository performance will make conservative assumptions intended to overestimate adverse effects. Such assumptions are usually appropriate for licensing decisions because they contribute to the required reasonable assurance that the performance objectives will be met. Moreover, they generally make the analyses easier to perform and easier to understand than the complex analyses that are less conservative but more realistic. If these assumptions are overly conservative, however, predictions based on them could overestimate the effects of a PAC so severely that the actual effects of the PAC would be obscured. Before concluding that a PAC has significant effects on performance, therefore, the DOE would examine the methods used in the analyses of significance to be sure that they are realistic enough to give reliable predictions. Figure 8.3.5.17-1 shows this step (20) as a decision in the issue-resolution strategy. Step 20 also shows an examination of whether the site characterization investigations have been adequate for the determination of significance. If the analyses are found realistic and the investigations

adequate, the DOE will abandon the strategy of showing that the PAC is present and not significant.

The next step, shown in Figure 8.3.5.17-1, is to decide whether the strategy should adopt either of the other two options--remediation or compensation by a combination of favorable conditions--for showing that the PAC does not compromise waste isolation (step 21). If neither option appears feasible for the PAC, the DOE expects to interpret the analyses as showing that the PAC is present and does indeed compromise performance (step 22). If one of the options appears feasible, the DOE expects, as shown in the diagram, to develop a new strategy showing that remediation or compensation can be demonstrated and that the PAC will not compromise performance (step 23).

If, on the other hand, either the analyses or the investigation is found unacceptable, the strategy calls for the DOE to reformulate the analysis methods or the scope of the investigations in an attempt to make the decision on significance better reflect the conditions at the site (step 24). As Figure 8.3.5.17-1 shows, such a step would be followed by a decision on whether the new methods or the new scope requires that additional data be collected (step 25). If more data are needed, new data needs are developed (step 26), and the strategy calls for a reiteration through the collection of data. If more data are not needed, the strategy calls for the question of significance to be revisited through new calculations (step 18).

If the analyses of significance show the PAC to be not significant, the strategy calls for answers to two further questions that express requirements of 10 CFR 60.122. The question shown first in Figure 8.3.5.17-1 asks whether the investigations have been adequate (step 27). The DOE expects that this question will be answered primarily through expert review of the data-collection program; the regulations give no guidance on how the adequacy is to be assessed. If the answer to this question is no, new data needs will be developed to ensure that the program is adequate (step 28). If the answer is yes, the strategy proceeds to the second question.

The second question addresses the requirement in 10 CFR 60.122(a)(2)(ii) that the evaluation of the PAC be done with analyses that are sensitive to "the potentially adverse human activity or natural condition" and that use assumptions that "are not likely to underestimate its effect" (step 29). The DOE expects to perform sensitivity analyses as adjuncts to the analyses of significance. This work will demonstrate that the methods are sensitive in the sense required, and it will contribute to a demonstration that the effects have not been underestimated. Further examination of the answer to this question will come from expert review of the analyses themselves.

If the answer to the second question is no, the strategy calls for the cycle of reformulating the analysis methods and investigations (step 24), possibly collecting more data (steps 25, 26, and 16), and again evaluating the significance of the PAC (step 18). If the answer is yes, the PAC will have been shown to be present but not to significantly affect the ability of the site to isolate waste (step 30).

It should be emphasized that the DOE does not expect to perform steps 20, 27, and 29 only in the strict order shown in Figure 8.3.5.17-1. The

questions of adequacy and realism will not, for example, be left unexamined until the analyses have been finished. These questions will be considered throughout site characterization as the DOE constructs and manages a program that will produce the information needed for the license application. The actual order of these steps is somewhat arbitrary; the important point to be drawn from the figure is that they must all be completed before Issue 1.8 can be resolved.

Strategy for favorable conditions

Figure 8.3.5.17-2 shows the major steps that the DOE intends to take in resolving Issue 1.8 for each favorable condition (FC) listed in 10 CFR 60.122. The figure, which is an expansion of the general issue-resolution strategy shown in Section 8.1, outlines the licensing strategy and the subsequent steps that will lead to the final resolution of Issue 1.8 for each FC. The steps in the licensing strategy--i.e., the steps up to the collection of site characterization data--were carried out in preparing this section, and have been used in the development of the site characterization program presented in other parts of Section 8.3.

The following detailed explanation of the figure describes all the steps and the reasoning behind them. The explanation is intended to guide the reader's understanding of the detailed discussions that, later in Section 8.3.5.17, explain how the licensing-strategy decisions were made for each FC. To keep the section as concise as possible, those detailed discussions omit many of the general principles that underlie the strategy they follow. The following explanation supplies those principles. The steps in the figure are numbered to aid the reader in following the explanation.

The first step in the licensing strategy for dealing with each FC is to adopt a tentative strategy on whether the license application will show that the FC is present at the Yucca Mountain site (step 1). This decision has been based on the evidence currently available to the DOE. As Section 8.1 explains in detail, the tentative decisions adopted for licensing strategies will be changed if evidence acquired in the future shows them to be technically unsound. For now they are simply a basis for planning site characterization.

If the DOE adopts a strategy for showing that the FC is not present at the site, no further action is planned (step 2). As far as the FC is concerned, Issue 1.8 will have been resolved, and the FC will be assumed in the license application to be not present at the site.

If the DOE adopts a strategy for testing the hypothesis that the FC is present at the site, several steps remain to be carried out before the issue can be resolved. The strategy calls first for an examination of Issue 1.1 to see whether the performance allocation there calls for site characterization data that can be used in determining whether the FC is present. As discussed in the explanation of the strategy diagram for potentially adverse conditions (Figure 8.3.5.17-1), the reason for this step and for two other steps near it in the diagram is the following: a major premise of the licensing strategy for Issue 1.8 is that most of the data needed for resolution are already called for by other issues. Issue 1.1 (total system performance) is the principal issue that calls for data needed in resolving Issue 1.8. It is


DECIDE STRATEGY: FC PRESENT (P) OR NOT PRESENT (NP) 1
P
NP
RESOLUTION: FC IS NOT PRESENT 2
DO THE SITE CHARACTERIZATION DATA CALLED FOR IN ISSUE 1.1 APPEAR ADEQUATE FOR SHOWING PRESENCE OF FC? 3
No
DO THE DATA CALLED FOR IN OTHER ISSUES APPEAR ADEQUATE? 4
No
DEVELOP NEW DATA NEEDS 5
Yes
Yes
COLLECT DATA 6
IS THE INVESTIGATION ADEQUATE FOR DECIDING ON PRESENCE OF FC? 7
No
Yes
IS FC PRESENT AT THE SITE? 8
No
Yes
RESOLUTION: FC IS PRESENT 9

Figure 8.3.5.17-2. Logic diagram for resolving Issue 1.8 for favorable conditions (FCs). The text discussion is keyed to the numbers in this diagram.

particularly important to the strategy for dealing with FCs. The list of FCs in 10 CFR 60.122 includes many conditions that are expected to contribute to the performance of the Yucca Mountain site; these conditions are included in the scenarios that Issue 1.1 has developed for allocating performance to the elements of the site that will contribute to isolating the emplaced waste. This allocation of performance has relied on the technical judgment of both performance assessment and geoscience personnel; this reliance has been important in making sure that the allocations in Issue 1.1 are responsive to the qualitative as well as the quantitative data needs of Issue 1.8.

The next step in Figure 8.3.5.17-2, therefore, is a decision on whether the site characterization data called for in the performance allocation for Issue 1.1 appear adequate for testing the hypothesis that the FC is present (step 3). If these data appear adequate, they are adopted as the licensing strategy for collecting the data that will determine the presence or absence of the FC. If the data in Issue 1.1 do not appear adequate, other issues are examined to see whether they call for the needed data (step 4). If no issue that addresses the FC is found, the strategy calls for a separate development of data needs for testing if the FC is present (step 5). Site characterization can then proceed to collect the needed data (step 6). The steps shown in Figure 8.3.5.17-2 up to the collection of data have been carried out and are reported later in this section. In actual practice, as the detailed descriptions of the individual FCs point out, the data called for by Issue 1.1 have proved sufficient for defining the strategy for dealing with each FC.

After the site characterization program has collected the data called for in the licensing strategy, the DOE examines the investigation that provided the data to decide whether the investigation is adequate for a conclusive decision on the presence or absence of the FC. This decision will be based on expert judgment after a careful review of the site studies (step 7). If the investigation is found to have been inadequate, the DOE will develop a new set of data needs for deciding on the presence or absence of the FC, as the figure shows in a return to an earlier step (5). It should be emphasized that the DOE will not actually wait until after site characterization to examine the adequacy of the investigation. Such examination is a part of planning the investigations, and it will continue through the site characterization period. As shown in Figure 8.3.5.17-2, however, an examination for adequacy must precede the determination of the presence or absence of the FC.

If the investigation is found to have been adequate, the DOE will proceed to decide whether the FC is present or absent at the site (step 8). This decision will be made primarily through expert judgment and peer review, which will, of course, be aided by the quantitative data collected in response to the calls made by the licensing strategy. If the FC is determined in this way not to be present, Issue 1.8 will have been resolved for the FC: the DOE, as shown in the diagram, will conclude that, contrary to the tentative position adopted for the licensing strategy, the FC is not present at the site (step 2). If the determination is that the FC is present, Issue 1.8 will also have been resolved and the license application will present the analyses to show that the FC is present at the site (step 9). These analyses will explicitly take into account the functions of the

FCs in enhancing isolation; they are also expected to use the presence of FCs in contributing to the demonstration of reasonable assurance.

Discussion of the potentially adverse conditions

This section presents individual discussions of the PACs listed in 10 CFR 60.122. For each PAC the discussion identifies the tentative strategy (present or not present) called for in step 1 of Figure 8.3.5.17-1. The potential effects of the PAC and their expected significance on performance are discussed, and the site characterization data needed for addressing the PAC are specified. The general method for identifying the needed data is similar for each PAC; it is explained here to avoid repeating it in each discussion.

As mentioned in the text accompanying the logic diagram for dealing with PACs (Figure 8.3.5.17-1), a preliminary set of scenarios has been developed for Issue 1.1, which covers the overall performance objective on cumulative radionuclide release to the accessible environment. Because the number of different scenarios could be unmanageably large, they have been grouped into scenario classes; the scenarios within a class can be dealt with similarly and require similar data for this evaluation. These classes help to focus the site characterization program on potentially significant processes and events that may affect the ability of the geologic repository to meet the system performance objective. A scenario class (the nominal case) has been developed for undisturbed conditions due to likely expected natural events, processes, and conditions. Other scenario classes have been developed for disturbed conditions, i.e., those due to unlikely yet credible natural events and human activity. The preliminary set of nominal and disturbed scenario classes are discussed in detail in Section 8.3.5.13.

The preliminary set of nominal and disturbed scenario classes focus on the particular events and processes that are considered credible and potentially significant for the Yucca Mountain site. The PACs specified in the siting criteria of 10 CFR 60.122 were taken into consideration in developing the preliminary set; each PAC can be associated with one or more of the scenario classes. Through the resolution strategy for Issue 1.1 performance measures and goals consistent with meeting the overall system performance objective have been selected to evaluate these scenario classes. Parameters and tentative parameter goals needed to guide site characterization and to evaluate these performance measures have also been identified. (Section 8.1 explains the special meanings used in performance allocation for such terms as "performance measure," "goal," and "parameter.") The values chosen for the parameter goals are consistent with the performance-measure goals in the following sense: if the parameter goals are achieved, the performance-measure goals will probably also be achieved. In other words, the calculation of cumulative release to the accessible environment is likely to show compliance with the overall performance objective if the site characterization data provide confidence that the parameter goals have been met.

Because they were set for consistency with the overall performance objective, the goals for the parameters in a particular scenario class are suitable for addressing the testing needed for the PACs associated with that scenario class. The data needs for each scenario class have been derived

from the performance parameters, which address effects on waste isolation; for this reason, they are considered appropriate for guiding the testing needed to determine the significance of the PACs associated with those scenario classes. The application of this method for deriving data needs is discussed for each PAC individually in this section.

This discussion reports a comparison of each PAC with the relevant scenario classes (i.e., the comparison called for in steps 4, 7, 12, and 15 of Figure 8.3.5.17-1). This comparison uses available information and the tentative strategy in examining the nominal and disruptive scenarios to identify the relevant data needs.

Information to determine the performance parameters for these scenario classes will be obtained in the characterization programs. The complete specification of the data needs for each potentially adverse condition, therefore, includes (in addition to the relevant scenario classes, performance parameters, and goals) the SCP sections that describe the characterization programs to obtain the information needed to determine the parameters. The following discussions of the PACs contain tables that summarize this specification.

The postclosure characterization programs are discussed in detail in Section 8.3.1 according to the following topical breakdown: geohydrology, geochemistry, rock characteristics, climate, erosion, dissolution, tectonics, and human interference. These topical areas may be addressed in more than one potentially adverse condition depending on the actual wording found in 10 CFR 60.122. Some readers may be interested in determining which potentially adverse conditions are of interest to particular technical disciplines. To assist such readers, the following is a general guide stating the topical breakdown in terms of the potentially adverse conditions they treat. Geohydrology data are requested by PACs 1 to 8, 11 to 15, and 22 to 24; geochemistry data by PACs 7 to 9 and 24; rock-characteristics data by PACs 4, 5, 7, 8, 11 to 14, 20, and 21; climate data by PACs 5, 6, 22, and 23; erosion data by PAC 16; dissolution data by PAC 10; tectonics data by PACs 3 to 5, 7, 8, 11 to 15, 22, and 23; and human interference data by PACs 2, 5, 9, 17 to 19, and 22.

Potentially adverse condition 1: Potential for flooding of the underground facility, whether resulting from the occupancy and modification of floodplains or from the failure of existing or planned man-made surface water impoundments.

This PAC addresses a condition occurring before closure that could affect postclosure performance (statements of consideration, (NRC, 1981c) 10 CFR Part 60). Flooding of the underground facility during the preclosure period could result in conditions, such as standing pools of water, that could adversely affect the performance of the waste package.

Because of the rugged terrain and meteorological conditions at the Yucca Mountain site, local intense flooding occurs periodically in the normally dry washes draining down from the Yucca Mountain ridge (Section 3.2.1). Preliminary investigations of the 100- and 500-yr floods have determined that the 100-yr flood would not exceed the banks of incised channels of Fortymile Wash

or its major tributaries (Yucca, Drill Hole, and Busted Butte washes). The 500-yr flood, however, could exceed the banks of Busted Butte and Drill Hole washes. The available evidence, therefore, suggests that this PAC may be present. The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to demonstrate that although the condition is present, it will not significantly affect the ability of the geologic repository to meet the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste.

This PAC is expected to be fully addressed by design of the systems that will take into account the probable maximum flood (PMF) (Section 6.1.2.6). This method has been successfully used by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for dam design and by the nuclear power industry for protection of safety-related facilities. The underground entries at the repository site will be protected against the PMF by diverting the upland runoff. Also, finish grade elevations will be set above the PMF levels.

Site characterization data will be collected in support of the design activities that will provide for this protection from preclosure flooding. Those data are also, therefore, the data to be used in the resolution of PAC 1. They are developed and presented in Section 8.3.2.5, which also lists the site characterization activities for collecting the data. The needed information consists of the surface-hydrology data that will permit descriptions of the 5-, 25-, 50-, 100-, and 500-yr floods, the PMF, and the corresponding areas of inundation. As explained in Section 8.3.2.5, these data are stream flow rates, quantities, durations for surface water systems at the site, and descriptions of channel morphology.

Because PAC 1 will be addressed by the design of the repository system, its resolution, unlike that of most other PACs, does not depend on data called for by Issue 1.1. The strategy for resolving Issue 1.1 does not call for explicit modeling of preclosure flooding of the underground repository. Neither the nominal-case scenario nor the disturbed-performance scenario classes include such flooding. If it is determined later that such a scenario class should be developed, the information needed to evaluate it could be found in the data needs of the scenario classes that address increased moisture flux through the repository (scenario class C-1) and water-table rise (scenario class C-2). These two scenario classes are discussed in Section 8.3.5.13.

Potentially adverse condition 2: Potential for foreseeable human activity to adversely affect the ground-water flow system, such as ground-water withdrawal, extensive irrigation, subsurface injection of fluids, underground pumped storage, military activity or construction of large scale surface water impoundments.

This PAC is concerned with future human activities that could alter the ground-water flow system to adversely affect the waste-isolation capabilities of a site. Isolation could be adversely affected, for example, by decreasing the ground-water travel time to the accessible environment, thereby increasing the rate of transport to the accessible environment of radionuclides dissolved in the ground water. The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to

test the hypothesis that this condition is not present at the Yucca Mountain site.

Assessing the potential for human activity at a site presents special problems because of the dependence upon future, unpredictable activities of humans (Section 8.3.1.9). Quantitative estimates of the absolute probability of human activities (e.g., ground-water withdrawal) in the distant future may not be feasible. The treatment of such events and processes will, however, follow an approach similar to that for the natural processes and events: the effects of potentially adverse human activities will be evaluated, appropriate scenario classes will be developed, and relative probabilities and consequence for these scenarios will be estimated. The data needed for resolving PAC 2 and other conditions produced by human activity can be found among the scenario classes of Section 8.3.5.13.

In the evaluation of future human activities that could affect post-closure performance (in the overall system performance assessment), the following were identified as credible potential future activities at the Yucca Mountain site: exploratory drilling, extensive irrigation near the controlled area, the construction of large-scale surface water impoundments near the controlled area, extensive surface or subsurface mining near the controlled area, and extensive ground-water withdrawal near the controlled area.

Preliminary disturbed-performance scenario classes have been developed for these activities. In the development of the scenario classes, it was concluded that significant adverse effects in the ground-water flow system due to exploratory drilling are not sufficiently credible to warrant consideration. For the other credible human activities, it was concluded that potentially significant effects on the ground-water flow system could include an increase in percolation flux through the unsaturated zone, an increase in the ground-water-table altitude, and an increase in head gradients.

No scenario classes have been developed explicitly for subsurface injection of fluids and underground pumped storage. Subsurface injection of fluids and underground pumped storage are not considered to be credible events at the Yucca Mountain site. The presence of ground-water resources at the site preclude subsurface injection of fluids, and the geohydrologic conditions at Yucca Mountain are not conducive to underground pumped storage. The DOE has judged that additional site data are not needed to demonstrate that these human activities are not likely to occur and are, therefore, not likely to adversely affect repository performance.

No scenario classes have been developed to explicitly address military activities. The strain generated from large-scale weapons testing may have an effect on the hydrologic conditions at the site; however, these effects are expected to be less significant than those from natural seismic activity (Section 1.4). The seismic effects of weapons testing are considered to be bounded by the scenario classes for tectonic disturbances (see, for example, the discussions of PACs 3, 4, and 11).

Table 8.3.5.17-3 lists the scenario classes associated with this PAC that are being investigated in the system performance assessments. The

Table 8.3.5.17-3. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 2[a] (page 1 of 5)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Extensive irrigation is conducted near the C-area[c]	Expected magnitude of flux change due to extensive irrigation near C-area over next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 Area irrigated, net water consumption, and crop and evapotranspiration rates	8.3.1.9.3.2.2(D), 8.3.1.9.3.2
			Infiltration rates	8.3.1.2.2.1.2
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8 or 8.3.1.2.2.9
	Expected magnitude of change in head gradients of the saturated zone in C-area due to extensive irrigation near C-area over next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 Area irrigated, net water consumption, and crop and evapotranspiration rates	8.3.1.9.3.2.2(D), 8.3.1.9.3.2
			Infiltration rates	8.3.1.2.2.1.2
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8 or 8.3.1.2.2.9
			Saturated-zone flow models	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3

Table 8.3.5.17-3. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 2[a] (page 2 of 5)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Extensive irrigation is conducted near the C-area (continued)	Expected magnitude of change in level of water table under C-area due to extensive irrigation near C-area over next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 Area irrigated, net water consumption, and crop and evapotranspiration rates	8.3.1.9.3.2.2(D), 8.3.1.9.3.2
			Infiltration rates	8.3.1.2.2.1.2
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8 or 8.3.1.2.2.9
			Saturated-zone flow models	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
Extensive groundwater withdrawal occurs near C-area	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level under C-area due to extensive groundwater withdrawal near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 Locations, hydrostratigraphic sources, and rates of withdrawal	8.3.1.9.2.2, 8.3.1.16.2.1
			Saturated-zone flow models	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
	Expected magnitude of changes in gradient of water table under C-area due to groundwater withdrawal near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 Locations, hydrostratigraphic sources, and rates of withdrawal	8.3.1.9.2.2, 8.3.1.16.2.1

Table 8.3.5.17-3. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 2[a] (page 3 of 5)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Extensive groundwater withdrawal occurs near C-area (continued)			Saturated-zone flow models	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
Extensive surface or subsurface mining occurs near C-area	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level under C-area due to mine water use or mine dewatering near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 (No change expected)	
			Rates and locations of dewatering	8.3.1.9.3.2.2
			Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.3.3.3
	Expected magnitude of change in gradient of water table under C-area due to extensive surface or subsurface mining near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 (No change expected)	8.3.1.9.3.2.2
			Rates and locations of dewatering	8.3.1.9.3.2.2
			Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.3.3.3
Large scale surface-water impoundments are constructed near the C-area	Expected magnitude of flux change due to presence of an artificial lake near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 (No change expected)	
			Area, depth, flow input, rate of impoundment	8.3.1.9.3.2.2(D), 8.3.1.9.3.2

Table 8.3.5.17-3. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 2[a] (page 4 of 5)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Large scale surface-water impoundments are constructed near the C-area (continued)			Infiltration/ percolation rates	8.3.1.2.2.1.2
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8 or 8.3.1.2.2.9
	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level under C-area due to placement of artificial lake near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 (No change expected)	8.3.1.9.3.2.2(D), 8.3.1.9.3.2.2
			Area, depth, flow input, rate of impoundment	8.3.1.9.3.2
			Infiltration/ percolation rates	8.3.1.2.2.1.2
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8 or 8.3.1.2.2.9
			Saturated-zone flow models	8.3.1.2.3.3.3
	Expected magnitude of changes in head gradients of the saturated zone in C-area due to presence of an artificial lake near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 (No change expected)	8.3.1.9.3.2.2(D), 8.3.1.9.3.2.2
			Area, depth, flow input, rate of impoundment	8.3.1.9.3.2
			Infiltration/ percolation rates	8.3.1.2.2.1.2

Table 8.3.5.17-3. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 2[a] (page 5 of 5)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Large scale surface-water impoundments are constructed near the C-area (continued)			Unsaturated-zone flow model Saturated-zone flow models	8.3.1.2.2.8 or 8.3.1.2.2.9 8.3.1.2.3.3.3

[a]Information on scenario classes, performance parameters, and tentative parameter goals is from Section 8.3.5.13.

[b]Study or activity directly addresses scenario.

[c]C-area = the controlled area (i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area).

performance parameters associated with these scenario classes are also shown. The site characterization data to be collected to address this PAC are listed by parameter category or set in Table 8.3.5.17-3. Table 8.3.5.17-3 also references the section that discusses the data to be collected and the associated studies and activities.

Potentially adverse condition 3: Potential for natural phenomena such as landslides, subsidence, or volcanic activity of such magnitude that large-scale surface water impoundments could be created that could change the regional ground-water flow system and thereby adversely affect the performance of the geologic repository.

This PAC is concerned with naturally formed surface-water impoundments that could adversely affect postclosure performance at a site. For example, if surface-water impoundments were to form, an increase in percolation through the unsaturated zone, and subsequently an increase in radionuclide transport rate, could result.

There is no substantial evidence of large-scale, rapid episodes of mass wasting, such as rock slides, debris avalanches, and earth flows, at the site (Section 1.1.3); thus, no disruptive scenario class was developed to explicitly address this process. Volcanic and tectonic processes, on the other hand, are believed to have the potential to alter the topography in such a way that surface-water impoundments could form over the next 10,000 yr. The available information, however, indicates that these events are not likely to adversely affect the performance of the geologic repository. Therefore, the strategy for resolution of this PAC is to test the hypothesis that this condition is not present at the Yucca Mountain site.

Additional information is required for testing the presence or absence of this PAC. Information to be obtained in the site characterization program with regard to the effect of natural surface-water impoundments is defined by disturbed-performance scenario classes. The relevant scenario classes defined in Section 8.3.5.13 are identified in Table 8.3.5.17-4, which also gives the associated parameters and goals. The site characterization data to be collected to address this PAC are listed by parameter category or set in Table 8.3.5.17-4. Table 8.3.5.17-4 also references the section that discusses the data to be collected and the associated studies and activities.

Potentially adverse condition 4: Structural deformation, such as uplift, subsidence, folding or faulting, that may adversely affect the regional ground-water flow system.

This PAC is concerned with future structural deformation and tectonic activity that could affect the regional ground-water flow system in such a way that a site's ability to isolate waste would be impaired. The flow system could, for example, be disrupted if tectonic processes could increase the percolation flux through the repository horizon, increase the altitude of the ground-water table, change the head gradients in the saturated zone, or create surficial discharge points within the boundaries of the accessible environment.

Table 8.3.5.17-4. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 3[a] (page 1 of 2)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Offset on fault creates surface impoundments, alters drainage, creates perched aquifers, or changes dip of tuff beds	Probability of offset >2 m on a fault in the C-area[c] in 10,000 yr	$<10^{-1}$	8.3.1.8 Vertical slip rate and recurrence intervals	8.3.1.8.3.1.5(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2, 8.3.1.17.4.4.3
	Probability of changing dip by >2° in 10,000 yr by faulting	$<10^{-4}$	8.3.1.8 Rates of vertical slip and tilting	8.3.1.17.4.6.2
	Effect of faulting on flux	Faulting will not affect flux because of low slip rates	8.3.1.8 Locations of faults	8.3.1.8.3.1.4, 8.3.1.17.4.6, 8.3.1.17.4.7, 8.3.1.17.4.12
			Runoff estimates	8.3.1.5.2.2.1
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9

Table 8.3.5.17-4. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 3[a] (page 2 of 2)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Volcanic eruption causes flows or other changes in topography that result in impoundment or diversion of drainage	Annual probability of volcanic events within C-area	$<10^{-5}$/yr	8.3.1.8 Probability of volcanic event	8.3.1.8.3.1.2(D), 8.3.1.8.1.1.4, 8.3.1.8.3.1.1
	Effects of volcanic event on topography and flow rates	Topographic changes are not great enough to affect flux	8.3.1.8 Topographic effects of eruptions	8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.1.8.1.2.2

[a]Information on scenario classes, performance parameters, and tentative parameter goals is from Section 8.3.5.13.

[b]Study or activity directly addresses scenario.

[c]C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.

Quaternary rupture on 32 faults within an 1,100-km^2 area surrounding the site has been documented, with evidence of movement on 5 of the faults within the past 270,000 yr (Section 1.3.2). Also, the region is currently undergoing active lateral crustal extension. Local patterns of uplift, tilting, and subsidence near Yucca Mountain are typical of shallow crustal response to regional extension and attendant volcanic activity in the Great Basin (Section 1.3.2.4).

According to the available information, these conditions are not likely to affect significantly the ability of the geologic repository to meet the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste. The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to test the hypothesis that this condition is not present at the Yucca Mountain site.

Additional information is required for evaluating the presence or absence of this PAC. Faulting, folding, uplift, or subsidence that could affect the ground-water flow system in such a way as to significantly increase the probability of cumulative releases to the accessible environment was found unlikely yet credible during the development of the scenario classes for disturbed performance of the geologic repository (see Section 8.3.5.13). The nominal-case scenario includes these tectonic processes only at their expected rates, which would not produce significant effects. Therefore, the information needed to investigate such effects is to be obtained in terms of scenario classes for unlikely natural events. Table 8.3.5.17-5 lists the scenario classes similar to those that will be considered in the overall system performance assessment, and the performance parameters that will be addressed. To address this PAC explicitly, the tectonic scenario classes listed in Table 8.3.5.17-5 will be considered on a broader, regional scale, rather than the controlled-area scale that is addressed in the total system performance assessment. Table 8.3.5.17-5 also lists the site characterization data to be collected to address this PAC and the associated studies or activities in the SCP. These data will be used to evaluate the effects of tectonic processes on the regional flow regime (such as water-table rises and flow-path changes). If these processes appear to produce significant changes in the larger-scale flow system, the effects on local flow-system behavior will be evaluated along with their effects on meeting the site-related parameter goals listed in the table. As explained in the introduction to the PAC discussions, these goals are those associated with the scenario classes developed for the total-system performance assessments (Section 8.3.5.13).

Potentially adverse condition 5: Potential for changes in hydrologic conditions that would affect the migration of radionuclides to the accessible environment, such as changes in hydraulic gradient, average interstitial velocity, storage coefficient, hydraulic conductivity, natural recharge, potentiometric levels, and discharge points.

This PAC is concerned with future changes in hydrologic conditions that could adversely affect the isolation capabilities of the site. Changes in

Table 8.3.5.17-5. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 4[a] (page 1 of 4)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Episodic offset on faults causes local changes in rock hydrologic properties thereby destroying existing barriers to flow or creating new conduits for drainage	Annual probability of faulting events on Quaternary faults within 0.5 km of C-area[c] boundary	$<10^{-4}$ per year	8.3.1.8 Locations, slip rates and recurrence intervals for Quaternary faults at the site and in the region	8.3.1.8.3.3.2(D), 8.3.1.17.4.3, 8.3.1.17.4.4, 8.3.1.17.4.5, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2, 8.3.1.17.4.7, 8.3.1.17.4.2
	Effects of fault motion on local permeabilities and effective porosities	Change in fracture permeability is less than a factor of 2; fracture porosity decreases	8.3.1.8 Evidence of episodic rock-property changes along faults	8.3.1.4.2.2.3, 8.3.1.4.2.2.4, 8.3.1.4.2.2.5, 8.3.1.2.1.4, 8.3.1.2.3.1, 8.3.1.2.3.3
Offset on fault creates surface impoundments, alters drainage, creates perched aquifers, or changes dip of tuff beds	Probability of offset >2 m on a fault in the C-area in 10,000 yr	$<10^{-1}$	8.3.1.8 Offsets, slip rates, and recurrence intervals for Quaternary faults at the site and in the region	8.3.1.8.3.1.5(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2, 8.3.1.17.4.12

Table 8.3.5.17-5. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 4[a] (page 2 of 4)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Offset on fault creates surface impoundments, alters drainage, creates perched aquifers, or changes dip of tuff beds (continued)	Probability of changing dip by >2° in 10,000 yr by faulting	$<10^{-4}$ per 10,000 yr	8.3.1.8 Rates of vertical slip and tilting at the site and in the region	8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2, 8.3.1.17.4.12
	Effect of faulting on flux in the C-area	Faulting will not affect flux because of low slip rate	8.3.1.8 Locations of faults in the C-area and in the region	8.3.1.8.3.1.4, 8.3.1.17.4.6, 8.3.1.17.4.7, 8.3.1.17.4.12
			Runoff estimates	8.3.1.5.2.2.1
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
			Saturated-zone flow models	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3

Table 8.3.5.17-5. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 4[a] (page 3 of 4)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Offset on faults juxtaposes transmissive and nontransmissive units, resulting in the creation of a perched aquifer, a rise in the water table, or a change in hydraulic gradients	Probability of total offsets >2.0 m in 10,000 yr on faults within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-1}$	8.3.1.8 Offsets, slip rates, and recurrence intervals for Quaternary faults at the site and in the region	8.3.1.8.3.1.5(D), 8.3.1.8.3.2.6(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2, 8.3.1.17.4.12
Offset on faults juxtaposes transmissive and nontransmissive units, resulting in the creation of a perched aquifer, a rise in the water table, or a change in hydraulic gradients (continued)	Effects of fault offsets on water-table levels	Water table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	8.3.1.8 Locations of faults in C-area and in region Unsaturated-zone flow model Saturated-zone flow models	8.3.1.8.3.1.4, 8.3.1.17.4.6, 8.3.1.17.4.7, 8.3.1.17.4.12 8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9 8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
	Effects of fault offsets on hydraulic gradients	Show gradients change less than a factor of 4	8.3.1.8 Locations of faults in C-area and in region Saturated-zone flow models	8.3.1.8.3.1.4, 8.3.1.17.4.6, 8.3.1.17.4.7, 8.3.1.17.4.12 8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3

Table 8.3.5.17-5. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 4[a] (page 4 of 4)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Episodic changes in strain in the rock mass due to faulting cause changes in water-table level	Probability that strain-induced changes increase water-table level to >850 m mean sea level	$<10^{-5}$/yr	8.3.1.8 Magnitudes and rates of strain changes in region, relation of hydraulic properties to strain	8.3.1.8.3.2.3(D), 8.3.1.17.4.8.1, 8.3.1.17.4.8.4, 8.3.1.17.4.12.1, 8.3.1.8.3.3.3, 8.3.1.8.1.4.4
			Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.8.3.3.3
Tectonic folding changes dip of tuff beds in C-area, thereby changing flux	Probability of changing dip by >2° in 10,000 yr by folding	$<10^{-4}$ per 10,000 yr	8.3.1.8 Rates of folding in region	8.3.1.8.3.1.7(D), 8.3.1.4.2.2.1, 8.3.1.4.2.2.4, 8.3.1.4.3.2, 8.3.1.8.2.1.6
Uplift or subsidence changes drainage, thereby changing flux	Probability of exceeding 30-m elevation change in 10,000 yr	$<10^{-4}$ per 10,000 yr	8.3.1.8 Rates of uplift and subsidence in region	8.3.1.8.3.1.7(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.6, 8.3.1.17.4.9.2, 8.3.1.17.4.10.3

[a]Information on scenario classes, performance parameters, and tentative parameters is from Section 8.3.5.13.

[b]Study or activity directly addresses scenario.

[c]C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.

hydrologic conditions could, for example, reduce the ground-water travel time, thereby increasing the rate of radionuclide transport to the accessible environment.

As discussed in Sections 8.3.5.12 and 8.3.5.13, hydrologic properties at the Yucca Mountain site could be altered by a number of mechanisms, including tectonic processes and events, climatic changes, and human activities. Hydrologic changes that could affect the migration of radionuclides to the accessible environment include increases in percolation flux through the repository horizon, increases in the altitude of the ground-water table, alteration of rock-mass hydrologic properties, the creation of surficial discharge points within the boundaries of the accessible environment, and changes in head gradients in the saturated zone. According to current information, changes of sufficient magnitude to significantly affect the migration of radionuclides are not likely. Therefore, the strategy for resolution of this PAC is to demonstrate that this condition is not present at the Yucca Mountain site.

The effects of tectonic processes, climate changes, and human activities on the ground-water flow system were evaluated with regard to each of the mechanisms previously specified in the development of the scenario classes. The potential for the changes in hydrologic conditions that are likely to occur are considered in the nominal-case scenario in Section 8.3.5.13. The unlikely, disruptive changes are considered in the disturbed-performance scenario classes, from which the information needs to address this PAC follow. Table 8.3.5.17-6 lists the scenario classes from which a potentially significant effect on the ground-water flow system may result and gives the performance parameters associated with these scenario classes. The site characterization data to be collected to address this PAC are listed by parameter category or set in Table 8.3.5.17-6. Table 8.3.5.17-6 also references the section that discusses the data to be collected and the associated studies and activities.

Potentially adverse condition 6: Potential for changes in hydrologic conditions resulting from reasonably forseeable climatic changes.

This PAC is concerned with future foreseeable climatic conditions that could adversely affect the isolation capabilities of a site by disrupting the hydrologic conditions at the site. Changes in hydrologic conditions could result in a decrease in the ground-water travel time from the repository horizon to the boundary of the accessible environment, thereby possibly increasing radionuclide transport to the accessible environment.

On the basis of current information, climatic changes are likely at the Yucca Mountain site during the next 10,000 yr. Such changes are expected to alter hydrologic conditions to some degree. However, changes sufficient to affect significantly the ability of the geologic repository to meet the performance objectives relating to waste isolation are not likely. That is, changes in the percolation flux, the water-table level in the vicinity of the controlled area, the head gradient in the saturated zone, or the discharge conditions due to reasonably forseeable climatic changes are not likely to significantly affect the performance of the repository.

Table 8.3.5.17-6. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 5[a] (page 1 of 12)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Climatic change causes increase in infiltration over C-area[c]	Expected magnitude of flux change due to climatic changes over next 10,000 yr	Expected flux change will be <0.5 mm/yr	8.3.1.5.2 Future-climate model	8.3.1.5.2.2.2(D), 8.3.1.5.1.6
			Infiltration characteristics	8.3.1.2.2.1
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
Climatic change causes an increase in level of water table	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level due to climatic changes over the next 10,000 yr	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level will not bring water table to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	8.3.1.5.2 Future-climate model	8.3.1.5.2.2.3(D), 8.3.1.5.1.6
			Saturated-zone recharge/flow models	8.3.1.2.3.3
			Paleoclimate synthesis	8.3.1.5.1.5
			Quaternary discharge areas	8.3.1.5.2.1.3
			Analog recharge data	8.3.1.5.2.1.4
			Distribution, origin, and age of vein deposits	8.3.1.5.2.1.5
Climatic change causes appearance of surficial discharge points within C-area	Expected locations of surficial discharge points within C-area over the next 10,000 yr	No surficial discharge points could appear within C-area, given	8.3.1.5.2 Future-climate model	8.3.1.5.2.2.3(D), 8.3.1.5.1.6
			Saturated-zone recharge/flow	8.3.1.2.3.3

Table 8.3.5.17-6. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 5[a] (page 2 of 12)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Climatic change causes appearance of surficial discharge points within C-area (continued)		a water-table rise of less than 160 m	models	
			Paleoclimate synthesis	8.3.1.5.1.5
			Quaternary discharge areas	8.3.1.5.2.1.3
			Analog recharge data	8.3.1.5.2.1.4
			Distribution, origin, and age of vein deposits	8.3.1.5.2.1.5
Climatic change causes an increase in the gradient of the water table within the C-area	Expected magnitude of change in water-table gradient due to climatic change over the next 10,000 yr	Change will be less than 4 times current value	8.3.1.5.2	
			Future-climate model	8.3.1.5.2.2.3(D), 8.3.1.5.1.6
			Saturated-zone recharge/flow models	8.3.1.2.3.3
			Paleoclimate synthesis	8.3.1.5.1.5
			Quaternary discharge areas	8.3.1.5.2.1.3
			Analog recharge data	8.3.1.5.2.1.4
			Distribution, origin, and age of vein deposits	8.3.1.5.2.1.5

Table 8.3.5.17-6. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 5[a] (page 3 of 12)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Extensive irrigation is conducted near the C-area	Expected magnitude of flux change due to extensive irrigation near C-area over next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 Net water consumption rates	8.3.1.9.3.2.2
			Cropland evapotranspiration rates	
			Infiltration characteristics	8.3.1.2.2.1.2
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
	Expected magnitude of change in level of water table under C-area due to extensive irrigation near C-area over next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 Net water consumption rates, cropland evapotranspirtation	8.3.1.9.3.2.2
			Infiltration characteristics	8.3.1.2.2.1.2
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
			Saturated-zone flow models	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
	Expected magnitude of change in head gradients of saturated zone in C-area due to extensive irrigation near C-area over next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 Net water consumption rates, cropland evapotranspiration	8.3.1.9.3.2.2
			Infiltration characteristics	8.3.1.2.2.1.2

Table 8.3.5.17-6. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 5[a] (page 4 of 12)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Extensive irrigation is conducted near the C-area (continued)			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
			Saturated-zone flow models	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
Large scale surface-water impoundments are constructed near the C-area	Expected magnitude of flux change due to presence of an artificial lake near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3	
			Impoundment characteristics	8.3.1.9.3.2.2
			Infiltration characteristics	8.3.1.2.2.1.2
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level under C-area due to placement of artificial lake near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3	
			Impoundment characteristics	8.3.1.9.3.2.2
			Infiltration characteristics	8.3.1.2.2.1.2
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
			Saturated-zone flow models	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
	Expected magnitude of changes in head gradients of saturated zone in C-area due to presence of an artificial lake near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3	
			Impoundment characteristics	8.3.1.9.3.2.2
			Infiltration characteristics	8.3.1.2.2.1.2
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
			Saturated-zone flow models	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3

Table 8.3.5.17-6. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 5[a] (page 5 of 12)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Extensive surface or subsurface mining occurs near C-area	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level under C-area due to mine water use or mine dewatering near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 Locations of mining and dewatering rates Saturated-zone flow model	 8.3.1.9.3.2.2 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
	Expected magnitude of changes in gradient of water table under C-area due to extensive surface or subsurface mining near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 Locations of mining and dewatering rates Saturated-zone flow model	 8.3.1.9.3.2.2 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
Extensive ground-water withdrawal occurs near C-area	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level due to extensive ground-water withdrawal near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 Locations and rates of expected withdrawals Saturated-zone flow model	 8.3.1.9.3.2.1(D) 8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
	Expected magnitude of changes in gradient of water-table under C-area due to ground-water withdrawal near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9.3 Locations and rates of expected withdrawals Saturated-zone flow model	 8.3.1.9.3.2.1(D) 8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3

Table 8.3.5.17-6. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 5[a] (page 6 of 12)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Volcanic eruption causes flows or other changes in topography that result in impoundment or diversion of drainage	Annual probability of volcanic events within C-area	$<10^{-5}$/yr	8.3.1.8 Probability of volcanic event	8.3.1.8.3.1.2(D), 8.3.1.8.1.1.4, 8.3.1.8.3.1.1
	Effects of a volcanic event on topography and flow rates	Topographic changes are not great enough to affect flux	8.3.1.8 Topographic effects of eruption	8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.1.8.1.2.2
Igneous intrusion causes barrier to flow or thermal effects that alter water-table level	Annual probability of igneous intrusion within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-5}$/yr	8.3.1.8 Probability of igneous intrusion	8.3.1.8.3.1.2(D), 8.3.1.8.1.1.4, 8.3.1.8.3.1.1
	Barrier-to-flow effects of igneous intrusion on water-table levels	Water-table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	8.3.1.8 Locations and geometry of possible intrusions at site	8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.1.17.4.12.1
			Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
	Thermal effects of igneous intrusions on water-table levels	Water-table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	8.3.1.8 Locations and geometry of possible intrusions at site	8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.1.17.4.12.1

Table 8.3.5.17-6. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 5[a] (page 7 of 12)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Igneous intrusion causes barrier to flow or thermal effects that alter water-table level (continued)			Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
			Thermal effects near intrusion	8.3.1.2.3.3.3
	Thermal effects of igneous intrusions on hydraulic gradients	Gradient change less than a factor of 4	8.3.1.8	
			Thermal effects near intrusion	8.3.1.2.3.3.3
Igneous intrusions, such as a sill, result in a change in flux	Annual probability of igneous intrusion in in the C-area	$<10^{-5}$/yr	8.3.1.8	
			Probability of igneous intrusion	8.3.1.8.3.1.2(D), 8.3.1.8.1.1.4, 8.3.1.8.3.1.1
	Effects of an igneous intrusion on flux	Igneous intrusion will not affect flux because of depth, location, and extent of intrusion	8.3.1.8	
			Locations and geometry of possible intrusions at site	8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.1.17.4.12.1
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
			Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.3.3

Table 8.3.5.17-6. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 5[a] (page 8 of 12)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Igneous intrusion causes changes in rock hydrologic properties	Annual probability of igneous intrusions within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-5}$/yr	8.3.1.8 Probability of igneous intrusion	8.3.1.8.3.3.1(D), 8.3.1.8.1.1.4, 8.3.1.8.3.1.1
	Effects of igneous intrusions on local permeabilities and effective porosities	No significant changes in rock hydrologic properties	8.3.1.8 Locations and geometry of possible intrusions	8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.1.17.4.12.1
			Effects of intrusions on hydraulic properties	8.3.1.8.3.3.1
Offset on fault creates impoundments, alters drainage, creates perched aquifers, or changes dip of tuff beds	Probability of offset >2 m on a fault in the C-area in 10,000 yr	$<10^{-1}$	8.3.1.8 Vertical slip recurrence intervals	8.3.1.8.3.1.5(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2
	Probability of changing dip by >2° in 10,000 yr by faulting	$<10^{-4}$	8.3.1.8 Rates of vertical slip and tilting	8.3.1.17.4.6.2
	Effects of faulting on flux	Faulting will not affect flux because of low slip rate	8.3.1.8 Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.8.3.1.4, 8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9

Table 8.3.5.17-6. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 5[a] (page 9 of 12)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Offset on faults juxtaposes transmissive and nontransmissive units, resulting in either the creation of a perched aquifer or a rise in the water table (or a change in hydraulic gradients)	Probability of total offsets >2.0 m in 10,000 yr on faults within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-1}$	8.3.1.8 Slip rates and recurrence intervals	8.3.1.8.3.2.6(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2
	Effects of fault offsets on water-table levels and hydraulic gradients	Water table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr Gradients change less than a factor of 4	8.3.1.8 Fault location and geometry Unsaturated-zone flow model Saturated-zone flow model Quaternary water levels	8.3.1.8.3.2.5, 8.3.1.17.3.1 8.3.1.2.2.6, 8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9 8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3 8.3.1.5.2.1.5
Episodic offset on faults causes local changes in rock hydrologic properties, thereby destroying existing barriers to flow, or creating new conduits for drainage	Annual probability of faulting events on Quaternary faults within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-4}$/yr	8.3.1.8 Slip rates and recurrence intervals	8.3.1.8.3.3.2(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2

Table 8.3.5.17-6. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 5[a] (page 10 of 12)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Episodic offset on faults causes local changes in rock hydrologic properties, thereby destroying existing barriers to flow, or creating new conduits for drainage (continued)	Effects of fault motion on local permeabilities and effective porosities	Change in fracture permeability is less than a factor of 2; fracture porosity increases	8.3.1.8 Evidence of episodic rock-property changes along faults	8.3.1.4.2.2.3, 8.3.1.4.2.2.4, 8.3.1.4.2.2.5
Folding, uplift, or subsidence lowers repository with respect to water table	Probability that repository will be lowered relative to water table by 100 m through action of folding, uplift, or subsidence in 10,000 yr	$<10^{-4}$	8.3.1.8 Rates of subsidence Rates of folding	8.3.1.8.3.1.6, 8.3.1.17.4.9.2, 8.3.1.17.4.10.3 8.3.1.4.2.2.1, 8.3.1.4.2.2.4, 8.3.1.4.3.2, 8.3.1.8.2.1.6
Uplift or subsidence changes drainage, thereby changing flux	Probability of exceeding 30-m elevation change in 10,000 yr	$<10^{-4}$	8.3.1.8 Rates of uplift and subsidence	8.3.1.8.3.1.7(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.6, 8.3.1.17.4.9.2, 8.3.1.17.4.10.3

Table 8.3.5.17-6. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 5[a] (page 11 of 12)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Tectonic folding changes dip of tuff beds in C-area, thereby changing flux	Probability of changing dip by >2° in 10,000 yr by folding	$<10^{-4}$	8.3.1.8 Rates of folding	8.3.1.8.3.1.7(D), 8.3.1.4.2.2.1, 8.3.1.4.2.2.4, 8.3.1.4.3.2, 8.3.1.8.2.1.6
Changes in stress or strain in C-area resulting from episodic faulting, folding, or uplift cause changes in the hydrologic properties of the rock mass	Effects of changes of stress or strain on hydrologic properties of the rock mass	Changes in conductivity and porosity of rock mass are less than a factor of 2	8.3.1.8 In situ stress field Magnitude of stress change Stress-strain relationships Relation of hydraulic properties to strain	8.3.1.8.3.3.3(D), 8.3.1.17.4.8.1 8.3.1.17.4.8.4 8.3.1.4.2.1.3 8.3.1.8.3.3.3
Episodic changes in strain in the rock mass due to faulting cause changes in water-table level	Probability that strain-induced changes increase potentiometric level to greater than 850 m mean sea level	$<10^{-8}$/yr	8.3.1.8 In situ stress field Magnitude of stress change Stress-strain relationships	8.3.1.8.3.3.3(D), 8.3.1.17.4.8.1 8.3.1.17.4.8.4 8.3.1.4.2.1.3

Table 8.3.5.17-6. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 5[a] (page 12 of 12)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Episodic changes in strain in the rock mass due to faulting cause changes in water-table level (continued)			Relation of hydraulic properties to strain	8.3.1.8.3.3, 8.3.1.17.4.12.1
			Rate of stress change	8.3.1.8.3.2.3(D)
			Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3

[a]Information on scenario classes, performance parameters, and tentative goals is from Section 8.3.5.13.

[b]Study or activity directly addresses scenario.

[c]C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.

If the wording of this PAC included an evaluation of the significance of the effect on isolation the strategy for the PAC resolution would be to test the hypothesis that this condition is not present; however, since the PAC, as stated, refers only to the potential for climate-induced hydrologic changes, the strategy for resolution is to demonstrate that although the condition is present, it will not significantly affect the ability of the geologic repository to meet the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste.

The changes in hydrologic conditions that are likely to result from climatic changes are included in the nominal scenario class. In addition, disruptive scenario classes for climatic changes that will be investigated for the resolution of Issue 1.1 are summarized in Table 8.3.5.17-7. The parameters needed to evaluate these disruptive scenarios will be used to evaluate this condition. The goals for these parameters are also shown in this table. The site characterization data to be collected to address this PAC are listed by parameter category or set in Table 8.3.5.17-7. This table also references the section that discusses the data to be collected and the associated studies and activities.

Potentially adverse condition 7: Ground-water conditions in the host rock, including chemical composition, high ionic strength, or ranges of Eh-pH, that could increase the solubility or chemical reactivity of the engineered barrier system.

This PAC is concerned with ground-water conditions that could adversely affect the performance of the engineered barrier system (EBS). The EBS consists of the waste form, the waste container, and an air gap separating the waste container from the borehole wall. Ground-water conditions in a host rock could have an effect on the degradation rate of the waste packages (the waste form and the waste containers) and thus on radionuclide release rates from the EBS. This release rate is directly related to the source term to be used in determining releases to the accessible environment.

The corrosion rate of the metallic barriers and the release rates from the waste form are affected by the pH and oxidation-reduction conditions as well as composition of the fluids contacting the waste package. Site data to be collected to address this PAC include the major ion composition of the unsaturated-zone ground waters and the thermal stability of the minerals in the host rock. These data will be used to develop a ground-water model that will be used to show that near-field geochemical processes will not adversely affect EBS performance. During characterization, the ground-water chemistry of the unsaturated zone will be analyzed to ensure that the chemistry falls within the range considered in the testing programs supporting EBS design. The geochemical modeling to reliably predict the emplacement environment will consider the interactions of the host rock and ground waters under expected conditions. The EBS design or material selection may have to be modified if adverse effects are indicated. In addition, ground water is not expected to come into contact with, and thus will not affect, the waste container during the 300-yr containment period. The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to test the hypothesis that this condition is not present at the Yucca Mountain site.

Table 8.3.5.17-7. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 6[a] (page 1 of 3)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Climatic change causes increase in infiltration over C-area[c]	Expected magnitude of flux change due to climatic changes over next 10,000 yr	Expected flux change will be <0.5 mm/yr	8.3.1.5.2 Future-climate model	8.3.1.5.2.2.2(D) 8.3.1.5.1.6
			Infiltration characteristics	8.3.1.2.2.1.2
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
Climatic change causes an increase in level of water table	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level due to climatic changes over the next 10,000 yr	Water table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	8.3.1.5.2 Future-climate model	8.3.1.5.2.2.3(D) 8.3.1.5.1.6
			Saturated-zone recharge/flow models	8.3.1.2.3.3
			Paleoclimate synthesis	8.3.1.5.1.5
			Quaternary discharge areas	8.3.1.5.2.1.3
			Analog recharge data	8.3.1.5.2.1.4
			Distribution, origin, and age of vein deposits	8.3.1.5.2.1.5

Table 8.3.5.17-7. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 6[a] (page 2 of 3)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Climatic change causes appearance of surficial discharge points within C-area	Expected locations of surficial discharge points within C-area over the next 10,000 yr	No surficial discharge points could appear within C-area, given a water-table rise of less than 160 m	8.3.1.5.2	8.3.1.5.2.2.3(D)
			Future-climate model	8.3.1.5.1.6
			Saturated-zone recharge/flow models	8.3.1.2.3.3
			Paleoclimate synthesis	8.3.1.5.1.5
			Quaternary discharge areas	8.3.1.5.2.1.3
			Analog recharge data	8.3.1.5.2.1.4
			Distribution, origin, and age of vein deposits	8.3.1.5.2.1.5
Climatic change causes an increase in the gradient of the water-table within the C-area	Expected magnitude of change in water-table gradient due to climatic change over the next 10,000 yr	Change will be less than 4 times current value	8.3.1.5.2	8.3.1.5.2.2.3(D)
			Future-climate model	8.3.1.5.1.6
			Saturated-zone recharge/flow models	8.3.1.2.3.3
			Paleoclimate synthesis	8.3.1.5.1.5

Table 8.3.5.17-7. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 6[a] (page 3 of 3)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Climatic change causes an increase in the gradient of the water-table within the C-area (continued)			Quaternary discharge areas	8.3.1.5.2.1.3
			Analog recharge data	8.3.1.5.2.1.4
			Distribution, origin, and age of vein deposits	8.3.1.5.2.1.5

[a]The information on scenario classes, performance parameters, and tentative parameter goals is from Section 8.3.5.13.

[b]Study or activity directly addresses scenario.

[c]C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.

The nominal (undisturbed-performance) scenario class in Section 8.3.5.13 takes into account the full range of potential geochemical conditions, i.e., variations in ground-water composition. The EBS design is also based on this range. The information generated through this evaluation of the nominal case will therefore provide the confirmation necessary to evaluate this PAC. This information is summarized in Table 8.3.5.17-8.

Potentially adverse condition 8: Geochemical processes that would reduce sorption of radionuclides, result in degradation of the rock strength, or adversely affect the performance of the engineered barrier system.

This PAC is concerned with conditions that could significantly affect the site geochemical characteristics related to the transport of radionuclides and performance of the engineered-barrier system (EBS). These conditions could result from the thermal effects of the emplaced waste or from tectonic or human activities that could significantly change the ground-water composition by introducing ground water or other fluids into the isolation system. In principle, tectonic activity could also alter the mineralogic characteristics along the likely radionuclide transport pathways or create new pathways with different mineralogic characteristics; such effects are expected to be minor.

The expected thermal effects of waste emplacement may affect minerals in the tuffs, producing phase changes that may, in turn, affect sorptive properties. Sorption could also be affected by disturbance to ground-water chemistry. These geochemical processes that affect the sorptive mineralogy are expected to occur at rates too slow to significantly affect the sorptive capacity of the tuffs in the time frame of concern to a repository. In addition, any alteration of glass that did occur in the tuffs is expected to produce sorptive mineral phases, thereby producing an increase in sorptive capacity.

At present, geochemical process are not expected to significantly affect rock strength during the postclosure period. Fracturing of the tuffs due to chemical changes (e.g., dehydration and phase transitions) in the rocks is not expected under the range of thermal conditions predicted. Furthermore, the waste package is being designed to withstand the impacts that could occur from falling rock, and the information needs for the design are addressed in Issue 1.10 (Section 8.3.4.2).

The engineered-barrier system could be affected if the chemical characteristics of the ground water contacting it were to be disturbed significantly. No currently operating geochemical processes are thought, however, to have a potential for significantly affecting the EBS.

The available data do not, therefore, support a statement that the geochemical processes described in the PAC are operating at the site. The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to test the hypothesis that this condition is not present at the Yucca Mountain site.

In the development of the preliminary scenario classes, changes of this type were grouped into two categories: changes in the geochemical conditions

Table 8.3.5.17-8. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 7[a] (page 1 of 2)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Nominal case	Distribution coefficients (K_ds) for Sr, Cs, Pu, Am, C, U, Np, Tc, Zr, I, and Cm in unsaturated-zone units below repository and above water table	$K_d \geq 0$ for I and C. $K_d \geq 0.1$ for other elements under expected temperature range	8.3.1.3 Saturated- and unsaturated-zone sorptive properties	8.3.1.3.4(D)
			Solubility of radionuclides	8.3.1.3.5(D)
			Rock-unit mineralogy, petrology, and chemistry	8.3.1.3.2(D)
			Fracture-filling mineralogy	8.3.1.3.2(D)
			Unsaturated- and saturated-zone ground-water chemistry	8.3.1.3.1(D)
	Liquid constrictivity/ tortuosity factor		Unsaturated- and saturated-zone dispersive and diffusive properties	8.3.1.3.6(D)

Table 8.3.5.17-8. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 7[a] (page 2 of 2)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Nominal case (continued)			Retardation potential changes over 10,000 yr	8.3.1.3.7(D)

[a]Information on scenario classes, performance parameters, and tentative parameter goals is from Section 8.3.5.13.

[b]Study or activity directly addresses scenario.

due to likely events (for example, to the heat generated by the emplaced wastes) and disturbances to the geochemical conditions due to unlikely natural events. The former category is addressed by information needs for the nominal-case scenario class, and the latter is addressed by certain disturbed-performance scenario classes. Table 8.3.5.17-9 lists the relevant scenarios that will be considered in the overall system performance assessment to address the concern of this PAC. Scenarios concerning surface-water impoundments, irrigation, and mining near the controlled area are not considered to have credible significant effects on geochemical processes (sorption) at the site. They are not listed in Table 8.3.5.17-9. The performance parameters, for which values will be obtained during site characterization, are shown in the table; the site characterization data to be collected to address this PAC are listed by parameter category or set. Table 8.3.5.17-9 also references the section that discusses the data and the associated studies and activities.

The principal geochemical data that will be collected to address this PAC include the stability of sorptive minerals in the tuffs under both the ambient and the postemplacement thermal conditions and ground-water compositions. The sorptive behavior of the tuffs will be determined under a range of conditions intended to cover the effects of expected and unexpected events on the variables controlling sorption properties.

Potentially adverse condition 9: Ground-water conditions in the host rock that are not reducing.

This PAC is concerned with oxidizing ground-water conditions in the host rock because such conditions may be less favorable then chemically reducing conditions with regard to sorption and solubility relationships for radionuclides that exhibit sensitivity to oxidation-reduction conditions.

Because the host rock at the Yucca Mountain site is located in the unsaturated zone, the ground water in the host rock is oxidizing. It is expected that this condition can be shown not to significantly affect performance, because any potentially adverse effects it may theoretically cause will be compensated for by the low water flux through the repository and the sorptive capacity of the host rock and surrounding units. The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to demonstrate that although the condition is present, it will not significantly affect the ability of the geologic repository to meet the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste.

The information needed to address this condition (natural processes and waste-emplacement effects) will be generated through the evaluation of the nominal-case scenario class defined in Section 8.3.5.13. This information is summarized in Table 8.3.5.17-10.

Potentially adverse condition 10: Evidence of dissolutioning such as breccia pipes, dissolution cavities or brine pockets.

The available information is sufficient to conclude that this potentially adverse condition is not present at the Yucca Mountain site. There are no known dissolution features within the potential host rock or the other

Table 8.3.5.17-9. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 8[a] (page 1 of 3)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Nominal case	Distribution coefficients (K_ds) for Sr, Cs, Pu, Am, C, U, Np, Tc, Zr, I, and Cm in unsaturated-zone units below repository but above water table	$K_d \geq 0$ for I and C. $K_d \geq 0.1$ for other elements under expected temperature range	8.3.1.3 Saturated- and unsaturated-zone sorptive properties	8.3.1.3.4(D)
			Solubility of radionuclides	8.3.1.3.5(D)
			Rock-unit mineralogy, petrology, and chemistry	8.3.1.3.2(D)
			Fracture-filling mineralogy	8.3.1.3.2(D)
			Unsaturated- and saturated-zone ground-water chemistry	8.3.1.3.1(D)
	Liquid constrictivity/ tortuosity factor		Unsaturated- and saturated-zone dispersive and diffusive properties	8.3.1.3.6(D)
			Retardation potential changes over 10,000 yr	8.3.1.3.7(D)

Table 8.3.5.17-9. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 8[a] (page 2 of 3)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Igneous intrusions cause changes in rock geochemical properties	Annual probability of igneous intrusions within 0.5 km of C-area[c] boundary	$<10^{-5}$/yr	8.3.1.8 Probability of igneous intrusion	8.3.1.8.4.1.1(D), 8.3.1.8.1.1.4, 8.3.1.8.3.1.1
	Effects of igneous intrusions on local rock geochemical properties	Potential changes in mineralogy will not be extensive	8.3.1.8 Locations and geometry of intrusions	8.3.1.3.3, 8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.1.17.4.12.1
			Mineralogic changes	8.3.1.3.2.2.2, 8.3.1.8.5.2.2
Tectonic processes cause changes in ground-water table or movement that results in mineralogic changes in C-area	Degree of mineralogic change in the controlled area resulting from changes in water-table level or flow paths in 10,000 yr	Adverse changes in mineralogy will not occur	8.3.1.8 Probability and magnitude of mineralogic changes	8.3.1.8.4.1.4(D), 8.3.1.8.3.2.2, 8.3.1.8.3.2.3, 8.3.1.8.3.2.4, 8.3.1.8.3.2.6
			Rate of mineral alteration	8.3.1.3.2.2.1, 8.3.1.3.3.3, 8.3.1.3.3.4
Offset on a fault changes potential radionuclide travel pathway to one with different geochemical properties	Probability of total offsets >2.0 m in 10,000 yr on faults within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-1}$	8.3.1.8 Offsets, slip rates, and recurrence intervals	8.3.1.8.4.1.3(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2

Table 8.3.5.17-9. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 8[a] (page 3 of 3)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Offset on a fault changes potential radionuclide travel pathway to one with different geochemical properties (continued)	Effects of fault offset on travel pathway	Significant changes will not occur	8.3.1.8 Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
			Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.3.3.3
Offset on a fault causes changes in movement of ground water that result in mineralogical changes along the fault zone	Probability of movement within 2 km of surface and location of Quaternary faults in C-area	$<10^{-4}$/yr per fault	8.3.1.8 Locations of faults, slip rates, and recurrence intervals	8.3.1.8.4.1.2(D), 8.3.1.17.4.6.1, 8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2
	Degree of mineralogic change in fault zone in 10,000 yr	Adverse changes in mineralogy will not occur	8.3.1.8 Nature and age of mineralogic changes along faults	8.3.1.4.2.2.3, 8.3.1.4.2.2.5, 8.3.1.3.2

[a]Information on scenario classes, performance parameters, and tentative parameter goals is from Section 8.3.5.13.

[b]Study or activity directly addresses scenario.

[c]C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.

Table 8.3.5.17-10. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 9[a] (page 1 of 2)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Nominal case	Distribution coefficients (K_ds) for Sr, Cs, Pu, Am, C, U, Np, Tc, Zr, I, and Cm in unsaturated-zone units below repository and above water table	$K_d \geq 0$ for I and C $K_d \geq 0.1$ for other elements under expected temperature range	8.3.1.3 Saturated- and unsaturated-zone sorptive properties	8.3.1.3.4(D)
			Solubility of radionuclides	8.3.1.3.5(D)
			Rock-unit mineralogy, petrology, and chemistry	8.3.1.3.2(D)
			Fracture-filling mineralogy	8.3.1.3.2(D)
			Unsaturated- and saturated-zone ground-water chemistry	8.3.1.3.1(D)
	Liquid constrictivity/ tortuosity factor		Unsaturated- and saturated-zone dispersive and diffusive properties	8.3.1.3.6(D)

Table 8.3.5.17-10. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 9[a] (page 2 of 2)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Nominal case (continued)			Retardation potential changes over 10,000 yr	8.3.1.3.7(D)

[a]Scenario classes, performance parameters, and tentative parameter goals are from Section 8.3.5.13.
[b]Study or activity directly addresses scenario.

rock units at the sites (DOE, 1986b), and the minerals that make up the host rock (alkali feldspar, quartz, cristobalite, and tridymite) are not prone to dissolution in any significant quantities.

Because the available information appears adequate to address this PAC, no further characterization is needed. No scenario classes associated with dissolutioning will be developed as a part of the evaluation of the geologic repository with respect to the overall system performance objective.

Potentially adverse condition 11: Structural deformation, such as uplift, subsidence, folding, and faulting, during the Quaternary Period.

This PAC is concerned with future structural deformation, similar to the observed Quaternary deformation, that could adversely affect a repository system in such a way that the isolation capabilities of a site would be impaired. For example, structural deformation could affect radionuclide transport rates from the repository horizon to the boundaries of the accessible environment, if the hydrologic conditions or geochemical characteristics along the transport path were adversely affected.

Quaternary rupture on 32 faults within an 1,100-km^2 area surrounding the site has been documented (Section 1.3.2). In addition, Quaternary activity has been observed on faults near Yucca Mountain. The region is currently undergoing active lateral crustal extension in response to regional extension within the Great Basin (Section 1.3.2.4). The rate is, however, considered to be low. The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to demonstrate that although the condition is present, it will not significantly affect the ability of the geologic repository to meet the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste.

The potential effects of structural deformation on the ground-water flow system are addressed by PACs 4 and 5. Tables 8.3.5.17-5 (PAC 4) and 8.3.5.17-6 (PAC 5) summarize the information needed to evaluate these effects. Table 8.3.5.17-11 repeats this information and also includes the information regarding the effects of tectonic activity on waste packages and the geochemical conditions important to waste isolation. The table lists the performance parameters for those scenarios relevant to the effects of tectonic activity, such as faulting, on waste isolation. The characterization programs that will provide the information needed to determine these parameters are also listed in Table 8.3.5.17-11.

Potentially adverse condition 12: Earthquakes that have occurred historically that if they were to be repeated could affect the site significantly.

This PAC is concerned with historic earthquakes that, if they reoccurred in the future, could adversely affect the postclosure performance of a geologic repository.

The Yucca Mountain site is located in the southern Great Basin, a seismically active region (Section 1.4). The pattern of regional seismicity, as defined by historical epicenters within 400 km of Yucca Mountain, consists of

the north-south-trending Nevada-California seismic belt, the southern end of the Intermountain seismic belt in southwestern Utah, and the diffuse East-West seismic belt encompassing the Nevada Test Site. Six major historical earthquakes ($M \geq 6.5$) have occurred in the Nevada-California seismic belt, and two have occurred on or near the San Andreas fault. The nearest major earthquake (1872 Owens Valley) was about 150 km west of Yucca Mountain. Yucca Mountain itself is located in a quiescent area characterized by few hypocenters and low seismic-energy density, and the historical record of the region suggests that past seismic activity, if repeated, would not be expected to significantly affect the postclosure performance of a geologic repository. The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to test the hypothesis that this condition is not present at the Yucca Mountain site.

The historical record is limited. Therefore, detailed geologic investigations will be combined with ongoing earthquake monitoring activities to assess the effects of future earthquakes at the site. Additional information to strengthen the strategy is included in Table 8.3.5.17-11 (PAC 11). This table lists the scenario classes associated with fault movement and ground motion developed in Section 8.3.5.13. The performance parameters needed to evaluate these phenomena and the characterization programs that will provide the information to develop these parameters are also listed in this table.

Potentially adverse condition 13: Indications, based on correlations of earthquakes with tectonic processes and features, that either the frequency of occurrence or magnitude of earthquakes may increase.

Like PAC 12, PAC 13 is concerned with the potential for seismic activity, including ground motion and faulting, that could adversely affect the performance of the repository in the postclosure period. The information needed for this PAC is the same as that for PAC 12 and will be investigated through PAC 11. The information needs for this PAC are defined in Table 8.3.5.17-11 (PAC 11). The available information is insufficient to determine whether future seismic activity is likely to be more frequent or of higher magnitude than historic seismicity. The maximum earthquake magnitude in the historical record and the record of Quaternary faulting within the geologic setting are assumed to be the strongest indicators of future earthquake potential for the postclosure time frame. Difficulty in interpreting the Quaternary faulting record suggests that the historical record may not reveal the largest earthquake that could occur at Yucca Mountain. Given this interpretation, it is possible that the geologic setting of the Yucca Mountain site may experience earthquakes of higher magnitude or frequency than have been historically observed. The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to demonstrate that although the condition may be present, it will not significantly affect the ability of the geologic repository to meet the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste. The characterization work that will provide the information needed for resolving this PAC is listed in Table 8.3.5.17-11.

Potentially adverse condition 14: More frequent occurrence of earthquakes or earthquakes of higher magnitude than is typical of the area in which the geologic setting is located.

Table 8.3.5.17-11. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 11[a] (page 1 of 7)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Changes in stress or strain in C-area[c] resulting from episodic faulting, folding, or uplift cause changes in the hydrologic properties of the rock mass	Effects of changes of stress or strain on hydrologic properties of the rock mass	Changes in conductivity and porosity of rock mass are less than a factor of 2	8.3.1.8 In situ stress field Relation of hydraulic properties to strain	 8.3.1.17.4.8.1 8.3.1.8.3.3.3(D)
Episodic changes in strain in the rock mass due to faulting cause changes in water-table level	Probability that strain-induced changes increase potentiometric level to > 850 m mean sea level	$<10^{-8}$/yr	8.3.1.8 In situ stress field Relation of hydraulic properties to strain Rate of stress change Saturated-zone flow model	 8.3.1.17.4.8.1 8.3.1.8.3.3.3(D) 8.3.1.8.3.2.3(D), 8.3.1.17.4.12.1 8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
Offset on fault creates surface impoundments, alters drainage, creates perched aquifers, or changes dip of tuff beds	Probability of offset >2 m on faults in the C-area in 10,000 yr	$<10^{-1}$	8.3.1.8 Vertical slip rate and recurrence intervals	 8.3.1.8.3.1.5(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2

Table 8.3.5.17-11. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 11[a] (page 2 of 7)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Offset on fault creates surface impoundments, alters drainage, creates perched aquifers, or changes dip of tuff beds (continued)	Probability of changing dip by > 2° in 10,000 yr by faulting	$<10^{-4}$	8.3.1.8 Rates of vertical slip and tilting	8.3.1.17.4.6.2
	Effects of faulting on flux	Faulting will not affect flux because of low slip rate	8.3.1.8 Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.8.3.1.4, 8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
Offset on faults juxtaposes transmissive and nontransmissive units, resulting in the creation of a perched aquifer, a rise in the water table, or a change in hydraulic gradients	Probability of total offsets >2.0 m in 10,000 yr on faults within C-area	$<10^{-1}$	8.3.1.8 Slip rates and recurrence intervals	8.3.1.8.3.2.6(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2
	Effects of fault offset on water-table levels and hydraulic gradients	Water table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr Gradients change less than a factor of 4	8.3.1.8 Fault location and geometry Unsaturated-zone flow model Saturated-zone flow model Quaternary water levels	8.3.1.8.3.2.5, 8.3.1.17.3.1 8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9 8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.5.3.3.3 8.3.1.5.2.1.5

Table 8.3.5.17-11. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 11[a] (page 3 of 7)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Episodic offset on faults causes local changes in rock hydrologic properties, thereby destroying existing barriers to flow, or creating barriers to flow, or creating new conduits for drainage	Annual probability of faulting events on Quaternary faults within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-4}$/yr	8.3.1.8 Slip rates and recurrence intervals	8.3.1.8.3.3.2(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2
	Effects of fault motion on local permeabilities and effective porosities	Change in fracture permeability is less than factor of 2; and fracture porosity decreases	8.3.1.8 Evidence of episodic rock-property changes along faults	8.3.1.4.2.2.3, 8.3.1.4.2.2.4, 8.3.1.4.2.2.5
Offset on a fault changes potential travel pathway to one with different geochemical properties	Probability of total offsets >2.0 m in 10,000 yr on faults within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-1}$	8.3.1.8 Offsets, slip rates, and recurrence intervals	8.3.1.8.4.1.3(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2
	Effects of fault offset on travel pathway	Significant changes will not occur	8.3.1.8 Unsaturated-zone flow model Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9 8.3.1.2.3.3.3

Table 8.3.5.17-11. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 11[a] (page 4 of 7)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Offset on a fault causes changes in movement of groundwater that result in mineralogical changes along the fault zone	Probability of movement within 2 km of surface and location of Quaternary faults in C-area	$<10^{-4}$/yr per fault	8.3.1.8 Locations of Quaternary faults in C-area	8.3.1.8.4.1.2(D), 8.3.1.17.4.6.1
			Slip rates and recurrence intervals	8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2
	Degree of mineralogic change in fault zone in 10,000 yr	Adverse changes in mineralogy will not occur	8.3.1.8 Nature and age of mineralogic changes along faults	8.3.1.4.2.2.3, 8.3.1.4.2.2.5
Uplift or subsidence changes drainage, thereby changing flux	Probability of exceeding 30-m elevation change in 10,000 yr	$<10^{-4}$ per 10,000 yr	8.3.1.8 Rates uplift and subsidence	8.3.1.8.3.1.7(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.6, 8.3.1.17.4.9.2, 8.3.1.17.4.10.3

Table 8.3.5.17-11. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 11[a] (page 5 of 7)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Tectonic folding changes dip of tuff beds in C-area, thereby changing flux	Probability of changing dip by >2° in 10,000 yr by folding	$<10^{-4}$ per 10,000 yr	8.3.1.8 Rates of folding	8.3.1.8.3.1.7(D), 8.3.1.4.2.2.1, 8.3.1.4.2.2.4, 8.3.1.4.3.2, 8.3.1.8.2.1.6
Folding, uplift, or subsidence lowers repository with respect to water table	Probability that repository will be lowered by 100 m through action of folding, uplift, or subsidence in 10,000 yr	$<10^{-4}$	8.3.1.8 Rates of subsidence	8.3.1.8.3.1.6, 8.3.1.17.4.9.2, 8.3.1.17.4.10.3
			Rates of folding	8.3.1.4.2.2.1, 8.3.1.4.2.2.4, 8.3.1.4.3.2, 8.3.1.8.2.1.6
Tectonic processes cause changes in water table or movement that results in mineralogic changes in C-area	Degree of mineralogic change in the controlled area resulting from changes in water-table level or flow paths in 10,000 yr	Adverse changes in mineralogy will not occur	8.3.1.8 Probability and magnitude of hydrologic changes	8.3.1.8.4.1.4(D), 8.3.1.8.3.2.2, 8.3.1.8.3.2.3, 8.3.1.8.3.2.4, 8.3.1.8.3.2.6
			Rate of mineral alteration	8.3.1.3.2.2.1, 8.3.1.3.3.2, 8.3.1.3.3.3

Table 8.3.5.17-11. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 11[a] (page 6 of 7)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Offset on one or more faults intersects waste package and causes failure[d]	Number of waste packages affected by fault penetrating repository	Less than 0.5% of waste packages intersected by a single fault, with a 95% probability	8.3.1.8 Characteristics of faults that penetrate repository, width and orientation of Quaternary faults, number of waste packages affected by a fault	8.3.2.2.7, 8.3.1.3.3.1, 8.3.1.17.4.2, 8.3.1.17.4.6.1, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2
	Probability of faulting with displacement over 5 cm in repository	Annual probability less than 10^{-4} of faulting with displacement over 5 cm		
Ground motion causes spalling or failure and closes air gap around waste packages[d]	Expected ground motion at emplacement boreholes in 1,000-yr period	Probability of exceeding ground motion values <0.1 in 1,000 yr	8.3.1.17 Probability of ground motion	8.3.1.17.3.5.2, 8.3.1.17.3.6.2

Table 8.3.5.17-11. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 11[a] (page 7 of 7)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Folding or distributed shear causes waste-emplacement-borehole deformation and results in waste-package failure[d]	Rate of deformation due to folding or distributed shearing in repository horizon	Waste-emplacement boreholes will be subject to <0.005 shear strain in 1,000 yr as a result of folding or deformation	8.3.1.8 Nature and age of folding in repository	8.3.1.4.2.2.1, 8.3.1.4.3.2, 8.3.1.17.4.12.1, 8.3.1.8.2.1.2

[a]Scenario classes, performance parameters, and parameter goals are from Section 8.3.5.13, except where noted.

[b]Study or activity directly addresses scenario.

[c]C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.

[d]Scenario class, performance parameter, and parameter goal are from Section 8.3.2.2.

This PAC is concerned with the potential for future seismic activity to adversely affect the postclosure performance of a geologic repository. The frequency and magnitude of earthquakes at Yucca Mountain during the several years of close monitoring is the same as or less than that for the southern Basin and Range Province. Furthermore, it is not expected that future seismicity at the site will be more frequent or of higher magnitude than is typical of the region in which the geologic setting is located. The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to test the hypothesis that this condition is not present at the Yucca Mountain site.

The information needed to evaluate this PAC is identical to that needed for PACs 12 and 13, and the information needs for this PAC are included in Table 8.3.5.17-11 (PAC 11). Data to be collected to address PAC 11 are expected to be adequate for resolving PAC 14.

Potentially adverse condition 15: Evidence of igneous activity since the start of the Quaternary Period.

This PAC is concerned with igneous activity during the next 10,000 yr that could adversely affect the performance of a repository system. Igneous activity could cause direct releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment as a result of an extrusive event. Igneous activity could also affect releases indirectly by disrupting the geohydrologic conditions at a site (increasing the ground-water table altitude, increasing percolation flux through the repository horizon, changing head gradients in the saturated zone, or creating surficial discharge points within the accessible environment) or altering the rock-mass hydrologic or geochemical characteristics along the potential radionuclide transport pathways.

Although the volcanic rocks in the region of Yucca Mountain are predominately silicic tuffs and rhyolite domes formed during middle Tertiary, the youngest volcanic rocks are mostly basalt flows. These basalts were probably formed as recently as approximately 15,000 yr ago (Crowe and Turrin, 1988; Crowe et al, 1988; Wells et al, 1988); however, the dating methods have significant uncertainties. These basalts were formed in isolated Strombolian eruptions of small volume and short duration. The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to demonstrate that although the condition is present, it will not significantly affect the ability of the geologic repository to meet the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste.

The likelihood and extent of igneous activity during the next 10,000 yr and its effects on site characteristics will be investigated during site characterization. Table 8.3.5.17-12 shows the scenario classes associated with igneous activity that will be considered in the overall system performance assessment. The table also lists the performance parameters for which values will be obtained during site characterization. The site characterization data to be collected to address this PAC are listed by parameter category or set in Table 8.3.5.17-12. Table 8.3.5.17-12 also references the section that discusses the data to be collected and the associated studies and activities.

Table 8.3.5.17-12. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 15[a] (page 1 of 5)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Igneous intrusion penetrating repository resulting in failure of waste packages[c]	Probability of igneous intrusion penetrating repository	Annual probability less than 10^{-5}	8.3.1.8 Probability of intrusion	8.3.1.8.2.1.1(D), 8.3.1.8.1.1.4
	Effects of igneous intrusion penetrating repository	Less than 5% of waste packages disrupted	8.3.1.8 Geometry of intrusions	8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.1.17.4.12.1
			Number of waste packages disrupted	8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.2.2.6.2, 8.3.2.2.7.1
Volcanic eruption penetrates repository and causes direct releases to the accessible environment	Annual probability of volcanic eruption that penetrates the repository	$<10^{-6}$/yr	8.3.1.8 Probability of eruption	8.3.1.8.1.2(D), 8.3.1.8.1.1.4
	Effects of volcanic eruption penetrating repository, including area of repository disrupted	Given occurrence, <0.1% of repository area disrupted with a conditional probability of <0.1 of being exceeded in 10,000 yr	8.3.1.8 Effects of eruption	8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.1.8.1.2.2

Table 8.3.5.17-12. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 15[a] (page 2 of 5)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Volcanic eruption causes flows or other changes in topography that result in impoundment or diversion of drainage	Annual probability of volcanic events within C-area[d]	$<10^{-5}$/yr	8.3.1.8 Probability of volcanic event	8.3.1.8.3.1.2(D), 8.3.1.8.1.1.4, 8.3.1.8.3.1.1
	Effects of a volcanic event on topography and flow rates	Show topographic changes are not great enough to affect flux	8.3.1.8 Topographic effects of eruption	8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.1.8.1.2.2
Igneous intrusion, such as a sill, that could result in a significant change in average flux	Annual probability of igneous intrusion in the C-area	Show $<10^{-5}$/yr	8.3.1.8 Probability of igneous intrusion	8.3.1.8.3.1.2(D), 8.3.1.8.1.1.4, 8.3.1.8.3.1.1
	Effects of an igneous intrusion on flux	Show igneous intrusion will not affect flux because of depth, location, and extent of intrusion	8.3.1.8 Locations and geometry of possible intrusions at site	8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.1.17.4.12.1
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
			Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.3.3

Table 8.3.5.17-12. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 15[a] (page 3 of 5)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Igneous intrusion causes barrier to flow or thermal effects that alter water-table level (or hydraulic gradients)	Annual probability of an igneous intrusion within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-5}$/yr	8.3.1.8 Probability of igneous intrusion	8.3.1.8.3.1.2(D), 8.3.1.8.1.1.4, 8.3.1.8.3.1.1
	Barrier-to-flow effects of igneous intrusions on water-table levels	Water table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon within 10,000 yr	8.3.1.8 Locations and geometry of possible intrusions at site	8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.1.17.4.12.1
			Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
	Thermal effects of igneous intrusions on water-table levels	Water table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon within 10,000 yr	8.3.1.8 Locations and geometry of possible intrusions at site	8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.1.17.4.12.1
			Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
	Thermal effects of igneous intrusions on hydraulic gradients	Gradients change less than a factor of 4	8.3.1.8 Thermal effects near intrusion	8.3.1.8.1.2.1

Table 8.3.5.17-12. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 15[a] (page 4 of 5)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Igneous intrusions cause changes in rock hydrologic properties	Annual probability of igneous instrusions within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-5}$/yr	8.3.1.8 Probability of igneous intrusion	8.3.1.8.3.3.1(D), 8.3.1.8.1.1.4, 8.3.1.8.3.1.1
	Effects of igneous intrusions on local permeabilities and effective porosities	No significant changes in rock hydrologic properties	8.3.1.8 Locations and geometry of possible intrusions	8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.1.17.4.12.1
			Effects of intrusions on hydraulic properties	8.3.1.8.3.3.1
Igneous intrusions cause changes in rock geochemical properties	Annual probability of igneous intrusions within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-5}$/yr	8.3.1.8 Probability of igneous intrusions	8.3.1.8.4.1.1(D), 8.3.1.8.1.1.4, 8.3.1.8.3.1.1

Table 8.3.5.17-12. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 15[a] (page 5 of 5)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Igneous intrusions cause changes in rock geochemical properties (continued)	Effects of igneous intrusions on local rock geochemical properties	Potential changes in mineralogy will not be extensive	8.3.1.8 Mineralogic changes	8.3.1.8.5.2.2
			Rates of mineral alteration	8.3.1.3.2.2.1, 8.3.1.3.3.2, 8.3.1.3.3.3

[a]Scenario classes, performance parameters, and parameter goals are from Section 8.3.5.13, except as noted.

[b]Study or activity directly addresses the scenario.

[c]Scenario class, performance parameter, and parameter goal are from 8.3.2.2.

[d]C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.

Potentially adverse condition 16: Evidence of extreme erosion during the Quaternary Period.

This potentially adverse condition is concerned with the potential for erosional processes to adversely affect the isolation capabilities of the site. Repository performance could be directly affected through denudation of the underground facility or indirectly affected through disturbance of the hydrologic system, such as the creation of new ground-water discharge points within the controlled area.

Erosional processes in the area of Yucca Mountain site have been, and continue to be, dominated by a general pattern of upland erosion, piedmont transport, and basin deposition (Section 1.1.3.3.2). Average downwasting rates over the past 1 to 5 million years have been 0.5 to 2.0 cm per thousand years. Assuming that these rates would continue, the total downwasting would amount to a maximum of approximately 20 cm during the next 10,000 yr. Large-scale rapid mass wasting has not played a major role in the erosional regime at the site. Although generally stable, episodes of rapid erosion have occurred locally in areas of concentrated fluvial activity. In these areas, rates of stream incision, averaged over the past 0.15 to 0.3 million years, range from 5.3 to 37.5 cm per thousand years. These rates would amount to a maximum of approximately 3.8 m over the next 10,000 yr. Therefore, it is not likely that erosion would significantly affect the ability of the Yucca Mountain site to meet the performance objectives related to waste isolation. The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to test the hypothesis that this condition is not present at the Yucca Mountain site.

Because of these low rates, disturbed-performance scenario classes associated with erosional processes have not been developed for the Yucca Mountain site. Furthermore, no information needs associated with the nominal-case scenario are identified for erosion. The underground facility will be at least 200 m below the surface at all points. Therefore, direct releases resulting from denudation are considered to be not credible during the next 10,000 yr. Even the rates associated with stream incision are not expected to affect the ground-water flow important to waste isolation. Although erosion-related site data are limited, no new site data are necessary to address this condition. Some erosion data will be collected for purposes other than characterizing extreme erosion (Section 8.3.1.6), and these data will be used to test the hypothesis that this PAC is not present at the site.

Potentially adverse condition 17: The presence of naturally occurring materials, whether identified or undiscovered, within the site, in such a form that: (i) Economic extraction is currently feasible or potentially feasible during the forseeable future; or (ii) Such materials have a greater gross value or net value than the average for areas of similar size that are representative of and located within the geologic setting.

This PAC is concerned with the potential for future human activities associated with resource exploration and exploitation at the site that could

adversely affect the isolation capabilities of the site. Such activities include exploratory drilling, surface and subsurface mining, and ground-water withdrawal. These activities could result in direct radionuclide releases to the accessible environment if radioactive material were brought up to the surface along with the resource or in the course of exploration. The activities could also indirectly affect isolation if the geohydrologic or geochemical conditions of the site were disturbed.

There are no known occurrences of economic mineral resources at the Yucca Mountain site (Section 1.7). Preliminary analyses of drill-core samples at Yucca Mountain suggest there are no mineral occurrences in any significant abundance that could be economically feasible to extract in the near future. Comparison of the site with similar regions, where mineral resources have been found, indicates that there are some similarities in rock types and depositional environments for economic minerals; however, the occurrences at Yucca Mountain are not expected to be unique or of a higher value. The potential for energy resources (uranium, oil, gas, and geothermal resources) at the site is considered very low. Deep boreholes in the region have failed to detect the presence of any significant quantities of hydrocarbons. Most of the southern Great Basin, including the Yucca Mountain site, has a potential for low- to moderate-temperature geothermal development, data from wells at Yucca Mountain, however, suggest low heat flow would preclude geothermal energy development at the site.

Ground-water resources exist near the Yucca Mountain site. The extent of the resource is unknown; however, the limited ground-water resources in southern Nevada make the ground-water resources proximal to the site attractive for future extraction. The ground-water resources within the site, however, are not considered feasible for economic extraction because of depth to the ground water, topographic conditions, land-use restrictions at the repository site, and the expected availability of ground-water resources outside of the controlled-area boundary. Ground-water withdrawal near the controlled area is discussed in PAC 2.

The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to test the hypothesis that this condition is not present at the Yucca Mountain site.

The potential for human activities that are associated with resource exploration and extraction at the Yucca Mountain site and their effects on the site characteristics will be investigated during site characterization (Section 8.3.1.9). Scenario classes associated with human activities have been developed for this purpose. Table 8.3.5.17-13 shows the scenario classes that will be evaluated in the overall system performance assessment and the performance parameters associated with those scenarios for which values will be obtained. Because of the unpredictable nature of human activities, goals cannot be set for many of these parameters (see Section 8.3.5.13 and the discussion of PAC 2). Nevertheless, investigations will be conducted to obtain information needed to evaluate these parameters, and these investigations are also listed in this table. The site characterization data to be collected to address this PAC are listed by parameter category or set in Table 8.3.5.17-13. Table 8.3.5.17-13 also references the section that discusses the data to be collected and the associated studies and activities.

Potentially adverse condition 18: Evidence of subsurface mining for resources within the site.

This potentially adverse condition is concerned with the potential for past or present mining-related activities to adversely affect the performance of a repository. There is no evidence of mining activity within 10 km of the Yucca Mountain site (Section 1.6.4). Surface exploration of the area found no evidence of abandoned underground mines, surface mines, or prospecting drillholes.

The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to test the hypothesis that this condition is not present at the Yucca Mountain site. The available evidence is sufficient to address this PAC, and no additional site data are called for. Information needed to evaluate future mining activities is identified in Table 8.3.5.17-13.

Potentially adverse condition 19: Evidence of drilling for any purpose within the site.

This PAC is concerned with the potential for past or present drilling to adversely affect the performance of a repository, e.g., by providing pathways for transport of radionuclides from the repository.

A study has been made of the available records, and all the area within a 10-km radius around the perimeter drift outline has been physically examined during surface mapping operations. A total of 184 drillholes within the 10-km radius has been reported (Section 1.6.1). Two of these drillholes, the J-12 and J-13 water wells, were completed for water supply for the Nuclear Rocket Development Station work in 1957 and 1963, respectively. The other 182 holes were drilled under the control of the Nevada Test Site Operations Office for the Project during exploratory work to investigate the site. If the wording of this PAC related the significance of drillholes to the ability of the site to isolate waste, the strategy for PAC resolution would be to test the hypothesis that the PAC is not present; however, since the PAC, as stated, refers only to evidence of drilling, the strategy for PAC resolution is to demonstrate that although the condition is present, it will not affect significantly the ability of the geologic repos- itory to meet the performance objective relating to isolation of the waste.

Scenarios associated with drilling for purposes other than those of previous drilling activities at the site will be investigated in the overall system performance assessment. These scenario classes are discussed by PAC 17, and the information needed to evaluate this PAC is identified in Table 8.3.5.17-13.

Potentially adverse condition 20: Rock or ground-water conditions that would require complex engineering measures in the design and construction of the underground facility or in the sealing of boreholes and shafts.

This PAC is concerned with a preclosure condition that could affect postclosure performance. According to the NRC's statements of consideration for 10 CFR Part 60 (NRC, 1981c), complex engineering measures are not

Table 8.3.5.17-13. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 17[a]

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Exploratory drilling intercepts a waste package and brings waste up with core or cuttings	Presence and readability of C-area[c] markers over next 10,000 yr	>50% chance that markers are readable over next 10,000 yr	8.3.1.9 Rates of processes decreasing survival period, visibility, or readability of markers	8.3.1.9.3.1.1(D), 8.3.1.9.1.1
	Expected drilling rate (number of boreholes/ km^2/yr) in C-area over the next 10,000 yr	Expected drilling rate $\leq 3 \times 10^{-4}$/ km^2/yr	8.3.1.9 Types and locations of inferred resources	8.3.1.9.2.1
			Expected exploratory methods	8.3.1.9.3.1.1
	Distribution of depths of exploratory drillings	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9 Expected exploratory methods	8.3.1.9.2.1, 8.3.1.9.3.1.1
	Distribution of diameters of exploratory drill holes	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9 Expected exploratory methods	8.3.1.9.2.1, 8.3.1.9.3.1.1

[a]Scenario classes, performance parameters, and parameter goals are from Section 8.3.5.13.
[b]Study or activity directly addresses the scenario.
[c]C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.

inherently unacceptable. The concern lies in the reliability of the measures. Preclosure failure of such measures could conceivably affect postclosure performance, for example, through collapse of underground openings or flooding of the repository. The isolation capability of the repository system during the postclosure period could then be inferior to that which would exist if closure had been intentional.

Presently available data indicate that measures beyond those that are accepted mining practices would not be required to compensate for unfavorable rock characteristics (Chapters 2 and 6) and ground-water conditions (Chapter 3). The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to test the hypothesis that this condition is not present at the Yucca Mountain site.

Rock characteristics will be investigated further during site characterization to satisfy the information needs of both design and performance issues. However, no other information associated with particular scenario classes has been identified for this PAC. Present rock and ground-water conditions are included in the nominal-case scenario class as described in Section 8.3.5.13. Additional studies beyond those described in the sections cited above are presently believed not to be necessary.

Potentially adverse condition 21: Geomechanical properties that do not permit design of underground openings that will remain stable through permanent closure.

This PAC is concerned with a preclosure condition that could affect postclosure performance. Failure of an underground opening during the preclosure period could result in the enlargement of existing fractures or opening of new fractures that could potentially affect radionuclide transport. In addition, fracturing due to failure of an underground opening could potentially increase the amount of ground water reaching the waste package.

No measures beyond those generally acceptable in the mining industry are expected to be required to maintain stable underground openings through the preclosure period (Chapter 6). The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to test the hypothesis that this condition is not present at the Yucca Mountain site.

Additional studies beyond those described for the nominal-case scenario class (Sections 8.3.5.13, 8.3.2.2, and 8.3.2.5) are presently believed not to be necessary. The final plans for maintaining stable underground openings will be presented as part of the license application design.

Potentially adverse condition 22: Potential for the water table to rise sufficiently so as to cause saturation of an underground facility located in the unsaturated zone.

This PAC is concerned with the saturation of an underground facility initially located in the unsaturated zone. A water-table rise that would flood an underground facility could result from climatic conditions (also considered in PAC 6), human activity (also considered in PAC 2), or tectonic processes or events (also considered in PACs 3 and 5).

Climate change, human activities, structural deformation, and igneous activity are all possible at the site. The effects of these processes are not, however, expected to produce a water-table rise high enough to saturate the underground repository. The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to test the hypothesis that this condition is not present at the Yucca Mountain site.

Table 8.3.5.17-14 shows the scenarios that will be considered in the overall system performance assessment and that address water-table rise during the postclosure period. The table also shows the performance parameters for which values will be obtained during site characterization to address these scenarios. The site characterization data to be collected to address this PAC are listed by parameter category or set in Table 8.3.5.17-14. Table 8.3.5.17-14 also references the section that discusses the data to be collected and the associated studies and activities.

Potentially adverse condition 23: Potential for existing or future perched water bodies that may saturate portions of the underground facility or provide a faster flow path from an underground facility located in the unsaturated zone to the accessible environment.

This PAC is concerned with perched-water bodies that could affect the transport of radionuclides by increasing flux through the unsaturated zone. These perched-water bodies could result from structural deformation at a site or from a climate change that produces a significant increase in infiltration.

The site is located in the southern Great Basin, a tectonically active region (Section 1.3); however, the effects of tectonism are not expected to create perched-water bodies that could saturate portions of the underground repository. Although the potential for existing perched-water bodies at the site cannot be ruled out on the basis of currently available information, it is unlikely that large bodies exist, because they have not been encountered in the program-related drilling performed to date. The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to test the hypothesis that this condition is not present at the Yucca Mountain site.

Table 8.3.5.17-15 shows the scenarios that have been identified that could create perched-water bodies in the unsaturated zone at the site. These scenarios are being considered in the overall system performance assessment. The table also shows the performance parameters for which values will be obtained during site characterization. The categories and sets of site characterization data to be collected to address this PAC are listed in Table 8.3.5.17-15. Table 8.3.5.17-15 also references the section that discusses the data to be collected and the associated studies and activities.

Existing perched-water bodies, if any, at the site will be identified by the program of hydrologic testing and modeling proposed for the site. The development of an unsaturated-zone flow model, using the data from the hydrologic testing program, will support an evaluation of the potential for perched-water bodies to have formed at the site under present conditions.

Table 8.3.5.17-14. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 22[a] (page 1 of 5)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Climate change causes an increase in level of water table	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level due to climatic changes over the next 10,000 yr	Water table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	8.3.1.5 Future-climate model	8.3.1.5.2.2.3(D), 8.3.1.5.1.6
			Saturated-zone recharge/flow models	8.3.1.2.3.3
			Paleoclimate synthesis	8.3.1.5.1.5
			Paleodischarge areas	8.3.1.5.2.1.3
			Analog recharge data	8.3.1.5.2.1.4
			Vein-deposit distribution, age, and origin	8.3.1.5.2.1.5
Extensive irrigation is conducted near the C-area[c]	Expected magnitude of change in level of water table under C-area due to extensive irrigation near near C-area over next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9 Irrigation characteristics	8.3.1.9.3.2.2(D), 8.3.1.9.3.2
			Infiltration rates	8.3.1.2.2.1.2
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
			Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.3.3.3

Table 8.3.5.17-14. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 22[a] (page 2 of 5)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Large-scale surface-water impoundments are constructed near the C-area	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level due to placement of artificial lake near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9 Impoundment characteristics	8.3.1.9.3.2.2(D), 8.3.1.9.3.2
			Infiltration rates	8.3.1.2.2.1.1
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
			Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.3.3.3
Extensive surface or subsurface mining occurs near C-area	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level due to mine water use or mine dewatering near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9	8.3.1.9.3.2
Extensive ground-water withdrawal occurs near C-area	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level due to extensive ground-water withdrawal near C-area in next 10,000 yr	No goal (human activity)	8.3.1.9	8.3.1.9.3.2.1(D), 8.3.1.9.2.2

Table 8.3.5.17-14. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 22[a] (page 3 of 5)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Episodic changes in strain in the rock mass due to faulting cause changes in water-table level	Probability that strain-induced changes increase potentiometric level to > 850 m mean sea level	$<10^{-5}$/yr	8.3.1.8 Magnitudes and rates of strain, relation of properties to strain	8.3.1.8.3.2.3(D), 8.3.1.17.4.8.1, 8.3.1.17.4.8.4, 8.3.1.8.3.3.3
			Saturated-zone flow models	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
Folding, uplift, or subsidence lowers repository with respect to water table	Probability that repository will be lowered by 100 m through action of folding, uplift, or subsidence in 10,000 yr	$<10^{-4}$	8.3.1.8 Rates of subsidence	8.3.1.8.3.1.6, 8.3.1.17.4.9.2, 8.3.1.17.4.10.3
			Rates of folding	8.3.1.4.2.2.1, 8.3.1.4.2.2.4, 8.3.1.4.3.2, 8.3.1.8.2.1.6
Offset on faults juxtaposes transmissive and nontransmissive units, resulting in a rise in the water table	Probability of total offsets >2.0 m in 10,000 yr on faults within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-1}$	8.3.1.8 Offsets, slip rates, and recurrence intervals	8.3.1.8.3.1.5(D), 8.3.1.8.3.2.6(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2, 8.3.1.17.4.1.2

Table 8.3.5.17-14. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 22[a] (page 4 of 5)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Offset on faults juxtaposes transmissive and nontransmissive units, resulting in a rise in the water table (continued)	Effects of fault offset on water-table levels	Water table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	8.3.1.8 Locations of faults Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.17.4.6, 8.3.1.17.4.7, 8.3.1.17.4.12, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
Igneous intrusion causes barrier to flow or thermal effects that alter water-table level	Annual probability of igneous intrusion within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	Show < 10^{-5}/yr	8.3.1.8 Probability of igneous intrusion	8.3.1.8.3.1.2(D), 8.3.1.8.1.1.4, 8.3.1.8.3.1.1
	Barrier-to-flow effects of igneous intrusion on water-table levels	Water table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	8.3.1.8 Locations and geometry of possible intrusions at site	8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.1.17.4.12.1
			Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3

Table 8.3.5.17-14. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 22[a] (page 5 of 5)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Igneous intrusion causes barrier to flow or thermal effects that alter water-table level (continued)	Thermal effects of igneous intrusions on water-table levels	Water table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	8.3.1.8 Locations and geometry of possible intrusions at site	8.3.1.8.1.2.1, 8.3.1.17.4.12.1
			Saturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.1.4.4, 8.3.1.2.3.3.3
			Thermal effects near intrusive bodies	8.3.1.8.1.2.1

[a]Scenario classes, performance parameters, and parameter goals are from Section 8.3.5.13.
[b]Study or activity directly addresses the scenario.
[c]C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.

Table 8.3.5.17-15. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 23[a] (page 1 of 2)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Offset on fault creates impoundments, alters drainage, creates perched aquifers, or changes dip of tuff beds	Probability of offset >2 m on a fault in the C-area[c] in 10,000 yr	$<10^{-1}$	8.3.1.8 Offsets, vertical slip rates, and recurrence intervals	8.3.1.8.3.1.5(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2, 8.3.1.17.4.12
	Probability of changing dip by >2 in 10,000 yr by faulting	$<10^{-4}$	8.3.1.8 Rates of vertical slip and tilting	8.3.1.17.4.6.2
	Effect of faulting on flux	Faulting will not affect flux because of low slip rate	8.3.1.8 Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.8.3.1.4, 8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
Offset on fault juxtaposes transmissive and nontransmissive units, resulting in the creation of a perched aquifer or a rise in the water table	Probability of total offsets >2.0 m in 10,000 yr on faults within 0.5 km of C-area boundary	$<10^{-1}$	8.3.1.8 Offsets, vertical slip rates, and recurrence intervals	8.3.1.8.3.2.6(D), 8.3.1.8.3.1.3, 8.3.1.17.4.6.2, 8.3.1.17.4.12

Table 8.3.5.17-15. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 23[a] (page 2 of 2)

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Offset on fault juxtaposes transmissive and nontransmissive units, resulting in the creation of a perched aquifer or a rise in the water table (continued)	Effects of fault offsets on water-table levels	Water table will not rise to within 100 m of repository horizon in 10,000 yr	8.3.1.8 Credible offsets Hydraulic properties of faults Unsaturated-zone flow model	 8.3.1.8.3.1.3 8.3.1.8.3.3.2 8.3.1.8.3.1.4, 8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9
Climatic change causes increase in infiltration over C-area	Expected magnitude of flux change due to climatic change over next 10,000 yr	Flux change will be <0.5 mm/yr	8.3.1.5.2 Future-climate model Infiltration characteristics Unsaturated-zone flow model	 8.3.1.5.2.2.2, 8.3.1.5.1.6 8.3.1.2.2.1.2 8.3.1.2.2.8, 8.3.1.2.2.9

[a]Scenario classes, performance parameters, and parameter goals are from Section 8.3.5.13.

[b]Study or activity directly addresses scenario.

[c]C-area = the controlled area, i.e., the actual area chosen according to the 10 CFR 60.2 definition of controlled area.

Potentially adverse condition 24: Potential for the movement of radionuclides in a gaseous state through air-filled pore spaces of an unsaturated geologic medium to the accessible environment.

Gaseous transport has been identified as a potentially significant transport mechanism for a repository located in the unsaturated zone (Section 8.3.5.13). Carbon-14 is expected to be the most important radionuclide species to be transported in this mode. The total-system performance assessment is therefore investigating gas-phase C-14 releases from the waste form and the characteristics and mechanisms of gas-phase transport of C-14 in the unsaturated rock units overlying the repository in the nominal-case scenario class (Section 8.3.5.13).

Available evidence suggests that this condition may be present. The strategy for resolution of this PAC is to demonstrate that although the condition is present, it will not significantly affect the ability of the geologic repository to meet the performance objectives relating to isolation of the waste.

The information needs for the nominal-case scenario relevant to movement of C-14 in the gaseous state in the unsaturated zone are summarized in Table 8.3.5.17-16. The investigations supporting those information needs are also listed in this table. The site characterization data to be collected to address this PAC are listed by parameter category or set in Table 8.3.5.17-16. Table 8.3.5.17-16 also references the section that discusses the data to be collected and the associated studies and activities.

Discussion of the favorable conditions

This section provides individual discussions of the favorable conditions (FCs) listed in 10 CFR 60.122. For each FC, the discussion identifies the tentative strategy (present or not present) called for in Step 1 of Figure 8.3.5.17-2. Also, the potential contribution of the FC to performance is discussed, and the site characterization data needed for addressing the FC are identified.

Favorable condition 1: The nature and rates of tectonic, hydrogeologic, geochemical, and geomorphic processes (and any of such processes) operating within the geologic setting during the Quaternary Period, when projected, would not affect or would favorably affect the ability of the geologic repository to isolate waste.

Available evidence indicates that there were several processes operating during the Quaternary that, if projected into the future, would contribute to isolating waste. Certain geochemical conditions, for example, would retard the transport of radionuclides to the accessible environment. These geochemical processes include the sorbing of radionuclides by the mineralogic assemblages along the flow path and the precipitating of radionuclides out of solution. Also, the rates of erosional processes during the Quaternary were relatively low and, if continued into the future, would not disrupt the performance of the repository system. The strategy for resolving this FC

Table 8.3.5.17-16. Scenario classes and parameters associated with potentially adverse condition 24[a]

Scenario class	Performance parameter	Tentative parameter goal	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct (D)[b] or associated study or activity
Nominal case (undisturbed performance)	Fraction of carbon-14 that could be released as carbon-14 dioxide	<10% of inventory at closure	8.3.5.10.4 Model of spent-fuel release	8.3.5.10.3.3.1(D)
	Mean residence time of released carbon-14 dioxide in unsaturated-zone units	Show residence time less than 10,000 yr	8.3.1.2.2, 8.3.1.3.8.2 Gas composition, transport mechanisms, flow paths, water chemistry and physics	8.3.1.2.2.3, 8.3.1.3.8.1.1(D), 8.3.1.3.8.1.2(D)

[a]Scenario classes, performance parameters, and parameter goals are from Section 8.3.5.13.
[b]Study or activity directly addresses scenario.

with respect to these Quaternary processes is to demonstrate that they would favorably affect the ability of the repository to isolate waste.

Some aspects of the tectonic setting, however, could be disruptive if they were to continue into the future. Both faulting and volcanic activity were present within the geologic setting during the Quaternary and, depending on the extent of these processes, could adversely affect the hydrologic system by raising the water table level, changing the flow path through the unsaturated zone, changing gradients in the saturated zone, or creating surficial discharge points within the controlled area. Also, the hydrologic system within the geologic setting during the Quaternary, though generally favorable, was influenced by cyclic fluctuations in precipitation. This resulted in sometimes greater flux and higher water-table altitudes than presently exist. If these tectonic and hydrogeologic conditions were to reoccur in the future, ground-water travel time to the accessible environment could be decreased and subsequently the rate of radionuclide transport increased. The strategy for resolving this FC with respect to these potentially disruptive processes is to demonstrate that they will not affect the ability of the repository to isolate waste.

The overall strategy for resolving this FC is to test the hypothesis that it is present at the Yucca Mountain site. The various programs that are planned for site characterization will investigate the processes operating within the setting during the Quaternary and use the information as a basis for predicting future processes, events, and conditions. Overall, the geologic setting is expected to exhibit sufficient favorable characteristics to ensure waste isolation. The descriptions of the various site conditions are given in Chapters 1 through 5, and the discussions of the various characterization programs are given in Section 8.3.1. The data needed to evaluate the effects of the potentially disruptive conditions are discussed above in the issue-resolution strategies for PACs.

Favorable condition 2: For disposal in the saturated zone, hydrogeologic conditions that provide: (i) a host rock with low horizontal and vertical permeability, (ii) downward or dominantly horizontal hydraulic gradient in the host rock and surrounding hydrogeologic units, and (iii) low vertical permeability and low hydraulic potential between the host rock and surrounding hydrogeologic units.

Because disposal at the Yucca Mountain site will be in the unsaturated zone, this favorable condition is not present at the site.

Favorable condition 3: Geochemical conditions that: (i) promote precipitation or sorption of radionuclides, (ii) inhibit the formation of particulates, colloids, and inorganic and organic complexes that increase the mobility of radionuclides, or (iii) inhibit the transport of radionuclides by particulates, colloids, and complexes.

Favorable condition 3 is concerned with conditions that would reduce radionuclide transport through precipitation or sorption. This condition is

also concerned with the absence of conditions that would interfere with these processes. These conditions include the formation of or transport by particulates, colloids, and organic and inorganic complexes.

Available evidence indicates that some aspects of favorable condition 3 are expected to exist at the Yucca Mountain site. Conditions present at the site are expected to promote precipitation of some radionuclides. Present evidence indicates that many radionuclide oxides are least soluble in solutions of neutral pH (6-8). Water samples taken from wells near the site have pH values in this range. Conditions at the site are also expected to promote the sorption of radionuclides. Highly sorbing zeolitic and clay minerals are common in the tuffaceous beds of Calico Hills that underlie the proposed repository horizon. The hydrologic flow path from the proposed host rock is expected to be downward through the unsaturated Calico Hills to the saturated zone, and sorptive processes are expected to retard migrating radionuclides.

Insufficient information is available at this time to state a definite expectation regarding the formation of colloids, particulates, or complexes. Colloids may form and there may be a potential for the transport of radionuclides as colloids or as complexes or by particulates, but the relative significance or importance of these processes is not yet determined.

The strategy for resolving this FC is to demonstrate that the condition is present at the Yucca Mountain site. The geochemistry test program will investigate radionuclide sorption and solubility. Furthermore, the test program will investigate the formation and stability of radiocolloids, the sorption of radionuclides on particulates and colloid material, and the potential for transport and retardation of particulates and colloids. The test program will provide the necessary information to determine the potential for radionuclide retardation, and this information will be used in determining compliance with the waste-isolation performance objective (10 CFR 60.112, Issue 1.1, Section 8.3.5.13).

The investigations that address favorable condition 3 fall into two categories. The first category of investigations study (1) radionuclide sorption in a nonadvective and advective system and (2) the solubility of radionuclides. Investigations and studies in this category are

1. Investigation 8.3.1.3.4 (radionuclide retardation by sorption processes) including Studies 8.3.1.3.4.1 through 8.3.1.3.4.3.

2. Investigation 8.3.1.3.5 (radionuclide retardation by precipitation processes) including Studies 8.3.1.3.5.1 and 8.3.1.3.5.2.

3. Investigation 8.3.1.3.6 (radionuclide dispersion, diffusion, and advection) including Studies 8.3.1.3.6.1 and 8.3.1.3.6.2.

The second category includes investigations that study (1) radiocolloid formation and stability, (2) sorption of radionuclides by particulates or colloids, (3) the transport of radionuclides (retardation) in general and transport by colloids or particulates, and (4) the overall potential for radionuclide retardation. Investigations and studies in this category are

1. Investigation 8.3.1.3.4 (radionuclide retardation by sorption processes) including Study 8.3.1.3.4.1 and Activity 8.3.1.3.4.1.4 (sorption by particulates and colloids).

2. Investigation 8.3.1.3.5 (radionuclide retardation by precipitation processes) including Study 8.3.1.3.5.1 (colloid formation).

3. Investigation 8.3.1.3.6 (radionuclide dispersion, diffusion, and advection) including Studies 8.3.1.3.6.1 and 8.3.1.3.6.2 (transport processes) and Activity 8.3.1.3.6.1.5 (filtration particulate transport).

4. Investigation 8.3.1.3.7 (radionuclide retardation by all processes) including Study 8.3.1.3.7.1 (retardation sensitivity analysis).

The descriptions of these investigations provide detailed discussions of the studies and their interrelationships. Equally informative is the overview to the geochemistry test program (Section 8.2).

Favorable condition 4: Mineral assemblages that, when subjected to anticipated thermal loading, will remain unaltered or alter to mineral assemblages having equal or increased capacity to inhibit radionuclide migration.

Under expected repository conditions, the present high radionuclide-retardation capacity of the tuff units at Yucca Mountain is not expected to be significantly degraded and may, in fact, be increased. Zeolitic minerals (clinoptilolite and mordenite) are expected to contribute most to inhibiting radionuclide migration through sorptive processes. Most of the sorptive zeolites are located below the proposed repository horizon and are not expected to be significantly altered under the expected postemplacement thermal loading.

The minerals that could be affected by thermal loads include feldspar-silica assemblages, the heulandite-smectite assemblage, and volcanic glass. Feldspar-silica assemblages have a low sorbing capacity that is unlikely to decrease significantly under expected repository conditions. The heulandite-smectite assemblage, which together with volcanic glass comprises approximately 2 percent of the host rock, might be affected by the increase in temperature. However, the potential loss of sorption from alteration of these zeolites in the host rock represents a very small proportion of the total sorption potential of the zeolites in the underlying Calico Hills unit, where the thermal effects of the waste are expected to be much lower than in the host rock. Studies of volcanic glass alteration suggest that the glassy rock could alter to silica-feldspar-zeolite-smectite assemblages. The high sorptive properties of the zeolite-smectite assemblages could possibly enhance the overall sorptive capacities along radionuclide migration pathways.

The strategy for resolving this FC is to test the hypothesis that it is present at the Yucca Mountain site. The geochemistry test program will investigate the mineral assemblages already present at Yucca Mountain in order to adequately characterize the potential for future mineral alteration. The test program will (1) evaluate the present ground-water composition to

establish the rock, mineral, and water interactions; (2) establish the alteration history of the minerals present at Yucca Mountain; (3) experimentally investigate mineral stability; (4) establish the thermodynamic data base for mineral alteration; and (5) develop a conceptual model of mineral evolution that would allow a prediction of potential future changes in mineralogy due to the expected thermal loading. The potential mineral changes will be assessed in terms of the sensitivity of radionuclide retardation to potential mineral changes, particularly changes in sorptive minerals. The portions of the geochemistry test program that will provide this information are

1. Investigation 8.3.1.3.1 (water chemistry) including Study 8.3.1.3.1.1 (ground-water chemistry model).

2. Investigation 8.3.1.3.2 (mineralogy, petrology, and rock chemistry) including Study 8.3.1.3.2.2 (alteration history) and Activities 8.3.1.3.2.2.1 (past alteration) and 8.3.1.3.2.2.2 (heating experiments on sorbing minerals).

3. Investigation 8.3.1.3.3 (mineral and glass stability) including Studies 8.3.1.3.3.1 through 8.3.1.3.3.3 (the thermodynamic and kinetic experimental and theoretical work to develop a conceptual model of mineral evolution).

4. Investigation 8.3.1.3.7 (radionuclide retardation by all processes).

Favorable condition 5: Conditions that permit the emplacement of waste at a minimum depth of 300 meters from the ground surface. (The ground surface shall be deemed to be the elevation of the lowest point on the surface above the disturbed zone.)

The unsaturated, densely welded, devitrified portion of the Topopah Spring has been selected as the preferred repository horizon. The ranking criteria used to select the horizon included (1) ground-water travel time, (2) allowable gross thermal loading, (3) excavation stability, and (4) relative economics. In the primary area, only 50 percent of the waste could be emplaced at least 300 m below the ground surface. The strategy for resolving this FC is to claim that it is not present at the Yucca Mountain site. It will not be investigated further.

Favorable condition 6: A low population density within the geologic setting and a controlled area that is remote from population centers.

The Yucca Mountain site is located in a county with a population density of 0.5 person per square mile. This is substantially less than the average for the continental United States, which is 76 persons per square mile. Also, the controlled area is located 137 km (85 mi) by air from the city of Las Vegas, Nevada, the nearest highly populated area.

The strategy for resolving this FC is to test the hypothesis that it is present at the Yucca Mountain site. The identification of additional information that might be necessary to address population density and

distribution concerns, and subsequently provide additional evidence regarding this favorable condition, is outside the scope of this document. Information required to address population density and distribution concerns will be identified through environmental scoping hearings and presented in the environmental impact statement.

Favorable condition 7: Pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time along the fastest path of likely radionuclide travel from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment that substantially exceeds 1,000 yr.

Preliminary calculations of the ground-water travel time from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment have been made. Using an upper bound of 0.5 mm/yr for flux through the repository horizon, the mean travel time was calculated to be approximately 43,400 yr, with a range of 9,500 yr to 80,200 yr. These calculations were based on available data and the current understanding of the geohydrologic flow system.

The strategy for resolving this FC is to test the hypothesis that it is present at the Yucca Mountain site. Additional data are needed to refine the unsaturated- and saturated-zone models so that more accurate calculations can be made. Issue 1.6 (Section 8.3.5.12) addresses the NRC performance objective for pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time (10 CFR 60.113). This objective requires that the ground-water travel time from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment be at least 1,000 yr for a site to be acceptable. The strategy to demonstrate compliance with the objective, thereby resolving Issue 1.6, is presented in Section 8.3.5.12. The information needs identified in the strategy for Issue 1.6 are expected to be sufficient to determine the extent to which this favorable condition is present at Yucca Mountain, i.e., the extent to which the ground-water travel time exceeds 1,000 yr. This information is given in Section 8.3.5.12.

Favorable condition 8: For disposal in the unsaturated zone, hydrogeologic conditions that provide: (i) low and nearly constant moisture flux in the host rock and in the overlying and underlying hydrogeologic units, (ii) a water table sufficiently below the underground facility such that fully saturated voids continuous with the water table do not encounter the underground facility, (iii) a laterally extensive low-permeability hydrogeologic unit above the host rock that would inhibit the downward movement of water or divert downward moving water to a location beyond the limits of the underground facility, (iv) a host rock that provides for free drainage, or (v) a climatic regime in which the average annual historic precipitation is a small percentage of the average annual potential evapotranspiration.

The strategy for resolving this FC is to test the hypothesis that it is present at the Yucca Mountain site. Each part of the favorable condition will be discussed individually.

(i) Low and nearly constant moisture flux

This favorable characteristic is not expected to exist at the Yucca Mountain site. The moisture flux at the site is expected to be low; however, the actual magnitude of the flux is expected to vary throughout the host rock and overlying and underlying units. This variation results from variations in the matrix and fracture characteristics of the different rock units. Also, structural features such as fault zones result in areas of higher than average moisture flux.

(ii) Extent of fully saturated voids

Saturated void spaces in the unsaturated zone consist of the capillary fringe above the water table and any saturated fractures that extend from the water table upward. The zone of continuous, fully saturated voids (capillary fringe and saturated fractures) is not expected to extend above the top of the Calico Hills nonwelded unit below the repository host rock.

Current data indicate that in the area of Yucca Mountain, the water table is approximately 500 to 750 m below the ground surface. The proposed repository horizon is the densely welded, divitrified portion of the Topopah Spring Member of the Paintbrush tuff. This horizon is approximately 200 to 400 m above the water table.

(iii) Lateral diversion of infiltration

Preliminary evidence suggests that the downward movement of water will not be diverted completely beyond the limits of the underground facility. It is expected, however, that lateral diversion could occur to some extent, thus reducing the overall downward flux through the repository.

The combination of contrasting welded, highly fractured units and nonwelded, porous units with the general 3 to 8 eastward dip of the units could promote lateral diversion to some degree. The nonwelded, highly porous unit of the Paintbrush Tuff overlies the welded, highly fractured Topopah Spring unit. Because the permeability of the Topopah Spring unit is much less than the permeability of the nonwelded unit, a permeability barrier is expected at the contact. Because the pores of the overlying unit are much smaller than the fractures of the Topopah Spring unit, a capillary barrier is also expected. These barriers, together with the dip of the beds, could result in a general, eastward lateral diversion.

Structural features of high permeability could disrupt this lateral movement, however. The Ghost Dance fault, for example, could act as a conduit for downward flow through the repository horizon. The extent to which these conditions are present needs further investigation to determine their likelihood and significance.

(iv) Free drainage

It is expected that the host rock would be freely draining if flux through the host rock were to increase sufficiently to cause fracture flow. The welded Topopah Spring unit is highly fractured, which results in a high bulk permeability. Although matrix flow predominates at lower fluxes,

fracture flow would be expected at higher rates. Existing drill-hole data support a position that the fractured, welded tuff is continuous beneath the site; thus, free drainage would be expected throughout the host rock.

(v) Precipitation less than evapotranspiration

Meteorological recording stations at Yucca Mountain have not been in operation long enough to provide historically significant precipitation records. Data available from nearby recording stations (Yucca Flat and Beatty) indicate average annual precipitation values of 145 and 114 mm. The actual precipitation at Yucca Mountain is expected to be slightly higher. Taking into account the terrain and high elevation of Yucca Mountain, the average annual precipitation has been estimated to be approximately 150 mm. Potential evapotranspiration has been estimated by empirical methods to be approximately 630 mm/yr. This results in an average annual precipitation that is roughly 20 percent of the evapotranspiration.

The concerns of favorable condition 8 will be investigated through the geohydrology test program (Section 8.3.1.2). The concerns of the first four parts of this condition are included in the investigation of the unsaturated-zone hydrologic properties and conditions. These properties, shown in tabular form in Section 8.3.1.2, include fracture and matrix permeability, flux, flow velocities, matric potentials, moisture content, and infiltration rates. Collecting data on these properties will allow more quantitative analyses of the first four parts of this FC. The concerns of the fifth part, precipitation and evapotranspiration at Yucca Mountain, will be investigated through the meteorology test program (Section 8.3.1.12). The information made available through these test programs for the resolution of other issues is expected to be sufficient to determine the extent to which each aspect of this favorable condition is present and could contribute to waste isolation.

Interrelationships of the information needs

The strategies for making the demonstrations required by 10 CFR 60.122 for the potentially adverse conditions and the favorable conditions rely on the investigations and assessments of other issues, as explained in the preceding discussion. All information necessary to make these demonstrations is expected to be identified and obtained through the activities of these other issues. Because the purpose of the demonstrations required for the conditions is to show that the performance objectives can be met given the conditions present at the site, it is also expected that the goals and levels of confidence identified by the other issues are suitable for resolution of this issue. Therefore, there are no information needs identified specifically for this issue.

DOE/RW-0199

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.18, Higher Level Findings — Postclosure System and Technical Guidelines

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.18 Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.9: (a) Can the higher-level findings required by 10 CFR Part 960 be made for the qualifying condition of the postclosure system guideline and the disqualifying and qualifying conditions of the technical guidelines for geohydrology, geochemistry, rock characteristics, climatic changes, erosion, dissolution, tectonics and human interference; and (b) can the comparative evaluations required by 10 CFR 960.3-1-5 be made?

The DOE has established a set of siting guidelines to be used as a basis for evaluating the suitability of potential repository sites during the site selection process.* These siting guidelines, which are set forth in 10 CFR Part 960, are separated into two categories: those that address postclosure conditions (10 CFR 960.4) and those that address preclosure conditions (10 CFR 960.5). The manner in which the siting guidelines must be addressed during the siting process is described by DOE implementation guidelines (10 CFR 960.3).

In addition to the preclosure and postclosure guidelines, 10 CFR Part 960 describes two evaluations that will predict radionuclide releases to the accessible environment under expected conditions during the next 100,000 yr (10 CFR 960.3-1-5). These evaluations were intended to compare the expected postclosure performance of candidate sites. Given the passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 (NWPAA, 1987), such comparisons are no longer required, although the evaluation will still be performed. The first evaluation will emphasize the performance of the natural barriers; the second will emphasize the performance of the total system.

Issue 1.9 is concerned with the DOE's postclosure guidelines (Issue 1.9(a)) and the two evaluations of repository performance over 100,000 yr (Issue 1.9(b)). The discussion that follows explains how the guidelines and the evaluations will be addressed and how the necessary information will be made available. Because the guidelines and the comparative evaluations are distinct, this issue will be described in two parts.

Regulatory basis for Issue 1.9(a) of the postclosure siting guidelines

The postclosure siting guidelines consist of a system guideline and eight technical guidelines. The system guideline is concerned with the effect of the geologic setting of a site as a whole on postclosure performance of the repository system. Each technical guideline, however, is concerned with the effect of some specific aspect of the setting on postclosure performance. Each guideline has a qualifying condition that must be met for a site to be acceptable. In addition, five of the technical guidelines have at least one disqualifying condition. A site is unacceptable if any one of the disqualifying conditions is found to be present. The technical guidelines also identify favorable conditions and potentially adverse conditions

*Passage of the Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 (NWPAA, 1987) may impact the manner in which this process is implemented.

that describe characteristics of the setting that, if present, could contribute to or detract from the postclosure performance of a site.

The implementation guidelines require that the qualifying and disqualifying conditions of the system and technical guidelines be evaluated and that specific findings be made for each condition at principal decision points in the siting process. These findings are stated in 10 CFR Part 960, Appendix III, and are shown in Table 8.3.5.18-1.

Table 8.3.5.18-1. Findings for qualifying and disqualifying conditions

Disqualifying condition--lower-level findings		
Level 1	(a)	The evidence does not support a finding that the site is disqualified.
	(b)	The evidence supports a finding that the site is disqualified.
Disqualifying condition--higher-level findings		
Level 2	(a)	The evidence supports a finding that the site is not disqualified on the basis of that evidence and is not likely to be disqualified.
	(b)	The evidence supports a finding that the site is disqualified or is likely to be disqualified.
Qualifying condition--lower-level findings		
Level 3	(a)	The evidence does not support a finding that the site is not likely to meet the qualifying condition.
	(b)	The evidence supports a finding that the site is not likely to meet the qualifying condition, and therefore the site is disqualified.
Qualifying condition--higher-level findings		
Level 4	(a)	The evidence supports a finding that the site meets the qualifying condition and is likely to continue to meet the qualifying condition.
	(b)	The evidence supports a finding that the site cannot meet the qualifying condition or is unlikely to be able to meet the qualifying condition, and therefore the site is disqualified.

There are four levels of findings. Disqualifying and qualifying conditions both require a lower-level and a higher-level finding. Lower-level findings must be made to determine if a site may be nominated as suitable for characterization or recommended as a candidate site for characterization. Higher-level findings, however, must be made to determine if a site may be recommended for the development of a repository. Disqualifying conditions require Level 1 and Level 2 findings, and qualifying conditions require Level 3 and Level 4 findings. Each level has both a positive finding and a negative finding associated with it.

Table 8.3.5.18-2 shows the findings previously made for the postclosure guideline qualifying and disqualifying conditions. These findings and the evidence supporting them are given in the Yucca Mountain environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b). The available evidence was sufficient to support positive higher-level findings for the qualifying and disqualifying conditions of the dissolution technical guideline and positive lower-level findings for the qualifying and disqualifying conditions of the other postclosure technical guidelines and the postclosure system guideline. To determine if the Yucca Mountain site is suitable for the development of a repository, therefore, higher-level findings must be made for the remaining qualifying and disqualifying conditions.

The DOE siting guidelines do not require any findings similar to lower-level or higher-level findings to be made for the favorable or potentially adverse conditions of the technical guidelines. As stated in the Supplementary Information for 10 CFR Part 960, Overview of the Guidelines (DOE, 1984c), these conditions were intended to be used to predict the suitability of a site and provide a preliminary indication of system performance before the start of detailed site characterization studies. These conditions were considered and used in the identification of potentially acceptable sites, and in the nomination and recommendation of sites as suitable for characterization. By the completion of site characterization, however, sufficient data will be available to directly evaluate site performance against the qualifying conditions of the system and technical guidelines. Therefore, the favorable and potentially adverse conditions will not be considered in specific terms as they were for the environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b).

Approach to resolving Issue 1.9(a)

To resolve Issue 1.9(a), sufficient evidence must be available to support either a positive or negative higher-level finding for each qualifying and disqualifying condition associated with postclosure repository performance. Each of the qualifying conditions makes reference either directly or through the system guideline to regulatory requirements of the NRC (specifically, 10 CFR Part 60). To support higher-level findings for the qualifying conditions, evidence must show that the geologic setting as a whole (for the system guideline) and the various aspects of the setting (for the technical guidelines) will not prevent compliance with the NRC regulations. The disqualifying conditions are also related to NRC regulations, but not always as explicitly as the qualifying conditions.

Figure 8.3.5.18-1 shows the strategy for resolving Issue 1.9(a). The first step is to eliminate from further consideration the qualifying and disqualifying conditions for which higher-level findings have already been

Table 8.3.5.18-2. Preliminary findings on postclosure system and technical guidelines[a]

Postclosure guideline (10 CFR 960)		Preliminary finding[b]
960.4-1	Postclosure system	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
960.4-2-1	Geohydrology	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
(d)	Disqualifying condition	Level 1(a)
960.4-2-2	Geochemistry	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
960.4-2-3	Rock characteristics	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
960.4-2-4	Climate	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
960.4-2-5	Erosion	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
(d)	Disqualifying condition	Level 1(a)
960.4-2-6	Dissolution	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 4(a)
(d)	Disqualifying condition	Level 2(a)
960.4-2-7	Tectonics	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
(d)	Disqualifying condition	Level 1(a)
960.4-2-8-1	Natural resources	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)
(d)(1)	Disqualifying condition	Level 1(a)
(d)(2)	Disqualifying condition	Level 1(a)
960.4-2-8-2	Site ownership and control	
(a)	Qualifying condition	Level 3(a)

[a]Preliminary findings from DOE (1986b).
[b]See Table 8.3.5.18-1 for an explanation of the finding levels.


PERFORMANCE ISSUE 1.9(a) RESOLUTION STRATEGY
ADDRESS QUALIFYING OR DISQUALIFYING CONDITION
HAS A HIGHER-LEVEL FINDING BEEN MADE ?
Y
DOCUMENT PREVIOUS FINDING AND SUPPORTING EVIDENCE
N
CAN AVAILABLE EVIDENCE SUPPORT A HIGHER-LEVEL FINDING ?
Y
N
ENSURE THAT THE CONCERNS OF THE CONDITION ARE ADDRESSED BY OTHER ISSUES
REVISE STRATEGIES OF OTHER ISSUES
SITE CHARACTERIZATION
COLLECT ADDITIONAL SITE DATA
ATTEMPT RESOLUTION OF OTHER ISSUE
N
HAVE THE IDENTIFIED INFORMATION NEEDS OF THE OTHER ISSUES BEEN SATISFIED ?
N
CAN A HIGHER-LEVEL FINDING BE SUPPORTED ?
Y
Y
DOCUMENT FINDING AND EVIDENCE
SITE IS REJECTED
N
IS THE HIGHER-LEVEL FINDING POSITIVE ?
Y
SITE IS ACCEPTABLE
Y
HAVE HIGHER-LEVEL FINDINGS BEEN MADE FOR ALL CONDITIONS ?
N

Figure 8.3.5.18-1. Issue resolution strategy for Issue 1.9(a) (postclosure higher-level findings)

made. This is the case for the qualifying and disqualifying conditions of the dissolution technical guideline. Next, for each remaining condition, it is determined whether the evidence presently available is sufficient to support a higher-level finding. This evidence consists of the information presented in the Yucca Mountain environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b) and in Chapters 1 through 7 of the SCP. If the evidence is sufficient, the finding and the evidence are documented.

For the qualifying and disqualifying conditions for which there is not adequate evidence available, the planned site characterization studies are reviewed to determine if the conditions will be investigated. This is accomplished by evaluating the resolution strategies of the other postclosure performance issues that assess the ability of the site to comply with the NRC's postclosure regulatory requirements (10 CFR Part 60) (Issues 1.1 through 1.6). As discussed previously, each qualifying and disqualifying condition is linked to NRC regulatory requirements. Evidence to support a higher-level finding will be generated through evaluations of compliance with the referenced NRC regulatory requirements. If the concerns of the qualifying and immediately disqualifying conditions are being considered in the resolution strategies of the issues that assess compliance with the regulations, it can be expected that the evidence to support higher-level findings will be made available through the information and analyses that support resolution of these other issues.

After ensuring that the qualifying and disqualifying conditions will be investigated, the information necessary to evaluate resolution of the other postclosure performance issues will be obtained during site characterization. The results will be evaluated over the course of site characterization to determine if sufficient evidence is available to support higher-level findings. If the evidence is deemed sufficient at any point, the findings and the evidence will be documented. If the evidence shows that a negative higher-level finding must be made for any one of the conditions (i.e., that a disqualifying condition is present or that a qualifying condition is not present), then the site will be immediately disqualified. This evaluation will continue until positive higher-level findings can be supported for all the conditions or until a negative higher-level finding must be made.

If, in evaluating the results of the assessments, insufficient information is found to support either a positive or a negative higher-level finding for a qualifying or disqualifying condition, additional data and analyses may be necessary to satisfy existing information needs. The resolution strategies of the appropriate performance issues will be reviewed to determine if, in fact, the condition was adequately considered and the information needs satisfied. If not, the strategies for the appropriate performance issues will be revised, and new information needs will be identified as necessary, additional data will be collected, and compliance will be reassessed. This process continues until there is sufficient evidence to support either a positive or a negative higher-level finding for every qualifying and disqualifying condition.

As discussed previously, findings are not required for the favorable conditions or the potentially adverse conditions at this stage in the siting process. Site conditions that may favorably affect performance will be considered only to the extent necessary in the assessment of compliance with

the NRC regulations (Issues 1.1 through 1.6; total system performance, individual protection, ground-water protection, containment by waste package, engineered barrier system release rates, and ground-water travel time, respectively). However, since the potentially adverse conditions describe processes or events that could adversely affect postclosure performance, it would be prudent to ensure that they are being considered in the appropriate performance assessments performed in support of the other performance issues. The concerns of the potentially adverse conditions of 10 CFR Part 960 are very similar to the concerns of the potentially adverse conditions of the NRC's siting criteria (10 CFR 60.122), which are addressed by Issue 1.8 (Section 8.3.5.17). The strategy for addressing the potentially adverse conditions of the NRC siting criteria is to link each of the conditions to the site characteristics and disruptive scenarios being considered in the assessments of postclosure performance of the total repository system (Issue 1.1, Section 8.3.5.13) and the engineered barrier system (Issue 1.4, Section 8.3.5.9, and Issue 1.5, Section 8.3.5.10). This will ensure that the effects on postclosure performance of each of the potentially adverse conditions of the NRC siting criteria will be evaluated. Because of the similarity of the NRC's potentially adverse conditions to the DOE's potentially adverse conditions, the DOE's analysis indicates that the information and evaluations performed to support resolution of Issue 1.8 (NRC siting criteria) will ensure that the effects of the DOE's potentially adverse conditions on postclosure performance will be adequately evaluated.

The following is a discussion of the qualifying condition of the postclosure system guideline and of each of the qualifying and disqualifying conditions of the postclosure technical guidelines. The ties of each condition to the NRC regulations are explained, and the postclosure performance issue resolution strategies that will be relied upon are identified. The information relevant to each guideline, which will be collected during site characterization and used in the resolution of the other issues, is also given.

System guideline qualifying condition

The qualifying condition of the postclosure system guideline is stated in 10 CFR 960.4-1(a) as follows:

> The geologic setting at the site shall allow for the physical separation of radioactive waste from the accessible environment after closure in accordance with the requirements of 40 CFR Part 191, Subpart B, as implemented by the provisions of 10 CFR Part 60. The geologic setting at the site will allow for the use of engineered barriers to ensure compliance with the requirements of 40 CFR Part 191 and 10 CFR Part 60

This qualifying condition is concerned with the overall compatibility of the geologic setting with the isolation of waste. To satisfy this condition, evidence must demonstrate that the characteristics of the geologic setting were investigated and that they do not prevent compliance with the EPA's requirements for the physical separation of radioactive waste from the accessible environment after closure (40 CFR Part 191, Subpart B, as implemented by 10 CFR 60.112) or prevent the use of engineered barriers to

ensure compliance with these requirements or those separate requirements established by the NRC for particular barriers (10 CFR 60.113).

The requirements of 40 CFR Part 191, Subpart B, as implemented by 10 CFR Part 60, are addressed through Issues 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3. Issue 1.1 assesses radioactive releases to the accessible environment during the next 10,000 yr (40 CFR 191.13, as implemented by 10 CFR 60.112). Issue 1.2 evaluates individual doses in the accessible environment (40 CFR 191.15). Issue 1.3 is concerned with the protection of special sources of ground water (40 CFR 191.16).

The NRC's requirements for particular barriers after permanent closure are contained in 10 CFR 60.113, which establishes the requirements for the performance of the engineered barrier system with respect to waste package containment period, limits on the rate of releases from the engineered barrier system, and requirements for the geologic setting with respect to the pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time. These requirements are addressed by Issues 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6, respectively.

The information that will be used to support a higher-level finding for this qualifying condition, therefore, is a compilation of all the site characteristics identified and evaluated through the issue resolution strategies of Issues 1.1 through 1.6, and evidence that these site characteristics will not prevent the resolution of these six issues.

Issues 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 are discussed in Sections 8.3.5.13, 8.3.5.14, and 8.3.5.15. Issues 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 are discussed in Section 8.3.5.9, 8.3.5.10 and 8.3.5.12. The site information that will be considered and evaluated in the resolution of these issues is described in these sections. Collectively, this represents the information upon which a higher-level finding for the system guideline qualifying condition will be based. The higher-level findings, however, may be made before all of the information that will support resolution of these issues in the license application becomes available.

Geohydrology technical guideline

The geohydrology technical guideline has one qualifying condition and one disqualifying condition.

Qualifying condition. The qualifying condition for the geohydrology technical guideline is stated in 10 CFR 960.4-2-1(a) as follows:

> The present and expected geohydrologic setting of a site shall be compatible with waste containment and isolation. The geohydrologic setting, considering the characteristics of and the processes operating within the geologic setting, shall permit compliance with (1) the requirements specified in Section 960.4-1 for radionuclide releases to the accessible environment and (2) the requirements specified in 10 CFR 60.113 for radionuclide releases from the engineered-barrier system using reasonably available technology.

The qualifying condition for the geohydrology technical guideline requires that the present and expected geohydrologic setting permit

compliance with the postclosure system guideline qualifying condition (Section 960.4-1). As explained in the discussion of the system guideline qualifying condition, the requirements of that qualifying condition are addressed by Issues 1.1 through 1.6.

The geohydrology qualifying condition also specifically requires that the geohydrologic setting permit compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 60.113: radionuclide containment within the waste package, limits on allowable releases from the engineered barrier system, and a minimum pre-waste-emplacement ground-water travel time from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment. These three performance requirements are addressed by Issues 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 (Sections 8.3.5.9, 8.3.5.10, and 8.3.5.12), respectively.

The evidence to support a higher-level finding for this qualifying condition, therefore, will be made available through the analyses used to evaluate resolution of Issues 1.1 through 1.6. The evidence will show how the geohydrologic setting was considered in these evaluations and that these characteristics will not prevent the resolution of these issues. Table 8.3.5.18-3 shows the general present and expected characteristics of the geohydrologic setting that will be considered by each issue. A more detailed discussion of how these characteristics will be evaluated in the resolution of each issue is presented in the SCP section addressing that issue.

Disqualifying condition. The disqualifying condition for the geohydrology technical guideline is stated in 10 CFR 960.4-2-1(d) as follows:

> A site shall be disqualified if the pre-waste emplacement ground-water travel time from the disturbed zone to the accessible environment is expected to be less than 1,000 yr along any pathway of likely and significant radionuclide travel.

This disqualifying condition is essentially the same as the NRC's pre-waste emplacement ground-water travel time objective, stated in 10 CFR 60.113(a)(2). Issue 1.6 addresses the NRC's ground-water travel time objective. In the process of resolving Issue 1.6, the site information and the calculational models necessary to determine the ground-water travel times and ultimately demonstrate compliance with the objective will be compiled. All the information necessary to support a higher level finding for the geohydrology disqualifying condition, therefore, will be provided by Issue 1.6. This information is discussed in greater detail in Section 8.3.5.12.

Geochemistry technical guideline

The geochemistry technical guideline has one qualifying condition and no disqualifying conditions.

Qualifying condition. The qualifying condition for the geochemistry technical guideline is stated in 10 CFR 960.4-2-2(a) as follows:

> The present and expected geochemical characteristics of a site shall be compatible with waste containment and isolation. Considering the likely chemical interactions among radionuclides, the host rock, and the ground water, the characteristics of and the

Table 8.3.5.18-3. Geohydrologic characteristics considered in making a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the geohydrology technical guideline, and issues for which the information will be obtained

Issue	Information
1.1	Same characteristics as used by Issue 1.6 below Disruptive conditions Increase in percolation flux Change in water-table altitude Change in saturated-zone head gradients Creation of surficial discharge points
1.2	Same characteristics as used by Issue 1.6 below
1.3	Regional hydrogeologic reconnaissance of the site Regional ground-water flow system Ground-water uses Site hydrogeologic system Aquifer communication Aquifer contamination potential
1.4	Water flow mechanism in the host rock Quantity of water flow in contact with waste packages
1.5	Water flow mechanism in the host rock Quantity of water flow in contact with waste packages
1.6	Unsaturated zone characteristics Flux Moisture content Pressure head (matric potential) Saturation Moisture retention curve Permeability Saturated zone characteristics Flux Pressure head Saturated permeability Aquifer geometry Water-table altitude

processes operating within the geologic setting shall permit compliance with (1) the requirements specified in Section 960.4-1 for radionuclide releases to the accessible environment and (2) the

> requirements specified in 10 CFR 60.113 for radionuclide releases from the engineered-barrier system using reasonably available technology.

The qualifying condition for the geochemistry technical guideline requires that the present and expected geochemical setting permit compliance with the postclosure system guideline qualifying condition (Section 960.4-1). As explained in the discussion of the system guideline qualifying condition, the requirements of the system guideline qualifying condition are addressed by Issues 1.1 through 1.6.

The geochemistry qualifying condition also specifically requires that the geochemical setting permit compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 60.113: radionuclide containment within the waste package, limits on allowable releases from the engineered barrier system, and a minimum pre-waste emplacement ground-water travel time from the underground facility to the accessible environment. These three performance requirements are addressed by Issues 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 (Sections 8.3.5.9, 8.3.5.10, and 8.3.5.12), respectively.

The evidence to support a higher-level finding for this qualifying condition, therefore, will be made available through the analyses used to evaluate the resolution of Issues 1.1 through 1.6. The evidence will show how the geochemical setting was considered and that these characteristics will not prevent the resolution of these issues. Table 8.3.5.18-4 shows the general present and expected characteristics of the geochemical setting that will be considered during the resolution of each issue. A more detailed discussion of how these characteristics will be evaluated in the resolution of each issue is presented in the SCP section addressing that issue.

Rock characteristics technical guideline

The rock characteristics technical guideline has one qualifying condition and no disqualifying conditions.

Qualifying condition. The qualifying condition for the rock characteristics technical guideline is stated in 10 CFR 960.4-2-3(a) as follows:

> The present and expected characteristics of the host rock and surrounding units shall be capable of accommodating the thermal, chemical, mechanical, and radiation stresses expected to be induced by repository construction, operation, and closure and by expected interactions among the waste, host rock, ground water, and engineered components. The characteristics of and the processes operating within the geologic setting shall permit compliance with (1) the requirements specified in Section 960.4-1 for radionuclide releases to the accessible environment and (2) the requirements set forth in 10 CFR 60.113 for radionuclide releases from the engineered-barrier system using reasonably available technology.

The qualifying condition for the rock characteristics technical guideline requires that the present and expected characteristics of the host rock and surrounding units permit compliance with the postclosure system guideline qualifying condition (Section 960.4-1). As explained in the discussion of

Table 8.3.5.18-4. Geochemical characteristics considered in making a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the geochemistry technical guideline, and issues for which the information will be obtained

Issue	Information
1.1	Coupling factors and radionuclide retardation factors Gas-phase carbon-14 transport characteristics Disruptive conditions Change in ground-water chemistry Change in unsaturated zone K_d values Change in saturated zone K_d values
1.2	Coupling factors and radionuclide retardation factors Gas-phase carbon-14 transport characteristics
1.3	No geochemistry information needed
1.4	Ground-water chemistry in host rock
1.5	Ground-water chemistry in host rock
1.6	No geochemistry information needed

the system guideline qualifying condition, the requirements of that qualifying condition are addressed by Issues 1.1 through 1.6.

The rock characteristics qualifying condition also specifically requires that the rock characteristics permit compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 60.113: radionuclide containment within the waste package, limits on allowable releases from the engineered barrier system, and a minimum pre-waste emplacement ground-water travel time from the underground facility to the accessible environment. These three performance requirements are addressed by Issues 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 (Sections 8.3.5.9, 8.3.5.10, and 8.3.5.12), respectively.

The evidence to support a higher-level finding for this qualifying condition, therefore, will be made available through the analyses used to evaluate resolution of Issues 1.1 through 1.6. The evidence will show how the rock characteristics of the geologic setting were considered in these evaluations. Table 8.3.5.18-5 shows the present and expected rock characteristics of the geologic setting that will be considered by each issue. A more detailed discussion of how these characteristics will be evaluated in the resolution of each issue is presented in the SCP section addressing that issue.

Table 8.3.5.18-5. Rock characteristics considered in making a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the rock characteristics technical guideline, and issues for which the information will be obtained

Issue	Information
1.1	Unsaturated zone characteristics Effective porosity Location of geologic unit contacts Fault zone characteristics Bulk density Fracture frequency Saturated zone characteristics Effective thickness Effective porosity Fracture compressibility Matrix-fracture interface constrictivity-tortuousity factors Fracture frequency Fault zone characteristics
1.2	Same characteristics as those used by Issue 1.1
1.3	No rock characteristics information required
1.4	No rock characteristics information required
1.5	No rock characteristics information required
1.6	Unsaturated zone characteristics In situ temperature Bulk density Effective porosity Hydrologic unit contact altitudes Fault displacement Fault locations Saturated zone characteristics Bulk density Effective porosity Aquifer geometry Lithologic unit contact altitudes Fault displacement Fault locations Fracture characteristics

Climatic changes technical guideline

The climatic changes technical guideline has one qualifying condition and no disqualifying conditions.

Qualifying condition. The qualifying condition for the climatic changes technical guideline is stated in 10 CFR 960.4-2-4(a) as follows:

> The site shall be located where future climatic conditions will not be likely to lead to radionuclide releases greater than those allowable under the requirements specified in Section 960.4-1. In predicting the likely future climatic conditions at a site, the DOE will consider the global, regional, and site climatic patterns during the Quaternary Period, considering the geomorphic evidence of the climatic conditions in the geologic setting.

The future climatic conditions at the site are expected to have some effect on the geohydrologic characteristics of the site during the next 10,000 yr. The qualifying condition for the climatic-changes technical guideline requires that the future climatic conditions, both expected and unexpected, permit compliance with the postclosure system guideline qualifying condition (10 CFR 960.4-1). As explained in the discussion of the system guideline qualifying condition, the requirements of the postclosure system guideline qualifying condition are addressed by Issues 1.1 through 1.6.

Future climatic conditions will be investigated during site characterization to establish the potential for unexpected disruptive changes to the hydrologic system as a result of unexpected, yet credible, climatic conditions. These unexpected changes in the geohydrologic setting will be factored into the evaluations for resolution of Issue 1.1.

The requirements of 40 CFR 191.13, 40 CFR 191.15, and 40 CFR 191.16, which are addressed by Issues 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, and of 10 CFR 60.113, which is addressed by Issues 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6, are concerned with the undisturbed expected performance of the repository system. Future expected climatic conditions will be factored into the resolution of these issues through the evaluation of the expected geohydrologic setting. Issue 1.1 must also take disruptive processes and events into account.

The evidence to support a higher-level finding will consist of demonstrations that future climatic conditions, both expected and unexpected, have been investigated and that these conditions will not prevent the resolution of Issues 1.1 through 1.5. Table 8.3.5.18-6 shows the effects of future unexpected disruptive climatic conditions that will be considered specifically during the resolution of Issue 1.1. The way in which these effects will be evaluated in the resolution of Issue 1.1 is discussed in Section 8.3.5.13. As stated previously, the effects of expected conditions will be incorporated in the resolution of the other issues through the development and evaluation of the expected geohydrologic setting.

Table 8.3.5.18-6. Effects of future climatic conditions considered in making a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the climatic change technical guideline and in the resolution of Issue 1.1

Issue	Information
1.1	Disruptive conditions: Change in infiltration through host rock Change in water table altitude Change in saturated-zone head gradients Creation of surficial discharge points

Erosion technical guideline

The erosion technical guideline has one qualifying condition and one disqualifying condition.

Qualifying condition. The qualifying condition for the erosion technical guideline is stated in 10 CFR 960.4-2-5(a) as follows:

> The site shall allow the underground facility to be placed at a depth such that the erosional processes acting upon the surface will not be likely to lead to radionuclide releases greater than those allowable under the requirements specified in Section 960.4-1. In predicting the likelihood of potentially disruptive erosional processes, the DOE will consider the climatic, tectonic, and geomorphic evidence of rates and patterns of erosion in the geologic setting during the Quaternary Period.

Hypothetically, future erosional processes could affect the transport of radionuclides to the accessible environment by decreasing the thickness of the overburden, or by creating surficial discharge points between the underground facility and the boundary of the accessible environment. The qualifying condition for the erosion technical guideline requires that the future erosional processes, both expected and unexpected, permit compliance with the postclosure system guideline qualifying condition (10 CFR 960.4-1). As explained in the discussion of the system guideline qualifying condition, the requirements of the postclosure system guideline qualifying condition are addressed by Issues 1.1 through 1.6.

The requirements of 40 CFR 191.13, 40 CFR 191.15, and 40 CFR 191.16, which are addressed by Issues 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, and of 10 CFR 60.113, which are addressed by Issues 1.4 and 1.5, are concerned with the undisturbed expected performance of the repository system (the requirement of 10 CFR 60.113 addressed by Issue 1.6 considers pre-emplacement conditions). Future

expected erosional processes will be investigated during site characterization and will be factored into the resolution of these issues through the evaluation of the expected geohydrologic setting and rock characteristics. Issue 1.11 must also take into account disruptive processes and events. As discussed in Section 8.3.5.13, erosion has been considered in the identification of disruptive scenarios. Erosional processes at the Yucca Mountain site have been evaluated and no disruptive scenarios associated with erosional processes have been found that are credible at the site during the next 10,000 yr. Evidence to support this position is presented in Chapter 1.

Disqualifying condition. The disqualifying condition for the erosion technical guideline is stated in 10 CFR 960.4-2-5(d) as follows:

> The site shall be disqualified if site conditions do not allow all portions of the underground facility to be situated at least 200 m below the directly overlying ground surface.

A positive higher-level finding can be made for the disqualifying condition on erosion on the basis of the geologic unit selected for the repository location and the conceptual design for the repository, which place the repository at a depth in excess of 200 m from the overlying ground surface (Chapter 6).

Dissolution technical guideline

The dissolution technical guideline has one qualifying condition and one disqualifying condition. The qualifying condition is stated in 10 CFR 960.4-2-6(a) as follows:

> The site shall be located such that any subsurface rock dissolution will not be likely to lead to radionuclide releases greater than those allowable under the requirements specified in Section 960.4-1. In predicting the likelihood of dissolution within the geologic setting at a site, the DOE will consider the evidence of dissolution within that setting during the Quaternary Period, including the locations and characteristics of dissolution fronts or other dissolution features, if identified.

The disqualifying condition is stated in 10 CFR 960.4-2-6(d) as follows:

> The site will be disqualified if it is likely that, during the first 10,000 yr after closure, active dissolution, as predicted on the basis of the geologic record, would result in a loss of waste isolation.

Positive higher-level findings have been made previously for these two conditions for the Yucca Mountain site. The evidence supporting these higher-level findings is presented in Chapter 6 of the Yucca Mountain environmental assessment (DOE, 1986b). Since higher-level findings have been made, the dissolution technical guideline does not need to be considered further.

Tectonics technical guideline

The tectonics technical guideline has one qualifying condition and one disqualifying condition.

Qualifying condition. The qualifying condition for the tectonics technical guideline is stated in 10 CFR 960.4-2-7(a) as follows:

> The site shall be located in a geologic setting where future tectonic processes or events will not be likely to lead to radionuclide releases greater than those allowable under the requirements specified in Section 960.4-1. In predicting the likelihood of potentially disruptive tectonic processes or events, the DOE will consider the structural, stratigraphic, geophysical, and seismic evidence for the nature and rates of tectonic processes and events in the geologic setting during the Quaternary Period.

Future tectonic activity at the site is expected to have some effect on the geohydrologic and rock characteristics of the site during the next 10,000 yr. The qualifying condition for the tectonics technical guideline requires that future tectonic activity, both expected and unexpected, permit compliance with the postclosure system guideline qualifying condition (10 CFR 960.4-1). Predictions of future tectonic activity will be based on the evidence of such activity during the Quaternary. As explained in the discussion of the system guideline qualifying condition, the requirements of the postclosure system guideline qualifying condition are addressed by Issues 1.1 through 1.6.

Future tectonic activity will be investigated during site characterization to establish the potential for unexpected disruptive changes to the expected conditions as a result of unexpected, yet credible, tectonic events and processes.

The requirements of 40 CFR 191.13, 40 CFR 191.15, and 40 CFR 191.16, which are addressed by Issues 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3, and of 10 CFR 60.113, which are addressed by Issues 1.4 and 1.5, are concerned with the undisturbed expected performance of the repository system (the requirement of 10 CFR 60.113 addressed by Issue 1.6 considers pre-emplacement conditions). Future likely tectonic activity will be factored into the resolution of these issues through the evaluation of the expected geohydrologic and rock characteristics. Issue 1.1 must also take disruptive processes and events into account.

The evidence to support a higher-level finding will consist of demonstrations that the potential for future tectonic activity has been investigated and that any such activity will not prevent the resolution of this issue. Table 8.3.5.18-7 shows the effects of future disruptive tectonic activity that will be considered during the resolution of Issue 1.1. The way in which these effects will be evaluated in the resolution of Issue 1.1 is discussed in Section 8.3.5.13.

Table 8.3.5.18-7. Effects of future tectonic activity considered in making a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the tectonics technical guideline and in the resolution of Issue 1.1

Issue	Information
1.1	Structural deformation Rupturing waste packages Increasing water table altitude Increasing percolation flux Altering hydraulic gradients Diverting flow pathways Igneous activity Causing direct releases Rupturing waste packages Altering hydraulic gradients Diverting flow pathways Increasing water table altitude Ground motion Closure of borehole air gap

Disqualifying condition. The disqualifying condition for the tectonics technical guideline is stated in 10 CFR 960.4-2-7(d) as follows:

> A site shall be disqualified if, based on the geologic record during the Quaternary Period, the nature and rates of fault movement or other ground motion are expected to be such that a loss of waste isolation is likely to occur.

This disqualifying condition is concerned with future fault movement or other tectonics-related ground motion disrupting the geologic setting during the next 10,000 yr such that isolation will be adversely affected. The DOE defines isolation in 10 CFR 960.2 as "inhibiting the transport of radioactive material so that the amounts and concentrations of this material entering the accessible environment will be kept within prescribed limits." The prescribed limits are those limits set forth by the EPA in 40 CFR Part 191, Appendix A and implemented by 10 CFR 60.112. The effects of fault movement or other ground motion on waste isolation will be evaluated as part of the evaluation of the tectonics guideline qualifying condition for expected performance.

Human interference technical guideline

This technical guideline has two parts. The first part is concerned with natural resources and has one qualifying condition and two disqualifying conditions. The second part is concerned with site ownership and control, and has one qualifying condition.

Natural resources qualifying condition. The natural resources qualifying condition of the human interference technical guideline is stated in 10 CFR 960.4-2-8-1(a) as follows:

> This site shall be located such that--considering permanent markers and records and reasonable projections of value, scarcity, and technology-- the natural resources, including ground water suitable for crop irrigation or human consumption without treatment, present at or near the site will not be likely to give rise to interference activities that would lead to radionuclide releases greater than those allowable under the requirements specified in Section 960.4-1.

The presence of natural resources at a site has the potential to encourage activities that could interfere with the isolation of waste. Human activities could result in direct releases, if the waste containers were penetrated and waste brought to the surface, or could affect isolation in other ways, such as a shortening of travel pathways by ground-water removal. The natural resource qualifying condition requires that the extent of natural resources at the site be such that retrieval activities in the future would not be likely, so that compliance with the postclosure system guideline would not be prevented. As explained, the requirements of the system guideline are addressed by Issues 1.1 through 1.6.

The requirements of 40 CFR 191.15 and 40 CFR 191.16, which are addressed by Issues 1.2 and 1.3, and of 10 CFR 60.113, which are addressed by Issues 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6, are only concerned with the undisturbed performance of the repository system (the requirement of 10 CFR 60.113 addressed by Issue 1.6 considers pre-waste-emplacement conditions). Since human intrusion due to the potential for natural resources is considered a disruptive scenario, the evidence to support a higher-level finding for this qualifying condition will be made available through the information and analyses used to support resolution of Issue 1.1, which will consider the long-term performance of the system and take disruptive processes and events into account. The evidence will consist of demonstrations that the potential for future human interference has been investigated and will not prevent the resolution of this issue. Table 8.3.5.18-8 shows the future human activities that will be considered during the resolution of Issue 1.1. The way in which these effects will be evaluated in the resolution of Issue 1.1 is discussed in Section 8.3.5.13.

Table 8.3.5.18-8. Effects of human activities considered in making a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition of the human interference technical guideline and in the resolution of Issue 1.1

Issue	Information
1.1	Irrigation Change in flux through repository horizon Change in water-table altitude Change in saturated-zone head gradients Ground-water withdrawal Change in water-table altitude Change in saturated-zone head gradients Surface and subsurface mining Change in water-table altitude Change in saturated-zone head gradients Construction of surface water impoundments Change in flux through repository horizon Change in water-table altitude Change in saturated-zone head gradients Exploratory drilling Potential for and effects of interception of waste by exploratory drilling

Natural resources disqualifying conditions. There are two disqualifying conditions for the natural resources section of the human interference technical guideline. They are stated in 10 CFR 960.4-2-8-1(d) as follows:

A site shall be disqualified if

1. Previous exploration, mining, or extraction activities for resources of commercial importance at the site have created significant pathways between the projected underground facility and the accessible environment; or

2. Ongoing or likely future activities to recover presently valuable natural mineral resources outside the controlled area would be expected to lead to an inadvertent loss of waste isolation.

This disqualifying condition is essentially the inverse of the natural resources qualifying condition discussed previously. (In establishing the disruptive scenarios associated with human activities that could occur at the

site, previous exploration, mining, and extraction activities are investigated.) Therefore, the same evidence that will support a higher-level finding for the qualifying condition will be sufficient to support a higher-level finding for this disqualifying condition.

Site ownership and control technical guideline

Site ownership and control qualifying condition. The site ownership and control qualifying condition of the human interference technical guideline is stated in 10 CFR 960.4-2-8-2(a) as follows:

> The site shall be located on land for which the DOE can obtain, in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR Part 60, ownership, surface and subsurface rights, and control of access that are required in order that potential surface and subsurface activities at the site will not be likely to lead to radionuclide releases greater than those allowable under the requirements specified in Section 960.4-1.

The concern of this qualifying condition is an institutional one related to acquiring sufficient land for the controlled area in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 60.121. DOE ownership and control of this land is expected to decrease the potential for future human interference activities. The institutional concerns of this guideline condition are outside the scope of site characterization as defined by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act (NWPA, 1983) and, hence, are outside the scope of the SCP. The issue of land acquisition will be addressed in future environmental program planning (see Section 8.3.1.11).

Regulatory basis for Issue 1.9(b) of the postclosure siting guideline

Comparative evaluations of postclosure performance, as stipulated in 10 CFR 960.3-1-5, are no longer needed as the result of the passage of the NWPAA (NWPAA, 1987). Following the characterization of the Yucca Mountain site and before recommending the site for the development of a repository, the DOE will nevertheless evaluate the postclosure performance of the repository system. The NRC implementation guidelines (10 CFR 960.3-1-5) will be followed in making these evaluations. The guidelines state that "predicted releases of radionuclides to the accessible environment" will be evaluated by combining "releases of different radionuclides...by the methods specified in Appendix A of 40 CFR Part 191."

Two evaluations are required to predict releases for 100,000 yr after repository closure. The first evaluation will emphasize the performance of the natural barriers at the site. The second evaluation will (1) consider the expected performance of the repository system; (2) be based on the expected performance of waste packages and waste forms, in compliance with the requirements of 10 CFR 60.113, and on the expected hydrologic and geochemical conditions at the site; and (3) take credit for the expected performance of all other engineered components of the repository system.

In making these evaluations, the DOE will only consider natural processes and events that are considered likely to occur or exist at the site over the next 100,000 yr.

Approach to resolving Issue 1.9(b)

Issue 1.1 addresses the NRC's overall system performance objective (10 CFR 60.112). For the resolution of Issue 1.1, an assessment of the total system performance will be made to predict the performance of the total repository system over the next 10,000 yr. This assessment will consider both undisturbed and disturbed conditions. Undisturbed conditions are those processes and events that have a probability greater than 0.1 of occurring or existing at the site during the next 10,000 yr. Disturbed conditions are those processes and events that have a probability between 0.1 and 0.0001 of occurring or existing during the next 10,000 yr at the site. Processes and events that have a probability of less than 0.0001 of occurring or existing at the site during the next 10,000 yr are considered incredible and will not be considered.

Scenario classes have been identified to describe the events and processes. These scenario classes are described in Section 8.3.5.13. Through the resolution strategy of Issue 1.1, performance measures and parameters have been identified to address the scenario classes.

To resolve Issue 1.9(b), the DOE will rely on the same strategy used to resolve Issue 1.1, with a few modifications. The nominal scenario class, the class describing undisturbed conditions, will be expanded to include those processes and events that have a probability of greater than 0.1 of occurring during the next 100,000 yr. This means that certain scenario classes considered to represent disturbed conditions over the 10,000-yr performance period may fall within the nominal scenario class for the 100,000-yr performance period. The same total system model and submodels used to resolve Issue 1.1 will be used for Issue 1.9(b), however, additional information may be necessary. Disturbed scenario classes--those within a probability of less than 0.1 of occurring at the site during the next 100,000 yr--are considered to be incredible and need not be considered.

Figure 8.3.5.18-2 shows this strategy. The first step is to evaluate the nominal and disturbed-performance scenario classes that are being considered in the assessment of the 10,000-yr performance of Issue 1.1. Those conditions that are within the 10,000-yr nominal-performance scenario class will also be considered in the nominal-performance scenario class for the 100,000-yr evaluation. In addition, the 100,000 yr nominal scenario class may need to be expanded because (1) some of the disturbed-performance scenario classes of the 10,000-yr assessment may become part of the nominal-performance scenario class of the 100,000-yr evaluation, and (2) some events and processes eliminated from consideration in the 10,000-yr assessment may need to be considered in the 100,000-yr nominal-performance scenario class. In both cases, this will depend upon the probability of occurrence of the events of these scenario classes, i.e., if the probability of realization during the next 100,000 yr is greater than 0.1. The determination of events and processes that need to be considered, as in the assessment of 10,000-yr performance, are identified based on available evidence and professional judgment and will be revised as necessary based on new information.

The next step, once the nominal performance scenario class of events and processes is established, is to determine what information is required to evaluate the scenario class and assess the performance of the repository


PERFORMANCE ISSUE 1.9(b) RESOLUTION STRATEGY
EVALUATE NOMINAL AND DISRUPTIVE SCENARIO CLASSES BEING CONSIDERED IN THE RESOLUTION OF ISSUE 1.1
BASED ON AVAILABLE EVIDENCE AND PROFESSIONAL JUDGEMENT, ESTABLISH THE NOMINAL CASE FOR THE 100,000 YR ASSESSMENT
WILL THE DATA REQUIREMENTS OF ISSUE 1.1 SUFFICE FOR ISSUE 1.9(b) ?
N
IDENTIFY NEW INFORMATION NEEDS
Y
HAVE THE IDENTIFIED INFORMATION NEEDS BEEN SATISFIED ?
Y
N
SITE CHARACTERIZATION
EVALUATE PERFORMANCE OF NATURAL BARRIER SYSTEM OVER 100,000 YR
EVALUATE PERFORMANCE OF TOTAL SYSTEM OVER 100,000 YR
ARE THE ASSESSMENTS ADEQUATE ?
N
Y
DOCUMENT RESULTS OF THE 100,000-YR. EVALUATIONS

Figure 8.3.5.18-2. Resolution strategy for Issue 1.9(b).

during the next 100,000 yr. This is accomplished by evaluating the data requirements of Issue 1.1. As mentioned previously, the models used in the 10,000-yr performance are sufficient to evaluate 100,000-yr performance. The only additional information would be the information needed to address events and processes that were not included in either the nominal or disturbed-performance scenario classes of Issue 1.1, or the information necessary to address events or processes over 100,000 yr that would not be adequately addressed by data for the 10,000-yr period.

Once these data needs are established, site characterization is conducted. The necessary information is collected during this phase, and the 100,000-yr performance of the repository is assessed, based on the 100,000-yr nominal-performance scenario class and using the same techniques, models, etc., as those used in the resolution of Issue 1.1. With respect to a radionuclide source term, two evaluations are made, in accordance with 10 CFR 960.3-1-5. The first will assess the performance of the repository system, using as a source term a range of release rates bounded by a factor of ten above and below the rates specified in 10 CFR 60.113, thus emphasizing the isolation capabilities of the site's natural barriers. The second assessment will use as a radionuclide source term the actual expected performance of the engineered barrier system. This will allow full assessment of all aspects of the repository system at the site.

If during these evaluations insufficient information is available to assess the 100,000-yr performance, the data base will be reviewed. If the information identified is found adequate, but the data to satisfy the information needs are not, additional data will be collected. Otherwise, additional information needs may be necessary to assess 100,000-yr performance.

This reevaluation will continue until a satisfactory assessment of 100,000-yr performance is attained. The results of both evaluations will then be documented and used in the recommendation of the site for development of a repository.

The steps of this resolution strategy have been completed through the identification of information needs. It has been determined, using the same information, evaluations, and judgment used in constructing the scenario classes of Issue 1.1, that the only conditions that need to be added to the nominal-performance scenario class of Issue 1.1 to form the nominal-performance scenario class for Issue 1.9(b) are those conditions associated with climatic events and processes. Over the 10,000-yr period, the DOE has determined that disruptive climatic changes have a probability of occurring of less than 0.1 and are therefore considered in the disturbed-performance scenario classes. However, over the 100,000-yr period these changes are expected to have a probability of occurring of greater than 0.1, and therefore need to be included in the 100,000-yr nominal-performance scenario class. The tectonic events and processes that were determined to have a probability of realization of less than 0.1 during the next 10,000 yr (and are, therefore, included in the disturbed-performance scenario classes of Issue 1.1) are expected to also have a probability of realization of less than 0.1 for the 100,000-yr period and hence need not be considered. Also, the disturbed-performance scenario classes of Issue 1.1 that were associated with human activities need not be considered in the 100,000-yr assessments since they are not natural events or processes. As for the other events and processes

that were part of the nominal-performance scenario class of Issue 1.1 and will also be part of the nominal-performance scenario class of Issue 1.9(b), the information required for the 10,000-yr assessment will be sufficient for the 100,000-yr assessment.

The information needed to supplement that information required by Issue 1.1 to assess 100,000-yr performance is shown in Table 8.3.5.18-9. This information will be obtained through the climate test program (Section 8.3.1.5). This information, with the information and analyses of Issue 1.1, is expected to be sufficient to make the two 100,000-yr performance evaluations as required by 10 CFR 960.3-1-5. In addition, the data required to evaluate the tectonic-related disturbed-performance scenario classes of Issue 1.1 will provide evidence to support the position that, over the 100,000-yr period, tectonic events would not be part of the nominal-performance scenario class. As mentioned, the positions taken with regard to the events and processes included in the 100,000-yr nominal-performance scenario class will be modified as necessary as new site data becomes available.

Table 8.3.5.18-9. Scenarios and parameters associated with the 10,000-yr disturbed-performance scenario class that need to be added to the 100,000-yr nominal-performance scenario class (page 1 of 2)

Scenario class (from Section 8.3.5.13)	Performance parameter (adapted from Section 8.3.5.13)	Tentative parameter goal (adapted from Section 8.3.5.13)	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct or associated study or activity[a]
Climatic change causes increase in infiltration over controlled area[b]	Expected magnitude of flux change due to climatic changes over next 100,000 yr	Show expected flux change will be less than 5 mm	8.3.1.5.2 Future climate model	8.3.1.5.2.2.2(D) 8.3.1.5.1.6
			Infiltration characteristics	8.3.1.2.2.1
			Unsaturated-zone flow model	8.3.1.2.2.9
Climatic change causes an increase in altitude of water table	Expected magnitude of change in water-table level due to climatic changes over the next 100,000 yr	Show expected magnitude of water-table rise will be less than 100 m	8.3.1.5.2 Future climate model	8.3.1.5.2.2.3(D) 8.3.1.5.1.6
			Saturated-zone recharge/flow models	8.3.1.2.3.3
			Paleoclimate synthesis	8.3.1.5.1.5
			Quaternary discharge areas	8.3.1.5.2.1.3
			Analog recharge data	8.3.1.5.2.1.4
			Distribution, origin, and age of vein deposits	8.3.1.5.2.1.5

Table 8.3.5.18-9. Scenarios and parameters associated with the 10,000-yr disturbed-performance scenario class that need to be added to the 100,000-yr nominal-performance scenario class (page 2 of 2)

Scenario class (from Section 8.3.5.13)	Performance parameter (adapted from Section 8.3.5.13)	Tentative parameter goal (adapted from Section 8.3.5.13)	SCP section and parameter category or set	Direct or associated study or activity[a]
Climatic change causes appearance of surficial discharge points within controlled area	Expected locations of surficial discharge points within the controlled area over the next 100,000 yr; magnitude of discharge at each location	Show that no surficial discharge points could appear within controlled area, given a water-table rise less than 160 m	Same as information given for an increase in altitude of water table	
Climatic change causes an increase in the gradient of the water-table within the controlled area	Expected magnitude of change in water-table gradient due to climatic change over the next 100,000 yr	Show average gradient to controlled area boundary will be less than 2×10^{-3}	Same as information given for an increase in altitude of water table	

[a](D) indicates the study or activity directly addressing the scenario.
[b]The controlled area is the actual area chosen according to the 40 CFR 191.12 definition of controlled area.

DOE/RW-0199

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.19, Completed Analytical Techniques

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.19 Substantially completed analytical techniques

Postclosure performance assessments by the Yucca Mountain Project will evaluate the potential for containment and isolation of waste emplaced in the Topopah Spring Member of the Paintbrush Tuff at Yucca Mountain as discussed in Issues 1.1 through 1.9 (Sections 8.3.5.9, 8.3.5.10, and 8.3.5.12 through 8.3.5.18). The objective of the postclosure performance assessments is to determine whether the Yucca Mountain repository system is such that the regulatory standards set forth in 10 CFR 960.4, 10 CFR 60.112, 10 CFR 60.113, 40 CFR 191.13, 40 CFR 191.14, and 40 CFR 191.15 can be met.

Preclosure performance assessments will evaluate the potential for constructing and operating a repository in the Topopah Spring Member of the Paintbrush Tuff at Yucca Mountain, as discussed in Section 6.4 and addressed by Issues 2.1 through 2.5 and Issue 4.1 (Sections 8.3.5.2 through 8.3.5.6). The objective of the preclosure performance assessments is to determine if the repository system is such that the standards set forth in 10 CFR 960.5, 10 CFR 60.111, 40 CFR 191 Part A, and 10 CFR Part 20 can be met.

Over the next few years, preclosure and postclosure performance assessments will be made using many mathematical and numerical analytical techniques that have already been developed. Analytical techniques considered substantially completed are those that already exist and could be used, with little additional work or only minor modifications, to conduct performance assessment analyses. These analytical techniques have not yet been fully verified and validated for application to the conditions that exist at the Yucca Mountain Project repository site. The need for verification and validation of analytical techniques depends upon the intended application and the specific nature of the techniques. Preliminary verification is currently in progress, as discussed in this section. Validation activities have been initiated but, for the most part, are still being developed, as discussed in Section 8.3.5.20.

Those techniques that are substantially completed and available are summarized here for postclosure and preclosure performance issues. Section 8.3.5.20 describes plans to verify the accuracy of the techniques and to validate the models that are based on these techniques and also discusses the techniques that still require significant development.

8.3.5.19.1 Postclosure performance-assessment analytical techniques

Computer codes that have been developed and are found suitable for use in assessing the postclosure performance of a repository at the Yucca Mountain site are listed in Table 8.3.5.19-1. These computer codes fall into four broad categories, depending on the physical processes and conceptual models they incorporate: (1) those suitable for assessing the performance of the waste package; (2) those suitable for assessing the behavior of the rock and the water in the repository environment, where heat effects are important and cannot be completely decoupled from the geomechanical and hydrological calculations; (3) those suitable for assessing site behavior on a scale at which temperature effects do not have to be accounted for directly; and (4) those suitable for assessing the behavior of the entire repository system

Table 8.3.5.19-1. Computer codes for use in performance assessment

Performance assessment task	Performance measures	Type of analysis	Potential codes[a]	Related issue in which the code may be used[b]
Waste package	Canister temperature	Conductive and convective heat and mass transfer	ADINAT NORIA, COYOTE, ARRAY F, TAC02D	1.4
	Waste containment time, waste release rate	Material degradation, dissolution, decay, leaching	WAPPA ORIGEN2, MORSE-L, NIKE2D,	1.4, 1.5
		Geochemistry	EQ3/EQ6, PANDORA, PHR81	
Repository	Rock stress-strain, displacement, permeability changes	Rock stress and fracture alterations induced by excavation; thermal loads, moisture changes; backfilling	ADINAT SPECTROM 31, SPECTROM 41, JAC2D	1.4, 1.5, 1.6
	Unsaturated water travel times, radionuclide release rates	Water flow in unsaturated media; coupled water and heat flow; coupled water flow and radionuclide migration	NORIA/FEMTRAN, WAFE/TRACR3D, TOUGH	1.5, 1.6
Site	Ground-water travel time	Probabilistic analysis of ground-water travel time distributions along flow paths at Yucca Mountain	GWTT	1.6
	Unsaturated and saturated water and radionuclide transport	Water flow paths; radionuclide migration	SAGUARO/FEMTRAN, TRUST/TRUMP, NWFT, TRACR3D, ISOQUOD, HDOC, VSFAST,	1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.6
	Dose to man	Biosphere transport and human uptake	PABLM, DACRIN	1.2
Total integrated system	Radionuclide release Ground-water contamination Individual dose	Simple systems model of water flow in unsaturated media; leaching; flow and migration in unsaturated media; flow and migration in saturated media	TOSPAC, NWFT, SPARTAN	1.1, 1.2, 1.3
	Dose to man	Biosphere transport and human uptake	PABLM, DACRIN,	1.2
	Atmospheric transport	Inhalation dose at accessible environment boundary	AIRDOS-EPA	1.2

[a]The list of potential codes does not exclude use of other codes.
[b]Issues 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, and 1.6 are discussed in Sections 8.3.5.13, 8.3.5.14, 8.3.5.15, 8.3.5.9, 8.3.5.10, and 8.3.5.12, respectively.

and for probabilistic calculations of total releases to the accessible environment. The fourth category includes simplified versions of some of the models in the first three categories. In addition to the computer codes listed in Table 8.3.5.19-1, some simple analytical techniques, such as hand calculations, may be used in performance-assessment analyses. The information needs under each postclosure performance issue discussed in Sections 8.3.5.9 through 8.3.5.17 contain the descriptions of the analyses that will be done. Therefore, the last column entry in Table 8.3.5.19-1 lists the issue(s) that the code might be used to resolve so that the reader can determine what analyses might be done using these codes.

Table 8.3.5.19-2 briefly describes each code, its documentation, and its availability for use by the Yucca Mountain Project. There are three reasons for listing several codes for each type of application: (1) where closed-form analytic solutions do not exist and while benchmarking activities are ongoing, several codes whose performance can be compared are needed for verification exercises; (2) the complexity (i.e., dimensions, level of detailed physical parameter descriptions, etc.) of the analyses that must be done have not yet been determined; and (3) the specific capabilities of the codes are usually different.

8.3.5.19.2 Preclosure performance-assessment analytical techniques

Computer codes that could be used in constructing models to assess the preclosure safety of the Yucca Mountain repository site are listed in Table 8.3.5.19-3. These computer codes fall into two broad categories: preclosure repository-systems analyses and preclosure repository-consequence analyses. Computer codes for preclosure repository-systems analyses perform (1) initiating-event identification and quantification such as for criticality, fire, seismic activity, and flood; (2) systems-reliability studies such as analyses of fault trees and failure modes and effects; (3) human-reliability analysis; (4) common-cause failure analysis; (5) accident-sequence quantification; and (6) uncertainty, sensitivity, and importance analyses. Computer codes for preclosure repository-consequence analyses include (1) source-term characterization, (2) in-repository-consequence analysis, (3) environmental transport and offsite-consequence analyses, and (4) uncertainty and sensitivity analyses. In addition to the computer codes listed in Table 8.3.5.19-3, some simple analytical techniques, such as hand calculations, may be used in preclosure safety assessment. The last column in Table 8.3.5.19-3 lists the issues in which the codes may be used. Table 8.3.5.19-4 gives a brief description of each code identified as a potential code to be used by the Yucca Mountain Project and its status. The preclosure risk assessment methodology (PRAM) program is designed to assess the Yucca Mountain Project computer codes, as well as codes from other sources to determine the most appropriate computer codes to be used.

Unlike the computer codes used for postclosure performance assessment, most of the computer codes used in preclosure safety assessment are adopted from codes used for other nuclear-safety assessments (e.g., assessments of reactors). Compilation and evaluation of such codes can be found in the following references: Hoffman et al. (1977), Mauro et al. (1977), Mills and Vogt (1983), Till and Meyer (1983), NCRP (1984), Elder et al. (1986), Parks

Table 8.3.5.19-2 Brief description of codes from Table 8.3.5.19-1 (page 1 of 5)

Code name	Code analysis capabilities	Material models	Status of documentation	Status of use by Yucca Mountain Project[a]
ADINAT 1,2,3d	Linear, nonlinear, transient, steady state, thermal conduction	Temperature, space-dependent variation of heat, thermal conductivity; boiling model; multiple layers; anisotropic properties, generates input to SANDIA-ADINA	Bathe 1975; 1977	SNLA (a,o)
AIRDOS-EPA	Predictions of radionuclide concentrations in air, rates of deposition, intake rates, and doses	Modified Gaussian plume equation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission terrestrial food-chain models, dose-conversion factors	Moore et al., 1979	SNLA (a)
ARRAY F 3D	Thermal conduction and radiation; solutions by superposition of exponentially decaying point sources	Analytic solution of a heat source in an infinite medium; all material properties constant	Klett et al., 1980	SNLA (a,o)
COYOTE	Linear and nonlinear transient heat conduction with energy sources	Temperature, time, and space-dependent variation of specific heat and thermal conductivity; boiling in partially saturated media approximated through latent heat consideration; multiple material layers; jointed rock model	Gartling, 1982	SNLA (a,o)
DACRIN	Organ dose to man from acute or chronic inhalation of radioactive aerosols	ICRP Task Group Organ Models; atmospheric dispersion; effective radiation doses to organs and the gastrointestinal tract	Houston et al., 1974	PNL (a)
EQ3/EQ6	EQ3: Equilibrium distribution of chemical species in an aqueous solution; saturation state of fluid with respect to minerals. EQ6: Mass transfer and effects of heating and cooling of the aqueous solutions; irreversible reaction in rock-water system	EQ3: Fixed temperature and pressure; empirical models of minerals in stable phase assemblage; EQ6: Reaction path models include precipitation, reaction progress in open/closed system	Wolery, 1979	LLNL (a,o,d)
FEMTRAN	Convective, dispersive, and diffusive transport of dissolved constituents; sorption, first order decay; development with first order decay complete; decay chain capabilities in developmental stage	Unsaturated porous media; retardation by sorption; chemical reactions, decay, moisture-dependent retardation factor; assumes local equilibrium for sorption	Martinez, 1985	SNLA (a,o,d)

Table 8.3.5.19-2 Brief description of codes from Table 8.3.5.19-1 (page 2 of 5)

Code name	Code analysis capabilities	Material models	Status of documentation	Status of use by Yucca Mountain Project[a]
GWTT	Probability distributions of ground-water travel times along distribution of flow paths, simplified Darcy's law in both matrix and fractures	Frequency distribution for saturated conductivity; effective porosity in multilayers throughout repository; implicit assumptions for correlation lengths; probability distribution functions generated for flow paths; probability distribution functions calculated for areally integrated ground-water travel times	Sinnock et al., 1986	SNLA (o)
HDOC	Two-phase nonlinear mass and heat transport in porous media, radionuclide decay; method of dynamics of contours	Transient, 1D, nonlinear flow; solute transport includes advection and diffusion with decay and retardation of radionuclides		Los Alamos (a,o,d)
ISOQUOD	Regional saturated hydrologic analysis of aquifer systems in multilayered media	Heterogeneous, multidimensional saturated media, Darcy's law applied with transient leakage coefficient, storage/sink terms, transmissivity	Pinder, 1976	SNLA (o)
JAC2D	Linear and nonlinear static stress analysis of 2D solids	Temperature-dependent, elastoplastic strain hardening; temperature-dependent secondary creep, soil with thermal loading, jointed rock with thermal loading	Thomas, 1982	SNLA (o,d)
MORSE-L	Atomic displacements from slowing of alpha particles and fission fragments; attenuation and absorbed dose rate from gamma rays	Gamma-ray interaction with atoms in water, metal barrier, and waste to produce alpha particles and spontaneous fission	Wilcox, 1972	LLNL (o)
NIKE2D	Stress in waste package from external loads, thermal expansion and thermal gradients, volume expansion of corrosion products, residual stress from fabrication	Mechanical and thermal stress, yielding, and unstable crack propagation	Hallquist, 1983	LLNL (o)
NORIA	Transport of water, water vapor, air and energy through partially saturated porous media; four nonlinear parabolic equations solved simultaneously	Material properties either constant or function of dependent and independent variables through user-defined subroutines; ideal gas law	Bixler, 1985	SNLA (a,o,d)

Table 8.3.5.19-2 Brief description of codes from Table 8.3.5.19-1 (page 3 of 5)

Code name	Code analysis capabilities	Material models	Status of documentation	Status of use by Yucca Mountain Project[a]
NWFT	Flow and transport in saturated porous media	2D network representation of 1D paths for flow and transport of 3-member decay chains; properties vary between flow segments, constant along each segment	Campbell et al., 1980	SNLA (a,o)
ORIGEN2	Time-dependent compositions radiation, spectra, and hazard indices, etc., based on fuel burnup and decay	Bateman equations, secular equilibria where appropriate; space- and spectrum-averaged cross sections; one-group flux		SNLA (a)
PABLM	Internal doses and dose commitments to man for acute or chronic ingestion of radionuclides	ICRP models for doses by ingestion for population or maximum individual for air pathway	Napier et al., 1980	SNLA (a); PNL (a)
PANDORA	Physical and chemical degradation of waste package barriers, radionuclide flux	Radiation, thermal, mechanical corrosion, and leach models; 1D flow and transport in porous media	O'Connell and Drach, 1986	LLNL (d)
PHR81	Geochemical speciation and mass transfer	Ion association model; pH, redox-potential, mass transfer functions of reaction progress equilibrium; solid phases, distribution of aqueous species, saturation state of aqueous phase with respect to mineral phase; temperature variations		Los Alamos (a)
SAGUARO	Richard's equation for flow through partially saturated porous media using Darcy's law; capillary effects; assumes single-phase incompressible fluid; includes energy transport by conduction, convection, dispersion; development complete on all but vapor transport	Pressure, temperature, time, and space-dependent specific heat, thermal conductivity and internal heat generation, moisture content, permeability; moisture-dependent permeability; thermal expansion, multiple material layers, anisotropic material properties	Eaton et al., 1983; Gartling and Hickox, 1982	SNLA (a,o,d)

Table 8.3.5.19-2 Brief description of codes from Table 8.3.5.19-1 (page 4 of 5)

Code name	Code analysis capabilities	Material models	Status of documentation	Status of use by Yucca Mountain Project[a]
SPARTAN	Water flow and radionuclide transport through dual porosity media; Darcy's law and convective transport of sorbing radionuclides	Release rates, cumulative releases, and ratios of releases to Environmental Protection Agency standards calculated as functions of geometry, repository area, flow path, water flux, effective porosity, initial inventory, water solubility, canister lifetime, and retardation factors	Lin, 1985	SNLA (o)
SPECTROM41 and SPECTROM31	Thermoplastic and plastic analyses of stresses, displacement, plasticity zones and failure zones due to extraction and canister emplacement in a repository	Nonisotropic, 3D elastic and thermal properties; ubiquitous joint element; failure modes include Von Mises and Mohr-Couloumb-Drucker-Prager	Svalstad, 1983	RESPEC (o)
TACO2D	Transient and steady-state thermal conduction in 2D		Burns, 1982	LLNL (o)
TOSPAC	Infiltration through unsaturated porous media, radionuclide decay and leaching, saturated and unsaturated flow and transports of decaying radionuclides in porous media	1D space-dependent material properties; 3-member decay chains; solubility-limited leaching, assumed source dissolution and diffusion model; equilibrium adsorption; dispersive, diffusive, convective transport	Peters et al., 1986	SNLA (o)
TOUGH	Transport of water, water vapor, and heat in partially saturated porous media	Transient, 3D non-linear flow, liquid water, pore gas, water vapor, heat, variably saturated	Pruess, 1987	LBL (o), LLNL (a,o,d), USGS (a)
TRACR3D	Saturated and unsaturated, fractured and porous media; multicomponent ground-water flow and radionuclide migration	Transient, 3D, nonlinear flow, one- or two-phases (air and water), tracer in one phase, molecular dispersion, radioactive decay, adsorption, capillary pressure, buoyancy, spatial variation of material properties, saturated and unsaturated seepage from fractures	Travis, 1984	Los Alamos (a,o,d)
TRUMP	Diffusive-advective transport of sorbing radionuclides	Transient, 1, 2, or 3D molecular diffusion and advection of radioactive tracers in single phase, equilibrium sorption		LBL (a,o)

Table 8.3.5.19-2 Brief description of codes from Table 8.3.5.19-1 (page 5 of 5)

Code name	Code analysis capabilities	Material models	Status of documentation	Status of use by Yucca Mountain Project[a]
TRUST	Conservation of fluid mass in variably saturated, deformable porous medium	Permeability, compressibility nonlinearly related to stress; permeability, saturation related to pore water pressure in unsaturated zone	Reisenauer et al., 1982	LBL (a,o,d)
VSFAST	Saturated and unsaturated, water flow in porous media; radionuclide migration	Transient, 2D, nonlinear flow, single solute, decay, adsorption		USGS (o)
WAFE	Two-phase nonlinear mass and heat transport in porous media	Transient, 2D, nonlinear flow; anisotropic properties; equations of state for liquid and vapor water; multicomponent (air and water)	Travis, 1985	Los Alamos (o)
WAPPA	Physical and chemical degradation of waste package barriers, radionuclide flux	Radiation, thermal, mechanical corrosion, and leach models	INTERA, 1983	LLNL (a,o,d), SNLA (a,o)

[a]Abbreviations as follows: SNLA = Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque; LBL = Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory; LLNL = Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; Los Alamos = Los Alamos National Laboratory; USGS = U.S. Geological Survey; INTERA = INTERA Environmental Consultants, Inc.; RESPEC = RESPEC, Inc.; PNL = Pacific Northwest Laboratories; a = codes available; o = codes operational; d = codes under development.

Table 8.3.5.19-3. Examples of computer codes for use in preclosure safety assessment

Categories of preclosure safety assessment	Type of analysis	Potential codes	Issue in which the code may be used[a]
Systems analyses	Criticality	KENO-IV	2.1, 2.2
	Systems reliability	SETS	2.3
	Shielding code	ANISN	2.1, 2.2, 2.3
Consequence analyses	Source-term characterization	ORIGEN-2	2.1, 2.2, 2.3
	Public exposures	GASDOSE	2.1
	Public exposures	AIRDOS-EPA	2.1, 2.2
	Public exposures	CRRIS system	2.1, 2.2, 2.3
	Public exposures	DACRIN	2.3

[a]Issues 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 are discussed in Sections 8.3.5.3, 8.3.5.4, and 8.3.5.5, respectively.

Table 8.3.5.19-4. Brief description of codes from Table 8.3.5.19-3

Code name	Code description	Status of documentation	Status of use by Yucca Mountain Project
AIRDOS-EPA	Routine-release dose consequences (Clean Air Act compliance)	User manual extant; no verification; some limited validation	Under evaluation
ANISN	Discrete-ordinate for shielding	User manual extant; no verification and validation data	Used in preparation of existing project documentation
CRRIS	New Environmental Protection Agency radioactive-release dose consequences	Documentation in preparation; limited verification and validation	Under evaluation
DACRIN	Accident-release, airborne-pathway dose consequences	User manual extant; limited validation only	Under evaluation
GASDOSE	See AIRDOS-EPA	Proprietary	Used in preparation of existing project documentation
KENO-IV	Monte-Carlo criticality and shielding	User manual extant; has been validated	Under evaluation
ORIGEN-2	Radionuclide inventory of spent fuel	User manual extant; verification and validation underway	Under evaluation
SETS	Fault-tree and event-tree analysis	User manual extant; no verification and validation data	Under evaluation

et al. (1987), and Ayer et al. (1988). Since these computer codes have been used extensively in safety assessment, they do not require extensive verification and validation. Some exceptions to this statement are the ORIGEN-type codes, which are used by all the waste-management subsystems, and the computer codes developed specifically for repository applications, such as computer codes to model the consequences inside the surface and underground facilities.

Nuclear Waste Policy Act
(Section 113)

Site Characterization Plan

Yucca Mountain Site, Nevada Research and Development Area, Nevada

Volume VII, Part B

Chapter 8, Section 8.3.5.20, Analytical Techniques Requiring Development

December 1988

U. S. Department of Energy
Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management

8.3.5.20 Analytical techniques requiring significant development

Sections 8.3.5.20.1 and 8.3.5.20.2 discuss (1) the need to develop analytical techniques for those areas where well-developed methods (as discussed in Section 8.3.5.19) are currently not available and (2) the verification of computer codes and the validation of models on which the methods are based. Historically, analytical techniques have played a central role in estimating the performance of nuclear facilities for the purpose of demonstrating regulatory compliance. As a consequence, special quality-assurance requirements have been placed on these techniques, per 10 CFR 60.152, and the licensing assessments of high-level waste repository system performance must use analytical techniques certified in accordance with these requirements. Therefore, it is expected that both completed techniques (Section 8.3.5.19) and techniques to be developed (Section 8.3.5.20.1) may require some degree of verification and validation beyond what has been done for previous applications to make them suitable for repository applications.

8.3.5.20.1 Analytical techniques

The analytical techniques that require significant development are those for which analysis approaches are still being formulated, solution methods are still being developed, or codes are still being written or tested. Among the analytical techniques that still require significant development are those that are expected to be used to estimate the performance measures that are to be compared with regulatory requirements. These system performance assessment techniques include

1. Simplified physical models that will be used in the probabilistic analyses of total system performance.

2. Techniques for implementing statistical methods that will be used to do probabilistic estimates of ground-water travel time, release rates from the engineered-barrier systems, and cumulative releases to the accessible environment, as described in Sections 8.3.5.12.2, 8.3.5.10.3, and 8.3.5.13.4, respectively.

3. Systematic techniques that will be used for screening scenarios, as described in Section 8.3.5.13.3.

In addition, the analytical techniques described in Tables 8.3.5.19-1 and 8.3.5.19-2 in Section 8.3.5.19 may require more development if validation or site characterization activities show that the models fail to adequately simulate conditions at the site.

Some analytical techniques will be used specifically in the assessments of preclosure safety during repository construction, operation, retrieval (if required), and permanent closure. Those that may require significant development for preclosure safety assessment will be determined by the preclosure risk assessment methodology (PRAM) program, as described in Section 8.3.5.1. Preclosure safety assessments are expected to use existing analytical techniques with minor modification. A potential area that may require development is source-term characterization.

A number of methods and practices that will be useful in assessing the postclosure performance of a repository might be termed "analytical techniques"; they are discussed in other sections of the SCP. For example, Section 8.3.5.13 describes the selection and characterization of scenarios for releases of radioactive material from the total repository system. The section also explains in detail the basic construction of complementary cumulative distribution functions for assessing these releases. As described in Section 8.3.5.13, the assessment of releases will require some special-purpose models in addition to the models described in Section 8.3.5.19. Sensitivity and uncertainty analyses will also be an important part of the performance assessments and will provide guidance for site characterization. Preliminary sensitivity and uncertainty work has been done, and some important results are described in the detailed performance allocations throughout Section 8.3.5.

8.3.5.20.2 Plans for verification and validation

Verification and validation activities are intended to reduce and evaluate the uncertainty in estimates of repository performance that are based on predictive models, thereby enhancing the confidence in the accuracy of predictions. Verification studies are used to demonstrate that the numerical values produced by a computational procedure correspond to the mathematical formulas on which they are based. Verification becomes especially important for complex computer codes using advanced numerical methods to solve systems of equations. Validation is an attempt to demonstrate that a mathematical representation of repository performance will adequately replicate the actual performance of the repository. The DOE will provide an explanation, during licensing, of the verification and validation activities that were used to support the performance assessment models. Emphasis will be given to those models used (1) to assess the postclosure performance of the natural and engineered barriers and their effectiveness in controlling the release of radioactive material (taking into account both anticipated and unanticipated processes and events) and (2) to assess favorable and potentially adverse conditions at the site.

The preliminary plans for verification and validation are discussed in the following sections. Although these plans are general, they demonstrate how validation enters the site characterization program that addresses the needs identified in the performance allocation process. Detailed plans are being developed that will describe (1) the overall procedure for verification of computer codes and (2) the overall strategy for the validation of models. The validation strategy will address how the data from site characterization and performance confirmation will be used in validation, how data from natural or other analogues will be used, and how peer review will be used in the validation process.

8.3.5.20.3 Verification of analytical techniques

Verification of codes, according to the guidelines in NUREG-0856 (Silling, 1982), is the "assurance that a computer code correctly performs the operations specified in a numerical model." This definition includes any analysis method, however simple (e.g., semianalytic computer code for calculating a single-valued, uniquely determined algebraic expression) or complex (a numerical computer code). For the purposes of this discussion, the analytical techniques addressed in this section are those computer codes used to implement mathematical models.

All computer codes used for final performance assessments of the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site will be verified to demonstrate that they correctly implement the mathematical and numerical procedures on which they are based. The extent to which verification will be pursued depends on (1) the extent to which verification has been previously done, documented, and certified software control procedures subsequently followed; (2) whether the code has been previously used and accepted in other nuclear facility licensing application; and (3) the importance of the code to the demonstration of regulatory compliance. The codes to be verified include the completed codes described in Section 8.3.5.19 and the groups of analytical codes described in this section (8.3.5.20).

The numerical accuracy and stability of the hydrologic and radionuclide transport codes will be verified by comparison with analytic solutions and by benchmarking against other computer codes. If the verification process reveals that the mathematical model has been inaccurately incorporated into the numerical code or that the existing codes have insufficient capabilities, then additional code-development work may be needed. A comprehensive set of verification steps would include the following:

1. The use of numerical-analysis techniques to define the limits of code accuracy in terms of methods of solution, discretization, and parameter ranges.

2. The testing of numerical accuracy and solution sensitivities by comparison with analytical solutions wherever possible.

3. The revision or modification of computer codes as necessary to ensure sufficient accuracy and stability.

4. The performance of benchmarking comparisons of codes on problems typical of those required by the issue or issues the codes are intended to address. These comparisons are to be made by the Yucca Mountain Project, using these codes and the data obtained from site characterization of Yucca Mountain, and will be coordinated with the analyses performed for Issues 1.1 through 1.6 (Sections 8.3.5.9, 8.3.5.10, and 8.3.5.12 through 8.3.5.16).

5. The documentation of the verification activities according to the guidelines in NUREG-0856 (Silling, 1982) as implemented in the Yucca Mountain Project.

COVE: a Yucca Mountain Project benchmarking activity

Not all applications of codes are amenable to testing of numerical accuracy by comparison with analytical solutions. Therefore, the code verification (COVE) activity has been initiated for benchmarking the water flow and radionuclide-transport codes being used for performance assessments. The goals of the COVE activity are to (1) demonstrate and compare the numerical accuracy and sensitivity of selected codes, (2) identify and resolve problems in running typical performance assessment calculations using this code, and (3) evaluate the computer resources needed for running these codes. The following benchmarking problems have been defined:

1. Isothermal transport of water and radionuclides through homogeneous, variably saturated tuff (COVE 1).

2. Isothermal transport through layered, variably saturated tuff (COVE 2).

3. Nonisothermal transport of water, vapor, air, and heat in fractured, welded tuff (COVE 3).

4. Isothermal transport of water and radionuclides through saturated tuff.

Other benchmarking problems may be defined, as required, during the code verification process.

COVE 1 was the first step in benchmarking some of the performance-assessment codes. Isothermal calculations for the COVE 1 benchmarking have been completed using the hydrologic flow codes SAGUARO, TRUST, and GWVIP; the radionuclide codes FEMTRAN and TRUMP; and the coupled flow and transport code TRACR3D. The COVE 1 participants are listed in Table 8.3.5.20-1. Hayden (1985) presents the results of the three cases of the benchmarking problem solved for COVE 1, a comparison of the results, questions raised regarding sensitivities to modeling techniques, and conclusions drawn regarding the status and numerical sensitivities of the codes.

Table 8.3.5.20-1. Participants and codes used in the COVE 1 benchmarking exercise

Participant	Code
Los Alamos National Laboratory	TRACR3D
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory	TRUST/TRUMP
Pacific Northwest Laboratories	TRUST
Sandia National Laboratories	SAGUARO/FEMTRAN
Environmental Consultants, Inc.	GWVIP

Work is currently in progress on both COVE 2 and COVE 3. The goals of COVE 2 and COVE 3 are the same as for COVE 1. However, the emphasis in COVE 2 and 3 is on modeling site-scale problems of the type that will be required for performance-assessment calculations. Both one- and two-dimensional problems have been defined under both isothermal and nonisothermal conditions. Isothermal water flow through several layers of unsaturated tuff with different hydrologic properties is modeled in COVE 2. The participants in COVE 2 and the codes they are using are listed in Table 8.3.5.20-2.

Table 8.3.5.20-2. Participants and codes used in the COVE 2 benchmarking exercise

Participant	Code
Los Alamos National Laboratory	HDOC/TRACR3D
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory	TRUST
Sandia National Laboratories	SAGUARO/NORIA/TOSPAC

In COVE 3, temperatures and saturation profiles are being calculated in a nonisothermal condition in tuff, using hydrologic properties that may be similar to the Topopah Spring Member. These simulations examine expected post-waste-emplacement conditions in the near field. The participants in COVE 3 and the codes they are using are listed in Table 8.3.5.20-3. The COVE 2 and 3 activities will be fully documented in Yucca Mountain Project reports.

Table 8.3.5.20-3. Participants and codes used in the COVE 3 benchmarking exercise

Participant	Code
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory	TOUGH
Sandia National Laboratories	NORIA
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory	WAFE

International code verification and model-validation activities

The Yucca Mountain Project is participating in two international code comparison projects to supplement its benchmarking activities. These comparisons address problems designed to test a number of aspects of the exercised codes. Participation also provides independent assessment and peer review. Results of the comparisons aid the establishment of the general applicability, acceptability, and flexibility of the exercised codes.

The Hydrologic Code Intercomparison (HYDROCOIN) project examines hydrologic models and codes and their uses in performance assessments of nuclear waste repositories. The International Nuclide Transportation Code Intercomparison (INTRACOIN) study examines models and codes that describe the transport of radionuclides in geologic media.

Both HYDROCOIN and INTRACOIN have three principal activities:

1. Level 1, benchmarking and verification of codes.

2. Level 2, validation of models.

3. Level 3, sensitivity and uncertainty analyses of models and codes.

Several level 1 benchmarking analyses, on test cases that may be pertinent to Yucca Mountain, have been performed for both projects by Yucca Mountain Project participants. The results are documented in the INTRACOIN Final Report for Level 1 (1986) and in the HYDROCOIN report prepared by Cole (1986).

8.3.5.20.4 Model validation

Overview

This section presents the DOE approach to dealing with the complex task of model validation by defining what validation is, describing the need for model validation in the repository program, and describing activities that may be useful in supporting the validation effort. In general, validation is an important part of the investigative effort that is to create the record upon which the NRC is to base its licensing decision. Validation thus addresses the competence of the performance assessment effort. Evaluating and documenting the quality of site and laboratory data, interpreting that data, and certifying the appropriateness of uses made of that data is also important in establishing the credibility of the performance assessment effort, and is sometimes referred to as data validation. For the purposes of this discussion, however, the meaning of validation is restricted to establishing the soundness of specific computer models and the legitimacy of specific applications being made of those models.

Definitions

Before discussing some of the aspects of the DOE validation strategy and program, some of the terminology that will be used will be clarified to avoid semantic difficulties.

Performance assessment

Performance assessment is the process of quantitatively evaluating system, subsystem, or component behavior relative to the containment or isolation of radioactive waste, to support the development of a high-level waste repository and to determine compliance with quantitative safety criteria.

Performance assessment refers to evaluations of risks and hazards to workers and the public in the preclosure phase of the repository (Section 8.3.5.1) and refers to evaluations of the behavior of the repository for the postclosure phase (Section 8.3.5.8). In particular, as articulated in Section 8.3.5.8, postclosure performance assessment addresses the resolution of Key Issue 1 in the issues hierarchy, which parallels the regulatory system-performance requirements. Thus, performance assessment is a type of systematic safety analysis that is used to (1) predict potential health and safety effects, (2) depict these effects in terms of magnitude and likelihood, (3) compare the results to acceptability standards, and (4) document the process and results in an appropriate and usable format.

Conceptual model

A conceptual model is an abstraction of the relationships among the system and its component subsystems, processes, geometric structures, and bounding environmental conditions. The conceptual model is a set of these relationships, selected from among a larger set of possible relationships and conditions, that is sufficient to describe the system for the intended application of the model to a preclosure safety or postclosure waste isolation assessment. Ideally, these relationships and their alternatives are expressed in terms of testable hypotheses.

Model

A model is a representation of a system that implements the conceptual model in terms of quantitatively linking key features or aspects of the conceptual model with important behaviors, such as containment and isolation. A quantitative model may range in complexity from simple, closed-form analytical solutions of one or more governing equations to numerical models that rely on sophisticated and complex computer codes and resources. Of necessity, mathematical models will only be applied to problems that are mathematically well posed, meaning that a solution does exist.

Code

A code is a sequence of mathematical expressions and computer instructions written so that a computer can implement those instructions and solve the mathematical expressions as directed. A code, with appropriate

data, implements the model, and running the code quantifies the predictions of the model.

Validation

The concept of validation was defined by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, 1982) as follows:

> A conceptual model and the computer code derived from it are "validated" when it is confirmed that the conceptual model and the derived computer code provide a good representation of the actual processes occurring in the real system. Validation is thus carried out by comparison of calculations with field observations and experimental measurements.

This definition is adequate for many cases but is not strictly appropriate for the long-term and large-scale postclosure system performance predictions that cannot be compared with field measurements or replicated in a laboratory. The definition does, however, separate the validation problem into two aspects: (1) ascertaining when the model has achieved a good representation of the system and (2) comparing predictive results to appropriate observations and experimental results.

Validation in the repository program

Reasons for validation

In the repository program, the record that will be provided by the DOE to support the NRC's licensing decision-making will consist in large part of information from the site characterization and design programs. The laboratory and field studies of these two programs will, however, be used to support one of the most important parts of the license application, the predictive modeling that is to be done to demonstrate regulatory compliance related to Key Issue 1. Many types of scientific investigations will be used to create the data bases needed to support the predictive modeling effort. Empirical field and laboratory data will be used in modeling as the basis for (1) formulating the conceptual model and its component hypotheses, (2) evaluating the conceptual model in terms of selecting between competing hypotheses, which includes selecting alternative processes, and (3) evaluating the predictive validity of the model that implements the conceptual model.

The record that the DOE places before the NRC as part of its license application must address the appropriateness and quality of the data, including the data that is used to support the building of predictive models. The record must also show that all lines of code constituting a predictive model have been verified in terms of their correct implementation of the mathematical expressions embodied, as described in Section 8.3.5.19. In addition, validation, or the demonstration of the correctness of the conceptualization of the system being modeled and of the implementation of that conceptualization in a predictive model, must also be addressed in the record because validation is a fundamental part of the scientific process of building and demonstrating the competence of a quantitative predictive model.

Limitations on validation

As noted previously in the definition of validation, the estimate of postclosure repository performance resulting from a performance assessment cannot be compared to experimental measures of system performance. In other words, direct experimental corroboration of models via full-scale, full-duration testing is not feasible because of the time scales over which the repository is required to isolate waste (10,000 yr) and the length scales for which performance measures are specified (kilometers). In addition, the performance of the waste disposal system must be estimated for a variety of potential future scenarios, further complicating the ability to design experiments that yield results to which long-term system behavior predictions can meaningfully be compared.

In terms of the postclosure aspects of the repository performance assessment program, the role of model validation is to demonstrate the state or performance of the repository system to within some acceptable limits of uncertainty. The sources of uncertainty in a repository system model derive from (1) uncertainties associated with the conceptual model on which the system model is based, (2) measurement errors and sparse data, (3) intrinsic heterogeneities of internal system properties or processes, and (4) uncertainty in the future environmental setting of the repository (adapted from Dettinger and Wilson, 1981). The sparsity of data is, in part, a consequence of the need to limit characterization of the site so as to "limit adverse effects on the long-term performance of the geologic repository to the extent practical." (10 CFR 60.15(d)(1))

To achieve an adequate degree of validation, appropriate data from scientific investigations and from the design effort are needed to ensure that system descriptions and modeling assumptions are appropriate and adequate, and peer reviews may be necessary to assess the competence of the scientific investigations and judge the uses made of results. Difficulties exist in the application of the results of scientific investigations to the validation of postclosure predictive modeling. For example, in a hydrogeologic system in which ground-water flow velocity is small (less than 1 mm/yr (0.04 in./yr)), direct measurement of mechanical dispersivity on the scale of 1 to 10 km (0.6 to 6 mi) will not be possible because a field experiment would have to be run for thousands of years to yield pertinent data. Thus, some of the data sparsity that contributes to the overall uncertainty of the predictive model is irreducible, and peer reviews may be needed to judge whether or not the residual uncertainty allows the predictive result to meet regulatory requirements with reasonable assurance.

That the validity of regulatory compliance calculations cannot be established in the sense that prediction is compared with observation is acknowledged by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in its 40 CFR Part 191, where Paragraph 191.13 (b) says in part

> Proof of the future performance of a disposal system is not to be had in the ordinary sense of the word in situations that deal with much shorter time frames. Instead, what is required is a reasonable expectation, on the basis of the record before the implementing agency, that compliance with 191.13 (a) will be achieved.

[Note: 191.13 (a) specifies the 10,000 year containment requirement and that compliance is to be shown through performance assessments.]

Similarly, the NRC discusses the evidence that may support a regulatory compliance calculation in terms that also recognize that the nature of these long-term projections of system performance limits their certainty and hence limits the degree to which validity can be established. The NRC's 10 CFR Part 60, Paragraph 60.101(a)(2) states in part

> Proof of the future performance of engineered barrier systems and the geologic setting over time periods of many hundreds or many thousands of years is not to be had in the ordinary sense of the word. For such long term objectives and criteria, what is required is reasonable assurance, making allowance for the time period, hazards, and uncertainties involved, that the outcome will be in conformance with those objectives and criteria.

Others have recognized the difficulties inherent in validating complex environmental models, even those for which some level of comparison with system performance is possible (Gass, 1983; Sargent, 1987). Cale and Shugart (1980) and Eisenberg et al. (1987) point out that partial validation of a model may be feasible and will enhance model credibility.

Validation is application dependent, and thus must be performed for the particular circumstances of the problem under consideration. This application-dependence of model validation has been recognized by the EPA in its published protocols for validating an application of a specific, well-documented and accepted model used in air-pollution studies addressing regulatory siting criteria (EPA, 1987).

The application-dependence of validation was also addressed by Eisenberg et al. (1987) but from a different perspective. In terms of setting priorities for validation activities, for example, it was suggested that the priority given to the validation of a model be determined by the role the model has in evaluating safe operation. This is equivalent to the priority the model has in demonstrating compliance with the EPA system performance requirement and the NRC subsystem performance requirements. Thus, the importance of a given validation effort is linked to the importance of the given application to the overall demonstration of regulatory compliance, and resources will be allocated accordingly.

Finally, Brinberg and McGrath (1985) conclude that one of the difficulties associated with model validation is that the nature of the validation need, and even the meaning of validation, may change at different stages of the modeling and research process. Similarly, Eisenberg et al. (1987) suggest that the NRC's 10 CFR Part 60, Subpart F, which mandates a performance confirmation period, provides time for this type of continuous feedback process for model confirmation beyond what is achieved at licensing. This, in turn, suggests that at the time of permanent closure there is a need for a more comprehensive validation to accompany the assessments addressing the postclosure performance requirements than there was for the more preliminary phases of the licensing process.

8.3.5.20.5 Validation program

Scientific validation activities

The DOE goal for validating performance assessment models is to use all appropriate means to ensure that modeling results are accurate within an acceptable degree of uncertainty and that regulatory requirements are satisfied with reasonable assurance. The validation approach is still being formulated in detail for specific aspects of the requisite compliance demonstrations, but the approach would include applying the models to predict the outcomes of specific scientific investigations. The NRC has suggested that in terms of the long-term postclosure performance objectives imposed by the regulations:

> Demonstration of compliance with such objectives and criteria will involve the use of data from accelerated tests and predictive models that are supported by such measures as field and laboratory tests, monitoring data and natural analog studies. (10 CFR Part 60, Paragraph 60.101(a)(2))

These are scientific investigations and other activities that can be carried out on a human time scale, and will be carried out to support resolution of the questions addressed in validation. A more complete list would include

1. Laboratory experiments.

2. Field investigation, i.e., monitoring, in situ tests in the exploratory shaft facility, field tests, and studies that are part of the surface-based studies at the site.

3. Analog studies, i.e., natural, anthropogenic, and laboratory analogs.

4. Numerical or synthetic modeling experiments.

5. Theoretical scoping studies and asymptotic bounding estimates.

The investigations and activities that may provide useful information for validation each have positive aspects and limitations, as has been discussed elsewhere (Eisenberg et al., 1987). Many of the site characterization activities outlined in Section 8.3.1 may be used to support model validation. These activities and their relationship to the testing of alternative conceptual models are described in Section 8.3.1.1 and Tables 8.3.1.2-2a and -2b, 8.3.1.3-2, 8.3.1.4-2, 8.3.1.5-3, 8.3.1.8-7 and -8, 8.3.1.9-3, 8.3.1.15-2, and 8.3.1.17-7 and -8.

Performance assessment models are planned to be subjected to impartial and critical peer review throughout their inception, development, testing, and repository system application. Testing would include the model's application to predicting the outcomes of appropriate investigations and activities as listed above, and would also include the sensitivity and uncertainty analyses performed to describe the characteristics of the model and to quantify some of the uncertainty in its predictive results.

Hypothesis testing

As noted in the definition of "conceptual model," a conceptual model is developed from hypotheses and, where appropriate, competing or counter-hypotheses. Experiments can be constructed that will attempt to falsify a hypothesis or that will allow discrimination between competing hypotheses. The pursuit of this type of experimental validation of the component hypotheses of a conceptual model is called "hypothesis testing."

A conceptualization of a complex system would have numerous component hypotheses and numerous counter-hypotheses that can be experimentally evaluated. This implies that a program of hypothesis testing, and where possible elimination, is a necessary part of formulating a provisional conceptual model for a system. The hypothesis testing program is discussed in Section 8.3.1.

A conceptual model is developed on the basis of many sources of data and evidence. It is desirable that the conceptual model be consistent with as many of these sources of data and evidence as possible. The conceptual model must also be complete in the sense that at a minimum it must provide hypotheses that address the important aspects of system performance. Generally, conceptual models that describe more aspects of system behavior are more desirable. Section 8.3.1 discusses the evaluation of the adequacy of conceptual models. Questions that will be addressed in such evaluations are to include the following:

1. Are the repository system and its subsystems described accurately enough with respect to the enclosing environmental setting (i.e., the geologic framework, the hydrologic regime, and the boundary and initial conditions)?

2. Are the physicochemical and other processes governing repository performance properly identified and incorporated into the performance assessment conceptual models and quantitative models?

3. Are systems dynamics and responses to changing conditions, both evolutionary and disruptive, capable of being addressed by both the conceptual and quantitative models?

Since the degree of knowledge concerning a system would improve with time, new data or observations may become available that may conflict with aspects of the provisional conceptual model. Thus, conceptual model development will be an evolving and iterative process of model modification, testing, and refinement, as described by Mankin et al. (1977).

International validation programs

Some validation activities are currently being pursued by the DOE through the international cooperative validation study, INTRAVAL.

INTRAVAL was established in October 1987 by the Swedish Nuclear Power Inspectorate in Stockholm, with cooperation from the Nuclear Energy Agency in Paris and the participating nations. The project is a cooperative effort to

validate geosphere transport models by using experimental, field, and natural analog studies. The problems, or test cases, being considered in INTRAVAL include transport problems in porous rock, fractures, and fractured rock masses in saturated and unsaturated flow. The DOE participation consists of teams that are to solve selected field cases and conduct an unsaturated zone laboratory and field experiment that has been selected for inclusion in the INTRAVAL project.

Peer review

Peer review will be formalized through the establishment of applicability and review criteria before conducting a review. These criteria and the procedures that are to be followed in the review may be set by the designated review bodies. In establishing these criteria, the review body will consider the implications of the modeling under review in terms of system safety and performance. The criteria will be specific to the comparisons at hand, taking into account the characteristics, limitations, and uncertainties in both the modeling and experimental results. The final determination of modeling adequacy will also address whether or not, taking into account all uncertainties, there is a sufficient basis for judging that the regulatory requirement being addressed will be met with reasonable assurance. A negative finding, as described in Figure 1 of Eisenberg and Van Luik (1987), requires reconsideration of system data, design, and performance allocations, as well as of the modeling.

Peer review will address model construction and implementation in order to be able to assess the adequacy of the model as an appropriate representation of the repository system or its subsystems, which is a part of validation by definition. As noted by Eisenberg et al. (1987), the following issues must be addressed:

1. Are the repository system and its important subsystems described accurately enough in terms of geometry and physical parameters?

2. Are the internal operating conditions (temperature, pressure, etc.) and external states of nature adequately described for the repository and its important subsystems?

3. Are the physicochemical processes that are important in determining system performance identified for the repository and its important subsystems?

The following number is for OCRWM Records Management purposes only and should not be used when ordering this publication.

Accession Number: HQO.881201.0002